




UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



THE GIFT OF
MAY TREAT MORRISON
IN MEMORY OF
ALEXANDER F MORRISON

THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA



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THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

BY
A. W. KINGLAKE

CHEAPER EDITION

VOL. III.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCM I

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214
K592
1901
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BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

CHAPTER I.

I.

FOR an army undertaking to withstand the march of invaders who come along the shore from the north, the position on the left bank of the Alma is happily formed by nature, and is capable of being made strong. The river springs from the mountain-range in the south-east of the peninsula, and its tortuous channel, resulting at last in a westerly course, brings it down to the sea near the headland called Cape Loukool. In that region the right or northern bank of the stream inclines with a very gentle slope to the water's edge; but on the south or left bank, the river presses close against a great range of hills; and the rocky acclivities at their base have been so visibly scarped by the action of the river in its swollen state, that they almost afford a measure of the loud, red torrent thrown down in flood-times from the sides of the Tchatir Dagh. Yet,

CHAP
I.

Position on
the Alma.

CHAP.

I.

so long as it flows in its summer bed, the pure, grey stream of the Alma, though strong and rapid even then, can be crossed in most places by a full-grown man without losing foot. There are, however, some deeps which would force a man to swim a few strokes; and, on the other hand, the river is passed in several places by easy and frequented fords. Near the village of Bourliouk, at the time of the action, there was a good timber bridge.

Along the course of the stream, on the north or right bank, there is a broad belt of gardens and vineyards fenced round by low stone walls, and reaching down to the water; but on the left or south side there are few enclosures, for in most places the rock formation, which marks the left bank of the river, has its base so close down to the water's edge as to leave but little soil deep enough for culture.

The smooth slopes by which the invader from the north approaches the Alma are contrasted by the aspect of the country on the opposite bank of the river; for there, the field is so broken up into hills and valleys,—into steep acclivities and narrow ravines—into jutting knolls and winding gullies,—that with the labouring power of a Russian army, and the resources of Sebastopol at his command, a skilled engineer would have found it hard to exhaust his contrivances for the defence of a ground having all this strength of feature.

It is the high land nearest to the shore which

falls most abruptly : for when a man turns his back to the sea, and rides up along the river's bank, the summits of the hills on his right recede from him more and more—recede so far that, although they are higher than the hills near the shore, they are connected with the banks of the stream by slopes more gently inclining.

The main features of the ground are these : first and nearest to the sea-shore there is what may be called the 'West Cliff'—for the ground there rises to a height of some 350 feet, and not only presents, looking west, a bluff buttress of rock to the sea, but on its northern front also rises up so abruptly that a man going eastward along the bank of the stream has at first an almost sheer precipice on his right hand ; and it is only when he all but reaches the village of Almatamack that he finds the cliff losing its steepness. At that point, the ground becomes so much less precipitous, and is besides so broken, as to be no longer difficult of ascent for a man on foot, nor even impracticable for country waggons. In rear—Russian rear—of the cliff there are the villages of Hadji-Boulat, Ulukul Tiouets, and Ulukul Akles.

Higher up the river, but joined on to the West Cliff, there is a height, which was crowned at the time of the war by an unfinished turret intended for a telegraph. This is the Telegraph Height. At their top, the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height form one connected plateau or table-land ; but the sides of the Telegraph Height have not

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I.

the abrupt character which marks the West Cliff. They are steep, but both towards the river and towards the east they are much broken up into knolls, ridges, hollows, and gullies. At all points they can be ascended by a man on foot, and at some by waggons. These steep sides of the Telegraph Height are divided from the river by a low and almost flat ledge with a varying breadth of from two to six hundred yards. The ledge was a good deal wooded at the time of the war, and on some parts of it there were vineyards or orchards.

To the east of the Telegraph Height the trending away of the hills leaves a hollow or recess, so formed and so placed that its surface might be likened to a huge vine-leaf—a vine-leaf placed on a gentle incline, with its lower edge on the river, its stem at the bridge, and its main fibre following the course of the great road which bends up over the hill towards Sebastopol. This opening in the hills is the main Pass; and through it (as might be gathered from what has just been said) the Causeway or great post-road goes up, after crossing the bridge.* At right-angles to the line of the Pass, and crossing it at a distance of a few yards from the bridge, there are small natural mounds or risings of ground, having their tops at a height of about sixty feet above the level of the river. These are so ranged as to form, one with

* In speaking of this opening as a 'Pass,' I have followed the example of one whom I regard as a great master of the diction applicable to military subjects; but it is not, of course, meant that there is anything at all Alpine in the character of this range of low hills—hills less than 400 feet high.

the other, a low and uneven but almost continuous embankment, running from east to west, and parallel with the river. The natural rampart thus formed controls the entrance to the Pass from the north; for it not only overlooks the bridge, but also commands the ground far and wide on both sides of the river, and on both sides of the great road. Behind, the ground falls and then rises again, till it mingles with the slopes and the many knolls and hillocks which connect it with the receding flanks of the Telegraph Height on the one side, and the Kourganè Hill on the other.

Still higher up the river, but receding from it in a south-easterly direction, the ground rises gradually to a commanding height, and terminates in a peak. This hill is the key of the position.* It is called the Kourganè Hill. Around its slopes, at a distance of about three hundred yards from the river, the ground so swells out as to form a strong rib—a rib which bends round the front

* This assertion was denied by a commentator in the 'Quarterly Review,' who professed to write with military knowledge. It may therefore be well to give here the following extract from Lord Raglan's published despatch: 'The high pinnacle and ridge before alluded to *was the key of the position*, and, consequently, there the greatest preparations had been made for defence.'—*Published Despatch of the 23d September 1854*. Probably no living man is a better judge of what is the true 'key' of a position than Sir John Burgoyne. Now, I have before me a manuscript in his handwriting, which he wrote at the time, and whilst he was still on the banks of the Alma. In that paper he says: 'The high pinnacle and ridge on the 'right' [he is speaking of the Russian right, and of the Kourganè Hill] *was the key of the position if attacked in front.*'—*Note to 4th Edition*.

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I.

and the flanks of the bastion there built by nature, giving a command towards the south-west, the west, the north-west, and the north-east. Towards the west, this terrace, if so it may be called, is all but joined to those mounds which we spoke of as barring the entrance of the Pass. Behind all these natural ramparts there are hollows and dips in the ground, which give ample means for concealing and sheltering troops; but from the jutting rib down to the bank of the river, the slope is gentle and smooth like the glacis of a fortress. It was on this Kourganè Hill that Prince Menschikoff established his headquarters.

The immediate approach to the river from its right bank is everywhere gentle, but the ground on its south side is a good deal scarped by the action of the water; and all along that part of the river which flows opposite to the Kourganè Hill and the main Pass, the left bank rises almost vertically from the water's edge to a height of from eight to fifteen feet.

On the north bank of the river, and at a distance of about a mile from its mouth, there is the village of Almatamack. On the same bank, but more than a mile and a quarter higher up the stream, there stood at the time of the war a large white homestead. Yet a mile higher up the river on the same bank, and nearly facing the entrance of the Pass, there stands the large straggling village of Bourliouk. The cottages and farm-buildings which skirt this village on its eastern side extend far up the river. From Bourliouk to

the easternmost part of the position the distance is two miles. CHAP.
I.

To ascend the position from the north there are several frequented ways:—

1. Close to the sea and to the mouth of the river, there is a singular fissure in the rock through which there bends a path leading up to the top of the cliff.

2. From the ford at the village of Almata-mack there is a waggon-road which leads up to the top of the plateau. It was difficult but still practicable for artillery.

3. From the white homestead there is a road which crosses the river and goes up to the plateau; but, either owing to the want of a good ford, or else to the ruggedness of the ascent beyond it, this road could not be used for artillery. The want of a road for their guns in this part of the field was a circumstance which grievously hampered the advance of the French army.

4. On the western side of the village of Bourliouk there is a frequented ford across the river, and from that spot two waggon-roads, forking off at no great distance from one another, lead up to the Telegraph and the villages in its rear. The westernmost of these roads was found to be practicable for artillery.

5. Opposite to Bourliouk two almost parallel waggon-roads lead up from the bank of the river to the top of the plateau.

6. The Great Causeway, or post-road leading from Eupatoria, goes through the eastern skirts of

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I.

Bourliouk, there crosses the bridge, then enters the Pass, and ascends by a gentle incline towards the low chain of mounds higher up. After piercing that natural rampart, it bends into the southerly course which leads it to Sebastopol.

7. To the east of the main Pass there were other roads leading up from the banks of the river; but they need not be specially designated, because, even where no road existed, the hill-side in this part of the field was accessible to the march of artillery.

Except at the West Cliff, every part of the position can be reached by men on foot.

In the rear—Russian rear—of the hills which form this position, the ground falls, and it rises again at a distance of two miles.

Down to the edge of the vineyards, the whole of the field on the north or right bank of the river is ground tempting to cavalry; and although the south side of the stream is marked, as we saw, by stronger features, still the summits of the heights spread out broad, like English ‘Downs.’ Except the sheer sides of the Cliff, and the steeps of the Telegraph Height, there is little on the higher ground to obstruct the manœuvres of horsemen.

From the sea-shore to the easternmost spot occupied by Russian troops, the distance for a man going straight was nearly five miles and a half; but if he were to go all the way on the Russian bank of the river he would have to pass over more ground; for the Alma here makes a strong bend,

and leaves open the chord of the arc to invaders who come from the north.*

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I.

II.

Against any plan for occupying the whole of this range of hills by the forces of the Czar there were two cogent reasons: for the summits of the West Cliff, and even of part of the Telegraph Height, were exposed to fire from the ships, and the ground was too wide for the numbers that could be brought to defend it.

But the whole of the naval and military resources of the Crimea had been entrusted to the direction of Prince Mentschikoff. With him it rested to make head against the invasion; and it seems he had been so forcibly struck with the great apparent steepness of the West Cliff and the heights connected with it, that he thought it must be wholly inaccessible to troops. He conceived, therefore, that he might safely omit to occupy it, and might be content to take up a comparatively narrow position, beginning on the eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and termi-

Mentschi-
koff's plan
for availing
himself of
the position

* See the maps at the end of the volume. I am aware that in distances, and in other material points, this description of the position differs widely from the result of the hasty surveys which were made soon after the battle, by English officers. The French Government plans bear such strong marks of having been made with great care and labour, that, in general, I have ventured to take them for my guide in preference to those of my own countrymen.

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I.

nating on the west of the Telegraph Height at a distance of two miles from the sea. In that way he thought he might elude both of the objections above stated; for his extreme left would be comparatively distant from the shipping, and the whole ground occupied would be so far contracted that the troops which he had at his command might suffice to hold it. Upon this plan he acted. So, although the position of the Alma, as formed by nature, had an extent of more than five miles, the troops which stood charged to hold it had a front of only one league. Prince Mentschikoff's resolve was based upon an assumption that the whole of the ground which he proposed to leave unoccupied was inaccessible to troops; but if he had walked his horse into the waggon-track, which was within half a mile of his extreme left, he would have found that it led down to a ford opposite to the village of Almatamack, and that, although it is true very steep, the road could still be ascended by artillery. His army had been on the ground for several days, yet, with a strange carelessness, he not only omitted to break up or to guard this road from Almatamack, but based all his dispositions upon the apparent belief that the natural strength of the ground secured him against any hostile approach attempted in that part of the field.

His forces.

The forces brought forward to defend this position for the Czar were 16 squadrons of regular cavalry, besides 11 sotnias of Cossacks, with 44 battalions of infantry supported by 10 bat-

teries;* and, unless there be some grave source of error in computations long accepted as sound, these bodies comprised altogether a strength of 39,000 (of whom 3600 were horsemen), with as many as 96 guns.†

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I.

Prince Mentschikoff commanded in person. He was a wayward, presumptuous man, and his bearing towards the generals under his command was of such a kind that he did not or could not strengthen himself by the counsels of men abler than himself.‡ In times past, he had been mutilated by a round-shot from a Turkish gun. He bore hatred against the Ottoman race; he bore hatred against their faith. He had opened his mission at the Porte with insult; he had closed it with threats. And now—a sequence rare in the lives of modern statesmen—he was out on a hill-side, with horse and foot, having warrant—full warrant this time—to adduce ‘the last reason of kings.’

His personal position.

So far as regards the general scheme of the

* General Todleben puts the number of battalions at 42½ instead of 44; but except as regards that small difference (which I deal with elsewhere) his conclusion as to the number of squadrons, sotnias, battalions, and guns is exactly the same as the one above stated.

† See No. II. of the Appendix. General Todleben puts the cavalry at 3600, in accordance with this statement; but, as regards the computation resulting in the sum above stated, he differs very widely indeed, and therefore it is that I have resorted to the carefully qualified, and even conditional, language above appearing. The subject will be found fully treated in No. I. of the Appendix.

‡ I infer this from the fact that, the day before the action, General Kiriakoff, an officer of high reputation, was attempting indirect methods of calling Prince Mentschikoff's attention to the defectiveness of his arrangements.—*Kiriakoff's Statement.*

CHAP.
I.His plan of
campaign.

campaign, his conception, it seems, was this: he would suffer the Allies to land without molestation, because he desired that the defeat which he was preparing for them should be, not a mere repulse, but a crushing and signal disaster. He would not attack them on their line of march, because he liked better to husband his strength for the great position on the Alma. It seemed to him that there he could hold his ground against the invaders for three weeks; and his imagination was that, baffled for many days by the strength of his position, drawing their supplies from the ships with pain and uncertainty, and encumbered more and more every day with wounded men, the Allies would fall into evil days. In the mean time, the troops long since despatched from Bessarabia would begin to reach him by way of Perekop and Simpheropol; and thus reinforced, he would in due season take the offensive, inflicting upon the Western Powers a chastisement commensurate with their rashness.

His reliance
on the
natural
strength of
the position.

Prince Mentschikoff rested this structure of hope upon the assumption that he could hold the position on the Alma for at the least many days together, and against repeated assaults. Yet he took little pains to prepare the ground for a great defence.* On the jutting rib which goes round the front of the Kourganè Hill, at a distance of

* I say this in the teeth of the English despatches, and, I fear, of many written and oral statements from officers; but I am sure that every engineer who saw the ground will support my assertion.

about 300 yards from the river, he threw up a breastwork—a work of a very slight kind, presenting no physical obstacle to the advance of troops, but sufficiently extended to be capable of receiving the twelve heavy guns with which he armed it.* This work, on the day of the battle, was called by our people the ‘Great Redoubt.’† Prince Mentschikoff was delighted with it. ‘Is not this a grand thing?’ said he to General Kiriakoff the day before the action; ‘see, it will do mischief both ways.’ And he then pointed out how, whilst the face of the redoubt commanded the smooth slope beneath it, the guns at the shoulder of the work would throw their fire across the great road on either side of the bridge.

CHAP.
I.

The means
he took for
strengthen-
ing it.

* In speaking of this field-work, one of the Reviewers expressed a belief ‘that its armament consisted of six or eight, not guns of ‘position, but field-guns and howitzers.’ As to the number of the guns, I rely upon Prince Gortschakoff himself, as well as upon General de Todleben, p. 173. And in proof that they were ‘guns of position’ I say that the two of them which were captured by our army are now at Woolwich, and have been duly measured. The report from Woolwich says:— ‘The calibres of the guns taken at the Alma were as follow:—

Brass shot-gun, . . .	4.82 inches.
„ howitzer, . . .	6.12 „

† The work was formed by cutting a shallow trench and throwing up the earth in front of it. In calling this and the other entrenchment ‘redoubts,’ I follow the language very generally used by our officers on the day of the battle; but they were open towards the rear, and therefore, of course, the use of the term in its *special sense* would be inaccurate. The word, however (like some others, as, *e.g.*, the word ‘ship’), has a *general*, as well as a *special*, meaning, and, accordingly, St Arnaud, in his official despatch, calls these works ‘redontes.’ Sir Colin Campbell, in his despatch, also calls the greater of the two works a ‘redoubt.’

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I.

On the same hill, but higher up and more to his right, the Prince threw up another slight breastwork, which he armed with a battery of field-guns. This was the Lesser Redoubt.

The vineyards at some points were marked and cleared so as to give full effect to the action of the artillery; but except the two redoubts, no field-works were constructed by the Russian General. Wilful and confident, he was content to rest mainly upon the natural strength of the ground, the valour of his troops, and the faith that he had in his own prowess as a commander. He even omitted, as we have seen, to break up or to guard the waggon-road which led up from Almatamack to the left of his position. The Prince did not attempt to occupy the West Cliff; but some days before the action, a battalion * supported by half a battery had been placed overlooking the sea in the village of Ulukul Akles, in order, as was said, to 'catch marauders,' or to prevent a descent from the sea in the rear of the Russian army; and the detachment remained in that part of the field until the time when the battle began.

Disposi-
tion of his
troops.

On the ledge which divided the river from the steep broken side of the Telegraph Height Prince Mentschikoff placed four Militia † battalions, and

* The No. 2 battalion of Minsk.

† I adopt this inaccurate term as the best I can find to describe these semi-regular troops, because to call them, as the Russians do, 'reserve battalions,' would tend to confuse, by suggesting the idea of 'reserves' in the ordinary sense. I thought at one time I might have called them 'dépôt battal-

supported them by three battalions of regular infantry,* placed only a hundred and fifty yards in their rear, and by a fourth battalion† drawn up in a neighbouring ravine.‡ Further still in rear, he held in hand, as a reserve for his left wing, the four battalions of the ‘Moscow’ corps which had joined him that morning.§ At the commencement of the action, these thirteen battalions, with one or two companies of the 6th Rifles, and a ten-gun battery of artillery,|| were the only forces occupying the part of the position then about to be assailed by the French. They formed the left wing of the Russian army, and were commanded by General Kiriakoff.

Forces
originally
posted in
the part of
the position
assailed by
the French:

In this western part of the position the ground at the time of the battle had not been strengthened by field-works.

In the main Pass, facing the bridge, and destined to confront the 2d Division of the English army, Prince Mentschikoff placed four battalions of light infantry,¶ with also some portion of the

‘ions,’ but upon the whole it seemed to me that the term ‘militia’ would be less likely to convey a wrong notion than the term ‘depôt.’ They are troops regarded as very inferior in quality to troops of the line. The four battalions which I call ‘militia’ were the ‘reserve’ battalions of the 13th Division.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

* Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the Taroutine corps.—*Ibid.*

† The No. 1 battalion of the same corps.—*Ibid.*

‡ Chodasiewicz.

§ The battalions of the Moscow corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz.*

|| Viz., the No. 4 battery of the 17th brigade of artillery.—*Todleben*, p. 177.

¶ The four battalions of the Borodino corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz, Todleben.*

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I.

Forces
originally
posted in
the part of
the position
assailed by
the English.

6th Rifles ; * and some of these troops had orders to advance and skirmish in the vineyards. Near the bridge, and with materials in readiness for destroying it, there was posted a battalion of sappers and miners.† Astride the great road, and disposed along the chain of hillocks which runs across the Pass looking down on the bridge, there were planted the sixteen pieces of field-artillery which are here termed ‘the Causeway batteries,’‡ whilst eight other guns placed further eastward connected the defences here ranged with those of the Kourganè Hill.§ The force in this part of the field formed the centre of the Russian line of battle, and was practically under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff,|| who also, however, commanded the whole of the enemy’s right wing.

The right wing of the Russian army was the force destined to confront, first our Light Division, and then the Guards and the Highlanders. It was posted on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Here was the Great Redoubt, armed with its

* *Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz, Todleben.*

† Anitchkoff speaks of this body as a whole battalion, but General de Todleben calls it only a half battalion.

‡ Prince Gortschakoff says that the Causeway guns were eighteen in number.

§ The 24 guns above mentioned were furnished by the two 12-gun Light batteries, Nos. 1 and 2 of the 16th Artillery brigade.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz, Todleben.*

|| The Borodino corps formed part of General Kiriakoff’s command ; but the nature of the ground and the course which the action took prevented him from having it in his actual control ; and Gortschakoff was the General to whom the corps had to look for guidance.

twelve heavy guns;* and Prince Mentschikoff was so unsparing of efforts to defend this part of the ground, that he gathered, on the slopes of the hill, a force of no less than sixteen battalions of regular infantry,† besides the two battalions of sailors,‡ and in addition to the twelve guns last mentioned, four batteries of field-artillery.§ The right of the forces on the Kourganè Hill rested on a slope to the east of the Lesser Redoubt,|| whilst their left touched those other defences which barred, as we saw, the great road. Twelve of the battalions of regular infantry were posted on the flanks of the Great Redoubt; whilst the other four battalions, drawn up in one massive column, were held as a reserve for the right wing on the higher slope of the hill. One of the field-

* No. 1 12-gun battery of position, 16th Artillery Brigade.—*Totleben.*

† The four battalions of the Kazan, or Prince Michael's corps, the four battalions of the Vladimir corps, the four battalions of the Sousdal corps, and the four battalions of the Uglitz corps.—*Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz, Totleben.*

‡ Chodasiewicz. Anitchkoff calls this force a half battalion only; and Totleben speaks of it as *one* battalion; but Chodasiewicz saw the two battalions in march with their four guns, and I accept his statement, for he was an admirably accurate observer. Before the action began these seamen were thrown forward as skirmishers, and endeavoured to operate in the vineyards which belt the right bank of the river, but were afterwards withdrawn to the Kourganè Hill.

§ Two of the 14th Artillery Brigade, and two of the Don Cossack Batteries. The five batteries altogether numbered 44 guns.—*Totleben.*

|| From the Lesser Redoubt there were only fired five guns at the time when the Highlanders advanced; but it is believed that the three additional guns requisite to complete the battery were in the work at the beginning of the action.

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I.

batteries armed the Lesser Redoubt, another was on the high ground commanding and supporting the Great Redoubt, and two were held in reserve.* Though subordinated to Prince Gortschakoff, General Kvetzinski was in immediate command of the troops in this part of the field.

Formation
of the
Russian
infantry.

As regards the formation of the Russian infantry in this and other parts of the field, it may be said, speaking generally, that those battalions which operated in the immediate rear of the skirmishers were broken up into columns of companies, whilst the battalions supporting them stood massed in columns of attack.

On his extreme right, and posted at intervals along a curve drawn from his right front to his centre rear, Prince Mentschikoff placed his sixteen squadrons of regular cavalry and his eleven sotnias of Cossacks, making up altogether a force of 3600 horsemen.

Thus, then, it was to bar the Pass and the great road, to defend the Kourganè Hill and to cover his right flank, that the Russian General gathered his main strength; and this was the part of the field destined to be assailed by our troops. That portion of the Russian force which directly con-

*Although I necessarily gather the numbers and descriptions of these forces from Russian authorities, I draw much of my knowledge of the way in which they were disposed from the observation of our officers; and it should be observed that the above description, so far as concerns the cavalry, applies rather to the state of the field at the time when the battle was going on, than to the dispositions which Prince Mentschikoff may have made in the earlier part of the day.

fronted the English army, consisted of twenty-seven squadrons or sotnias of horse, with twenty-three battalions of infantry, besides the before-mentioned part of the 6th Rifles, and was supported by sixty-eight guns.*

But besides this force, Prince Mentschikoff, at the commencement of the action, had posted across the great road leading down to the bridge a force of seven battalions of infantry,† with two batteries‡ of artillery. These troops he called his ‘Great Reserve;’ and they were, in fact, his last.§ Yet he held them so closely in rear of the battalions facing the bridge, that they might be regarded as forces actually operating in support. Plainly this disposition of his troops was governed by a keen anxiety to defend the great road and the Kourganè Hill—for it was so ordered that, to sustain the struggle there, it would cost him but a few moments to bring his last reserves into action; and, in truth, he committed himself so

* *Totleben*, p. 178. Viz. :—

Causeway batteries,	.	.	.	16
Adjoining battery,	.	.	.	8
Kourganè do.,	.	.	.	44
				<hr/>
				68

† The four battalions of the Volhynia corps, and three battalions, Nos. 1, 3, 4, of the Minsk corps.—*Anitchkoff*, *Chodasiewicz*, *Totleben*.

‡ No. 5 light battery of the 17th brigade of Artillery, and the No. 12 troop of Horse-Artillery.—*Totleben*, p. 173.

§ The sixteen squadrons of regular cavalry were also considered as a part of this ‘Great Reserve;’ but, as we have seen, they did not remain posted on the same ground as the infantry reserve.

CHAP.
I.

Forces of
the Allies.

deeply to this, his favourite part of the battle-field, that, when he afterwards endeavoured to shift a portion of the Great Reserves towards his left, he was unable to make their strength tell.

The forces with which the Allied commanders prepared to assail this position were thus composed: There were some 30,000 French infantry and artillerymen,* with sixty-eight guns; and, added to this force, under the command of the Marshal St Arnaud, was the division of 7000 Turkish infantry.† With Lord Raglan, and present under arms, there was a force of fully 1000 cavalry, 25,000‡ infantry and artillerymen, and sixty pieces of field-artillery.§ In all, the Allied armies advancing upon the Alma comprised near 63,000 men and 128 guns.

St Arnaud, with his 37,000 infantry and artillerymen and sixty-eight guns, and effectually supported by the fire of nine war-steamers,|| was destined to confront at the commencement of the

* 'Précis Historique,' pp. 101, 102, which gives 30,204 as the total, but that is a computation of the force embarked; and, since cholera was prevailing, the deductions from strength between the 7th and the 20th of the month must have brought the numbers below 30,000.

† Ibid.

‡ Or, speaking more closely, 24,400. The 'morning state' which I have before me is of the 18th September, and it gives as present under arms (without including the cavalry, of which there was no 'state') a total of 26,004 officers and men, and, deducting the 1600 men detached under Colonel Torrens, there remained 24,404 infantry and artillerymen.

§ The official 'state' prepared for Lord Raglan gives two troops of horse-artillery, and only seven batteries, but it omits the battery attached to the 4th Division.

|| Official despatch of Admiral Hamelin.

action much less than one-third part of the Russian force;* whilst much more than the other two-thirds of it was left to the care of the English. St Arnaud, with his Frenchmen alone, was to his then confronting adversaries in a proportion not very far differing from that of three to one; and the 7000 Turks that he also commanded increased yet further his great numerical preponderance, whilst, moreover, of guns he had sixty-eight to ten. Lord Raglan, on the other hand, was upon the whole fairly matched by his appointed antagonists in numbers of men and guns;† but the distinguishing characteristic of the task that awaited him was this:—he had to attack troops entrenched, and entrenched too upon very strong ground.

The heights about to be invaded by the French presented grave physical obstacles to their advance, but the greater part of them were undefended by troops, and had nowhere been strengthened by field-works. The ground attacked by the English did not oppose great physical obstacles to the advance of the assailants, but it had been entrenched, and, besides, was so formed by nature as to give great destructive power, and, by consequence, great strength, to an enemy defending it with the resources of modern warfare.‡ The

The tasks
undertaken
by the
French and
the English
respectively

* The proportion changed afterwards, as will be by-and-by shown.

† In the Appendix No. II., the proportions are shown with more particularity; and the two last footnotes annexed to the Table there given show the changes that those proportions underwent in the course of the action.

‡ In these days, mere inert physical obstacles are commonly

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I.

French were covered and supported on their right by the sea and the ships; on their left, by the English army. The English were covered on their right by the French, but they marched with their left flank quite bare. The French advanced upon heights well surveyed from the sea. Except in an imperfect way from maps, the English knew nothing of the ground before them. No deserters, no spies had come in.

III.

Late in the evening of the 19th, Marshal St Arnaud, attended by Colonel Trochu, rode up to the little post-house on the Bulganak in which Lord Raglan had established his quarters. He came to concert a plan of attack for the following day.

Conference
the night
before the
battle be-
tween St
Arnaud
and Lord
Raglan.

From on board their ships the French had long been busily engaged in surveying the enemy's position, and by this time they had gathered a good deal of knowledge of that part of the ground which lies near the sea-shore. They had ascertained, or found means of inferring, that the stream was fordable at its mouth, and they moreover assured themselves that, at the time of their last observations, the West Cliff was not occupied in strength by the enemy. Upon these important discoveries overcome or eluded; and the security of the defender depends not in general upon those geographical features which would make access difficult for travellers, but rather upon such a conformation of ground as will give him the means of doing harm to his assailants.

CHAP.
I.The French
plan.

Marshal St Arnaud based his plan of attack. He proposed that the war-steamers, closing in as nearly as was practicable, should move parallel with the land-forces, and a little in advance; that, under cover of their fire, a portion of the French force should advance along the shore and seize the West Cliff; and that this movement should be followed up by a resolute, vigorous, and unremitting attack upon the enemy's left flank and left front.* M. St Arnaud was at this time free from pain; and, knowing that now, at last, he had an enemy in his front, and that a great conflict was near at hand, he seemed to be fired with a more than healthy energy. Sometimes in English, sometimes in the rapid words of his own tongue, and always with vehement gesture, he laboured to show how sure it was that the attack from his right centre would be fierce, unrelenting, decisive. Lord Raglan, cast in another mould, sat quiet, with governed features, restraining—or only, perhaps, postponing—his smiles, listening graciously, assenting, or not dissenting, putting forward no plan of his own, and, in short, eluding discussion. This method, perhaps, was instinctive with him; but, in his intercourse with the French, he followed it deliberately and upon system. He never forgot that to keep good our relations with the French was his great duty; and, studying how best to

The part
taken by
Lord Rag-
lan at the
conference.

* The plan was like that of the great Frederick at Leuthen, but with the difference that the force advancing to turn the enemy's left was to be covered and supported by fire from the shipping.

CHAP.
I.

avert the danger of misunderstandings, he had already made it his maxim that there was hardly any danger so great as the danger of controversy. Whether in any even small degree the English General had been brought to share the opinion entertained of M. St Arnaud in the French capital and in the French army, the world will never know. Of a certainty, Lord Raglan dealt as though he held it to be a clear gain to be able to avoid entrusting the Marshal with a knowledge of what our army would be likely to undertake; but my belief is that this, his seemingly guarded method, was not so much based upon anything which may have come to his ears from Paris or from the French camp, but rather upon his desire to ward off controversy, and upon his true native English dislike of all premature planning. He was so sure of his troops, and so conscious of his own power to act swiftly when the occasion might come, that, although he was now within half a march of the enemy's assembled forces, he did not at all long to ruffle his mind with projects—with projects for the attack of a position not hitherto reconnoitred.

M. St Arnaud's plan of turning the enemy's left was to be executed by the French army, with the aid of the shipping; and the part which the English land-forces should take in the action was a matter distinct. But for this, also, the French commander and his military counsellors had carefully taken thought.

To illustrate the operations which he proposed,

M. St Arnaud produced a rough map,—a map slightly and rapidly drawn, yet traced with that spirit and significance which are characteristic of French military sketches. In this sketch Bosquet's Division and the Turkish troops were represented as effecting the turning movement on the enemy's left; and the 1st and 3d French Divisions were shown to be so deployed, and so placed, that, in the order of attack assigned to them by the sketch, they would confront almost the whole face of the enemy's position, leaving only one or two battalions to be dealt with in front by the English troops.* So, to find some occupation for the English, the sketch represented our army as filing away obliquely, in order to turn the enemy's right flank. Of course this plan rested entirely upon the assumption that the enemy's front would be fully occupied (as represented in the sketch) by the French attack.

Lord Raglan's experience or instinct told him that no such plan as this could go for much until the assailing forces should come to measure their line with that of the enemy. So, without either combating or accepting the suggestion addressed to him, he simply assured the Marshal that he might rely upon the vigorous co-operation of the

CHAP.
I.

French plan
for the
operations of
the English
army.

* See the fac-simile of this plan, taken from the 'Pièces Officielles,' published by the French Government.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

My justification for saying (in the corner of the plan) that it was '*untruly* stated to have been accepted by Lord Raglan,' will be found in succeeding pages, and in particular at pp. 259, 276, 277.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

CHAP.
I.

British army. The French plan seems to have made little impression on Lord Raglan's mind. He foresaw, perhaps, that the ingenuity of the evening would be brought to nothingness by the teachings of the morrow.

St Arnaud's
demeanour.

Whilst the French Marshal was striving, in his vehement way, to convey an idea of the vigour with which he would conduct the attack, his appointed adviser, Colonel Trochu, whose mission it was to moderate the fire of his chief, thought it right to interpose with a question of a practical kind—a question as to the time and place for relieving the French soldiers of their packs. Instantly, if so one may speak, St Arnaud reared, for Trochu had touched him with the curb, and in the presence, too, of Lord Raglan. He angrily suppressed the question of the packs as one of mere detail. Yet, on the afternoon of the morrow, that question of the packs was destined to recur, and to govern the movements of the whole French army.

Before the Marshal and Lord Raglan parted, it was agreed that Bosquet with his Division should advance at five o'clock in the morning, and that, two hours later, the rest of the Allied forces should begin their march upon the enemy's position.

Result of
the confer-
ence.

This determination as to the time for marching was almost the only fruit which St Arnaud drew from the interview. He had thought to engage his colleague in the plan contrived for the guidance of the English at the French headquarters; but when he came to be in the presence of the

English General, he unconsciously yielded, as other men commonly did, to the spell of his personal ascendancy; and although he showed the sketch, and may have uttered, perhaps, a few hurried words to explain its meaning, he did not effectually bring himself to proffer advice to Lord Raglan. Either he altogether omitted the intended counsel, or else he so slurred it over as not to win for it any grave notice from even the most careful of listeners.

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I.

When the conference ended, Lord Raglan came out with his guests to the door of the hut. M. St Arnaud mounted his horse, and was elate; but he was elate, not with the knowledge of having achieved a purpose, but rather, it would seem, from the sense of that singular comfort which anxious men always derived from the mere power of Lord Raglan's presence. Perhaps, when the Marshal reached his quarters, he began to see that, after all, there was a gulf between him and the English General, and that, notwithstanding his energy and boldness, he had been unaccountably hindered from passing it.

IV.

It had been determined that the troops should get under arms without bugle or drum.

March of
the Allies

Silently, therefore, on the morning of the 20th of September 1854, the men of the Allied armies rose from their bivouac, and made ready for the march which was to bring them into the presence

CHAP
I.

Causes de-
laying the
march of
the English
army.

of the enemy. It was so early as half-past five that Bosquet, with the 2d French Division and the Turkish battalions, began his march along the coast; and at seven o'clock the main body of the French army was under arms and ready to march. But the position taken up by the English for the defence of the Allied armies on the Bulganak had imposed upon Lord Raglan the necessity of showing a front towards the east; and for the Divisions so employed a long and toilsome evolution was needed in order to bring them into the general order of march.* At that time too, there was a broad interval between our extreme right and Prince Napoleon's Division. Moreover, the line of the coast which the armies were to follow trended away towards the south-west, forming an obtuse angle with the course of the stream (the Bulganak) on which the Allies had bivouacked; and in the movement requisite for adjusting the front of the Allied forces to the direction of the shore, the English, marching upon the exterior arc, had to undergo more labour than those who moved near the pivot on which the variation of front was effected.†

This was not all. The baggage-train accom-

* Those divisions had been posted nearly at right angles to the front line, and the segment in which the troops would have to wheel in order to get into the line of march would be nearly 90 degrees.

† Several military reports and documents explain this, but the plan prepared by the French Government shows with admirable clearness the nature of the evolution which the English army had to perform. See the plan, No. 4, 'Invasion of the 'Crimea,' vol. ii. of Cabinet Edition.

panying our forces, though small in comparison with the encumbrances usually attending an army in the field, was large as compared with that of the French; and Lord Raglan (whose favourite anxiety was concerning his reserve ammunition) refused to allow the convoy to be stripped of protection. The oblique movement of the troops towards their right was tending to leave the convoy uncovered; and in order that it should be again enfolded, as in the previous day's order of march, it was necessary to move it far towards our right. Lord Raglan insisted that this should be done; so on the morning of the long-expected battle, and with the enemy in front, St Arnaud and the whole French army, and the English army too, chafed bitterly at the delay they had to endure whilst strings of bullock-carts were slowly dragged westward into the true line of march. Besides, the enemy's cavalry gave the English no leave to examine the ground towards which they were marching; and whilst the French, being next to the sea, could make straight for the cliff already reconnoitred from the ships, the English army advanced without knowledge of that part of the position which it was to confront, and was twice compelled to make laborious changes in the direction of its march. Therefore, for much of the delay which occurred there were good reasons; but not for all. Sir George Brown had been directed on the night of the 19th to advance on the morrow at seven o'clock, and he imagined—it is strange if he, of all men, with his great knowledge

CHAP.
I.

of such things, was wrong upon a point of military usage—he imagined that the order would be repeated in the morning, and he waited accordingly. Also the English troops moved slowly. Time was growing to be of high worth, and from causes which justified a good deal, though not quite all, of their delay, the English at this time were behindhand.

In order that the operations of the day might be adjusted to the time which the English army required, orders were sent forward suspending for a while the advance of Bosquet's column; and at nine o'clock the main body of the French army came to a halt, and cooked their coffee. Whilst they rested, our troops, by moving obliquely towards their right, were slowly overcoming the distance which divided them from the French left, and were at the same time working their way through the angle which measured their divergence from the line of march.

Of those composing an armed force there are few who understand the hindrances which block its progress; and naturally the French were vexed by the delay which seemed to be caused by the slowness of the English army. They, however, conformed with great care to the tardiness of our advance, and even allowed our army to gain upon them; for when the Allies reached the ground which sloped down towards the Alma, the heads of our leading columns were abreast of the French skirmishers.*

* Lord Raglan was amongst those who observed this fact, and he stated it in a letter which is before me.

Meanwhile the Allied steamers had been seeking opportunities for bringing their guns to bear, and at twenty minutes past ten they opened fire.*

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I.

One or two of their missiles, though at a very long range, reached some of those Russian battalions which stood posted in rear of the Telegraph.

At half-past eleven o'clock the English right had got into direct contact with the French left, and our Light and 2d Divisions were marching in the same alignment as the 1st and 3d Divisions of our French Allies.

V.

Twice again there were protracted halts. The last of these took place at a distance of about a mile and a half from the banks of the Alma. From the spot where the forces were halted the ground sloped gently down to the river's side ;

The last
halt of the
Allies before
the battle.

* Private MS. by Mr Romaine, the Judge-Advocate. I may here say generally, to avoid repeated notes, that, whenever in my account of this battle I speak of an event as happening at a time stated with exactness, I do so on the authority of Romaine. He was a man so gifted with long sight, as well as with power of estimating numbers, and, though a civilian, was so thoroughly apt for military business, that Lord Raglan used at a later time to call him 'the eye of the army.' During the action he rode an old hunter, steady enough to allow him to write without quitting his saddle : so, whenever he observed a change in the progress of the action, he took out his watch and pocket-book and made at the minute the memoranda on which I rely. I am, therefore, very certain that the spaces of time intervening between any two events spoken of in this precise way were exactly those which I give ; but I have reason to think that the watches of men in the different camps had been differently set.

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I.

and though some men lay prostrate under the burning sun, with little thought except of fatigue, there were others who keenly scanned the ground before them, well knowing that now at last the long-expected conflict would begin. They could make out the course of the river from the dark belt of gardens and vineyards which marked its banks; and men with good eyes could descry a slight seam running across a rising-ground beyond the river, and could see, too, some dark squares or oblongs, encroaching like small patches of culture upon the broad downs. The seam was the Great Redoubt; the square-looking marks that stained the green sides of the hills were an army in order of battle.

That 20th of September on the Alma was like some remembered day of June in England, for the sun was unclouded, and the soft breeze of the morning had lulled to a breath at noontide, and was creeping faintly along the hills. It was then that in the Allied armies there occurred a singular pause of sound—a pause so general as to have been observed and remembered by many in remote parts of the ground, and so marked that its interruption by the mere neighing of an angry horse seized the attention of thousands; and although this strange silence was the mere result of weariness and chance, it seemed to carry a meaning; for it was now that, after near forty years of peace, the great nations of Europe were once more meeting for battle.

Even after the sailing of the expedition, the

troops had been followed by reports that the war, after all, would be stayed; and the long, frequent halts, and the quiet of the armies on the sunny slope, seemed to harmonise with the idea of disbelief in the coming of the long-promised fight. But in the midst of this repose Sir Colin Campbell said to one of his officers, 'This will be a good time for the men to get loose half their cartridges;'* and when the command travelled on along the ranks of the Highlanders, it lit up the faces of the men one after another, assuring them that now at length, and after long expectance, they indeed would go into action. They began obeying the order, and with beaming joy, for they came of a warlike race; yet not without emotion of a graver kind—they were young soldiers, new to battle.

VI.

Lord Raglan now crossed the front of Prince Napoleon's Division in order to meet Marshal St Arnaud, whose guidon was seen coming towards our lines.† The two commanders rode forward

Meeting
between M
St Arnaud
and Lord
Raglan

* The cartridges are delivered to each man in a packet, and, to avoid loss of time in presence of the enemy, a sufficient number should be 'shaken loose' before the troops are brought into action.

† They had met before at about half-past nine, but the Russian cavalry had not then quitted the heights, and they were obliged to postpone their reconnoissance.

When the Marshal got near, he was cheered by the English soldiery. Pleased with the compliment, he lifted his hat, and said (speaking in English and with only a slight accent)—'Hurrah for Old England!'

CHAP. together, inclining towards their left. No one
I. was with them. They rode on till they came to
one of those mounds or tumuli, of which there
were many on the steppe. From that spot they
scrutinised the enemy's position with their field-
glasses.

At this interview no change was made in that portion of the plan which determined that the French should turn the enemy's left; but the part to be taken by the English was still in question, and St Arnaud threw out or revived the idea of a flank movement by the English on the enemy's right.* Lord Raglan, however, now gazed upon the real ground which the French counsellors of the night before had striven to scan in their imaginations, and, having an eye for country, he must have begun to see the truth. He must have begun to see that the French, hugging the sea-shore, and pouring two-fifths of their whole force against the undefended part of the opposite heights, would not only fail to confront the whole Russian army in the way promised by the sketch, but would in reality confront only a small portion of it, leaving to the English the duty of facing the enemy along two-thirds of their whole front. Of a certainty he did not entertain for a moment the idea of making a flank attack, but it was not according to his nature to explain to men their errors, and it seems he spoke so little that St Arnaud did not yet know what the English General would do;* but presently, Sir George

* Inferred from what follows.

Brown rode up and joined the two chiefs. Then the Marshal, closing his telescope, turned to Lord Raglan and asked him 'whether he would turn the position or attack it in front?' Lord Raglan's answer was to the effect, that, 'with such a body of cavalry as the enemy had in the plain, he would not attempt to turn the position.' *

Whilst the chiefs were still side by side, it being now one o'clock, the advance sounded along the lines, and the French and the English armies moved forward close abreast. The Marshal then rode off towards his centre.

VII.

The orders for the advance were sent forward to Bosquet; and, as soon as they reached him, he threw out skirmishers and moved forward in two columns. His right column was the brigade commanded by General Bouat; the left column was Autemarre's brigade. Moving with its regiments in column at section distance, each brigade was followed by its share of the artillery belonging to the Division; and Bouat's brigade was followed by the whole of the Turkish Division except two battalions. Towards Bosquet's left, but far in his rear, there moved forward the 1st Division under

Bosquet's
advance.

He divides
his force.

* This—heard and recorded in writing by Sir George Brown—disposes of the notion which seems to have been really entertained by many of the French—the notion that Lord Raglan stood engaged to turn the enemy's right.

CHAP.
I.

Canrobert, and the 3d Division under Prince Napoleon. These two divisions advanced in the same alignment. The 4th Division, under General Forey, marched in rear of the 1st and 3d Divisions, and two Turkish battalions escorted the baggage.

Disposition
of the main
body of
the French
army.

The formation of Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions was upon two lines. The first brigade of each division was in front and deployed into a line of columns, whilst the second brigade of each division followed the first brigade, and was massed with the regiments in column at section distance.

The 4th French Division marched in the same order as the 1st and 3d Divisions, except that its leading brigade was not deployed. The artillery of each division was enfolded between its two brigades.

Of the Eng-
lish army.

On the immediate left of the French, Sir De Lacy Evans advanced with his 2d Division; and being close alongside of Prince Napoleon's troops, he caused his own men to adopt a similar order of march. He was followed by Sir Richard England with our 3d Division in column. The batteries belonging to each of these divisions marched on its right or inner flank.

Immediately on Sir De Lacy's left, the Light Division, preceded by Colonel Lawrence with a wing of the 2d Rifle battalion in skirmishing order, moved forward under Sir George Brown.* The

* In former Editions I was led into the mistake of substituting the name of Major Norcott for that of Colonel Lawrence, by

Division was in double column of companies from the centre, and had the front and left flank covered by riflemen in extended order. It was supported by the 1st Division under the Duke of Cambridge, and that in turn was followed by the 4th Division* under Sir George Cathcart. Sir George Cathcart, however, in accordance with a suggestion made by himself, was authorised to take ground to his left, and place his force in échelon to the 1st Division. The head of his column was abreast of the rear companies of the 1st Division.

The three great infantry columns thus composing the left wing of our army were covered

what I must call the erroneous wording of Sir George Brown's Report to Lord Raglan. I say 'erroneous,' because, though Sir George Brown does not, in terms, deny that the right wing of the 2d battalion of Rifles was fighting in front of his Division, he suppresses all mention of its achievements, and this in a despatch which gives a prominent place to the operations of the left wing under Major Norcott. In excuse for the error into which I was led by trusting too implicitly to Sir George Brown's Report, I may say that Lord Raglan also trusted to it, and was obviously misled by it into the adoption of the same mistake ; for although we now know that Lawrence and the men of the right wing were among the foremost of those who stormed the redoubt, Lord Raglan—seeing no mention of this in Sir George Brown's Report, and observing that Sir George specially spoke of Major Norcott's wing as taking part with the 23d Regiment in the capture of the redoubt—was induced to speak of the aid given by Major Norcott and the left wing of the Rifles, without speaking at all of the right wing, which was also taking a foremost part in the storming of the redoubt, under the orders of Colonel Lawrence.

* Minus the 63d and some companies of the 46th, left under the command of General Torrens at the place of disembarkation. The force actually with Sir George Cathcart during the action consisted of the 20th, 21st, and 57th Regiments, the 1st battalion of Rifles, and Townsend's battery.

CHAP.
I.

in front, left flank, and rear, by riflemen in extended order, and by the cavalry. The battery belonging to each division marched on its right or inner flank.

But Colonel Lawrence with his riflemen soon got on so far in advance as to provoke a fire from the Russian skirmishers then swarming in the vineyards below, and some rifle-balls shot from that quarter came dropping into the ground near the column formed by the Light Division. Almost at the same moment, the artillerymen on the Russian heights began to try their range; and although the air was so clear that our men could see and watch the flight of the cannon-balls, it seemed prudent for our leading divisions to go into line. Those divisions, therefore, were halted, and their deployment immediately began.

The leading Divisions of the English army deploy into line.

In deploying, Sir De Lacy Evans, being pressed upon by Prince Napoleon's Division on his right, was compelled to take ground to his left, and to encroach upon a part of the space which Sir George Brown had expected to occupy with his Division.

The Light Division not on its right ground.

The deployment of the Light Division was effected by each regiment with beautiful precision,* but, unhappily, the Division was not on its right ground.

Sir George Brown was near-sighted, and had

* The deployment was upon the two centre companies of the division. Whilst the movement was proceeding, one man, a sergeant, was killed by a rifle-ball. This was probably the first death in our lines.

not accustomed himself to repair the defect, as some commanders have done, by a constant and well-practised use of glasses; and, on the other hand, the very fire and energy of his nature, and his almost violent sense of duty, prevented him from getting into the habit of trusting to the eyes of other men. For hours in the early morning the Division had been wearied by having to incline towards its right. At half-past eleven the effort was reversed, and the Division then laboured to take ground to its left; but in that last direction it had not taken ground enough. Lord Raglan, with his quick eye, had seen the fault, and sent an order* to have it corrected. Not content with this, he soon after rode up to the Division, and, failing to see Sir George Brown at the moment, told Codrington that the Division must take more ground to the left. Then, unhappily, when he had uttered the very words which would have thrown the British army into its true array, and averted much evil, Lord Raglan was checked by his ruling foible. He had already sent the order to the divisional general, and he could not bear to pain or embarrass him by pressing the execution of it upon one of his brigadiers; so he recalled his wholesome words.† The Division failed to take ground enough to the left; and when the deployment was complete, Sir George Brown had the grief of seeing his right

* Colonel Lysons carried it.

† I derive my knowledge from an officer who heard Lord Raglan's words.

CHAP.
I.

regiment (the 7th, the Royal Fusiliers) overlapped by the left—nay, even by the centre—of Pennefather's brigade.* The fault was not retrieved, and we shall see it embarrassing the dispositions that had to be made for advancing in order of battle.

The artillery attached to our two leading divisions was now also drawn up in line, and Sir George Brown reckoned that he alone showed a front extending to nearly a mile.

At the same time, the Duke of Cambridge, at Sir George Brown's request, altered the formation of his Division by distributing it into a line of contiguous quarter-distance columns.

The march
continued.

These changes having been completed, the English army resumed its march; and the leading divisions coming more closely within range, and being a little galled by the enemy's fire, Sir George Brown halted, and tried the experiment of wheeling into open column. Afterwards, however, he returned to the line-formation, and in that order continued his advance.†

VIII.

So now the whole Allied armies, hiding nothing

* When the deployment took place, the 7th, the Royal Fusiliers, were in rear of the 95th Regiment; and they afterwards, as will be seen, marched through it.

† My knowledge respecting the movements and evolutions of our infantry divisions is derived mainly from original MSS. in my possession, written by Sir George Brown, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, and Sir George Cathcart.

of their splendour and their strength, descended slowly into the valley; and the ground on the right bank of the river is so even and so gentle in its slope, and on the left bank so commanding, that every man of the invaders could be seen from the opposite heights.

CHAP.
I.

The Russian officers had been accustomed all their days to military inspections and vast reviews, but they now saw before them that very thing for the confronting of which their lives had been one long rehearsal. They saw a European army coming down in order of battle—an army arrayed in no spirit of mimicry and not at all meant to aid their endless study of tactics, but honestly marching against them, with a mind to carry their heights and take their lives. And gazing with keen and critical eyes upon this array of strangers, whose homes were in lands far away, they looked upon a phenomenon which raised their curiosity and their wonder, and which promised, too, to throw some new light on a notion they had lately been forming.

Spectacle
presented to
the Russians
by the ad-
vance of the
Allies

The whole anxiety of Prince Mentschikoff had been for his right. If he could hold the main Pass, and scare the Allies from all endeavour to turn his right flank, he believed himself safe; and it had been clear long ago that his conflict in this part of the field would be with the English. It was therefore the more useful to try to spread amongst the Russian troops an idea that the English, all-powerful at sea, were thoroughly worthless as soldiers.

CHAP.
I.

Notion
which the
Russian
soldiers had
been taught
to entertain
of the Eng-
lish army.

The working of this little cheat had been hitherto aided by circumstance. With the force under Mentschikoff there were two battalions of Russian seamen—men belonging to those valiant crews of the Black Sea fleet which were destined to maintain the glory of the Russian arms in the bitterest hours of trial, when the land-forces seemed to desert them—but partly from their want of precision in manœuvring, partly from their sailor-like whims, and partly, no doubt, from the mere fact of their being a small and peculiar minority, they had become a standing subject of merriment to the rest of the troops. The Russian soldiery, therefore, were prepared to receive tales assuring them that the bodies of red-coats now discernible in the distance were, all of them, battalions of sailors, against whom they might well have their laugh as they had at their own naval comrades. This idea had fastened so well upon the mind of the Russian army, that before the battle began, it was shared by some of the more illiterate of the officers, and even, it was said, in one instance by a general of division.

Surprise at
the sight of
the English
array.

But the sight now watched with keen eyes from the enemy's heights was one which seemed to have some bearing upon the rumour that the English were powerless in a land engagement. The French and the Turks were in the deep, crowded masses which every soldier of the Czar had been accustomed to look upon as the formations needed for battle; but, to the astonishment

of the Russian officers, the leading divisions of the men in red were massed in no sort of column, and were clearly seen coming on in a slender line—a line only two deep, yet extending far from east to west. They could not believe that with so fine a thread as that the English General was really intending to confront their massive columns.* Yet the English troops had no idea that their formation was so singular as to be strange in the eyes of military Europe. Wars long past had taught them that they were gifted with the power of fighting in this order, and it was as a matter of course that, upon coming within range, they had gone at once into line.

Meanwhile, the war-steamers—eight French and one English—had pushed forward along the shore in single file, moving somewhat in advance of the land-forces; and now, at twenty-five minutes past one o'clock, the leading vessels opened fire against the four guns at the village of Ulukul Akles, and again tried the skill of their gunners upon the distant masses of infantry which occupied the Telegraph Height and the low flat ledge at its base. This last part of the cannonade from the ships was followed by a change of no small moment in the Russian front of battle.

Fire from
the ship-
ping:

Convinced that his chief had been guilty of a grievous error in placing the Taroutine and the militia battalions on this low narrow ledge, General Kiriakoff, who commanded in this part of the field, had tried by indirect means to pro-

followed by
a retrograde
movement
of Russian
troops con-
fronting the
French.

* Chodasiewicz.

CHAP.
I.

cure a change of plan, but had not ventured to say anything on the subject to Prince Mentschikoff himself. It is plain, however, that Kiriakoff's opinion, getting abroad, was adopted by the officers of these two corps; for first, the militia battalions, and then the battalions of the Taroutine corps, without orders, and without having been assailed or touched (except perhaps by a chance shot or two at very long range from the shipping), began a retrograde movement, and slowly ascended the steep hill till they gained a more commanding position at no great distance from the Telegraph. No effort was made to check this seemingly spontaneous movement.*

IX.

Half-past
one o'clock.
Cannonade
directed
against the
English line.

At half-past one o'clock a round-shot from the opposite heights came ripping the ground near Lord Raglan, and it marked the opening of the battle between the contending land-forces; for thenceforth, the enemy's fire was continuous. He directed a steady cannonade against the English line. At first no one fell; but presently an artilleryman riding in front of his gun bent forward his head, handled the reins with a convulsive grasp, and then, uttering a loud inarticulate sound, fell dead. The general peace of

* General Kiriakoff's statement, confirmed by Romaine, who observed and noted the movement. The General thought the change of position requisite; but he admits that a retrograde movement of this kind, just before the commencement of the battle, was a grave evil.

Europe had continued so long, that to many men the sight was a new one; and of the young soldiers who stood near, some imagined that their comrade had fallen down in a sudden fit; for they hardly yet knew that for the most part, in modern warfare, death comes as though sent by blind chance, no one knows from whence or from whom.

Since the enemy's artillery fire had now become brisk, our leading infantry divisions were halted, and the men ordered to lie down. Soon afterwards, it was found that the 1st Division had also come within range, and it was then forthwith thrown into line. In preparing for this manœuvre, the Duke of Cambridge took care that ground should not be wanting. Both on his right and on his left he took more ground than had been occupied by the division which marched in his front. Whilst the Light Division in his front was jammed in and entangled with the 2d Division, the Duke had the happiness of seeing his Guards and Highlanders well extended, and competent to act along the whole length of that superb line. The effect of this deployment was, that the extreme right of the Duke's line became a force operating in support of the 2d Division, and that a part of his Highland Brigade, reaching much further eastward than the extreme left of the Light Division, became in that part of the field the true front of the British line. When this manœuvre was completed, the men of the 1st Division lay down.

CHAP.
I.

Men of our leading divisions ordered to lie down.

The First Division deployed into line.

CHAP.

I.

Sir Richard
England
ordered to
support the
Guards.

Observing the extent of ground occupied by the first Division, Lord Raglan at once saw that the 3d Division would not have room to manœuvre in the same alignment with the Duke of Cambridge. He therefore ordered Sir Richard England to support the Guards. It was this, or some other order sent nearly at the same time, which, for some reason, good or fanciful, Lord Raglan chose to have carried quietly. The directions had been given, and the aide-de-camp was whirling round his charger, in order to take a swift flight with the message, when Lord Raglan stopped him, and said, 'Go quietly; don't gallop.' He knew he was, so to speak, in the presence of Russian commanders, and seemed to like that whenever the enemy pointed a field-glass towards the English headquarters he should look upon a scene of tranquillity and leisure.

Our batteries tried their range, but without effect, and they ceased to fire, reserving their strength for the time when they would come to close quarters.

The batteries on the Telegraph Height did not yet open fire upon the French columns.

Lord Raglan conceived that the operation determined upon by the French ought to take full effect before he engaged the English army in an assault upon the enemy's heights; and perhaps, if the whole body of the Allies had been one people under the command of one general, their advance would have been effected in échelon, with the left held back for some time, whilst the

effort on the right was in progress ; but the pride of nations must sometimes be suffered to deflect the course of armies ; and although there was no military value in any of the ground north of the vineyards, Lord Raglan, it seems, did not like to withhold his infantry whilst the French were executing their forward movement. Since our soldiers lay facing downwards upon the smooth slope which looked against the enemy's batteries, they were seen, every man of them, from head to foot, by the Russian artillerymen, and they drew upon themselves a studious fire from apparently about thirty guns.

Thus the first trial our men underwent in the action was a trial of passive, enduring courage. They had to lie down, with no duty to perform, except the duty of being motionless ; and they made it their pastime to watch the play of the engines worked for their destruction—to watch the jet of smoke—the flash—the short, momentous interval—and then, happily and most often, the twang through the air above, and the welcome sound of the shot at length imbedded in the earth. But sometimes, without knowing whence it came, a man would suddenly know the feel of a rushing blast and a mighty shock, and would find himself bespattered with the brains of the comrade who had just been speaking to him. When this happened, two of the comrades of the man killed would get up and gently lift the quivering body, carry it a few paces in rear of the line, then quietly return to their ranks, and again lie

Fire under
gone by our
men whilst
lying down

CHAP.
I.

down.* This sort of trial is well borne by our troops. They are so framed by nature, that, if only they know clearly what they have to do, or to leave undone, they are pleased and animated, nay, even soothed, by a little danger. For, besides that they love strife, they love the arbitrament of chance; and a game where death is the forfeit has a strange, gloomy charm for them. Among the guns ranged on the opposite heights to take his life a man would single out his favourite, and make it feminine for the sake of endearment. There was hardly perhaps a gun in the Great Redoubt which failed to be called by some corrupt variation of 'Mary' or 'Elizabeth.' It was plain that our infantry could be in a kindly humour whilst lying down under fire. They did not perhaps like the duty so well as an animating charge with the bayonet; but if they were to be judged from their demeanour, they preferred it to a church parade. They were in their most gracious temper. Often, when an officer rode past them, they would give him the fruit of their steady and protracted view, and advise him to move a little on one side or the other to avoid a coming shot. And this the men would do, though they themselves, however well their quickened sight might warn them of the coming shot, lay riveted to the earth by duty.

* Casualties of this sort were going on here and there along our line, but the exact incident described in the text was observed in the 30th Regiment.

X.

The recumbent posture of our infantry threw into strong prominence the figure of every mounted man who rode along their lines ; but the group of horsemen composing or following the Headquarter Staff was so marked by the white flowing plumes of the officers, that at a distance of a mile and a half it was a conspicuous object to the naked eye ; and a Russian artilleryman at the Causeway batteries could make out, with a common field-glass, that of the two or three officers generally riding abreast at the head of the plumed cavalcade, there was one, in a dark blue frock, whose right arm hung ending in an empty sleeve. In truth, Lord Raglan, at this time, was so often standing still, or else was riding along the line of our prostrate infantry at so leisurely a pace, that he and the group about him could not fail to become a mark for the Russian artillery. The enemy did not, as it seemed, begin this effort malignantly ; and at first, perhaps, he had no further thought than that of subjecting the English Headquarters to an ordinary cannonade, and forcing them to choose a more retired ground for their surveys.

Still, as might be expected, the Russian artillerymen could not easily brook the conclusion that, whilst the English General chose to remain under their eyes and within range, it was beyond the power of their skill to bend him from his path, or even, as it seemed, to break the thread

CHAP.
I.

Cannonade directed against Lord Raglan and his staff.

CHAP. of his conversation ; so, at length growing ear-
I.
— nest, they opened fire upon the group from a
great number of guns—but in vain, for none of
the Staff at this time were struck. Failing with
round-shot, the enemy tried shells—shells with
the fuses so cut as to burst them in the air a lit-
tle above the white plumes. This method was
tried so industriously and with so much skill,
that a few feet over the heads of Lord Raglan
and those around him there was kept up for a
long time an almost constant bursting of shells.
Sometimes the missiles came singly, and some-
times in so thick a flight that several would be
exploding nearly at the same moment, or briskly
one after the other, right and left, and all around.
The fragments of the shells, when they burst, tore
their shrill way down from above, harshly sawing
the air ; and when the novice heard the rush of
the shattered missile along his right ear, and then
along his left, and imagined that he felt the wind
of another fragment of shell come rasping the
cloth on his shoulders almost at the same mo-
ment, it seemed to him hardly possible that the
iron shower would leave one man of the group
untouched. But the truth is, that a fragment of
shell rending the air with its jagged edges may
sound much nearer than it is. None of the Staff
were wounded at this time.

Some of the suite were half vexed and half
angry ; for they knew the value of their chief's
life, and they conceived that he was affronting
great risk without due motive, and from mere

inattention to danger. The storm of missiles generally fell most thickly when Lord Raglan happened to be riding near the great road; for the enemy, having got the range at that point, always laboured to make the bursting of his shells coincide with the moment when our Headquarters were passing. This soon came to be understood, and thenceforth, when the Headquarter group were going to cross the Causeway, they rode at it briskly, as at a leap, and spanned it with one or two strides, thus leaving the prepared storm of shells to burst a little behind them. This effort of the Russian artillery against Lord Raglan and the group surrounding him lasted a long time, and was carried on upon a scale better proportioned to the destruction of a whole division than to the mere object of warning off a score of horsemen. If the fire thus expended had been brought to bear on Pennefather's brigade, it might have maimed the English line in a vital part of the field.

XI.

The time was now come when the Allies could measure their front with the enemy's position. It will be remembered that the plan* proposed the night before by Marshal St Arnaud rested upon the assumption that the whole of the enemy's forces except two or three battalions would be confronted by the French army, and that, therefore, the only opportunity for important


The Allies
could now
measure
their front
with that of
the enemy :

* See the fac-simile.

CHAP.
I.

the bearing
this admea-
surement
had upon
the French
plan.

service which the English army could find would be that of making a great flank-movement against the enemy's right; but, there being by this time a certainty that no more than a moderate portion of the Russian army would be met by the French, it followed that by simply providing a line of battle with which to confront face to face the rest of the enemy's forces, Lord Raglan would secure for his troops an ample field of duty; and now that the invading armies had come within cannon-shot range, it began to be seen that the entire front presented by the 1st and 3d French Divisions, and by our 2d and Light Divisions, would be only just commensurate with the length of the position which the Russian commander was occupying.



The ground
which each
of the lead-
ing divisions
had to
assail.

Of course, therefore, if Lord Raglan had not already rejected the French plan of a flank attack by our forces, it would have now fallen to the ground. It had never made any impression on his mind.*

* I infer this from the fact that those with whom Lord Raglan was thoroughly confidential in such matters never heard him speak of it. Lord Raglan, as we saw, distinctly and finally rejected the plan at the close of his interview with St Arnaud. It became a plan simply preposterous as soon as it was apparent that St Arnaud would not confront any part of the Russian army except their left wing; for to make two

The Allies were now so close to the enemy's position that the General of each of the five leading divisions could form a judgment as to the particular sphere of action which awaited him. To Bosquet the advance against the West Cliff had long ago been assigned. Canrobert faced towards the White Homestead and those spurs of the Telegraph Height which lie towards the west. Prince Napoleon confronted the centre and the eastern steepes of the Telegraph Height. Sir De Lacy Evans with the 2d Division faced the village of Bourliouk; and it seemed at this time that his left would not reach further up the river's bank than the bridge, for Sir George Brown had been reckoning that his first or right brigade would be charged with the duty of attacking the enemy's position across the great road, and that it would be his left, or Buller's brigade, which would assail the Great Redoubt.

The Generals of the five leading Divisions were thus directing their forces, and already the swarms of skirmishers thrown forward by the French, and the thinner chains of riflemen in advance of our divisions, were drawing close to the vineyards, and beginning their combats with the enemy's

flank-movements, one against the enemy's left and the other against his right, and to do this without having any force wherewith to confront the enemy's centre, would have been a plan requiring no comment to show its absurdity. The French accounts, whether official or *quasi* official, have always persisted in saying that Lord Raglan had engaged, and afterwards failed to make, a movement on the enemy's right flank. This is the only reason why the matter requires anything like careful elucidation.

CHAP.
1.

The village
of Bourliouk
set on fire by
the enemy.

The effect
which this
measure had
in cramping
the English
line.

sharpshooters; but then, and with a suddenness so strange as to suggest the idea of some pyrotechnic contrivance, the whole village of Bourliouk, except the straggling houses which skirted it towards the east, became wrapped in tall flames.* No man could live in that conflagration; and the result was, that in one minute a third of the ground on which the English army had meant to operate was, as it were, blotted out of the field. If this firing of the village took place under the orders of the Russian commander it was the most sagacious of all the steps he took that day; for his gravest source of care was the want of troops sufficing for the whole extent of the position at which he grasped, and therefore an operation which took away a large part of the battlefield was of great advantage to him. Our infantry were immediately thrown into trouble. The Light Division, as we saw, did not take ground enough on the left, and the firing of the village now cut short our front on the right. Sir De Lacy Evans, thus robbed of space, was obliged to keep his second brigade in rear of the first, and even then he continued to overlap the right of the Light Division.

The smoke from the burning village was depressed and gently turned towards the bridge by

* General de Todleben says that the materials for burning the village had been previously collected; and besides the great number of haystacks, and the peculiar nature of the hay, were causes accounting for the extreme swiftness of the conflagration. The hay of that country is full of stiff prickly stems, which resist compression, and so leave ample room for air.

the faint breeze which came from the sea. There, for hours, in a long fallen pillar of cloud, it lay singularly firm and compact, obscuring the view of those who were near it, but not at all staining the air in any other part of the field.

CHAP.
I.

XII.

The operations of the great column entrusted to General Bosquet now began to take effect. Bosquet was a man in the prime of life. Ten years of struggle and frequent enterprise in Algeria had carried him from the rank of a lieutenant to the rank of a general officer ; * and he was charged on this day, not only with the command of his own—the 2d—Division, but with the command of the troops which formed the Turkish Contingent. The whole column under his orders numbered about 14,000 men. The Arabs and Kabyles of Algeria, though men of a fierce and brave nature, and prone to petty strife, are so wanting in the power of making war with effect, that, as far as concerns the art of fighting, they can scarcely be said to have given much schooling to the bold and skilful soldiery of France ; but the deserts, the broad solitudes, and the great mountain-ranges of Northern Africa, have inured the French army to some of those military toils which are next in worth to the business of the actual combat ; and for Bosquet, the hero of

General
Bosquet

* A brigadier ; and now, at the time of the Crimean war, he was a general of division.

CHAP.
I.

many a struggle in the passes of the Middle and the Lesser Atlas, it was no new problem to have to cross a stream and carry a body of troops to the summit of a hill with a steep-looking face.

In the morning, he had ridden forward escorted by a few Spahis, to reconnoitre the ground with his own eyes; and thus, and by the aid of the careful surveys effected by the naval men, he was able to assure himself, not only that the river could be passed at its bar, but that troops there crossing it would be likely to find the means of getting round and ascending to the summit of the cliff from the south-west. Examining also the face of the cliff further inland, he saw that the broken ground opposite to the village of Almatamack could be easily ascended by foot-soldiers; and he also, no doubt, perceived that the road leading up from the village (unless it should prove to have been effectually cut or guarded by the enemy) would give him a passage for his artillery. Upon these observations Bosquet based his plan. He resolved to march in person with Autemarre's brigade upon the village of Almatamack, there to cross the river, and afterwards endeavour to ascend the plateau at the point where the road from Almatamack goes up between the West Cliff and the Telegraph Height; but he ordered General Bouat, with his brigade and with the Turkish Contingent, to incline far away towards his right, to try to pass the river at its bar, and then to find the best means he could for getting his troops up the cliff.

His plan of
operations.

CHAP
I.

The two bodies of troops under Bosquet's command began their diverging movement at the same time ; and before two o'clock the swarms of skirmishers which covered the front of the columns were pushing their way through the village of Almatamack, and the vineyards on either side of it. A few moments more and they were firing with a briskness and vivacity which warmed the blood of the many thousands of hearers then new to war. One of our officers, kindling a little with the excitement thus roused, and impatient, perhaps, that the French should be in action before our people, could not help drawing Lord Raglan's attention to the firing on our right. But the stir of French skirmishers through thick ground was no new music to Lord Fitzroy Somerset ; rather, perhaps, it recalled him for a moment to old times in Estremadura and Castile, when, at the side of the great Wellesley, he learned the brisk ways of Napoleon's infantry. So, when the young officer said, 'The French, my lord, are warmly engaged,' Lord Raglan answered, 'Are they? I cannot catch any return-fire.' His practised ear had told him what we now know to be the truth. No troops were opposed to the advance of Bosquet's columns in this part of the field ; but it is the custom of French skirmishers, when they get into thick ground near an enemy, to be continually firing. They do this partly to show the chiefs behind them what progress they are making, and partly, it would seem, in order to give life and spirit to the field of battle.

Advance of
Autemarre
under Bos-
quet in
person.

CHAP.
I.

Advance of
the detached
force under
Bouat.

When General Bouat reached the bank of the river, he found that the bar of sand at its mouth made it possible for his men to keep good their footing against the waves flowing in from the sea; and in process of time, with all his infantry, including the Turkish battalions, he succeeded in gaining the left bank of the river. He could not, however, carry across his artillery, and he therefore sent it back with orders to follow the march of Autemarre's brigade.

When he reached the left bank of the river, Bouat found an opening in the cliff before him, which promised to give him means of ascent. Into this opening he threw some skirmishers, and these, encountering no enemy, were followed by the main body of the brigade, and by the Turkish battalions. Pursuing the course thus opened to him, Bouat slowly crept forward with his column, and wound his way up and round towards the summit of the cliff. But it was only by marching upon a very narrow front that he was able to effect this movement; and it was not until a late period of the action that he was able to show himself in force upon the plateau. Even then he was without artillery. The troops under his command had not an opportunity of engaging in any combat with the enemy because they marched upon that part of the heights which the Russian General had determined to leave unoccupied.

Further
advance of
Autemarre's
brigade.

Meanwhile Bosquet, marching in person with Autemarre's brigade, traversed the village of Almatamack, forded the river at ten minutes past two

o'clock, and immediately began to ascend the road leading up to the plateau. The road, he found, was uninjured, and guarded by no troops. His artillery began the ascent; and meanwhile the keen and active Zouaves, impatient of the winding road, climbed the heights by shorter and steeper paths, and so swiftly, that our sailors, looking from the ships (men accustomed to perpendicular racing), were loud in their praise of the briskness with which the Frenchmen rushed up and 'manned' the cliff. As yet, however, Bosquet had encountered no enemy.

It has been seen that the position taken up by Prince Mentschikoff fell short of the sea-shore by a distance of more than two miles, and that he was not in military occupation of the cliff, now ascended by Bosquet with Autemarre's brigade; but also it will be remembered that, at the village in rear of the cliff, called Ulukul Akles, there had been posted some days before one of the 'Minsk' battalions of infantry, with four pieces of light artillery, and that the detachment had there remained. These four guns were now brought out of the village, and after a time were placed in battery at a spot near the village of Ulukul Tiouets, and within range of the point where the Zouaves were beginning to crown the summit of the cliff. The 'Minsk' battalion at this time could not be discerned by the French; but, on the cliff overlooking the beach, there were seen a few squadrons of horse.

Guns
brought out
against him
from Ulukul
Akles.

As soon as a whole battalion of Zouaves had

CHAP.
I.

Bosquet,
after a
momentary
check, es-
tablishes
himself on
the cliff.

gained the summit, they were drawn up and formed on the plateau. No shot was as yet fired by the enemy; and General Bosquet, with his staff, ascended a tumulus or mound on the top of the cliff, in order to reconnoitre the ground.

Meanwhile, his artillery was coming up, and the first two of his guns had just reached the summit when one of the carriages broke down. This accident embarrassed the rest of the column, and whilst the hindrance lasted, the enemy opened fire from his four guns.* Coinciding as it did with the breaking down of the gun-carriage, this fire produced for the moment an ill effect upon the head of the French column, and one of its battalions fell back under the shelter of the acclivity. But this check did not last. The road blocked by the broken-down gun-carriage was quickly cleared, the guns were moved up rapidly, and swarms of skirmishers pressed up in all directions. Then the troops which were already on the summit moved forward, and lodged themselves upon a part of the plateau a little in advance of the steep by which they had ascended.†

Measures
taken by
Kiriakoff
upon ob-
serving Bos-
quet's turn-
ing move-
ment.

As soon as he began to hear guns in the direction of the West Cliff, Kiriakoff took from his reserves two of his 'Moscow' battalions, and posted them, the one low down and the other

* Half of the No. 4 battery of the 17th brigade of the Russian artillery.

† Sir Edward Colebrooke saw this operation from the deck of one of our ships of war, and describes it very well in his memorial. He was a skilful and very accurate observer of military movements.

higher up, on that part of the hill which looked down upon the White Homestead. He also brought up his artillery to the slopes of the Telegraph Height, placing some of the guns in battery with front towards the sea, so as to command, though at a long range, the part of the plateau which Bosquet crossed by the Hadji road. Kiria-koff did not take upon himself to make any other dispositions for dealing with the turning movement which threatened his left.

Amongst the French who were gaining the summit of the plateau, no one seems to have divined the reason why a little body of Russian horsemen should have made its appearance on the cliff overlooking the sea, nor why, without attempting hostile action, it had tenaciously clung to the ground. Those troopers were the attendants of a man in great trouble. They were the escort of Prince Mentschikoff.

CHAP
I.

Horsemen
on the cliff

XIII.

The enemy's survey of the allied armies had been so carelessly made, and had been so little directed towards the sea-shore, that Bosquet, it seems, had already got near to the river before his movement was perceived. Prince Mentschikoff, with Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski at his side, had been standing on the Kourganè Hill watching the advance of the English army, and giving bold orders for its reception; but presently he was told that a French division was advancing

The effect of
Bosquet's
turning
movement
upon the
mind of
Prince Mentschikoff.

CHAP. towards the unoccupied cliff on his extreme left.
I. At first, he was so shocked by the dislocation
which his ideas would have to undergo if his left flank were indeed to be turned, that he had no refuge for his confusion except in mere disbelief, and he angrily refused to give faith to the unwelcome tidings.* For days, he had been on the ground which he himself had chosen for the great struggle; but he was so certain that he had effectually learnt its character by glancing at its general features, that he had not, it seems, had the industry to ride over it, nor even to find out the roads by which the villagers were accustomed to ascend the heights with their waggons.

He seems to have imagined it to be impossible that ground so steep as the cliff had appeared to be could be ascended by troops at any point westward of the Telegraph Height; but when at length he was compelled to know that the French and the Turks were marching in force towards the mouth of the river, his mind underwent so great a revulsion, that, having hitherto taken no thought for his left, he now seemed to have no care for any other part of the position. In his place, a general, calm, skilful, and conscious of knowing the ground, might have seen the turning movement of the French and the Turks with unspeakable joy; but instead of tranquilly regarding the whole field of battle under the new aspect which was given to it by this manœuvre, he only laboured to see how best he could imitate the

* Chodasiewicz.

CHAP.
I.

mistake of his adversary—how best he could shift his strength to the distant unoccupied cliff which was threatened by Bosquet's advance. The nature of the ground enabled him to make lateral movements in his line without much fear of disturbance from the Allies; and as soon as he saw that the French were detaching two-fifths of their army in order to turn his flank, he wildly determined to engage a portion of his scanty force in a march from his right hand to his left—in a march which would take him far to the westward of his chosen ground. For this purpose he snatched two batteries from his great Reserve and also two from his right, gave orders that he was to be followed by the four 'Moscow' battalions which were the reserve of his left wing, and by the three 'Minsk' battalions which formed part of his 'Great Reserve,' and then with four squadrons of hussars rode off towards the sea.*

His measures for dealing with it. His flank march.

It was certain that a long time would elapse before the troops engaged in this vain journey could be expected to get into action with Bosquet; and, meanwhile, the power of the whole force engaged in the flank movement was neutralised. But that was not all. Prince Mentschikoff's mind was so strangely subverted by the sensation of having his left turned, that, although a long

Mentschikoff on the cliff.

* The batteries which Prince Mentschikoff thus drew from his Great Reserve were, the 10-gun light battery, No. 5, and the 8-gun troop of Horse-artillery, No. 12; whilst the two he took from his right were the two 8-gun Don Cossack batteries, one of which was a battery of position, the other a light battery.

CHAP.
I.

time must needs pass before he could be in force on the West Cliff, he yet could not endure to be personally absent from the ground to which he now fastened his thoughts. So when, with his Staff and the horsemen of his escort, he had got to the ground overlooking the sea, near the village of Ulukul Tiouets, and had seen the first groups of the Zouaves peering up on the crest of the hill, he still remained where he was. Whilst he sat in his saddle, the appearance of his escort drew fire from the shipping, and four of his suite were struck down; but the Prince would not move. It is likely that the fire assuaged the pain of his thoughts.

His batteries at length coming up, there begins a cannonade between his and Bosquet's artillery.

At this time, it would seem, he gave either no orders, or none of a kind supplying real guidance for his generals. Lingered upon the ground without troops at hand, he impotently watched the progress of Antemarre's brigade. His light batteries soon came up; but neither these nor the squadrons of Hussars which formed his escort were the best of implements for pushing back General Bosquet into the steep mountain-road by which he had ascended; and in the hands of Prince Mentschikoff they were simply powerless. However, his guns, when they came up, were placed in battery, and Bosquet's guns being now on the plateau, there began a cannonade at long range between the twelve guns of the French and the whole of the light artillery which Prince Mentschikoff had hurried into this part of the field. At the same time the French artillery drew

some shots from the distant guns which Kiriakoff had placed looking seaward on the Telegraph Height; and the annals of the French artillery record with pride that the twelve pieces which Bosquet brought up with him engaged and overpowered no less than forty of the enemy's guns. Nor is this statement altogether without something like a basis of truth, for the Russians had now thirty-six pieces of artillery on the West Cliff, or the Telegraph Height;* and though most of them at this time were so placed that their gunners could attempt some shots at a more or less long range against Bosquet's guns, the French artillerymen not only held their ground without having a gun disabled, but soon pushed forward their batteries to a more commanding part of the plateau.

Bosquet
maintains
himself.

By this time, the seven battalions of infantry which Prince Mentschikoff had been moving flank-wise were very near to the spot where their General had been eagerly awaiting them; but when at last, after agonies of impatience, he was about to have these troops in hand, the Prince seems to have come to the conclusion that, after all, he could do nothing in the part of the field to which he had dragged them. He was brought, perhaps, to this belief by seeing that the French and the Turks, who had been crossing the river at its mouth, were now beginning to show their strength towards the westernmost part

* They had that number even upon the supposition that the heavy 8-gun battery of the Don Cossacks had not yet come up.

CHAP.
I.

Mentschi-
koff counter-
marching.

of the cliff; for he may not have known that this force, being without artillery, could be easily prevented from advancing against his batteries on the open plateau. At all events, Prince Mentschikoff now thought it necessary to reverse his flank-movement, and to travel back towards his centre with all the forces which he had brought from thence to his left.

But when the Prince began this last counter-movement, he was already beginning to fall under the dominion of events in another part of the field.

Position of
Bosquet on
the cliff.

Bosquet now stood undisturbed on the part of the plateau which he had reached. But he was not without grounds for deep anxiety. It did not fall to his lot on that day to be engaged in any conflict except with the enemy's artillery; but, from the moment when he began to establish himself on the plateau until towards the close of the action, he was in a dangerously isolated position, for he had no troops around him except Autemarre's brigade; and, until the action was near its end, he got no effective support either from Bouat on his right or from Canrobert on his left.

XIV.


As soon as Marshal St Arnaud perceived that Bosquet would be able to gain the summit of the cliff, he tried to give him the support towards his left which his position, when he got established on the cliff, would deeply need; and he determined that the time was come for the immediate

advance of his 1st and 3d Divisions. Addressing General Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, and giving them the signal for the attack, he said, I am told, these words: 'With men such as you I have 'no orders to give. I have but to point to the 'enemy!'* Hitherto these two French divisions had been nearly in the same alignment as the leading divisions of the English army; but now that they were ordered forward, leaving the English army still halted, the true character of the movement to be undertaken by the Allies was for the first time developed. Their array was to be what tacticians call 'an order of 'battle in three échelons by the right, the first 'échelon making a turning movement.'†

CHAP.
I.

St Arnaud orders the advance of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon.

The order into which the Allies now fell.



This disposition for the attack was not the result of any agreement made in words between Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan. It resulted almost

Lord Raglan's conception of the part he had to take.

* I have this from an officer who assures me that he heard the words.

† 'Un ordre de bataille à trois échelons par la droite, le premier échelon attaquant par le flanc.' These are the words in which a staff officer present in the action, and very high in the French service, has described to me the advance of the Allies. See the diagram, a much better guide than mere words.

CHAP.
I.

naturally, if so one may speak, from Bosquet's turning movement, from the extent of the front which the enemy was now seen to present, and from the character of the ground. Just as the Marshal had kept back his 1st and 3d Divisions till he saw that Bosquet could gain the height, so Lord Raglan, according to his conception at this time, had to see whether Canrobert and Prince Napoleon could establish themselves upon the Telegraph Height, before he endangered the continuity of the order of battle by allowing the English army to advance.

Artillery
contest be-
tween the
Russian and
the French
batteries.

During the first forty minutes of the cannonade directed against the English infantry, there had been no corresponding fire upon the left of the French; but artillery missiles discharged from the Telegraph Heights, and passing over the heads of the Taroutine and the militia battalions, now began to molest the divisions which were led by Canrobert and Prince Napoleon.

On the other hand, the artillery belonging to the Divisions of Canrobert and Prince Napoleon came down to a convenient ground above the edge of the vineyards, and opened fire upon the columns of the 'militia' battalions, now posted much farther up than before on the opposite height. And with effect; for although the range did not admit of great slaughter, some men were struck, and the rest, though they did not yet move, began to be displeased with the ground on which they stood.*

* Chodasiewicz.

The swarms of skirmishers which the French threw forward went briskly into the cover, forded the river, and then made themselves at home in the broken ground at the foot of the Telegraph Height. When the soldier is upon service of this kind, his natural character, neutralised in general by organisation, is often seen to reassert itself. One man, prying eagerly forward, would labour to get shots at Russian sharpshooters still lingering near the river; another would sit down, take out his little store of food and drink, and be glad to engage with any one who passed him in something like cynical talk concerning the pastime of war. But, upon the whole, French skirmishers push on with great boldness and skill.

When the foremost ranks of Canrobert's massed battalions had entered the vineyards, each man got through as best he could, and rapidly crossed the river; and though, during part of the advance, the troops were under the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height, yet the nature of the acclivity before them was of such a kind that the further they advanced (provided the heads of the battalions did not show themselves on the plateau above the broken ground), the better they were covered from fire. And, except some lingering skirmishers, they had no infantry opposed to them at this time; for the two 'Moscow' battalions which Kiriakoff had sent down towards the ford of the White Homestead were now, it seems, made to take part in the marches and counter-marches which Mentschikoff was direct-

Canrobert's
advance
across the
river.

His troops
are sheltered
from fire by
the steep-
ness of the
hill-side.

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I.

ing in person, and there were then no other Russian columns in this part of the field.* So, when the head of Canrobert's Division gained the broken ground on the Russian side of the river, it was for the moment sheltered; but if it had then ascended above the broken ground so as to peer up over the crest and face the open plateau at the top, it would not only have come under the fire of artillery, but would have before it the four battalions of militiamen, supported by the four Taroutine battalions.

For an army advancing to the attack, a rim of sheltered ground on the verge of the enemy's position is of infinite use, because it enables the assailants to make without hurry their final arrangements for the assault; but to troops which are not propelled by the decisive order of some resolute commander, such shelter as that is sometimes a snare, because it tempts men to hang back. In such a situation the best troops will often abstain from going forward of their own accord; for it seems, to officers and men, that if

* There is some ground for supposing that the second 'Moscow' battalion was for a while forgotten, and that, not receiving in due time the order to rejoin the other battalions of the corps, it was left alone in the ravine till it found itself opposed to Canrobert's whole division. If this is the case, and if there resulted anything which could be called a combat between the Russian battalion and the French Division, the statement that Canrobert was not met by any troops except skirmishers would have to be qualified. The statement of Chodasiewicz on this point receives no support from Kiriakoff, and that is the reason why I have not adopted it. Chodasiewicz did not belong to the 'Moscow' corps.

they are to quit good shelter and go out into the storm, they ought, at the least, to know that the movement is one really intended, and is needful to the purpose of the battle. The duty of pressing forward to terminate the isolation of Bosquet rested primarily with the General of the 1st Division.

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I.

Duty attaching upon the commander of the 1st French Division.

General Canrobert was a man of whom great hopes were entertained. According to every test which could be applied by school and college examinations, he promised to be an accomplished general. To the military studies of his youth he had added the experience of many campaigns in Africa; and even in the French army, where brave men abound, his personal valour had become a subject of remark. He was so deeply trusted by his Emperor, that he had become the bearer of a then secret paper which was to put him at the head of the French army in the event of St Arnaud's death. He had the misfortune to have upon his hands the blood of the Parisians slain by his brigade on the 4th of December; but it was said, to his honour, that he, more than all the other generals employed at that time, had loathed the work of having to abet the midnight seizure of his country's foremost generals. His spirit, they say, had been broken by the pestilence which some few weeks before had come upon his Division in the country of the Danube; but the extremity of the grief to which he then gave way had so much to justify it in the appalling nature of the calamity which slew his troops, that it

General
Canrobert

CHAP.
I.

was not a conclusive proof of his being wanting in military composure. The most successful of respondents to school and college questions now had to undergo a new test. Commanding a fine French division, he had the head of his column close under a height occupied by the enemy, and this at a time when the isolated condition of a French brigade on his right seemed to make it a business of great moment for him to be able to bring support to his comrades.

His
dilemma.

But at the point where Canrobert faced the height he found it impracticable to drag up artillery, and he was obliged to send his guns all the way down to the village of Almatamack, in order that they might there ford the river and ascend to the top of the plateau by the road which Bosquet had taken. This operation could not but take a long time; and what Canrobert was now called upon to determine was, whether he would wait until his artillery had completed its circuitous and difficult journey or at once carry forward his infantry to the summit of the plateau and engage the battalions there posted. He determined to wait. The maxims of the French army discourage the idea of bringing infantry into action upon open ground without the support of artillery; and Canrobert did not, it seems, conceive that the predicament in which Bosquet stood was a circumstance which dispensed him from the observance of a general rule. So, whilst he was thus waiting for his artillery, he did not deem it right to push forward his battal-

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ions on the open plateau, but he brought the head of his Division to a point high up on the steep broken side of the hill, and extended it, in single and double battalion columns, on either side of the track by which he had ascended. He spread himself more towards his left than towards his right, and did not move any of his battalions in such a way as to be able to give a hand to Bosquet.

The course
he takes.

Prince Napoleon's Division hung back in the valley, and the bulk of it at this time was still on the north bank of the river.

Prince
Napoleon's
Division.

Although the head of Canrobert's Division, being under the heights on the Russian side of the river, was enjoying good shelter, the masses of troops which stood more towards the rear, including some of Canrobert's battalions and the great bulk of Prince Napoleon's Division, were exposed to the fire of the guns on the Telegraph Height. They suffered; and a feeling of discouragement began to spread.

Fire sus-
tained by
the rear-
ward por-
tions of
the French
columns.

Discourag-
ment.

Marshal St Arnaud had understood the gravity of the danger which would result from any delay in the advance of his centre, but to meet it he used an ill-chosen safeguard. The way to send help to Bosquet was to give Canrobert due warrant to move up at once upon the plateau, whether with or without his artillery.* What the Mar-

* If the objection to advancing on the plateau without artillery was, according to French ideas, insuperable, an effort, one would think, should have been made to push forward Prince Napoleon's Division. Prince Napoleon had in his front two roads leading up to the Telegraph, and one of these, at the least, was practicable (and was afterwards used) for artillery.

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I.

St Arnaud
pushes for-
ward his
reserves.

The ill
effect of
this measure
upon the
French
troops.

Their com-
plaint that
they were
being 'mas-
'sacred.'

Anxiety on
account of
Bosquet.

State of
the battle
at this time.

shal did, however, was to order up his reserves, sending one brigade of his 4th Division to follow the march of Bosquet, and the other to support Canrobert. This last measure was actually a source of weakness rather than of strength; for, as far as numbers were concerned, Canrobert and Prince Napoleon were already in more than ample strength. With two superb divisions, numbering some 15,000 men, and having Bosquet and Bouat on their right with many thousands more, they were advancing upon a very narrow front; and the bringing up of fresh troops augmented the masses who came under the fire of the guns without at all propelling the leading divisions. So the evil lasted and increased. Inaction in the midst of a battle is hateful to the brave, impetuous Frenchman, and inaction under fire is intolerable to him. The troops towards the rear of the columns, not having the close presence of the enemy to animate them, and being without that shelter from the Russian guns which was enjoyed by the leading battalions, became discontented and uneasy. It was then that there sprang up among the French troops the ill-omened complaint that they were being 'massacred.'

All this while, Bosquet was on the summit of the cliff with his one brigade; and his isolation, as we shall presently see, was becoming a source of great anxiety.

Minute after minute aides-de-camp were coming to Lord Raglan with these gloomy tidings; and, in truth, the action at this time was going on ill

for the Allies. The duty of crowning the West Cliff had been fulfilled with great spirit and despatch by a small body of men ; but the step had not been followed up. Bouat, filing slowly round near the sea with some nine thousand men, but without guns, was for the time annulled. Bosquet, with one brigade, stood halted upon the heights which he had climbed ; and though, happily, he had not been assailed by infantry, his advanced and isolated position had become a source of weakness to the Allies. Of the two French divisions charged with the duty of attacking the front and western flank of the Telegraph Hill, the one had its foremost battalions high up the steep and on the verge of the open ground at its top, whilst the other was all down in the valley ; but (although in different ways, and for different reasons) these divisions were both hanging back, and no French force had hitherto attacked any part of the ground held by the enemy's formed battalions. Meanwhile the batteries still swept the smooth approach to the table-land where the Telegraph stood, and not only kept it free of all assailants, but, pouring their fire over the heads of their own soldiery, were able to throw plunging shots into the midst of Prince Napoleon's Division.

All this while, the English army had been kept under the fire of the Russian artillery ; and although the men had been ordered to lie down, the ground, sloping towards the river, yielded no shelter, and many had been killed and wounded.

CHAP.
1.

At first, our batteries replied; but after a while it had been ascertained that the advantage the enemy had in his commanding ground was too great to be overcome, and the English artillery had ceased to fire. Lord Raglan asked why this was: 'I observe,' said he, 'the enemy's six-pound-ers amongst us; why cannot we send our nine-pounders amongst them?' But he was told that our fire had proved to be ineffectual, and that it was therefore discontinued. He seemed struck. Perhaps the answer which he had received became one of the grounds on which, a few minutes later, he resolved to change the face of the battle.

XV.

Opportunities offered to Mentschikoff.

For some time, the course of the action had been offering to the Russian General an opportunity of striking a great blow; and, circumstanced as he was, it would have been easier for him to gain a signal victory before three o'clock, than to stand on the defensive and hold his ground till sunset. The English forces, confronting as they did a position of great natural strength, and having their left on ground as open as a race-course, would have been hampered in every attempt to storm the Great Redoubt if their flank had been assiduously threatened, and now and then charged, by the enemy's powerful cavalry. Therefore, if Mentschikoff, checking the English forces by a vigorous use of his horsemen, had undertaken at this time such an advance

against Canrobert's Division as was afterwards successfully executed by Kiriakoff, he would have found the French battalions quite soft to his touch by reason of their want of artillery;* and Canrobert's retreat from the verge of the plateau would have occurred at a time when half the French army was so far from the true scene of conflict as to be unable to give the least help. Except by reckoning broadly upon the quality of the French and the British troops, or else upon the smiles of fortune, it is hard to see how the Allies could then have escaped a disaster.

But men move so blindly in the complex business of war, that often, very often, it is the enemy himself who is the best repairer of their faults.

It was so that day. During the precious hour in which the Russian forces might have wrought a way to great glory, their cavalry were suffered to remain in idleness, and the battalions which formed the instrument afterwards used for striking the blow were marching in vain from east to west and from west to east. The torpor and the false moves of the enemy countervailed the shortcomings of the Allies.

No combat of any moment was going on at this time. It is true that Colonel Lawrence with the right, and Major Norcott with the left wing of the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade, had gone into the vineyards in front† of our Light Division.

The battle
at this time
languished.

* I should not have ventured upon this sentence if it were not that I am warranted in doing so by what actually occurred a little later. See *post*.

† During the march, as was shown in a former note, Major

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I.

But everywhere else, the battle flagged. The men of our infantry divisions, though under artillery fire, still lay passive upon the ground. Our cavalry awaited orders; our artillery declined to fire without being able to strike; the Russian and the French still exchanged their fire at long range. No French battalion advanced above the broken ground, though, covering their front and the left flank of their trailing columns, swarms of skirmishers were alive. Of these some were firing to show where they were, some duelling with the Russian riflemen who yet remained in the valley; others ascended the knolls and vexed any Russians they saw with long, careful shots; others, again, sat down and contentedly took their rest.

This languishing of the battle seemed to promise ill for the Allies. They had undertaken to assault the enemy's left, and to that enterprise they stood committed, for they had drawn away from the real field of battle to the West Cliff some fourteen thousand men. Yet since the moment when Bosquet began to ascend the cliff, more than forty minutes had elapsed, and nothing had yet been done to win a result from his movement, nor even to give him that support which he very grievously wanted. Both from Bonat on his right and from Canrobert on his left he was divided by a wide tract of ground.

Hitherto, then, the operations planned and

Norcott had been on the flank of the Division; but when the battle opened, he began to operate in front of Buller's brigade.

—*Note to 4th Edition.*

undertaken by the French had not only done nothing towards carrying the position, but had even brought the Allies into danger.

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I.

The causes of the miscarriage were,—the physical obstructions which hindered both Bouat and Canrobert from bringing up their guns with them, and the stiffness of the objection which prevents French Generals from engaging their infantry on open ground without the support of artillery. According to the intended plan of operations, Bosquet, after gaining the cliff with his whole column of some 14,000 men, was to bring round his right shoulder in order to fall upon the flank of the Russians; and, simultaneously with his appearance on the plateau, a vigorous and resolute onslaught was to be made by the rest of the French army upon the front of the enemy's left wing. But Bosquet, as we saw, though he was personally present on the part of the plateau overhanging Almatamack, had only one brigade there; and whether he looked to Bouat on his right, or to Canrobert on his left, he looked in either case to a general who, though he had masses of infantry, was without artillery, and he therefore looked in vain. In such circumstances the utmost that Bosquet could be expected to do was to hold his ground,—and this he did.

Causes
which had
occasioned
the failure
of the
French
operations

XVI.

For an hour and a half the Allies had lain under fire without even beginning to assail the

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I.

enemy's formed battalions. The only ground gained was that occupied by Bosquet; but, Bosquet's achievement not having been followed up, his very success now threatened to bring disaster upon the Allies. When a French soldier is one of a body placed in a false position, he knows it, and comments on the fact; and the very force and vivacity of his nature make it difficult to keep him long upon ground to which he feels a scientific objection. A French aide-de-camp came in haste to Lord Raglan, and represented that unless something could be done to support or relieve Bosquet's column it would be 'compromised.'*

A desponding account of Bosquet's condition is brought to Lord Raglan.

* Exactly the same pressure had just been applied by the French Marshal to Sir De Lacy Evans. In his published letter of the 28th of June 1855, Evans writes: 'On the arrival of the '2d Division in front of the village of Bourliouk, which, having 'been prepared for conflagration by the Russians, became 'suddenly for some hundred yards an impenetrable blaze, 'Major Claremont came to me in great haste, to say from the 'Marshal, that a part of the French army, having ascended the 'heights on the south of the river, became threatened by large 'bodies of Russians, and might become compromised unless 'the attention of the enemy were immediately drawn away by 'pressing them in our front. I made instant dispositions to 'conform to this wish, sending at the same time, as was my 'duty, an officer of my Staff (Colonel Herbert) to Lord Raglan, 'who was then a short distance in our rear, for his Lordship's 'approval, which was instantly granted.' From the recurrence of the word 'compromised,' and from the coincidence in point of time, one is led to infer that the message given in the text and the message conveyed to Lord Raglan through General Evans may have been one and the same. There is nothing that I know of to interfere with this conclusion, if it be supposed that Major Claremont was accompanied by a French aide-de-camp, who rode first to General Evans, and from him to Lord Raglan.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

Gifted himself with the command of graceful diction, Lord Raglan was not without fastidious prejudices against particular forms of expression, and it chanced that he bore a singular hatred against the French word which we translate into 'compromised.' So he archly resolved to have the meaning of the word fully expanded into plain French, and he asked the aide-de-camp what would be the actual effect upon the brigade of its being 'compromised.'

The answer was, 'It will retreat.*'

Was it time for the English General to take the battle into his own hands?

So long as Bosquet, with Autemarre's brigade, stood isolated upon the cliff, and Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions remained hanging back in the vineyards and the broken ground below the Telegraph height, an advance of our forces would plainly distort the Allied line in a hazardous way; and Lord Raglan had watched for the moment when the development of the expected French attack on the Telegraph Height would warrant him in suffering our infantry to go forward.

But he had hitherto watched in vain; and, not knowing how long the causes of the French delay might continue to operate, he resolved to depart from the scheme of action which had hitherto governed him, and to precipitate the advance of the English forces. It is true that while Bosquet stood halted on the cliff, whilst Canrobert abstained from assailing the Telegraph

Lord Raglan resolves to precipitate the advance of the English army.

* 'Battre en retraite.'

CHAP.
I.

Grounds
tending to
cause, or
to justify,
the resolve.

Height, and whilst Prince Napoleon's Division was still low down in the valley, the advance of the English forces against the Causeway and the Kourganè Hill would ruin the symmetry of the plan which the French had contrived; and if Bosquet should be obliged to retreat at a time when the English were hotly engaged in an attack upon the enemy's heights, the whole array of the Allies would be brought into peril. But the timely incurring of dangers is proper to the business of war; and though the enemy had hitherto been torpid and indulgent, the cause of the Allies had fallen into such a plight, that a remedy which involved heavy risks might nevertheless be the right one. And, so far as concerned his understanding with the French, Lord Raglan was freed from all care; for he had been already assured that Marshal St Arnaud anxiously desired him to advance; and one aide-de-camp, as we have seen, had told him plainly that nothing less than a diversion by the English forces would prevent General Bosquet from retreating.

A man may weigh reasons against reasons, but sometimes, after all, it is the power of the imagination, or else some manly passion, which comes to strike the balance and lead him on to action. The motive of which Lord Raglan felt the most conscious was the simple and natural longing to cease from being passive. He could no longer endure to see our soldiery lying down without resistance under the enemy's fire.*

* This is the motive for accelerating the advance of the

CHAP.
I.Order for
the advance
of the Eng-
lish infantry

He had been riding slowly upon the ground between the Great Causeway and the left of the French army ; but he now stopped his horse, and the cavalcade which had trailed in his wake whilst he moved then gathered more closely around him. There were altogether some twenty horsemen ; and although with several of them Lord Raglan from time to time talked gaily, yet, so far as concerned the duty of taking thought how best to conduct the action, he was like a man riding in mere solitude ; for it was not his custom to seek counsel, and the men around him so held their chief in honour that none of them would have liked to assail him with question or advice. Still, any one there could see that, besides Lord Raglan himself, there was one man of the Headquarter Staff whose mind was engaged in the business of the hour. We saw that General Airey had already begun to wield great power in the English army. With the power was its burthen. Whilst most of the other men on the Headquarter Staff seemed to be merely spectators or messengers, there was care, vexing care, on the lean, eager, imperious features of the Quarter-master-General. He was not simply impatient of the delay ; he judged it to be a great evil.

It was to him that Lord Raglan now spoke some five words. Whatever it was that was said, it lit the face of the hearer, and turned his look of care into sunshine. The horsemen in the sur-

British troops which Lord Raglan avowed to me on the evening of the action.

CHAP. rounding group rose taller in their saddles, and
 I. — handled their reins like men whose limbs are
 braced by the joy of passing from expectancy to
 action. Every man, whether he had heard the words
 or not, saw in the gladness of his neighbour's face
 that the moment long awaited was come.

Our infantry was to advance. The order flew;
 for it was Nolan — the impetuous Nolan — who
 carried it to the 2d Division.* A few moments
 later and the order had reached the Light Divi-
 sion. The whole of the foremost English line from
 the 47th Regiment on our right to the extreme

* My authority for this statement is the journal of poor
 Nolan now lying before me. There, after stating that 'a
 'general advance was ordered,' he says: 'To the 2d Division I
 'carried the order myself, and in riding forward with the ad-
 'vance brigade had my horse shot under me by a round-shot.'
 On the other hand, General Evans, I think, conceives that he
 got his warrant to advance when Colonel Herbert returned to
 him with the message that Lord Raglan granted his request to
 be allowed to accede to the prayer of the French Marshal. And
 again, Colonel Lysons (who was Assistant Adjutant-General of
 the 2d Division) states that he carried the order, and he adds
 this spirited record of the emotion which impressed the fact
 upon his memory: 'I could not be mistaken on this point; I
 'so well remember the excitement I felt as I galloped back to
 'the 2d Division, and then went on to the right of the Light
 'Division, passing the order along the line; and I shall never
 'forget the excited look of delight from each face as I repeated
 'the words, "The line will advance!"' It is evident that
 both Nolan's and Colonel Lysons's statements are correct; and
 I conceive that the impression which each of them entertained,
 as well as the impression entertained by General Evans, may
 be reconciled by supposing that the return of Colonel Herbert
 to Evans's side preceded the arrival of the formal orders, and
 that (either intentionally, or else from some mistake) the
 carriage of the formal order was entrusted to two Staff officers.

—*Note to 4th Edition.*

left of the Light Division, rose alert from the ground, dressed well their ranks, and then, having a front of two miles with a depth of only two men, marched grandly down the slope.*

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I.

XVII.

Sir De Laey Evans, commanding the 2d Division, had before him the blazing village. In that conflagration no man could live; and in order to make good his advance on either side of the flames, he had split his force by detaching General Adams to his right with two regiments† and Turner's battery. With that force Adams, driving before him some Russian skirmishers, marched down towards the ford which divided the French and English armies. Evans himself, with four battalions‡ and Franklin's battery of field-artillery,§ had to assail the defences which Prince Mentschikoff had accumulated for the dominion of the Pass and the great road. Soon, however, Evans was a good deal strengthened in the artillery arm; for an opportunity of rendering service in this part of the field was observed and seized by Captain Anderson with a battery belonging to the Light

Evans
detaches
Adams
with two
battalions,
and with
the rest of
his Division
advances
towards the
bridge.

* Computing from the right of the 47th Regiment, the English front was a little short of two miles; but, computing it from the ground on which Adams was advancing, the front was more than two miles in extent.

† The 41st and 49th.

‡ The 1st brigade, under Pennefather, and the 47th Regiment, belonging to Adams's brigade.

§ Fitzmayer commanded both this and Turner's battery.

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I.

Division and by Colonel Daeres with a battery belonging to the 1st Division. By the time that the infantry had got down to near the enclosures, eighteen English guns had begun to reply to the fire which the enemy was pouring upon Pennefather's brigade.

The conflict
in which
he became
engaged.

But Evans's task was a hard one. Having on his right an impassable conflagration, and being cramped towards his left by our Light Division, he was forced to move along the unsheltered line of the Great Causeway upon a narrow and crowded front, and this under a converging fire of artillery; for with the sixteen guns of the Causeway batteries, with the eight other guns planted near, and the heavy guns of position discharging their shot and shell flankwise from the left shoulder of the Great Redoubt, the enemy swept the main road and the bridge, and searched the fords both above and below it. And whilst the enemy's batteries thus dealt with the more open approaches to the bridge, his infantry defended the ground which could not be searched by round-shot, for, posted in the covert on either side of the Causeway, there were the four Borodino battalions;* and, besides, the companies of sappers, and of the 6th Rifles, were operating in the vineyards below, and at the bridge, whilst, moreover, there was a great portion

* There is some obscurity as to the operations of the Borodino corps. They were so placed as to become severed from the actual control of their divisional general, and they were covered, it seems, by the conflagration; but all accounts agree in stating that the Borodino corps was in the Pass, and close to the great road.

of the sixteen battalions posted on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill, which was near enough to be available for the defence of the Causeway as well as the Great Redoubt. Moreover, the enemy's reserves were so disposed as to be in close and easy communication with this part of the field. The Russian skirmishers at this time were swarming in the thick ground which belts the river.

Confronting these defences, Evans strove to work his way forward ; but although the walls and enclosures on the skirts of the village here and there formed islands of shelter, the rest of the ground which had to be traversed was so bare, that every man of the force passing over it came under the eyes of the Russian gunners ; and their fire being therefore effective, Pennefather's brigade, though always moving forward a little, could only gain ground by degrees.

At times, when the balls were falling thickly, the men sheltered themselves as well as they could behind such little cover as the ground afforded ; and when there came a lull, they sprang forward and made for some shelter a little more in advance. There were some buildings which afforded good cover against grape and musketry ; and some of the men, having gained this shelter by a swift rush across the open ground under very heavy fire, were slow to move out again into a storm of grape, canister, and musket-balls. At a later time, the enemy shattered the walls of these buildings with round shot, and some of our men were crushed or suffocated by the ruins ; but those

CHAP. who died that poor death were men hanging
I. back.

This kind of struggle did not of course allow the troops to adhere to their order of formation ; but whenever any number of men got together upon ground which enabled them to extend, they quickly fell into line, and this they did notwithstanding that the groups thus instinctively hastening into their English formation were sometimes men of different regiments. Several times the men were ordered to lie down.

From some unexplained cause, it happened that the Russian Sappers who had been posted near the bridge, moved off without having destroyed it.

The 47th Regiment, pushing in between the river and the burning village, and afterwards fording the stream a good way below the bridge, was better sheltered from the fire of the Causeway batteries than the regiments of Pennefather's brigade.

Colonel Hoey of the 30th persistently worked his men through the gardens and enclosures till at length he was able to cross the river and establish his regiment under cover of the steep bank on the Russian side of the stream. Thence, for some time, he maintained a steady fire against the gunners of the Causeway batteries.

The 95th, like the other regiments of the brigade, stole forward from one sheltering spot to another; and at one time three of its companies became divided from the rest of the corps, and united themselves in line with the 55th ; but the whole

regiment had been again got together, when, the Light Division coming on, it appeared that its right regiment was overlapped by the 95th. Lacy Yea did not choose to stop; and, the 95th being halted at the time, he with his Royal Fusiliers passed through it. But the 'Derbies' could not endure to be thus left behind, and soon the regiment rushed forward, bearing so strongly towards the left that the fortunes of the corps thenceforth became connected with the exploits of Codrington's brigade.

The 55th Regiment, whilst advancing in line over open ground, came under so crushing a fire that it staggered; and, though the line did not fall back, it was broken. But Colonel Warren soon rallied his troops, and carried them forward. Afterwards, when he reached a spot which yielded shelter to a man lying flat on the ground, he ordered his men to lie down; but he himself kept his saddle and remained steadfast in the centre of his regiment until the moment returned when again he could lead it forward.

The kind of struggle in which Evans was engaged could not be long maintained without involving heavy loss. Evans himself received a severe contusion, and almost all his Staff were struck; for Percy Herbert, his Assistant Quartermaster-General, was dangerously hit; and Captain Thompson, Ensign St Clair, and Captain A. M. McDonald were severely wounded. Of the officers of the 30th, 55th, and 47th regiments, Major Rose, Captain Schaw, and Lieutenant Luxmore were killed. Colonel Warren was wounded, and so

CHAP. were Pakenham, Dickson, Conolly, Whimper,
 I. Walker, Coats, Bissett, Armstrong, Lieutenants
 Warren, Wollocombe, Philips, and Maycock. Pennefather's brigade alone lost in killed and wounded nearly one-fourth of its strength.

So long as the Causeway batteries swept the mouth of the pass, Evans, with his three shattered battalions,† could do no more than maintain an obstinate and bloody combat in this part of the field, and gain ground by slow degrees. He was not yet able to push forward beyond the left bank of the river, and assail the enemy in the heart of his position across the great road.

XVIII.

Advance of
 the Light
 Division.

On Evans's left, but entangled with some of his regiments, Sir George Brown moved forward with the Light Division. He had before him the Great Redoubt, armed with its twelve guns of heavy calibre; and this stronghold was flanked on its right by the eight guns of the Lesser Redoubt, and on its left by the eight-gun battery connecting this part of the defences with the artillery and the infantry which guarded the Pass. Upon the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and so posted as to look down into the Great Redoubt, there was yet another battery of field-artillery.‡

The task it
 had before
 it.

* This, as well as all other statements which I make of casualties in the English army, is taken from the official returns.

† The 30th, 55th, and 47th Regiments. As to the 95th, see *post.*

‡ This was the strength of the artillery on or closely adjoin

Eighteen battalions of infantry* were still posted upon the slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Of this force, the four Kazan battalions formed stood in front near the shoulders of the Great Redoubt, and were supported by the four battalions of the Vladimir corps. On the right—proper right—of these troops, but somewhat refused, there were two of the Sousdal battalions, whilst more in advance, and so placed as to form the extreme right of the Russian infantry line, there were the two remaining battalions of the same corps. Besides the masses thus pushed forward, General Kvetzinski held in hand the four battalions of the Ouglitz corps as an immediate reserve, and posted them upon the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill. On the right rear of these forces (after having come in from their skirmishing) there stood the two battalions of sailors. On the extreme right, and massed in columns at intervals upon the eastern and south-eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, there were twelve squadrons of regular cavalry, and eleven sotnias of Cossacks.† These bodies of horsemen were so placed that, whilst they covered the enemy's right and right rear, the Russian commander could, so to speak,

ing the Kourganè Hill *after* the withdrawal of the two Don Cossack batteries.—*See* Appendix No. I.

* The four Kazan (or Archduke Michael's) battalions, the four Vladimir battalions, the four Sousdal battalions, and the four Ouglitz battalions, with also the two battalions of sailors.

† These bodies constituted the whole of the Russian cavalry except the four squadrons which Prince Mentschikoff took with him when he rode towards the sea, and having numbered 3600 at the first they now reckoned 2700.

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—

swing them round, and hurl them against the flank of an enemy assailing his position in front.

Again the troops which defended the Causeway could aid the defence of the Kourganè Hill; and, moreover, the four Volhynia battalions, which constituted what was now left of Prince Mentschikoff's 'Great Reserve,' were so placed that they might be promptly brought forward in support to the troops confronting our people.

It rested with the four Kazan battalions to make the first attack upon the English troops. This was to be done whilst our soldiery, after struggling through the fords, were gaining the top of the bank. The enemy's massive columns were to throw our men back into the channel of the river before they could find time to form.*

The slope which led up from the top of the bank to the parapet of the Great Redoubt was almost as even as the glacis of a fortress; and, except to one who knew beforehand how unaccountably life and limb are spared in a storm of artillery-fire, it seemed hard to understand that upon that smooth ground men would be able to live for many moments under round-shot, grape, and canister from the twelve heavy guns they confronted.

* After speaking of the disposition of the Russian infantry on the banks of the river, Prince Gortschakoff writes: 'These arrangements had been taken with a view to the unavoidable disorders amongst the enemy's lines when crossing the river, and in order to throw the Allies backward by a violent shock. Orders had been issued to that effect by Prince Mentschikoff, and severally reported to the commanding generals under me, and by me.'

Being on the extreme left of the Allied forces, Sir G. Brown had to stand prepared for an attack of cavalry on his flank. On our side of the river, home down to the edge of the vineyards, the broad and gently undulating downs, thickly clothed with elastic herbage, were all that horsemen could wish for; and even on the left bank, the ground in this part of the field was practicable for the evolutions of cavalry. Hardly ever in war did 2700 troopers sit still in their saddles under stronger provocation to enterprise, for they were upon fair ground; and, unless they submitted to be forbidden by the body of only eight hundred English horse, which stood in their path, fortune offered to let them ride down on the flank of a line of infantry, and strike it whilst in the act of advancing to attack a field citadel.* So, although in point of fact it occurred, the contingency of the enemy's withholding his cavalry arm, instead of bringing it down upon the unsheltered flank of his assailants, was hardly one that beforehand our people could have deemed at all probable, still less expected with confidence.

Rightly, therefore — though the apprehension was not afterwards justified by the event — the Light Division was carried into action with an idea that cavalry charges were to be expected on the flank;† and the duty of preparing against

* The English cavalry altogether had a strength of 1000; but Lord George Paget's regiment was in another part of the field.

† Before the action, there was a good deal of conversation amongst officers in the Light Division with respect to the way in which the expected charges of the Russian cavalry should be

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enterprises of this sort pressed specially upon General Buller, because he commanded the left brigade.

Means for preparing a well-ordered assault were open to the assailants.

To storm a position thus held in strength by forces of all arms, and to answer at the same time for the safety of the whole of the Allied army against a flank attack, was a task of great moment; but, on the other hand, Sir George Brown was not without means for preparing a well-ordered assault—for the enemy was making no attempt to hold the vineyards in strength; and on the Russian side of the river, the bank, although steep, and from eight to fifteen feet in height, was yet so broken that a skirmisher seeking to bring his eye and his rifle to a level with the summit, would easily find a ledge for his foot. Here, then, was exactly the kind of cover which the assailants needed; for if this steep bank could be seized and lined for a few minutes by their skirmishers, it would enable their main body to recover its formation after passing through the enclosures and fording the river. But in order to lay hold of the advantage thus offered by the nature of the ground, it was of necessity to take care that the advance of the Light Division should be amply covered by skirmishers. This was not done. The Rifles under Lawrence and Norcott had long before scoured the vineyards; but they met; and it was then—then, perhaps, for the first time—that men broached the idea of dispensing with the ‘hollow square,’ and receiving the enemy’s horse in line. At all events it was then, and amongst officers of the Royal Fusiliers, that I myself first heard the change mooted.

had inclined away towards their left, and, fording the river higher up, had left Codrington's brigade without any skirmishers to cover its advance.* No other light-infantry men were thrown forward in their stead, and the whole body went stark on with bare front, driving full at the enemy's stronghold.†

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The Division
not covered
by skir-
mishers.

XIX.

Sir George Brown's right brigade, consisting of the Royal Fusiliers, the 33d and 23d Regiments,‡

The tenor
of Sir G.
Brown's
orders for
the advance

* The right wing—the wing under Lawrence—was the wing which had had to advance in front of Codrington's brigade. Lawrence found himself so baffled by the smoke of the burning village, that he inclined away to his left, leaving Codrington's front uncovered, and got at last to the front of the 19th Regiment.

† Sir George Brown's omission to cause skirmishers to be thrown out from the regiments of Codrington's and Buller's brigades seems to have been caused by his imagining that the necessity of the step would be effectually superseded by the operations of the Rifle battalion. The event proved his error; but one would have thought that it might have been perceived beforehand; for, however well an independent body of rifle-men may be led, and however important a share it may be likely to have in governing the result of a battle, there is no safe ground for anticipating that its operations will supply the place of skirmishers thrown out from the formed battalions. Indeed, it may be said that the more able and enterprising the leader of an independent body of light infantry men may be, the less his force will be likely to fulfil the peculiar duty of companies thrown out from the formed battalions, and kept in close relation with them by the link of that obedience which a captain owes to his colonel.

‡ When I speak of several regiments in the same limb of the sentence, I generally follow the order in which they would be ranged, going from right to left. In a brigade consisting of three regiments—say, *e.g.*, of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Foot—the

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was under General Codrington. The left brigade, consisting of the 19th, the 88th, and 77th Regiments, was commanded by General Buller. The orders which General Codrington received from Sir George were simply to advance with his brigade, and not to stop until he had crossed the river. A like order, it is believed, was given to General Buller. The division still moved in line; and, after losing a few men from the fire of the enemy's artillery, it reached the boundary of the vineyards and gardens which belt the course of the river.

The advance
through the
vineyards;

The enclosures by this time had been almost entirely cleared of Russian skirmishers by our Rifles under Lawrence and Norcott, but could be searched by artillery fire. In their eagerness for the conflict, our regiments strove to advance quickly; but it was a laborious task to traverse the gardens and vineyards, and many of those who had hitherto kept their knapsacks here laid them down. In a few minutes, the whole of the Light Division of infantry, drawing along with it, in its impetuous course, the 95th Regiment, had forced a way into the vineyards. There, our young soldiers found themselves, as they imagined, in a thick storm of shot and cannon-balls; but it seems that missiles of war fly crashing so audibly through foliage that they sound more dangerous than they are.

1st would be posted at the right, the 3d in the centre, and the 2d on the left. So if one wished to speak of those three regiments in the order in which they would stand when ranged in the same battalion, one would take them from right to left, and in this order—viz., 1st Foot, 3d Foot, 2d Foot.

The loss at this time was not great. Our men were in the belief that speed was required of them; and having before them no chain of skirmishers to feel the way and control the pace of the Division, they struggled forward with eager haste. In passing from one of the enclosures to another, part of the line came to the top of a vertical bank, revetted with stone, and forming a kind of 'sunk fence.' Standing there, the men observed that a violent gust of shot was beating in against the stone work at their feet; and it seemed to them that, the moment they sprang from the top of the fence to the lower vineyard, their legs would be shattered by a thousand missiles. For a moment they paused, as though for some guidance; but the guidance was such as is given by—'Forward, first company!' 'Second company, show them the way!' The first who leaped down stood unscathed in the vineyard below; the rest followed. Dangers shrink before the advance of resolute men. There was not much loss in that lower vineyard. The troops pressed on.

Amongst the vineyards there were, here and there, farm-cottages and homesteads; and since the obstructions which the men were encountering had destroyed their formation, it became possible for such as loved their safety more than their honour to linger in the shelter afforded by these buildings. Some few, they say, lingered.

The Division hurried forward with just such trace of its original line-formation as could re-
and over
the river.

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main to it after rapidly passing through difficult enclosures. The river, though flowing in a swift current, was fordable by a strong man in most places, but it was of very unequal depth. General Codrington was seen riding quickly across at a point where the stream hardly flowed above his horse's fetlocks, and yet, almost close to him, the taller charger of another officer went down and had to swim. The soldiers rapidly waded across. Some few perished in the stream, and it was never known whether they fell from shot or from not being able to keep their footing in the current.

That part of Pennefather's brigade which was overlapped by the Royal Fusiliers* had become entangled with the Light Division; and at the moment of Codrington's advance, Hume of the 95th seized a colour, and, dashing across the river, carried with him the left wing of the regiment; but the men bore so much towards their left, that by the time they gained the foot of the bank on the Russian side of the river, they had become blended, not (as might be supposed) with the right, but with the left regiment of Codrington's brigade. They were destined to share the glory and the carnage which awaited the 23d Fusiliers.

At length the whole Light Division, together with the additional force under Hume which had strayed into its company, was upon the Russian side of the river; but as yet, the troops only stood

* *i.e.*, after the Fusiliers had marched through the 95th.

upon the narrow strip of dry ground at the water's edge, and such of them as were in the centre, or towards the right, were penned back by the rocky bank which rose steep and high over their heads. The soldiery were a crowd—a crowd shaped and twisted by the winding of the river's bank, yet with some remains of military coherence; for although the enclosures and the fording of the river could not but destroy all formation, the men of every company had kept together as well as they were able.

But a general who had omitted to line the bank with his own skirmishers might well expect to see it fringed with the enemy's rifles; and the strong wall which nature had offered to the English as a cover for the formation of their battalions was now, of course, held by the enemy's skirmishers. These light troops were in greatest force along the bank which faced the centre and the right of the Light Division. They came to the edge of the bank, fired down into the crowd of the red-coats, and then drew back for a pace or two that they might load in peace and be ready to fire again. They could kill and wound men in the crowd below without laying themselves open to fire.

Codrington's
brigade finds
the top of
the left
bank lined
with Russian
skirmishers.

Towards the left of the Light Division the bank was less abrupt, and also more free from the enemy's skirmishers.* There, after passing the river, General Buller, who commanded the 2d brigade, was able to form it at his leisure. He

Course
taken by
General
Buller.

* Because our rifles, as we saw, had inclined to their left, and were operating in this part of the field.

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ordered the 77th Regiment to lie down under the cover afforded by the configuration of the ground, and upon a slope somewhat sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery he placed the 88th Regiment.* With these two regiments he remained long halted, not partaking in the subsequent advance of Codrington's brigade. His reason was, that a large body of cavalry and infantry appearing on the plain to threaten his left,† he thought it right to keep two regiments in hand until he should find himself supported by the near approach of the Highland brigade. He conceived that he ought to beware of outstripping the 1st Division by too great an interval; and, in truth, the duty

* As to his 19th Regiment, see *post*.

† The absence of Prince Mentschikoff in a distant part of the field was probably the cause of the enemy's want of enterprise in not pressing with any degree of vigour upon the open flank of the English army. The only approach to any actual movement against the flank of the Light Division at the time of its advance from the river was one perceived and checked by Major Norcott. Norcott, having crossed the stream, had thrown forward his two right companies to a ridge in advance of the bank, and with his two remaining companies was occupying the precincts of a farmstead which offered him a point of *appui* for his left flank. Whilst he was thus posted, he saw some sixty or seventy Cossacks coming down from the south-east by a road which led to the farm, and close following these he perceived the head of a column of infantry. Norcott immediately withdrew his two right companies from the ridge, and prepared to make a stand at the farm. To aid him in this undertaking, he requested Captain Colville (who had come into this part of the field with one of Colonel Lawrence's companies) to draw up his men in line across the road leading down to the farm. Seeing these preparations for their reception, the horsemen, and the column of infantry which had been following them, turned about and withdrew.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

which attached upon General Buller at this moment was one of a grave kind; for if the enemy should seize the moment of Sir George Brown's assault upon the Great Redoubt as his time for making a resolute attack with horse, foot, and artillery upon the flank of our advancing troops, the safety of the whole Allied army would be challenged, and would be found to rest greatly upon such dispositions as General Buller might have made for covering our left.

Sir George Brown's order to Buller empowered him to advance until he was over the stream; but, that duty having been executed, the brigadier now found himself on the bank of a river, without, so far as I know, having any fresh orders to guide him, yet charged by circumstance with the duty of covering the flank of the whole Allied army at the moment of an assault upon the enemy's stronghold. The business was a vital one; and the caution which Buller used at this time was required by the occasion.* For to push forward the two regiments which formed the extreme left of the whole Allied front, and to march them against the enemy's stronghold in a line, out-flanked by the enemy's horse, and even, it would seem, by a portion of his foot, would have been to lay open, not Buller's brigade merely, but the whole Allied army, to the risk of a flank attack

* The way in which the 88th and the 77th Regiments were handled at a later period of the action was not the necessary result of the dispositions made at this time, and is a fit subject for distinct comments.

CHAP. I. involving great disasters. In these circumstances
 it was Buller's duty to take up such a position as
 would enable him to cover the advance of Cod-
 rington's brigade; and to sustain the shock of a
 flank attack. It was to that end that he kept in
 hand the 88th and 77th Regiments.

XX.

The 19th
 Regiment.

Though forming part of Buller's brigade, the 19th Regiment was suffered ere long to associate itself with General Codrington's advance; and thereupon, with Lawrence's wing of the Rifles and the wing of the 95th under Hume, the force taking part in this movement became swollen to a body of troops which, without substantial inaccuracy, may be counted as five battalions.*

State of
 the five
 battalions
 standing
 crowded
 along the
 left bank of
 the river.

These five battalions were extended in a broken chain at the foot of the bank on the Russian side of the river, and were falling—especially towards the right—under the close fire of the skirmishers who crowned the top. In this strait some of our officers instinctively tried to clear the front by getting the men to mount part way up the bank, and bring their rifles to a level with the summit. But among the foremost the General commanding the Division had forded the river. Sir George Brown was an officer whose career had begun, and begun with glory, in the great days under Well-

Sir George
 Brown.

* Because comprising four battalions and two wings of other battalions. The force was about to be yet further augmented by the accession of the right wing of the 95th.

ington ; but whilst he was still in his early manhood, wars had ceased, and thenceforth, for near forty years, he had brought his strong energies to bear upon the kind of military business which used to be practised by the English in peace-time. A long immersion in the Adjutant-General's department had led him to go even beyond other men in laying stress upon the value of discipline ; but the practice of this sort of industry had not at all helped to school him for the command of a division in war-time ; for in labouring after that mechanic perfection which, after all, is only one of many means towards an end, the end itself had been much forgotten by those who controlled our military system, and the business of war (as, for instance, the art of carrying a brigade in line through enclosures and thick grounds) had been little or never practised in England.* To a military system which omits to anticipate and to deal with the common obstacles to be expected in a battle-field, war is a rough disturber ; and unless the industry of the barrack-yard is supported by other and better resources, it is liable to be turned to nothingness by even a gentle contact with reality. A belt of garden-ground, a winding though fordable stream, and an enemy hitherto inert, had sufficed to make Sir George Brown despair of being able to present his troops to the enemy in a state of formation. Great dislocation

* Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Scinde, used to press the importance of practising troops in this way, but without success.

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of military order was, of course, the necessary result of having to pass through enclosures and to ford a winding stream; so what the main body needed to have before it when it approached the left bank of the river was a swarm of skirmishers clearing its immediate front, and prepared to cover it during the process of forming anew. This cover, however, was wanting. Sir George Brown declared that to attempt any formation after the passage of the river would be impossible, and that he had 'determined to trust to the spirit 'and individual courage of the troops.' Thus, on ground giving rare opportunity for the deliberate preparation of an attack, and under no great stress of battle, the Light Division—the 'Light 'Division' whose very name carried with it a great inheritance of glory—was suffered to lapse into a mere throng of brave men. In this plight the five battalions had to advance under the guns of a powerful battery supported by heavy columns of foot.

But an officer honoured with the command of British troops can always hope that, when his skill fails him, his men may still retrieve the day by sheer fighting; and to a commander frustrated in his evolutions, the prospect of a rude conflict with the enemy may offer the best kind of solace, and perhaps even a happy issue out of trouble. Of such comfort as was to be got from close fighting, there seemed to be fair promise in the Great Redoubt; and there, Sir George Brown resolved to seek it. Eager to

have, at the least, a forward place in the armed throng, he suffered agony lest the bank, very steep at the spot where he faced it, should be inaccessible to a mounted officer; but he soon found a place where a break in the stiffness of the acclivity left room for the two or three ledges which a horseman must find before he can reach the top. Then he quickly gained the open ground above. The Russian skirmishers were there. Schooled in habits of deep reverence for military rank, these men may have been startled, perhaps, by the sudden apparition of the hat which bespoke a general officer, and, what was worse, a general officer in a state of displeasure. It seems, too, there is something in the bearing of a fearless, near-sighted man which disturbs the reckonings of other people; for they see that his ways are not their ways, and they do not know but that he may be right in not fearing them, and that, if they were not to be afraid of him, they themselves might be in the wrong. At all events, the enemy's skirmishers, omitting or failing to bring down the English General, suffered him to remain unhurt on the top of the bank. There, flushed and angry—he was angry, perhaps, with himself, or angry with the gardens and walls and the perverse winding of a stream which had broken the cherished structure of his battalions—he sat on his grey charger full under the guns of the Great Redoubt, and the dun oblong columns of the enemy's infantry that flanked it on either side. However eagerly he might be longing

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to carry forward his Division, he was without the means of sending swift orders along his line.

General
Codrington.

But towards the right of Sir George Brown a movement corresponding with his determination had already begun. General Codrington, ordered 'to advance in line and not to stop till he had crossed the river,' had obeyed very swiftly; but having moved with a converging tendency during their passage through the vineyards and the river, the men of his brigade and the other troops acting with them were now thickly clustered under the left bank in a chain which took its bends from the winding of the stream. Codrington was at this time between the 33d Regiment and the 23d Fusiliers. He strove to do something towards restoring the formation of his troops; but these, jammed together, in a crowd that had been twisted into fantastic shape by the bends of the river's bank, and besides, standing helpless under the fire of the skirmishers shooting down upon their heads from above, could hardly even try to perform an evolution requiring free space and time. And, if for a moment, it seemed possible that any approach to a formation under the bank could be effected, the hope was rudely destroyed; for, on ground lower down the river, a body of the enemy's light troops found for themselves a spot yielding them shelter, yet so placed that it enabled them to pour a flanking fire along the strip or ledge which divided the stream from the bank, and this at a part where the earth was alive with our devoted soldiery.

To keep the men under this fire for many minutes, and to keep them, too, standing all the time in unresisting masses, would be to lose a brigade. The only order received by General Codrington had been obeyed to the full. He had no time to seek guidance from his Divisional General. Clearly there was come upon him one of those rare conjunctures in which a career is made to hinge upon the decision of a moment. His father was that Admiral whose achievement at Navarino had been a link in the chain of events which now brought the son in arms for the Sultan's cause. And any one who loved our navy, even to jealousy of the land service, might persuade himself that the bright, ardent, straightforward glance, and the bold, decisive speech of the Coldstream officer, must have come by inheritance from a sailor. He had the tightly closed lips, bespeaking an obstinate man who lives a life undistracted by breadth and diversity of views. And much of what he seemed he was—a firm, plain soldier, not liable to be bent from the simple path by refined or complex views. He could not see far without the help of the glass which he kept attached to his cap, but he was more alive to the world around him than near-sighted men often are. He had never before been in action. He could not suffer his troops to remain for another minute a helpless crowd under heavy fire. He knew not how he could withdraw them to any ground apt for manœuvring; and it was hardly possible for him to exert such a control over the

CHAP. I. crowd of soldiers hemmed in under the bank as
 would enable him to repair the evil by covering
 his brigade with skirmishers.

XXI.

Nelson, gliding into the Bay of Aboukir, told his assembled captains that if any one of them in the coming battle should chance to be disturbed by doubts about what he ought to do, he might find a good way out of trouble by closing with an enemy's ship; and it was a solution of this sort that now, as it happened, won favour in the heart of an admiral's son.

Codrington
 resolves to
 storm the
 Great
 Redoubt.

With no authority except that which was cast upon him by the stress of the moment, General Codrington resolved to storm the Great Redoubt; and he resolved to do this instantly. His immediate power over the disordered masses around him was confined to the range within which he could make himself heard; but, lifting himself a little in his stirrups, he spoke to the men in his clear ringing voice, and ordered them (all who could hear him) 'to fix bayonets, get up the bank, and advance to the attack.'

His words
 to the men.

He gains
 the top of
 the bank.

Then, also, Codrington imagined that the need of the moment was a ready leader rather than a cool and placid general. Besides, this was his first battle; and perhaps—our army, and not the world, will understand him if so it was—he unconsciously felt that the foremost place was peculiarly befitting a Guardsman who commanded

a brigade of the line. With the quickness of a man accustomed to hunting, he found a spot where the bank was practicable, and, facing it obliquely, his small white Arab with two or three strides carried him to the summit. From the spot he thus reached the enemy's skirmishers had withdrawn;* and Codrington, with the few soldiers who had already been able to gain the top, was alone upon this part of the hill-side. Looking up the smooth, gentle slope, he had before him the Great Redoubt; but for the moment the mouths of the heavy guns which armed it remained black and silent. On his right front he saw a body of infantry massed in column. The men, in their long, grey, sombre coats, stood formed with great precision and rigidly still; but right and left of the mass there was a chain of skirmishers so placed on the flanks of the column as to be abreast of its front rank. The troops close in rear of the body in front could hardly be seen, for they were almost hidden by the dip of the ground; but the crest was fringed with sparkling light, and the light was light playing upon the bayonet-points of battalions massed in the hollow.

Our troops were yearning to be commanded; and if the men, far and near, could have seen that the horseman on the small white Arab above them was a general officer, they would have looked to every wave of his arm for a guiding signal; but

* I imagine that they were withdrawn from the spot because it was under the guns—the guns of the Great Redoubt—from which the enemy was about to open fire on our troops.

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Codrington had come out to the East with no higher rank than that of a colonel;* and his simple forage-cap had not the significance of the hat and the flowing plumes, which would have shown men far from the spot that a general officer was on the top of the bank. There were soldiers, however, who gained the top almost at the same moment as their leader. First one here and there, then knots, then be vies of men clambered up.

Hitherto, the knowledge that there was to be an advance beyond the bank had been confined to the people who chanced to be near Sir George Brown or General Codrington; but those who heard the words or caught the meaning of the divisional general and the brigadier, hastened to give effect to the will of their chiefs by sending their words along the line.

The Royal Fusiliers, being on the extreme right of Codrington's brigade, was beyond the reach of his personal guidance, but Lacy Yea,† who commanded the regiment, was a man of an onward, fiery, violent nature, not likely to suffer his cherished regiment to stand helpless under muzzles pointed down on him and his people by the skirmishers close overhead. The will of a horseman to move forward, no less than his power

Lacy Yea
and his
Fusiliers.

* He had come out in command of the 1st battalion of the Coldstream; but the Brevet of the 20th of June deprived him of his command by making him a Major-General. He, however, remained in the East as a traveller, and was appointed on the 1st of September to the command of the 1st Brigade of the Light Division.

† Pronounced Yaw.

to elude or overcome all obstacles, is singularly strengthened by the education of the hunting-field, and Lacy Yea had been used in early days to ride to hounds in one of the stiffest of all hunting-counties. To him this left bank of the Alma crowned with Russian troops was very like the wayside acclivity which often enough in his boyhood had threatened to wall him back and keep him down in the depths of a Somersetshire lane whilst the hounds were running high up in the field some ten or fifteen feet above. His practised eye soon showed him a fit 'shord' or break in the scarped face of the bank, and then, shouting out to his people, 'Never mind forming! Come on, men! Come on, anyhow!' he put his cob to the task, and quickly gained the top.

On either side of him, men of his regiment rapidly climbed up, and in such numbers that the Russian skirmishers who had been lining it fell back upon their battalions.

And now, in the masses still crowded along the foot of the bank, there rose up that murmur of prayer for closer fighting which, coming of a sudden from men of Teuton blood, is the advent of a new and seemingly extrinsic power—the power ascribed in old times to the hand of an Immortal. From the first company of the Royal Fusiliers to the left of the 19th Regiment, the deep, angry, gathering sound was 'Forward!' 'Forward!' 'Forward!' The throng was heaved; and presently the whole 1st brigade of the Light Division, with the other troops that had joined it, surged

The heaving
of the crowd
beneath the
bank.

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up, and in numberless waves began to break over the bank.

Effect of the
converging
tendency
which had
governed
the troops.

When once on the top of the bank, the 'five battalions' there gathered had no physical obstruction before them, but were grievously wanting in elbow-room; for that tendency to converge, of which we have spoken already, had contracted the front they presented to what was only a fraction of the line they would have formed with their ranks deployed in due order; and the operation of taking ground and opening out into line was not one that could well be performed by a crowd of soldiery gathered under the guns of the Great Redoubt, and besides in the presence — close presence — of powerful Russian columns. It is true that the Royal Fusiliers, being on the extreme right of the brigade, and not finding themselves cramped at that time by any pressure from the troops of the 2d Division, had room to deploy; and, though numbers of soldiers belonging to other corps were mixed up with his regiment, Lacy Yea, using violent energy, was able in some degree to make the men open out. Colonel Blake, too, of the 33d was so circumstanced as to be able after a while to make his regiment open out, and in all the regiments our soldiers strove hard to put themselves in their English array; but to almost all of them space was wanting; and the silence which is the pride of the English army could not at that moment be preserved, for numbers of men, separated from their companies and their regiments, yet eager to follow

Endeavours
of the men
to form line
on the top
of the bank.

the path of duty, were anxiously seeking advice from officers, and trying, in fact, to place themselves under such command as time and circumstance would allow. In this condition of things the utmost that could be done in most cases was to try to give to the mass the rudiments of a line-formation; and upon the whole it may be said that although these five battalions, having now open ground before them, were no longer a helpless mass, their state was not such as would enable a chief to manœuvre them by simple word of command. They were an armed and warlike crowd.

The five battalions thus gathered on the crest of the bank were the first body of Allied troops which moved up to dispute with the enemy for ground he was holding in strength. Both their right and their extreme left confronted Russian infantry columns, drawn up near each flank of the Great Redoubt; but the centre and left centre of this part of our assailing force stood right under the face of the work, and directly meeting its frown.

*The task
they had
before them*

Although far from having been able to open out as was wished, the knotted chain of the red-coats had still a much greater front than the parapet of the opposing redoubt; and accordingly those troops which constituted the flanks of our assaulting force had no mission to throw themselves forward (as the centre was going to do) against the mouths of great guns; but on the other hand, they needs must encounter the gathered masses of infantry drawn up abreast of the work.

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Two of these from their two respective positions on the flanks of the Redoubt now began to move down the hillside.

Advance of
the Right-
hand Kazan
column.

The one descending from the eastern flank of the work,* marched against that part of our line which was formed by Lawrence's Rifles,† by the 19th Regiment, and by the 23d or Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Already, this right-hand Kazan column had advanced some way down the slope before any great number of the English had clambered up to the top of the bank; and our soldiers, it would seem, at that time might have been forced back into the channel of the river by a continued and resolute advance of the descending force; but when, one by one, and in knots and groups, our men gained the top of the bank, when they saw the ground above spreading smooth and open before them, and the huge grey square-built mass gliding down to where they were, then, happily for England and for the freedom of Europe—for on this in no small measure the common weal seems to rest—it came to be seen that now, after near forty years of peace, our soldiery were still

* A double-battalion column, I believe, of the Kazan Regiment. This Kazan corps, of which we shall see a great deal, is more commonly called in Russian accounts the 'Grand Duke Michael's Regiment.' It was a regiment of 'chasseurs.'

† Major Norcott's two right companies had been extended along the ridge above the river's bank, and were lying down, when Colonel Lawrence advancing in person with his wing of the Rifle battalion, an intermixture took place; and accordingly it must be understood that, both here and in subsequent pages, my mention of 'Lawrence's Rifles' includes some of the men belonging to Major Norcott's wing.

gifted with the priceless quality which hinders them from feeling, in the way that foreigners feel it, the weight of a column of infantry. In their English way, half sportive, half surly, our young soldiers seemed to measure their task ; and then—many of them still holding betwixt their teeth the tempting clusters of grapes they had gathered in the vineyards below—they began shooting easy shots into the big, solid mass of infantry which was solemnly marching against them. The column besides at this time was moving under a fire directed against its right flank by some of Norcott's Riflemen (then ensconced some way off in a farmstead) and yet, as seen by our people, it did not appear unsteady. It was perhaps an over-drilled body of men unskilfully or weakly handled. At all events, the mass failed to make its weight and strength tell against clusters of English lads who stood facing it merrily, and teasing it with rifle-balls. The column before long was ordered or suffered to yield ; and, because falling back in a hollow, it lapsed nearly or quite out of sight. Then, having thus ridded themselves of the infantry force in their front, Colonel Lawrence's Riflemen, and the 19th Regiment, and the Royal Welsh began, as they advanced, to bend towards their right, and thenceforth became a part of the force we shall presently see engaged in the storming of the Great Redoubt.

The column
is defeated,
and re-
treats.

The other Kazan column*—the column coming down from the west flank of the redoubt—was a

The Left
Kazan
column.

* A double-battalion column, I believe, containing 1500 men.

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force of high mettle; and it soon began that obstinate fight of which we shall by-and-by hear—a fight destined with the Royal Fusiliers, destined to last from the commencement of the infantry engagement until almost the close of the battle.

XXII.

The storm-
ing of the
Great
Redoubt.

With that part—the central part—of the ‘five ‘battalions’ which had not been challenged by infantry, General Codrington was already moving up under the guns of the Great Redoubt. He, indeed, had not waited for the moment when his whole brigade reached the top of the bank; for, having gathered some knots of men on either side of him, he rode forward gently a few paces, then waited until he gained some increase of numbers, and then again moved on, thus canvassing, as it were, for followers, and gradually carrying forward with him more and more of the troops. At first, he got on slowly; for the bulk of our officers having had no order to dispense with formation, they judged, when they gained the top of the bank, that they ought to strive to form line before they advanced, and they were labouring to that end; but when it came to be understood that an advance without formation was sanctioned by the generals or compelled by stress of events, the whole of the force, though clubbed and broken into clusters of men, began to move up the gentle slope of the hill.

For a little while every gun in the great battery above remained dark and silent.

Amongst the Russians who were plying their field-glasses from the parapet of the Great Redoubt there was a question meet for debate:—
'If the scarlet men of the sea were presumptuously bent upon storming the work, where was the great column of attack, and where the great column of support, and where the great columns of reserve that must needs have been formed for such an enterprise? Yet, if they had no such purpose, why were so many men coming up under the guns within grape-shot range? And unless those English were really attacking in force, why, in the name of the Holy Virgin and our own blessed Sergius,* why, riding forward even in front of the skirmishers, should there be that superb-looking horseman on the grey charger,'—they meant, of course, Sir George Brown—'whose visible rage no less than his general's hat clearly showed that he held high command?'

Upon the whole, it seemed that the advance of the red-coated soldiery must be an irruption of skirmishers preparatory to an attack in force, but still an irruption so strong as to be worthy of all that artillery could do to crush it. So, the Russian sharpshooters having now for the most part

* The troops in and near the redoubt belonged to the 16th Division—a body which carried with it the 'Icon,' or pictured image of St Sergius. This venerated image had been solemnly entrusted to the Division by the Bishop of Moscow.

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fallen back, or moved aside out of the line of fire, the gunners in the Great Redoubt made ready to open fire upon our regiments with round-shot, canister, and grape.

First one gun, then another, then more. From east to west the parapet grew white, and because of the bank of new smoke, no gun could any longer be seen by our men, except at the moment when it was pouring its blaze through the cloud ; but on what one may call a glacis, at three hundred yards from the mouths of the guns, the lightning, the thunder, and the bolt are not far apart. It was at an early moment after emerging from the bed of the stream that the slaughter of our people began. Indeed some of them, when struck down, had so nearly reached the top of the bank that they fell back dead and dying into the channel of the river. Death loves a crowd, and many fell ; but all who were not struck down continued to move forward. In some places, the closer portions of the advancing throng were eight or ten deep ; and the round-shot, tearing cruelly through and through, mowed down so many of our devoted soldiery that several times by sheer havoc the clusters for a moment were thinned.

But only for a moment ; because that singular tendency which had begun with the advance into the vineyards was now setting in more strongly. Moving to the attack without being ordered to make towards any given spot, almost every officer and man (except those towards the flanks who were engaged with the enemy's infantry) had in-

stinctively proposed to himself the same goal; and this goal was the Great Redoubt. Upon the Great Redoubt, therefore, the regiments kept always converging; and in less time than it took the Russian artillerymen to sponge and load their guns, our people, inclining away from the flanks, and pressing in towards the centre, filled up every space cut clear by the shot; and this so constantly that, again, after a fall of many men, and again, and still again, there was always a crowd meet for slaughter.

Amongst the troops thus converging upon the centre there was the right wing of the Derbyshire, the 95th Regiment, its foremost company led with unflinching boldness and zeal by Captain Sargent.*

* Before the crossing of the river, this wing of the 95th had become separated from the other one, and stood halted by a vineyard under a pelting storm of mitrail. For some time, General Pennefather was with this right wing, and by the side of Captain Sargent's company, which was not then aligning with the other three, but drawn up in front of them. Pennefather was so close to Captain Sargent that he could not have given any order without Sargent's knowing it; and, when the General rode off (as he presently did towards his right), Sargent was able to inform his commanding officer, Major Champion, that no recent order for the guidance of the wing had been given by the Brigadier. Although of a negative kind, this information was at the moment of great importance to Champion; and, the troops being all this while under a severe fire, he quickly came to his resolve. In answer to a remark from Sargent, he said to him at once: 'Then lead on with your company!' Thereupon Sargent led forward his company, which was followed by the other three, all four of course under the orders of Champion; and the way in which the onset was conducted is sufficiently shown in the text. These were the circumstances under which Champion stated in his official report that the right wing was led with 'determined bravery' by Cap-

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The Colonel was wounded, and Major Champion succeeded to the command of the regiment ; but with this its right wing as before he continued to be present in person. Shot dealt havoc around him. Captain Eddington was shot in the throat and killed ; Polhill was torn and slain with grape. Champion was a man of great gentleness and piety ; and if he was not highly endowed with intellectual gifts, he was able to express the feelings of his heart with something of a poetic force. His mind was accustomed to dwell very much on the world that lies beyond the grave ; and in the midst of this scene of carnage he gained, as it were, a seeming glimpse of the happy state ; for when the younger Eddington fell at his side, Champion paused to see what ailed him, and looking upon his young friend's pale face, he saw it suddenly clothed with a 'most sweet expression.' It was because death was on him that the blissful look had come. In the mind of Champion the sight had a deep import ; for he was of the faith that God's Providence is special, and to him the beautiful smile on the features of 'the dead' was the smile of an immortal man gently carried away from earth by the very hand of his Maker.

Yet this piety of his was of no unwarlike cast. Nay, he was of so noble a sort that, though he had not willingly chosen the profession of arms, yet, when he prayed, he was accustomed to render

tain Sargent. Sargent was wounded, but he refused to go on board ship, clung fast to the campaign, and lived to bring his regiment out of action on the great day of Inkermann.

thanks to his Creator for vouchsafing to make him a hardy soldier ; and being, he said, very strong in the belief that he could die as piously on the battle-field as in 'a downy bed,' he pressed on, content with his 'Derbies,' to the face of the Great Redoubt.

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And now, whilst the assailing force was rent from front to rear with grape and canister poured down from the heavy guns above, another and a not less deadly arm was brought to bear against it ; for the enemy marched a body of infantry into the rear of the breastwork ; and his helmeted soldiers, kneeling behind the parapet at the intervals between the embrasures, watched, ready with their muskets on the earthwork, till they thought our people were near enough, and then fired into the crowd. Moreover, the troops on either flank of the redoubt began to fire obliquely into the assailing mass.

Then, for such of our men as were new to war, it became time to learn that the ear is a false guide in the computation of passing shot ; and that amid notes sounding like a very torrent of balls, the greater part of even a crowded force may remain unhurt. The storm of rifle and musket balls, of grape and canister, came in blasts ; and although there were pauses, yet whilst a blast was sweeping through, it seemed to any young soldier, guided by the sound of the rushing missiles, that nowhere betwixt them, however closely he might draw in his limbs, could there be room for him to stand unscathed. But no man shrank. Our sol-

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diers, still panting with the violence of their labour in crossing the river and scaling the bank, scarcely fired a shot, and they did not speak; but they, every one, went forward. The truth is, that the weak-hearted men had been left behind in the gardens and buildings of the village; the dross was below, and the force on the hill-side was pure metal. Our men were so intent on their purpose, that not one of them, it is said, at this time, was seen to cast back a look towards the ground whence support might be coming.

The assailants were nearing the breastwork, when, after a lull of a few moments, its ordnance all thundered at once, or at least so nearly at the same moment that the pathway of their blast was a broad one; and there were many who fell; but the onset of our soldiery was becoming a rush. Codrington, riding in front of the men, gaily cheered them on; and all who were not struck down by shot pressed on towards the long bank of smoke which lay dimly enfolding the redoubt.

But already—though none of the soldiery engaged then knew who wrought the spell—a hard stress had been put upon the enemy. For a while, indeed, the white bank of smoke, lit through here and there with the slender flashes of musketry, stood fast in the front of the parapet, and still all but shrouded the helmets and the glittering bayonets within; but it grew more thin: it began to rise; and, rising, it disclosed a grave change in the counsels of the Russian Generals. Some

Englishman — or many, perhaps, at the same moment — looking keen through the smoke, saw teams of artillery-horses moving, and there was a sound of ordnance-wheels. Our panting soldiery broke from their silence. ‘By all that is holy! he is limbering up!’ ‘He is carrying off his guns!’ ‘Stole away! Stole away! Stole away!’ The glais of the Great Redoubt had come to sound more joyous than the covert’s side in England.

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The embrasures were empty, and in rear of the work, long artillery-teams—eight-horse and ten-horse teams—were rapidly dragging off the guns.

Then a small child-like youth ran forward before the throng, carrying a colour. This was young Anstruther. He carried the Queen’s colour of the Royal Welsh. Fresh from the games of English school-life, he ran fast; for, heading all who strove to keep up with him, he gained the redoubt, and dug the butt-end of the flag-staff into the parapet; and there for a moment he stood, holding it tight, and taking breath. Then he was shot dead; but his small hands, still clasping the flagstaff, drew it down along with him, and the crimson silk lay covering the boy with its folds. His successor in charge of the colour, namely, centre sergeant Luke O’Connor, was brought down at nearly that moment by a shot which struck his breast; but William Evans, a swift-footed soldier, ran forward, and had caught up the fallen standard, when O’Connor (finding strength enough to be able to rise) made haste to assert his right, and then proudly

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upholding the colour, he laid claim to the Great Redoubt on behalf of the 'Royal Welsh.*' The colour floating high in the air, and seen by our people far and near, kindled in them a raging love for the ground where it stood. Breathless men found speech. General Codrington, still in the front, uncovered, saluting the crisis, waved his cap for a sign to his people, and then, riding straight at one of the embrasures, leapt his grey Arab into the breastwork. There were some eager and swift-footed soldiers who sprang the parapet nearly at the same moment; more followed. Fire opening then on our people from a battery higher up the hill-side, both Lawrence and his adjutant Ross were unhorsed by a blast of grape-shot; but the ground that received

* It commonly happens that incidents occurring in a battle are told by the most truthful bystanders with differences more or less wide. All agree that young Anstruther rushed forward just as is mentioned in the text, and that being shot dead, he fell clasping the colour in the way above described; but, according to the testimony of some, the spot of ground where he fell was several paces below the redoubt. After the capture of the redoubt, sergeant Luke O'Connor, notwithstanding his wound, persisted in refusing to part with the honour of carrying the colour. Lieutenant Granville, and also, I think, some other officers of the regiment, observed that O'Connor was growing weak from the effect of his wound, and pressed him to go to the rear; but setting at nought all these counsels, O'Connor persisted in his determination to carry the cherished standard until the close of the battle. He received the thanks of Sir George Brown and General Codrington on the field; and, for having done what is above told, he was decorated with the Victoria Cross. He was also promoted. He is now (this was written in 1863) a captain in that same devoted regiment with which he had the glory of serving on the day of the Alma.

Lawrence falling was indeed the very goal he had sought, for he rolled at the foot of the breastwork. At each flank of the work, no less than along its whole front, agile men were now fast bounding in.

The enemy's still lingering skirmishers began to fall back, and descended—some of them slowly—into the dip where their battalions were massed. The bulk of our soldiery were up, and they flooded in over the parapet, hurraing, jumping over, hurraing—a joyful English crowd.

The cheer had not yet died away on the hillside, when from the enemy's battalions standing massed in the hollow there rose up, as though it had been wrung from the very hearts of brave men defeated, a long, sorrowful, wailing sound. This was the bitter and wholesome grief of a valiant soldiery not content to yield. For men who so grieve there is hope. The redoubt had been seized by our people; it was not yet lost to the Czar.

At the sight of the brass howitzer which was found in the work, a characteristic desire to assert the claims of private or corporate ownership began to seize upon the crowd; and more than one man—so they say—scratched his mark upon the piece, that he might make it the peculiar trophy of himself or his regiment. But there was a better prize than this within the reach of a nimble soldier; for of the guns moving off towards the rear there was one which, dragged by only three horses, had scarcely yet gained the rear of the

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redoubt. Captain Bell, of the Royal Welsh, ran up, overtook it, and, pointing his capless pistol at the head of the driver, ordered him, or rather signed to him, to stop instantly and dismount. The driver sprang from his saddle and fled. Bell seized the bridle of the near horse, and he had already turned the gun round, when, Sir George Brown riding up angry, and ordering him to go to his company, he of course obeyed, yet not until he had effectually started the horses in the right direction ; for they drew the gun down the hill, and the capture became complete.*

Of the men who had moved forward from the top of the river's bank, many now lay upon the hill-side dead or wounded ; and the Royal Fusiliers, with fragments of other regiments, were still engaged with the enemy's infantry ; but the greater portion of five battalions were now upon the ground which the enemy had made his stronghold.†

Yet the tendency to converge towards the redoubt as their goal had so closely compressed the assailing mass, that its front now hardly outflanked the parapet ; and all the assailants of the redoubt were either within the work or closely gathered round it.

These men by their impetuous onset had apparently bewildered the enemy ; for though having on

* The gun is now at Woolwich. The horses served for some time in our 'Black Battery.'

† The 33d, the 'Royal Welsh' (or 23d), the 'Derbies' (95th), the 19th, and the 2d battalion of the Rifle Brigade.

this one hill-side sixteen unbroken battalions of infantry supported by a powerful artillery as well as by the cavalry arm, he nevertheless for the moment hung back, as though minded to acquiesce in his loss. Our soldiery, on the other hand, were well inclined to rest and make themselves at home; and General Codrington, alighting from his horse, began to show the men how best to establish themselves on the ground they had won by lying down outside the parapet, and resting their rifles upon its top.

Thus the assaulting force had carried the great field-work which guarded the key of the enemy's position on the Alma; and if at this time the supporting Division had been half-way up the hill, or even if it had been beginning to crown the banks of the river on the Russian side, the toils and perils of the day would perhaps have been over. But our men were only a crowd; and they, all of them, wise and simple, now began to learn in the great school of action that the most brilliant achievement by a disordered mass of soldiery requires the speedy support of formed troops.

Then—and then, as is said, for the first time—the men cast back a look towards the quarter from which they might hope to see supports advancing; but when they carried their eyes down the slopes strewn thick with the wounded and the dead, they saw that, from the ground where they stood down home to the top of the river's bank, there were no succours coming.

No supports
yet coming
up from the
top of the
river's bank.

XXIII.

CHAP.
I.

The Guards.

Where were the supports?

The right of the 1st Division was formed by the brigade of 'Guards.' In its origin, the appellation given to the regiments called 'the Guards' imported that the personal safety of the sovereign was peculiarly committed to their charge. Princes have imagined that, by specially ascribing this duty to a particular portion of their armed forces rather than to the whole, and by granting some privileges to troops specially distinguished as their chosen defenders, they secure to themselves good means of safety in time of trouble; and that still, upon the whole, they do more good than harm to their military system, by establishing a healthy spirit of rivalry between the favoured body and the rest of the army. The danger is, that a corps thus set apart will come to be considered as a great reserve of military strength, and that, for that very reason, any disaster which it may sustain will be looked upon as more ruinous than a disaster of equal proportions occurring to other regiments.

With us, the corps of Guards numbers only seven battalions, distributed into three regiments, called the Grenadier Guards, the Coldstream, and the Scots Fusilier Guards; and each of these three regiments had sent one battalion to form the brigade of Guards now serving in the 1st Division. The officers of the corps enjoy some privileges tending to accelerate their advancement

in the army. They are, for the most part, men well born or well connected ; and being aided by a singularly able body of sergeants and corporals, they are not so over-burthened in peace-time by their regimental duties as to have their minds in the condition which too often results from monotonous labour. They have deeply at heart the honour of the whole body of the Guards as well as of their respective regiments ; and the feeling is quickened by a sense of the jealousy which their privileges breed, or rather, perhaps, by the tradition of that ancient rivalry which exists between the ' Guards ' and the ' Line.'

The Guardsmen of the rank and file have some advantages over the line in the way of allowances and accoutrements. They are all of fine stature. Without being overdrilled, they are well enough practised in their duties ; and whoever loves war sees grandeur in the movement of the stately forms and the towering bearskins which mark a battalion of the Guards. It is true that these household troops are cut off from the experience gained by line regiments in India and the colonies ; but whenever England is at war in Europe, or against people of European descent, it is the custom and the pride of the Guards to take their part.

The officers of the Guards have so many relatives and friends amongst those who generate conversation in London, that when two or three of their battalions are sent upon active service, the war in which they engage becomes, as it were for

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their sake, a subject of interest in circles which commonly yield only a languid attention to events beyond the seas. Grief for the death of line officers is dispersed among the counties of the three kingdoms; and when they fall in battle, it is the once merry country-house, the vicarage, or the wayside cottage of some old Peninsular officer, that becomes the house of mourning. But by the loss of officers of the household regiments the central body of English society is touched, is shocked, is almost angered; and a commander who has to sit in his saddle and see a heavy slaughter of the Guards, may be almost forced to think ruefully of fathers, of mothers, of wives, of sisters, who are amongst his own friends.

There was nothing in the history or traditions of the famous corps of the Guards to justify the notion that they were to be more often kept out of the brunt of the battle than the troops of the line; and in this very war they were destined to encounter the hardest trials of soldiers, and to go on fighting and enduring until the glory of past achievements, the strange ascendancy which those achievements had won, and a few score of wan men with hardly the garb of soldiers, should be all that remained of 'the Guards.' Still it is certain that the household battalions were more or less regarded as a cherished body of troops, and that the loss of the brigade of Guards would be looked upon as a loss more signal, and in that sense more disastrous, than the loss of three other battalions of equal strength.

The Duke of Cambridge is the grandson of King George III., and a cousin of the Queen. At the outbreak of the war he was thirty-five years of age. He had made the most of such experience as could be gained by following the vocation of a military life in the British Isles. He understood the mechanism of our army system; and so far as could be judged by the test of home service, he was a good and a diligent soldier. Nay, he had some qualifications for command which are not very common in England. He loved order, method, and organisation. Long before the war it had been said that he was gifted with that faculty of moving troops which is one of the prime qualifications of a general officer; and the skill with which his superb Division had been now deployed, seemed to give safe ground for saying that the flattering rumour was true. He was zealous and devoted to duty. He had the habit of exercising forethought. He was sagacious, and was more keenly alive than most other men of our land-service to passing and coming events. He had a good military eye.*

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I.

The Duke of
Cambridge.

* A few words which fell from Lord Raglan in October 1854 have caused me, perhaps, to speak with more confidence on this subject than I might otherwise venture to show. In that month—I believe on the 15th—Lord Raglan spoke to me of the exceeding anxiety of the Duke of Cambridge about the Inkerman position, and he said that in consequence of this pressure measures had been taken. Exactly three weeks afterwards the very ground about which the Duke had been so anxious was the scene of the mighty onslaught which commenced the battle of Inkerman.

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He was a great respecter of the public voice in England, and was even, perhaps, too ready to suffer himself to be swayed by light, transient breezes of 'opinion.' He had no dread of innovations; and the beard that clothed his frank, handsome, manly face, was the symbol of his adhesion to a then new revolt against custom. He was much loved, for he was of a genial temper; and his rank was so well helped out by his hereditary faculty of remembering those with whom he had once conversed, that, far from chilling his intercourse with other men, it enabled him to give happy effect to the kindness of his nature. But, after all, what a general has to do is to try to overcome the enemy by exposing his own soldiery to all needful risks. At any fit time he must be willing and eager to bring his own people to the slaughter for the sake of making havoc with the enemy; and it is right for him to be able to do this without at the time being seen to feel one pang. Nay, however certain it may be that his gentler nature will overcome him on the morrow, it is well for him to be able to pass through the bloodiest hours of battle with something of a ruthless joy. The Duke of Cambridge was wanting in this kind of truculence; and, however careless of his own life (for he had the personal courage of his race), he was liable to be cruelly wrung by the weight of a command which charged him with the lives of other men. He was of an anxious temperament; and with him the danger was that, in

moments when great stress might come to be put upon him, the very keenness of his desire to judge aright would become a cruel hindrance. Nor was he a man who would be driven to burst his way through scruples and doubts by the impulse of any selfish ambition. Far from straining after occasions for acting on his own judgment, he would have liked, if he could, to receive a series of precise orders which would serve to guide him in every successive change. But a general of division must not expect to be long in a campaign without being thrown upon his own judgment. Lord Raglan had furnished the Duke with one order—an order ‘to support ‘the Light Division in its forward movement’—and the Duke of Cambridge had begun to obey it by following the advance of the Light Division, and bringing his force home down to the enclosures; but having thus come to the end of the open ground, he felt the want of some new sanction before he carried his Division into the vineyards. He knew that, for a while at least, the superb array of his Guards and Highlanders would be shattered by passing through enclosures, and he wished for another order from Headquarters before he submitted to see his beautiful line broken up. The order ‘to support the Light ‘Division’ was becoming an imperfect guide, because that same Light Division had rushed headlong upon a task which was dissolving great part of it into a vast swarm of skirmishers. Were the Guards and Highlanders to do the

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I.

Halt of the
1st Division
before en-
tering the
vineyards.

like? Were they to do thus, although their efficacy as a force acting in support of the troops in advance was likely to depend upon their being able to come up in good order? The 1st Division was halted; yet the Light Division was moving rapidly forward.

Why was there this failure of concert between the Light and the 1st Divisions? Why was there no man there who could link the one Division to the other by a few decisive words?

Lord Raglan had already given his orders, and at this moment, led forward by a golden chance, he was riding far away in another part of the field. Sir George Brown, already in the enclosures, and having no line of skirmishers to cover the advance of his battalions, was unable to govern the movements of his Division in such a way as to prevent it from getting too far in advance of the Guards and Highlanders; and afterwards, when Sir George went forward in person with that part of his Division which stormed the redoubt, he seems to have found no means of communicating with the Duke of Cambridge and pressing for the immediate support of the 1st Division.

Every moment was precious; for the men of the Light Division were moving down at a run through the vineyards, or wading across the river.

At the time of this halt the battalion of the Grenadier Guards was across the great road. Thither now, from the west, a horseman came

galloping up. Of an actual order General Airey was not the bearer; but he was a man whose loyalty towards his chief made him always feel certain that what he himself saw clearly to be right was exactly what his chief desired to have done; and the result was, that in an emergency he was able to speak with a weight which virtually brought to bear upon the matter in hand the whole power of Headquarters. His keen eye had detected the halt of the 1st Division, and he saw also that the Light Division was pushing forward at a run. Another man would have gone round or sent to the commander of the forces for his opinion; but every moment of the lapsing time was bringing danger.

General Airey rode straight up to General Bentinck,* and explained it to be Lord Raglan's meaning that the 1st Division should instantly continue its advance in support of the Light Division. 'Must we,' asked Bentinck—'must we always keep within three hundred yards of the Light Division?' 'No,' said Airey, 'not necessarily at any fixed distance; that would not be possible. What His Royal Highness has to do is to support the Light Division by advancing in conformity with its movements.' At this moment the Duke of Cambridge rode up, and to him Airey repeated it to be Lord Raglan's mean-

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General
Airey
comes up.

His exposi-
tion of the
order to
advance in
support.

* Lord Raglan had made an order specially providing that the bearer of an order for a divisional general should deliver it to the first brigadier whom he happened to find, to be by him transmitted to the divisional chief.

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ing that the Division should instantly ‘push on.’ H.R.H. then gave orders for the immediate advance of the Division, and Clifton, I think, was the aide-de-camp who carried the order to Sir Colin Campbell. Then the 1st Division moved forward.

Now the enemy, whilst he dealt with the tumultuous onset of Codrington’s brigade, had rightly enough given some of his care to the more ceremonious advance of the 1st Division; and since the Guards confronted both the Causeway batteries and the Great Redoubt, they of course underwent for a time a fire of artillery, and some men were struck down.* The Grenadiers and the Scots Fusiliers suffered the most. This loss did not occur as a consequence of any mistake: it was in the order of things that it should be. But when men are new to war, and so placed in the battle-field as to be for the moment cut off from all knowledge of what is going on elsewhere, they are prone to imagine that a force which they see undergoing slaughter, yet having no immediate means of attack or resistance, must needs be the victim of some piece of forgetfulness or error; and when once this notion has got its lodgment in the brain of an officer, his next step probably is to try to avert what he fancies to be an impending disaster by venturing to disobey orders, or by counselling another to do so.

* Even when the Great Redoubt had been dismantled, and the Causeway batteries withdrawn, there were some guns in battery at more remote spots, which seem to have been brought to bear on the Guards.

Afterwards—but not, it seems, by any formal order to halt—the advance of the 1st Division was again stopped for a time; yet Codrington's brigade had then begun to rush forward. From the ground on which he was riding, Sir De Lacy Evans could see in profile the swift disordered advance of Codrington's brigade, and the stop to which the 1st Division had come. He understood the danger; and, comprehending at once that the advance of Codrington's brigade was a movement requiring instant support, he took upon himself to send a message conveying his opinion to the Duke of Cambridge.* The Division went forward, and, breaking into the enclosures, began to work its difficult way through the vineyards.

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I.

The Division again stopped for a time.

Step taken by Evans.

The 1st Division resumes its advance

But when a division of infantry extended in line is marched through gardens and walled enclosures, the power of the general commanding it must always be more or less thrown into abeyance, because the want of an unobstructed view and of free lateral communication makes it impossible for him to know what is going on along the whole line, or to send swift orders to the more distant companies. For a time his authority is necessarily dispersed among many; and if the force is moving deliberately and in the face of an enemy, numbers of little councils of war

Want of free communication along a line passing through enclosures

* Evans sent the message by Colonel Steel, who chanced to be near him at the time. Steel was Military Secretary, and he seems to have fulfilled his mission in a way which caused it to be understood that the message he brought was an order from Lord Raglan.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

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will of necessity be going on here and there, in order to judge how best to deal with what seems to be the state of the battle in each field, each garden, each vineyard.

Advance of
the Guards
to the left
bank of the
river.

Still, the Guards descended towards the bank with so much of the line-formation as was permitted by the obstacles they had to overcome. Upon gaining the river's side, the Coldstream broke into open column of sections, in order to make the most advantage of the ford; and when it reached the opposite bank it preserved its column-formation for a time, in order to march the more conveniently round an elbow there formed by the river. When this movement was complete, the colour-sergeants went out to take ground, and the battalion opened out into line-formation with all the precision and ceremony of a birthday review. On the right of this battalion, and moving with less deliberation, the Scots Fusilier Guards got through the enclosures and the river. On the right of that last corps there marched the battalion of the Grenadier Guards. The Grenadiers were a body of men so well instructed, and so skilfully handled, that in working their way through the enclosures they were able to preserve all the essential elements of their line-formation.* When they came to the bank they looked for no ford, but, treating the river as

* No less than seven of the officers serving with this battalion had acted as adjutants of the regiment, and to this circumstance the skill with which it was carried through the enclosures is in some measure ascribed.

a brook—as a brook which a soldier must pass without picking his way *—the battalion marched through it in line; † and though there were some points where a passage was easy, others where the soldiers had to wade deep, and some few—so they say—where the men were put to their swimming, still each file kept its place in the line with a near approach to exactness. At length—but after a painful lapse of time, for Codrington's disordered battalions were clinging all this while to the parapet of the Great Redoubt—the brigade of Guards stood halted, and formed anew under cover of the bank on the Russian side of the river. Their people were sheltered; but the heads of their colours, protruding a little above the top of the bank, could be seen by men looking down from the redoubt.

The Highland brigade at this time was not under a heavy fire, and Sir Colin Campbell effected the operation of passing the river very simply; for, without attempting formal evolutions, each of his regiments, whilst it advanced, tried to keep up, as well as the nature of the ground would allow, the rudiments of its line-formation; and when it gained the opposite bank, its array was carefully restored. As soon as one of the regiments was duly formed on the Russian side of

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I.

Advance of
the High-
land Brigade
to the left
bank of the
river.

* For very good reasons, soldiers in marching are called upon to go straight through brooks and pools of water without picking their way.

† With the exception of one (the 2d) company, commanded by Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, which, happening to be near the bridge, filed over it.

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the river, it was moved forward; and since the ground presented more obstacles towards our left than towards our right, the brigade fell naturally, and without design, into direct *échelon* of regiments. The 42d was in advance; on the left of that regiment there was the 93d, somewhat refused; and on the left of the 93d, but still further refused, there came the 79th.

Time was
lapsing

But already there was nearly an end of the precious moments in which it was possible for the 1st Division to bring an effective support to the troops in the Great Redoubt.

No support
brought by
the two
battalions
which
remained
under
Buller.

Nor did General Buller succeed in bringing his battalions to the rescue. We saw that the 19th Regiment had slipped from his control and joined with Codrington's brigade in storming the redoubt. The two battalions which remained in his power were the 88th and the 77th Regiments. He was in person with the 88th some way above the bank of the river; and the 77th, under the orders of Colonel Egerton, was on the extreme left of the English infantry line. The 88th and the 77th were not at this time under fire; but before them, at somewhat long distances, there were heavy columns of Russian infantry; and the enemy's horsemen, though not, it seems, visible at this moment, were known to be hovering on the left front of the English line. Buller, however, had not yet apprehended that the Russians were preparing any enterprise against his left flank; and when he saw how matters stood in the redoubt, he rightly determined to advance at

The cause
of this.

once with the two battalions which remained under his control. He therefore sent an order to Colonel Egerton directing him at once to move forward with the 77th, and he himself prepared to advance at the same moment with the 88th.

Colonel Egerton was a firm, able man, and he felt the momentous importance of the duties attaching upon an officer who had charge of the extreme left of our infantry line; for it was obvious that a successful flank attack upon the one battalion which he commanded would bring into grievous jeopardy the whole array, English and French. The dips and hollows which marked the hill-side towards his left, made it hard for him to see what the enemy was intending to do; and he failed to infer that the Czar's renowned forces were really abstaining from the enterprise which seemed to be almost forced upon them by the nakedness of our left wing, and by their strength in the cavalry arm. At the moment when Buller's order was brought to him, Colonel Egerton was so deeply impressed with a sense of the danger which he had to withstand in this part of the field, that—deliberately, and with a firmness which might have won him great praise if the actual course of events had brought him his justification—he took upon himself a grave burthen.* He took upon himself to say that, in the circumstances in which

* Colonel Egerton was the brilliant officer who, with only four companies of his 77th Regiment, proved able to exert a strong sway over the issue of the great Inkerman battle.

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he stood, he ought not to obey the order. This answer the aide-de-camp carried back to General Buller. Buller was a near-sighted man;* and being, it would seem, distrustful of what had been his own impression of the enemy's attitude, he acquiesced in Colonel Egerton's decision, allowed the 77th to remain where it was, and not only refrained from advancing with the 88th, but threw the regiment into square, as though it were about to be attacked by cavalry.†

XXIV.

State of
things in
the redoubt.

So when the men of Codrington's force looked back to whence they came, and when also they looked to their left rear, they saw they were alone—still alone—upon the hill-side. Then such of them as had the instinct of war began to understand that the blood of their comrades had been shed in vain.

* It has already been said that Sir George Brown, who commanded the Division, and Codrington, who commanded its 1st brigade, were both of them near-sighted. The Light Division was the force which had to feel and fight its way to the key of the position; and it was an error to allow it to be carried into action by three near-sighted generals.

† It seems that the order to form square was carried to all the three regiments of the brigade, including the 19th, and that a wing of the 77th was at one moment complying with it. The officers of the 19th, however, were apparently so convinced of the unfitness of the order, that they deliberately disobeyed it. Lieutenant Lidwill of the 6th company was told to pass down the word to 'square on the left centre company,' but he says:—'I saw it was madness, and would not pass on the order to the 7th and 8th companies.'

For they were only clusters of men without the strength of order; and masses of infantry, in a perfect state of formation, were heavily impending over them. The columns which were the nearest to them were in the dip behind the redoubt, and so placed that, without any danger to them, the Russian battery which had been planted higher up on the side of the Kourganè Hill could throw its fire into the site of the redoubt. The guns of this battery—the one that had brought Colonel Lawrence and his aide-de-camp, and perhaps many more, to the ground—were soon brought to bear upon those of our soldiery who stood within the redoubt; and this fire, after killing and wounding several men, drove the rest to seek cover by betaking themselves to the outer side of the parapet. Their movement, though it wanted the sanction of orders, was scarcely wrong or unsoldierly; for, since the men were without formation, their duty became like the duty of skirmishers, and the parapet of the redoubt supplied that kind of shelter which the need of the moment demanded. Yet the movement looked like the beginning of a retreat, and apparently for that reason mainly General Codrington strove to check it,* for being at the moment on the outside of the work, he for the second time put his horse at the parapet,

Battery on the higher slopes of the hill brought to bear on our men.

* We saw him at one moment busied in establishing *some* of his men on the outside of the parapet, but it did not of course at all follow that he would approve the reflux movement of those soldiers who being within the work now began to pour out of it.

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I.

Our men
lodge them-
selves out-
side the
parapet.

and again entered the redoubt, with a hope that the men would follow him in once more. But, this time, his example was little observed; for almost every man, being driven by want of formation to rely upon his own means of making a stand, was busied with the work of settling himself down as well as he could for a stubborn defence; and it was plain (as Codrington himself had been showing the men some few minutes before) that the best ground for making a stand was the foot of the parapet on its outer side.

When good infantry soldiers, in the immediate presence of a powerful enemy, are disordered, but still undaunted, the slightest rudiment of a field-work is of infinite value to it—not simply nor chiefly on account of the shelter which it affords, but rather—because it gives a base and nucleus for that coherence which is endangered by the want of formation. If our men, then lying or kneeling along the foot of the parapet, had been well covered at the flanks, it would have been their duty to hold the ground firmly against even a great body of infantry attacking them in front.

But on either flank, as well as in front of the lengthened crowd of English soldiery which lay clustering about the parapet, the enemy's masses were gathered. On their right rear there was the double-battalion column of the Kazan corps still engaged with the Royal Fusiliers. On their left and left front, there were the two remaining battalions of the Kazan corps and the four battalions of the Soudal corps; but in their immediate

front, and posted in the hollow behind the redoubt, they had before them the four superb battalions of the Vladimir Regiment. These forces were supported by the four battalions of the Ouglitz corps, which stood massed in one column on a higher slope of the Kourganè Hill. The two battalions of sailors also were in this part of the field ; and, except as regards his loss of an advantageous site for a battery, and his loss too of one gun and one howitzer, the discomfiture up to this time sustained had not lessened his strength in artillery. Moreover, 12 squadrons of Hussars and 11 sotnias of Cossacks stood drawn up close at hand on the enemy's extreme right ; so that (omitting the Kazan column, which was occupied with the Royal Fusiliers) there were impending over our disordered soldiery, then kneeling or lying down by the parapet of the redoubt, 16 battalions of infantry in a state of perfect formation, supported by powerful batteries, and by 2700 horse.

CHAP
I.

The forces
gathered
against
them.

And by this time there had sprung up amongst the Russian infantry on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill a sentiment of warlike indignation. Any Russian officer who had been standing on ground high enough to command a view of the river, must have seen that, from the moment of their first onset on the left bank, the troops which stormed the redoubt were an isolated, and, for the most part, a disordered force ; and even for some minutes after seeing them carry the work, he would be unable to make out that any supports

Warlike
indignation
of the
Russian
infantry
on the
Kourganè
Hill.

CHAP.
I.

moved up from the river were coming as yet to their aid. Naturally he would be shamed to think that many thousands of the once famous Russian infantry had been yielding up the Great Redoubt to a body which might almost be called a mere flush of skirmishers. Besides, it was known by this time in some of the Russian battalions, that of the pieces which had armed the redoubt, two were wanting, and to recover these there arose a burning desire. Unless the stain was to be lasting, it seemed clear that the red-coats still clinging to the dismantled redoubt must be driven at once down the hill.

Movement
of the Oug-
litz column.

Propelled, it would seem, by this warlike sentiment, the great column formed of the Ouglitz battalions, and posted on the high ground above the redoubt, began to descend towards our people; and for a few moments it came on, hot with zeal or anger, the men of the front ranks discharging vain, passionate shots whilst they marched, and young soldiers in the centre of the column shooting wildly into the air above them. Soon, however, this body was halted.*

But it was in the great Vladimir column that

* No mention of this suddenly arrested advance is made in the Russian accounts, and I imagine that it was a movement spontaneously undertaken by the colonel, but soon afterwards stopped by orders from some one of higher authority. The movement was observed by English officers so placed as to command a view of this part of the field, but it has been only by comparing their testimony with my knowledge of the position occupied by each Russian corps, that I have been able to infer the identity of the battalions they saw with those of the Ouglitz regiment.

there sprang up the warlike spirit which was destined to bring the foot soldiery of Russia and of England into a closer strife. The column, we know, was a mass composed of the four battalions of the Vladimir corps; and although it stood near to the English soldiery lying clustered along the outer side of the parapet, still, because drawn up in the dip behind the rear of the earthwork, it could not be perfectly seen by even such of our men as were standing up, and could not be seen at all by those who were lying down or kneeling.

For the honour of having led this high-mettled column against English infantry two men contend. From the time when Prince Mentschikoff rode off towards the sea, Prince Gortschakoff had been left in command of the whole of the forces opposed to the English; and General Kvetzinski, who commanded the Division to which the Vladimir battalions belonged, was under Prince Gortschakoff's orders. Each of these—the two last-mentioned—Generals says that (without knowing of the presence of the other) he gave orders for the advance of the column, and led it on in person. Their statements may perhaps be reconciled; for it is possible that Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski—the one riding with the left, the other with the right, of the column—may have, both of them, done what each of them said that he did. In that view of the matter the coincidence would be accounted for by supposing that the resolve of each of the two Generals sprang from the same cause—sprang

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I.

Advance of
the Vladimir
column.

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I.

in fact from the warlike anger which was heaving the general mass. I am, however, inclined to believe that Prince Gortschakoff is mistaken in his statement; * and that the impulse he gave to the Vladimir battalions was one given some minutes later, and after the movement now spoken of. Be this as it may, it is certain enough that—either alone, or jointly with Prince Gortschakoff—Kvetzinski led on the column.

These troops of the 16th Division had been touched with the warlike fire which a patriot priesthood can draw from Gospels, Epistles, and Psalms. With the baggage of the Division there was carried an image of the blessed Sergius; and when these troops were ordered to the south, the Archbishop of Moscow had taken care to whet them for the strife. ‘Children of the Czar’—so ran the Primate’s blessing—‘Children of the Czar ‘our father, and Russia our mother, my warrior ‘brethren! The Czar, your country, the Christian ‘faith, call you to brave deeds, and the prayers ‘of the Church and country are with you. . . . ‘Should it be the will of God that you too face ‘the foe, forget not that you are doing battle for ‘the most pious Czar, for our beloved country, ‘for holy Church, against infidels, against per- ‘secutors of the Christian faith—persecutors of ‘men united to us by ties of religion and of blood ‘—insulters of those who bow before the Holy ‘Places, sanctified by the birth, passion, and as-

* I found this belief upon a comparison of Prince Gortschakoff’s statements with the known facts.

‘ cension of Christ. Blessing and honour to him
 ‘ who conquers ! Blessing and happiness to him
 ‘ who, with faith in God, and love for his Czar
 ‘ and country, offers up his life as a sacrifice ! It
 ‘ is written in the Scriptures, concerning those of
 ‘ olden times who fought for their country, “ By
 ‘ “ faith were kingdoms conquered ” (Heb. xi. 33).
 ‘ Now, by faith you too shall be conquerors. Our
 ‘ most holy father Sergius whilome blessed our
 ‘ victorious war against the enemies of Russia.
 ‘ His image was borne in your ranks in the days
 ‘ of the Emperor Alexis, of Peter the Great, and,
 ‘ finally, in the great war against twenty nations
 ‘ in the reign of Alexander the First. That sacred
 ‘ form journeys with you also as a token of his
 ‘ fervent and beseeching prayers to God on your
 ‘ behalf. Take unto yourselves, moreover, the
 ‘ triumphal war-cry of the Czar and prophet
 ‘ David, “ In God is my salvation and glory ! ” *’

The Vladimir column came on. It moved slowly as though it were held in by some kind of awe or doubt. Still it moved, and without firing a shot ; for the orders were not to fire but to charge with the bayonet. Huge and grey, the mass crept gliding up the slope which divided it from our soldiery.

Our men, gathered round the parapet, were kneeling or lying down ; and being thus low they could not see into the dip which lay at a little distance before them ; but mounted officers, of course, could see farther, and even men on foot

* Psalm li. 8 ; ‘ Eastern Papers,’ part vii. p. 50.

CHAP. (especially those near to either flank of the re-
I. doubt), if they stood up for a moment to gain a wider view, could see a whole field of bayonet points, ranged close as corn, and seeming to grow taller and taller. And though none of our men knew the strength of the column which was closing upon them, yet, sometimes from what he himself saw, but more commonly by hearsay, almost every man came to know that towards the part of the parapet where he lay there was a mass of Russian soldiery coming.

The great Vladimir column at length emerged from the dip, and still withholding its fire, continued to move slowly forward, so that presently our men lying down, with their rifles levelled across the parapet, and their eyes a little above its top, were face to face with the approaching mass.

Whether owing to any high quality of the soul, or to a want of imagination, or only, after all, to a certain hardness of temperament, it is certain that the slow approach of massed infantry does not weigh on the hearts of our people as it does on the troops of the Continent; and, when our soldiers are formed in their English array, they see in a column opposing them a sensitive, frail human structure which, although indeed strong potentially, is nevertheless for the moment, and until broken up or deployed, a mere victim, a manacled giant, against men firing into its depths from a largely extended front. Even now, though our men lay in clusters without formation, they

were ready enough to begin shooting into the column; and those who first caught sight of the Russian helmets were going to deliver their fire, when suddenly they were checked by a voice which implored every man to stay his hand.

When troops are about to be overpowered, confusing rumours flit round them. The voice which had stayed the fire of our men was a voice crying out, 'The column is French!—the column is 'French! Don't fire, men! For God's sake don't 'fire!' At this moment Colonel Chester was sitting in his saddle close to the redoubt, and when he saw the soldiery beginning to catch the belief that the approaching column was French, he eagerly strove to undeceive them. Enforcing his words by gesture, he was impatiently moving his uplifted sword, as though he would say to those who might see without being able to hear, 'No! no! nonsense! the column is not French—'it is an enemy's column. Fire into it! fire into 'it!' Whilst thus striving to correct the mistake he was struck first by one shot, and then almost instantly by another. Upon receiving the first shot, he seemed to put his hand to the wound, but when the second shot struck him he dropped from his horse and fell dead.

Confusing
rumours
amongst our
soldiery.
Unauthentic
orders and
signals to
the men.

Repeated again and again, the prohibition against opening fire travelled fast along the line; and presently it was further impressed, for a bugler of the 19th, under orders from a mounted officer, began to sound the 'cease firing.'

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I.

Our men, obeying the voice thus enforced by the appeal of the bugle, withheld their fire and remained still. The belief that the column must be French was confirmed, if not caused, by observing that it delivered no fire; and although Kvetzinski has said that the front-rank men had brought down their muskets as though for a charge with the bayonet,* still the slow, formal movement of the approaching mass was so little like what the English regard as a 'charge,' that our people, so far as I know, never thought of accounting for the silence of the enemy's firelocks by suggesting that his movement was intended to be an attack with the bayonet. The Vladimir mass now halted,† as if from a suspicion of some snare, or perhaps from a dread of the unknown; and this indeed was natural enough, for although but imperfectly seeing our recumbent soldiers, the front-rank men of the column could by this time discern many forage-caps and a crowd of English faces of a fresh-coloured hue very strange to their eyes, and besides, the muzzles of rifles levelled thickly across the parapet. From mistake on one

* His expression, as rendered from the Russian into French, is, 'l'arme au bras, prête à la baionnette.'

† The Russian accounts do not speak of this halt. They represent the whole advance of the column as a bayonet-charge, and it seems quite true that the column really withheld its fire; but it would be a mistake to suppose that the forward movement of this body was marked with any of the swiftness or violence commonly associated with the idea of a 'charge.' To English eyes and English ears the slow, cumbrous advance of the Vladimir column was as different from a 'bayonet charge' as a funeral is from a horse-race, or a short, swift 'burst' with the hounds.

side, and misgiving on the other, there had come to be a strange pause; yet not along the whole line; for, either with a part of the Vladimir column or else with some other body of troops, two or three of the companies of the 33d were exchanging at this time a sharp fire. The men of the column took the fancy of pouring the main volume of their shot towards the ground where the colours of the 33d were upraised. The colours were new; and, as though the mere richness of their crimson folds were enough to draw the eye and the aim of the Russian musketeer, they were riddled in two or three minutes with numbers of balls. Of those who stood near them a large proportion were struck down.*

General Codrington, seeing that the fruits of the exploit performed by his brigade were going to be lost for want of supports, had already sent his aide-de-camp, Campbell, to press the advance of the Scots Fusilier Guards, the battalion most directly in his rear. But the very moments then passing were the moments charged with the result, and there were no other and later moments that could ever be used in their stead.

It is said—but my faith in men's impressions of what passed at this minute is wanting in strength—it is said that one of the heavy columns which the enemy had on his extreme right was

* I do not see anything in the Russian narratives which I can identify with the combat in which a part of the 33d was engaged, and I have not been able to say which of the Russian corps it was with which the 33d was at this time exchanging fire.

CHAP.

I.

A bugler
sounds the
'retire.'

Double
motive for
remaining
where they
were.

now seen to be marching upon the left flank of the English soldiery who lay clustered along the parapet of the redoubt ; * and it seems there are grounds for believing that the left of our line was the spot where a conviction of the necessity of retiring was first acted upon. According to testimony which seems to be trustworthy, a mounted officer † rode up to a bugler of the 19th Regiment, and ordered him to sound the 'retire.' The man obeyed ; and buglers along the whole line, from left to right, took up and repeated the signal. But the instinct of self-preservation, no less than the natural courage and tenacity of the soldier, made almost every man of the force very unwilling to abandon the ground ; for it happened that at this time a brisk shower of missiles was passing over the heads of our men without doing them harm ; and hearing how thickly the balls were raining into the ground behind them, they knew that a retreat would not only be an abandonment of ground dearly won, but also would bring them at once under a heavy fire. So strong was their conviction of the expediency of holding fast to the

* The Russian accounts do not confirm this belief.

† Afterwards the bugler described the officer in a way which might have enabled a court of inquiry to identify him. I may say that he was not an officer of the regiment to which the bugler belonged, that he was not a general officer, and that he did not deliver the order as coming from any one other than himself. The incident goes far to justify the opinion of officers who think that (unless it is strictly confined to the business of guiding skirmishers) the use of a bugle during an action is dangerous. See in the Appendix a Note respecting the often-repeated 'apparition of the unknown mounted officer.'

ground where they lay, that the sounding of the 'retire' was believed to have originated in some error; and in order that they might determine what should be done, the officers of several regiments, but more especially of the 23d, gathered into a group and began to consult together. Being firm, proud men, with a great self-respect, they did not, it seems, crouch for shelter under the parapet whilst exchanging counsel, and, on the contrary, remained standing upright, but under so thick a flight of balls that several—nay, they say almost all of them—were struck down and killed.* As before, so after the conference our officers continued to say that the sounding of the 'retire' must have been a mistake, and that the force ought to hold its ground.

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I.

Conference
of officers at
the parapet.

Their fate.

But then, again, and from the same quarter as before, a bugle sounded the 'retire,' and again, as before, the signal was taken up along the line. The repetition of the signal seemed to make it almost certain that the order must be authentic; but the troops were yet slow to persuade them-

The 're-
'tire' again
sounded

* I shall presently give the names of the officers who were killed in the 23d and the other regiments which stormed the redoubt, but I cannot undertake to say which of them fell at this time. In general, it seems to be almost beyond the power of human testimony to fix the time and the spot at which an officer falls when he is killed in battle. The difficulty is occasioned, not by the dearth, but by the vast abundance of testimony—testimony all seeming to be perfectly trustworthy, yet strangely contradictory. It will be seen, however, that the number of officers killed in the 23d was very great; and there is an impression that no small proportion of them met their death in the way above stated.

CHAP.
I.

Our soldiery
retreat from
the redoubt.

selves that this was the case, and they still lingered at the parapet. Then a sergeant of the 23d, standing upright in order to make himself better heard, told the men that they had twice heard the 'retire' sounded, and that they must do their duty and obey. Whilst he spoke he was shot down and killed. But it was now judged by officers and men that a signal twice made and twice carried on along the line from regiment to regiment was not to be neglected. The retreat began; and the men, quitting the shelter of the breastwork, fell back into the open ground, and incurred the fire which was pelting into the slope beneath.

As the advance had been, so also the retreat was for the most part without order, but for the most part also it was not hurried. Our soldiers in their retreat took care to ply the enemy with fire; and they picked up and carried off with them those of our wounded officers and men whom they found lying wounded on the slope. The retreat, speaking generally, was like the movement of skirmishers when they find themselves recalled to their battalions by sound of bugle.

There was, however, one part of the retreating force in which the men had become thronged together, and these presently we shall see face about with a mind to protract the struggle.*

Upon this crowd, and upon the lesser clusters of our soldiery then retreating down the hillside,

* These, I believe, were chiefly men of the 23d and 95th regiments.

the enemy might have inflicted grave losses; but apparently there was some spell which bound him; for when the Vladimir column had moved forward to the front of the breastwork, it used a strange abstinence, attempting no movement in pursuit, and coming at once to a halt. Of the two missing pieces of ordnance which the enemy had yearned to recover, one, they saw, had disappeared;* whilst the other (the howitzer) was found lying on the ground dismounted, and it proved so unwieldy that Kvetzinski says his Vladimir men were unable to drag it away. It remained in the redoubt.†

CHAP.
1.

During this conflict the five battalions‡ which stormed the redoubt had undergone cruel slaughter. In the 23d Regiment, besides Colonel Chester, Wynn, Evans, Conolly, Radcliffe, Young, Anstruther, and Butler, and 3 sergeants, were killed; and Campbell, Hopton, Bathurst, Sayer,§ and Applethwaite, and 9 sergeants, were wounded. Of the rank and file 40 were killed and 139 wounded.

Losses of
the regi-
ments which
stormed the
work.

In the 33d, Lieutenant Montagu and 3 sergeants were killed, and Colonel Blake, Major

* This was the shot-gun, now at Woolwich, that was taken by Captain Bell.

† And is the howitzer before spoken of as being now at Woolwich.

‡ These five battalions, observe, were not quite identical with the troops of equal strength which followed Codrington to the top of the bank. They no longer had with them the Royal Fusiliers, but had received the accessions which brought back their strength to that of 'five battalions.'

§ Sayer was one of those struck down by that salvo-like discharge which preceded the dismantling of the redoubt.

CHAP. I. Gough, Captain Fitzgerald, Wallis, Worthington, Siree, and Greenwood, and 16 sergeants, were wounded.* Of the rank and file 52 were killed, and 172 were wounded.

In the 95th, Colonel Webber Smith, Dowdall, Eddington, the younger Eddington, Polhill, Kingsley, Braybrook, and 3 sergeants were killed; and Hume, Reyland, Wing, Sargent, Macdonald, Garrard, Braybrook, Brooke, Boothby, Bazalgette, Gordon, and 12 sergeants, were wounded. Of the rank and file 42 were killed and 116 wounded.

In the 19th, Stockwell and Wardlaw were killed; and Cardew, Saunders, McGee, Warden, and Currie, and 4 sergeants, wounded. Of the rank and file 39 were killed and 170 wounded.

In the 2d battalion of Rifles, 2 sergeants were killed, and the Earl of Errol and 1 sergeant wounded. Of the rank and file 9 were killed and 37 wounded.

So, of the five battalions which had stormed the redoubt, there was a loss, in killed and wounded, of about 100 officers and sergeants, and 800 men.

XXV.

But what was the spell which bound the Czar's

* Colonel Blake would not report his wound, lest the account should alarm his wife and family. His horse was struck in three places. Siree, though badly wounded, insisted upon remaining out on the hillside all night, in order that men in a worse condition should be first attended to. Wallis was badly wounded, but he tied a handkerchief round the place, and remained with his regiment to the close of the battle. Worthington died from the amputation which was necessitated by the wound he received.

commanders? and why did they throw back the gifts which seemed to be brought them by the fortune of battle?

When our storming-force under Codrington was ascending the glacis in a crowd—in a crowd torn through and through by grape and canister—how came it that the enemy could suddenly make up his mind to stop the massacre and dismantle his Great Redoubt?

When the remnant of our storming-force was flocking back down the hill, why did the enemy spare from destroying it, and bring to a halt his triumphant Vladimir column?

Having several thousands of troops between the Causeway and the Kourganè Hill, why did the Russian Generals suffer Lacy Yea still to keep his stand on open ground with one disordered battalion?

We saw that when Mentschikoff, disturbed by the report of Bosquet's flank movement, rode off in great haste towards the sea, Prince Gortschakoff was left in command of all that part of the Russian army which confronted the English. Kvetzinski, the brave and able general who commanded the Division on the Kourganè Hill, was under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff; and as long as the absence of the Commander-in-chief was protracted, Gortschakoff was the officer who had to answer for the defence of the Pass, and of the whole position thence extending to the extreme right of the Russian army. Every part of the ground thus committed to Prince Gortscha-

CHAP.
I.

Cause which
paralysed
the Russians
in the midst
of their
success.

CHAP.
I.

koff's care was precious, but the Kourganè Hill was the key of the whole position on the Alma. There, and there only, the ground had been entrenched; there, and there only, heavy guns had been planted. That barren hill had become the very gage for which the Great Powers of the West and the Czar of All the Russias were to join in a strife computed to last many days. Prince Mentschikoff himself had so judged it. Establishing his headquarters on the slope overlooking the Great Redoubt, and so disposing his troops that whilst standing there he could exercise an immediate personal control over two-thirds of his whole force, he had intended that every movement of this part of the field should be under his own eyes. It might well be deemed certain that any one of Prince Mentschikoff's lieutenants entrusted, during the absence of his general, with this great charge, would be tenacious of the ground. As a general in high command, he would act upon the knowledge that the hill was vital to the whole position: as an officer commanding troops placed in a fortified work, he would be taught by the punctilio of his profession to hold his entrenchments, even at great sacrifice, until the weight of his charge should be taken from him by an order from the commander of the forces.

But there was a whim of the Emperor Nicholas which tended to weaken and disperse the authority of any man in command of his army. Longing always to make Wellington an example for his generals, but mistaking the gist of the saying that

‘the Duke never lost a gun,’ Nicholas gave his commanders to understand that the loss of a piece of ordnance would be likely to bring them into disgrace.* The result of such an intimation was just what a more sagacious prince would have easily foreseen. The commander who received the warning took good care to hand it down—to hand it all down the steps of the military hierarchy; and every general of division, every brigadier, nay, every officer who commanded a battery, was evidently made to understand that, happen what might, he must not lose a piece of artillery. In other words, every such officer was encouraged to deem the loss of a ‘position’ less calamitous than the loss of a gun, and thus brought into the mood for commencing a retreat, which perhaps under some conditions might carry with it the retreat of the whole army.

It was therefore very natural that the anxiety which had seized upon the mind of Prince Menschikoff should not only extend to Prince Gortschakoff and to General Kvetzinski, but also to the artillery officers who commanded the Causeway batteries and the guns in the Great Redoubt. Now, from the moment when Prince Menschikoff rode off towards the sea, he had never reappeared in the Pass, nor on the Kourganè Hill; he had

* The fact of the Duke never having lost a gun in action is a superb and summary proof that his career was uncheckered by the loss of a battle; but his avoidance of the loss of guns was not the cause, but the effect and the proof, of his ascendancy in war. The Duke would have scorned the notion of risking the loss of a battle for the sake of keeping his guns safe.

CHAP.
I.

sent no good tidings, and apparently had despatched no orders or directions of any kind.* With every moment the just grounds for alarm were increasing; and when the foremost divisions of the British army sprang to their feet and rapidly advanced along their whole line, the Russian generals and commanders of batteries had to cast in their minds and see how far their desire to hold fast a position very precious to the army and to the honour of the empire could be made to consist with the absolute safety of a few pieces of ordnance. They were about to be assailed by the English army. But this was not all they had to look for. The continued detention of Prince Menschikoff in that part of the position which confronted the French, gave ground for the fear that an evil crisis must there be passing. The fear would be that Bosquet's turning movement against the Russian left was producing its full effect, and that the tide of war, rolling up along the line of the Russian position, had set in from west to east.

If men were filled with this dread—a dread well justified by inference fairly drawn at the time, though not by actual facts—it would be to the Telegraph Height that they would bend their inquiring eyes, and there they would gaze with minds prepared to learn that the French, march-

* I think I might have almost ventured to leave out the 'apparently,' for although the narratives of Gortschakoff and Kvetzinski do not in terms declare that they received no orders, the tenor of their statements is all but equivalent to actual assertion.

ing eastward, had doubled up the Russian left wing, and were coming to ground from which they would look down triumphant into the flank of the Causeway batteries. Suddenly, to men thus expectant of a dreaded calamity, there was presented a sight well fitted to confirm their worst fears—nay, even to make them imagine that the whole tenor of their duty was changed. For one of the high knolls jutting up from the eastern slopes of the Telegraph Height, and closely overlooking the Russian reserves, became crowded all at once with a gay looking group of horsemen, whose hats and white plumes showed that they were Staff officers. What made the apparition seem the more fatal was that it was deep in the very heart of the Russian lines, and even somewhat near to the ground where Prince Mentschikoff had posted his reserves. It could be seen that the horsemen wore coats of dark blue—the colour of the French uniform. They were exactly on the ground where the van of the French army might hope to be if it had achieved a signal victory over the left wing of the Russian army. It was hardly to be imagined possible that the Allies could have a numerous staff in that part of the field without being there in great strength. Even a tranquil and cautious observer of the apparition could hardly have failed to infer that the French, carrying all before them, had marched through and through from west to east, and made good their way into the centre, nay, almost into the rear, of the Russian position.

Apparition
of horsemen
on a knoll in
the midst of
the Russian
position.

CHAP.
I.

Oppressed by this belief, Russian officers would be left to think that if they stood bound to provide against the possibility of losing their guns, the time they had for saving them was beginning to run very short.

The divisional general who was in command on the Kourganè Hill does not allege that he had any authority from Prince Gortschakoff or from the commander of the forces to remove the guns which armed the Great Redoubt. What he says is, that the defeat of the Kazan battalions by the English troops left the battery exposed, and necessitated its withdrawal.* General Kvetzinski, however, was the master of sixteen prime battalions, of which twelve were at this time untouched. At the time when the order must have been given for the removal of the guns, the defeat which one of his Kazan columns had sustained was nothing which, in the eyes of a man so firm as he was, would seem to justify despair.† Yet

* This is what Kvetzinski says : ‘ During this time masses of English troops were directing their steps towards the regiment of the Grand Duke Michael (the Kazan regiment). The batteries of our first lines began firing violently. Shells and missiles worked their bloody way through the lines of the enemies, but they immediately re-formed their lines, and, under cover of a strong line of bayonets and their battery then standing behind the smoky ruins of Bourliouk, they hastened to force their way over the ford in order to reach the breast-work. The Kazan regiment bravely met them, but, tormented by the destroying fire of the enemy, and having lost a frightful amount of men, was obliged to give way under the superior number of the enemy. The battery, being thus left exposed, was obliged to move.’

† Up to the same time when Kvetzinski dismantled the re-

to remove these guns was to abandon the key of the position on the Alma. It is hard to imagine that Kvetzinski could have brought himself to take such a step without trying resistance, unless he had been in some measure governed by an inculcated dread of losing guns, and also by what he wrongly imagined to be the state of the battle on the other side of the Causeway. Be this as it may, it is certain that, within some fifteen minutes from the time when the horsemen were first seen on the knoll, the Great Redoubt was dismantled.

The riders whose sudden appearance on the knoll thus scared or misled the enemy were a group of perhaps eighteen or twenty Englishmen. How came it that they were sitting unmolested in their saddles and contently adjusting their field-glasses in the heart of the Russian position?

At the time when Lord Raglan despatched to his leading divisions the final order to advance, he was riding between the French and the English armies, and was close to a road or track which led down towards a ford below the burning village. Impelled by his desire for a clear view of the coming struggle, and guided only by Fortune, or by the course of the track, he rode down briskly into the valley, followed close by his Staff, but leaving our troops in his rear. He soon reached, doubt, the only defeat which the Kazan corps had sustained was the one inflicted upon two of its battalions by the 19th Regiment and the left companies of the 23d : see *ante*. The defeat of the other two battalions—the battalions engaged with Lacy Yea—had not then occurred.

The road which Lord Raglan took when he had ordered the advance of his infantry

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soon passed through the vineyards, and gained the bank of the river.

The stream at this spot flowed rapidly, breaking against a mass of rock, which so far dammed it back as to form on the upper side of it a pool about four feet deep. One of the Staff rode into the stream at that point, and his horse nearly lost his footing. Lord Raglan, almost at the same moment, took the river on the right or lower side of the rock, and crossed it without any trouble. Though he was parted at this time from his own troops, there were several French soldiers near him. They were a part of the chain of skirmishers which covered the left flank and left front of Prince Napoleon's Division. They seemed to be engaged with some of the enemy's sharpshooters, whom they were able to discern through the foliage; for they were sheltering themselves behind vineyard walls, watching moments for firing, and receding in order to load, or cautiously peering forward. They looked surprised when Lord Raglan, with the group which followed him, rode down and passed them. More than one of them, sagacious and curious, paused in his loading, and stood gazing with ramrod half-down as though he were trying to make out how it accorded with the great science of war that the English General and his Staff should be riding through the skirmishers, and entering without his battalions into the midst of the enemy's dominions.

Though unseen by our officers, the Russian

sharpshooters, who had been exchanging shots with the French riflemen, were not far away. Of this they gave proof. Leslie dropped out of his saddle and fell to the ground. His startled horse made a move much as though he were blundering at a grip, and the fall seemed at first sight like a fall in hunting; but a rifle-ball had entered Leslie's shoulder. Nearly at the same time Weare, another of the Staff, was struck down. There was not a heavy fire, but the Russian sharpshooters had been patiently duelling with the French skirmishers, and of course, when they saw Lord Raglan and his plumed followers, they seized the occasion for easier shooting, and tried to bring down two or three of the gay cavalcade.

After gaining the left bank of the river, Lord Raglan speeded on into a kind of gully towards his right, and there for a moment he had no one very near him, except one man who had crossed the stream next after him; for the rest of the horsemen, when they reached the dry ground, had borne rather towards their left. Some one, however, from that quarter cried out, 'This seems 'a better way, my lord;' and Lord Raglan, then turning, rejoined the rest of the Staff, and took the path recommended. I do not know who the officer was who advised this road.* He has possibly forgotten the counsel he gave; but if he

* The officer was Lord Burghersh, now Lord Westmoreland. Colonel, now Major-General, Patton (who was present), has been so good as to write to me stating this; and adding, 'I heard the words.'—*Note to 5th Edition.*

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I.

remembers it, and sees how the issue was governed by taking the path which he chose, he may suffer himself to trace the gain of a battle, with all its progeny of events, to his few hurried words.

The brown bay Lord Raglan rode was of course well broken to fire, and he had been quiet enough during the earlier part of the action ; but now, suddenly, his blood rose, and for all the rest of the day he was so eager that he would hardly suffer his rider to use a field-glass from the saddle. The truth is, that in other times he had been ridden to hounds in England, and although he had long stood careless of all that was done by the Causeway batteries, yet when he and his rider and the horsemen around him cantered down into the valley, when they plunged into the river, when they briskly dashed through it, and began to gallop up the steep broken ground on the Russian side, the old hunter seemed to think of the chase and great days in the Gloucestershire country.

But it was not 'Shadrach' * alone who felt the onward impulse. They say that there lurks in the men of these isles a vestige of Man the Hunter and Man the Savage, and that this, after all, is the subtle leaven which, in spite of the dangerous inroads of luxury, still keeps alive the warlike spirit of the people and the freedom which goes along with it. It was not right—nay, if it were not that success brings justification, it

* The name of the horse.

would have been scarcely pardonable — that a general, charged with the care of an army, should be under the guidance of feelings akin to the impulses of the chase; but what one has to speak of is not of what ought to have been, but what was. By the stir and joyous animation of the moment, Lord Raglan was led on into a part of the field which he would not have sought to reach in cold blood. He would have regarded as nothing the mere difference between the risk of being struck by shot in one part of the field and the risk of being struck by shot in another; but he knew that, in general, it is from a point more or less in rear of battalions actually engaged that a chief can exercise the most constant and the most extended control over his army; and certainly an ideal commander would not suffer himself to ride to so forward a spot as to run the risk of losing the government of his troops for many minutes together in the critical period of an action: but the horseman who now rode his hunter across the valley of the Alma, and indulgently gave him his head, was not an ideal personage, but a man of flesh and blood, with many very English failings. ‘*Avant tout je suis gentilhomme Anglais*,’ was the preface of the fierce message sent by the then foremost man of the world to the King of France;* and certainly in the nature of that ‘*gentilhomme Anglais*’ the wilfulness is so firmly set that no true sample of the breed can

* To Louis the Eighteenth in the summer of 1815, shortly after his second restoration.

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I.

be altered, and altered down, to suit a pattern. The State must dispense with his services or take him as he is.

Body and soul, Lord Raglan was so made by nature, that, though he knew how to be prudent enough in the orders he gave to officers at a distance, yet when he was in the saddle directing affairs in person, and there came to be a question between holding back and going forward, his blood always used to get heated, and, like his great master, he had so often been happy in his choice of the time for running a venture, that his spirit had never been cowed. Having once begun to ride forward, he did not restrain himself. And surely there was a great fascination to draw him on. The ground was of such a kind that, with every stride of his charger, a fresh view was opened to him. For months and months he had failed to tear off the veil which hid from him the strength of the army he undertook to assail; and now suddenly, in the midst of a battle, he found himself suffered to pass forward between the enemy's centre and his left wing. As at Badajoz, in old times, he had galloped alone to the drawbridge and obtained the surrender of St Christoval, so now, driven by the same hot blood, he joyously rode without troops into the heart of the enemy's position; and Fortune, still enamoured of his boldness, was awaiting him with her radiant smile; for the path he took led winding up by a way—rather steep and rough here and there, but—easy enough

for saddle-horses; and presently in the front, but some way off towards the left, he saw before him a high commanding knoll, and, strange to say, there seemed to be no Russians near it. Instantly, and before he reached the high ground, he saw the prize and divined its worth. He was swift to seize it. Without stopping—nay, even, one almost may say, without breaking the stride of his horse—he turned to General Airey, who rode close at his side, and ordered him to bring up Adams's brigade with all possible speed. Then, still pressing on and on, the foremost rider of the Allied armies, he gained the summit of the knoll.

I know of no battle in which, whilst the forces of his adversary were still upon their ground, and still unbroken, a general has had the fortune to stand upon a spot so commanding as that which Lord Raglan now found on the summit of the knoll. The truth is, that the Russian commander had not troops enough to occupy the whole position, and the part he neglected was, happily, that very one into which Lord Raglan had ridden. During the earlier part of the day a battalion had been posted in the ravine close under the knoll; but, in an evil hour for the Czar, the battalion had been removed,* and, the enemy having no other troops in the immediate neighbourhood, and having no guns in battery which commanded the summit of the knoll, the English General, though as yet he had no troops with him, stood unmolested in the heart of the enemy's position—

Lord Raglan's position on the knoll:

* The No. 1 Taroutine battalion.—*Chodusiewicz.*


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I.

stood between that wing of the Russian army which confronted the French, and that doubly large portion of it which confronted the English. The knoll was not, indeed, so situated as to command a distant view towards our right; but, glancing to his left, or, in other words, glancing eastward and up the valley of the river, Lord Raglan saw in profile his own line of battle, but also (rare fortune!) he equally saw in profile the whole of that line of battle which the Russians opposed to his troops. Nor was even this all; for upon turning his eyes towards the rear of the enemy's Causeway batteries, he saw what then constituted the whole of Prince Mentschikoff's 'Great Reserve'—that is, a force of infantry drawn up in two heavy columns.*

The formation of each mass looked close and perfect as though it had been made of marble, and cut by rule and plumb-line. These troops being held in reserve, were, of course, on ground much less advanced than the front of the Russian array; but they were only 900 yards from the eye of the English General; for it was Lord Raglan's strange and happy destiny to have ridden through

* The three 'Minsk' battalions had been withdrawn, as we saw, from the 'Great Reserve;' and accordingly, if the Russian accounts be accurate, the two columns mentioned in the text must have included only the four 'Volhynia' battalions. It was certainly, I believe, the impression of our officers that *each* column had a strength of four battalions; but without trusting blindly to the official accounts of the Russians, I am nevertheless unwilling to cast myself loose from the guidance they offer me so far as concerns the presence or absence of particular regiments.

a gap left in the enemy's line of battle till he had approached thus closely to the very rearmost of Prince Mentschikoff's forces. CHAP.
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All this—now told with labour of words—Lord Raglan saw at a glance, and at the same moment he divined the fatal perturbation which would be inflicted upon the enemy by the mere appearance of our Headquarter Staff in this part of the field. The knoll, though much lower than the summit of the Telegraph Height, stood out bold and plain above the Pass. It was clear that even from afar the enemy would make out that it was crowned by a group of plumed officers; and, Lord Raglan's imagination being so true and so swift as to gift him with the faculty of knowing how in given circumstances other men must needs be thinking and feeling, it hardly cost him a moment to infer that this apparition of a few horsemen on the spur of a hill was likely to govern the enemy's fate. It would not, he thought, occur to any Russian general that fifteen or twenty Staff officers, whether French or English, could have reached the knoll without having thousands of troops close

his instant apprehension of the advantage gained:

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I.

at hand. The enemy's generals would therefore infer that a large proportion of the Allied force had won its way into the heart of the Russian position. This was the view which Lord Raglan's mind had seized when, at the very moment of crowning the knoll, he looked round and said, 'Our presence here will have the best effect.'* Then, glancing down, as he spoke, into the flank of the Causeway batteries, and carrying his eye round to the enemy's infantry reserves, Lord Raglan said, 'Now, if we had a couple of guns here! '*

his appeal
for a couple
of guns :

His wish was instantly seized by Colonel Dickson † and Captain Adye, both of the Royal Artillery, and one or two other officers. Captain Adye and one or two others rode off in all haste.

The rest of the group which had followed Lord Raglan remained with him upon the summit of the knoll; and now facing eastward, and making use of their field-glasses, they began to examine the battle. There was much that awaited their gaze; for the time when Lord Raglan attained this singular vantage-ground was a little anterior to the moment when our troops, led by General Codrington, sprang up as already narrated, to crown the left bank of the river.

The Light Division had not then begun to

* I heard him say so, and say so immediately upon crowning the knoll.

† Colonel Dickson of the Artillery. It was the happy accident of his being with Lord Raglan as chief of the staff of interpreters which gave him the opportunity of rendering the services narrated in the text.

emerge from the thick ground and the channel of the river; but presently some small groups, and afterwards larger gatherings of the red-coats, appeared upon the top of the river's bank on the Russian side, and at length—passing almost at right angles across Lord Raglan's line of vision—there went on before him that eager tumultuous onset of the troops, led by Codrington, which we long ago saw them maintaining until they had seized the Redoubt.

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I.

progress
of the battle
then going
on under
his eyes.

Lord Raglan knew that the distance between him and the scene of the struggle at the Redoubt was too great to allow of his then tampering with it; for any order that he might send would lose its worth in the journey, and tend to breed confusion. And it was not in his way to assuage his impatience by making impotent efforts; nor would he even give vent to his feeling by words or looks disclosing vexation. He had so great a power of preventing his animal spirits from drooping, that no one could see in his glowing countenance the faintest reflection of the sight which his eyes took in. His manner all the time was the manner of a man enlivened by the progress of a great undertaking without being robbed of his leisure. He spoke to me, I remember, about his horse. He seemed like a man who had a clue of his own, and knew his way through the battle.

Watching the onslaught of Codrington's brigade, Lord Raglan had seen the men ascend the slope and rush up over the parapet of the Great Re-

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I.

doubt. Then moments, then whole minutes—precious minutes—elapsed, and he had to bear the anguish of finding that the ground where he longed to see the supports marching up was still left bare. Then—a too sure result of that default—he had to see our soldiery relinquishing their capture and retreating in clusters down the hill.

A French
aide-de-
camp on
the knoll.

Moreover, at that moment affairs were going ill with the French. The appearance of our Headquarters on the knoll had been marked by our Allies as well as by the enemy; for now a French aide-de-camp, in great haste, came climbing up the knoll to seek Lord Raglan. He seemed to be in a state of grievous excitement; but perhaps it was the violence of his bodily exertion which gave him this appearance, for he had quitted his horse in order the better to mount the steep, and he rushed up bareheaded to Lord Raglan, but so breathless from his exertions that for a moment he could hardly articulate; and when he spoke, he spoke panting. He persisted in remaining uncovered. What he came to ask was that Lord Raglan would give some support to the French; and, as a ground for the demand, he urged that the French were hardly pressed by the enemy. ‘My Lord,’ he said—‘my Lord, my Lord, we have ‘before us eight battalions!’* One could see, or imagine that one saw, what was passing in Lord Raglan’s mind. He was pained by thinking that,

His mission.

* ‘Milord, milord, nous avons devant nous huit bataillons.’
I heard him say those words.

either from mental excitement or from the violence of his bodily exertion, the officer should seem CHAP.
I.
discomposed; but what tormented him most was Lord Raglan's way
the sight of the young man standing bareheaded, with L.M.
for to tell him to be covered would be to assume that the bared head was an obeisance meant to be rendered to himself. Bending in his saddle, Lord Raglan turned kindly round towards his right—towards the side of his maimed arm—and his expression was that of one intent to assuage another's pain, but the sunshine of the last two days had tanned him so crimson that it masked the generous flush which used to come to his face in such moments. He did not look at all like an anxious and vexed commander who had to listen to a desponding message in the midst of a battle. He was rather the courteous, lively host entertaining a shy, youthful visitor, and trying to place him at his ease. In his comforting, cheerful way, he said, 'I can spare you a battalion.*' But it was something of more worth than the promise of a battalion that the aide-de-camp carried back with him. He carried back tidings of the spirit in which Lord Raglan was conducting the battle. At the time when the French were cast down, it was of some moment to them to learn that the

* 'Je puis vous donner un bataillon.' I heard Lord Raglan make that answer. Lord Raglan, I imagine, meant to fulfil the promise by detaching one of the two battalions about to arrive under Adams; but by the time that force came up the course of events rendered it unnecessary to send the promised aid. However, Sir Richard England afterwards moved into the close neighbourhood of Prince Napoleon's Division.

CHAP.
I.

English Headquarters, strangely placed as they were in the midst of the Russian position, were a scene of robust animation, and that Lord Raglan looked and spoke like a man who had the foe in his power.

XXVI.

Causes of
the depres-
sion which
had come
upon the
French.

Operations
on the
Telegraph
Height.

It is now time to speak of events which had been bringing the French army into a state of increased depression. We saw that General Kiriakoff, commanding the Russian left wing, had charge of the Telegraph Height, and confronted the Divisions of Prince Napoleon and Canrobert, having also on his left and left front, though at greater distances, the two separated brigades of Bosquet's Division, and the five battalions of Turks. The infantry force remaining under Kiriakoff's orders had been reduced, by Prince Menschikoff's abstraction of the 'Moscow' troops, to a force of only nine battalions; and afterwards, when the second 'Moscow' battalion rejoined the rest of the corps, the infantry force remaining under Kiriakoff consisted only of the four 'Taroutine' and the four 'Militia' battalions. The part which these 'Taroutine' and 'Militia' battalions had been taking in the battle may be told in a summary way. They did not attack the French, and were not themselves attacked by any French infantry; but, because kept massed in battalion columns, upon slopes which faced towards their adversaries, they were exposed to a good deal of artillery-fire at long range, and were from

time to time forced to shift their ground. The 'Militia' battalions were troops of inferior quality; and finding at last that, wherever they stood, they were more or less galled by artillery, they dissolved.* So, although he was supported by Prince Mentschikoff in person, with 'the column of the 'eight battalions,' of which we shall presently speak, yet in his own hands Kiriakoff had only four battalions of sound infantry with which to show a countenance to thirty thousand Frenchmen and Turks. But on the other hand, both of Bosquet's brigades were distant. General Canrobert, indeed, had so spread out his battalions on the verge of the plateau, as to have them in readiness for an encounter, so soon as his guns should come up; and having somewhat brought round his right shoulder, he fronted towards the Telegraph, but, because still without his artillery, he was hanging back in expectancy on the steep broken ground close below the smooth cap of the hill.

Prince Napoleon's Division at this time was in the bottom of the valley close to the river; and, indeed, of the whole force which the Prince at this time had around him, there were only two battalions which had hitherto forded the stream.† To the hopes which the French army had of being

Backwardness of the 3d French Division.

* Chodasiewicz.

† The battalion of the 19th Chasseurs, and one of the battalions of the Marine Corps. The 2d Zouave Regiment had also crossed, but this, it will presently be seen, was not a part of the force which Prince Napoleon 'had' around him.'

CHAP.
I.

able to take a great part in the action, this backwardness of one of their finest divisions was almost ruinous; and it is natural enough that a divisional general, whose rank gave him shelter from the ordeal of a fair military investigation, should for that very reason be made to suffer the more bitterly from the stings which men robbed of their freedom are accustomed to plant with the tongue.

Prince
Napoleon.

Resembling the first French Emperor in outward looks, Prince Napoleon was also very like his uncle, not apparently in his main objects, but in the character of his intellect; for he had that rare and exceeding clearness of view which man is able to command when he can separate things essential from things of circumstance, and keep the two sets of thoughts so clean asunder as to be able to go to the solution of his main problem with a mind unclouded by details—unclouded by even those details which it is vital for him to master and provide for, though he refuses to let them mix with the elements from which he fetches out his conclusion. And although one cannot help knowing that the most cruel of all the imputations which can be brought against a soldier has long been kept fastened upon Prince Napoleon, I may say that the knowledge of his peculiar career which I have hitherto chanced to gain is far from being such as to warrant a denial of his personal courage.

The mishaps
which befell
him.

Before the delinquency of the 3d French Division on the day of the Alma is accepted as one

of the grounds which entitle the world to ratify its harsh judgment against Prince Napoleon, men ought in all fairness to know the mishap which befell the Division, and to understand the considerations which rendered this same mishap a much more grave evil than it might seem to be at first sight.

CHAP
I.

The French are so military a people that, when a great national sentiment is once aroused, the very children are ready to seize their little muskets and fall into columns of companies; but in the mean time, and until the mighty nation is challenged, the great bulk of the French peasantry are perhaps more homely, more rustic, more unadventurous than most of the people of Europe. From these quiet millions of people, many tens of thousands of small, sad, harmless-looking young men are every year torn by the conscription; and immense energy—energy informed with the traditions of an ancient and ever warlike nation—is brought to bear upon the object of turning these forlorn young captives into able soldiers. All that instruction can achieve is carefully done; but the enforced change from rural life to the life of barracks and camps seems not to be favourable to the animal spirits of the men: for although, when seen in masses or groups working hard at their military duties, they always appear to be brisk, and almost merry, their seeming animation is the result of smart orders—the animation of a horse when the rowels on either side are lightly touch-

The materials from which the bulk of the French army is taken.

CHAP.
I.

The great difference between their choice regiments and the rest of their troops.

Each Division, therefore, is furnished with a Zouave or other choice regiment.

ing his flanks ; and during the hours whilst they are left to themselves, the French soldiers of the line engaged in campaigning are commonly depressed and spiritless.* Of course, this want of lustiness in the French army is superbly masked by all the resources of military pomp, and all the outward signs which seem to show the presence of vigour, despatch, and warlike ardour ; but the material of which the line regiments are composed must always keep a good deal of its original nature ; and whoever glances at the rising steps of French officers successful in Africa will find that they have climbed to eminence, not by leading troops of the line, but by obtaining, in the critical part of their career, the command of choice French regiments, or, failing that, the command of troops of foreign race.† These choice French regiments are not composed of materials at all like those which supply the line : on the contrary, they number in their ranks many thousands of bold, adventurous men who take service in the army of their own accord ; and it is in these choice regiments that France sees the true expression of her warlike nature. Of all these choice regiments the ‘Zouaves’ are the most famous ; and each of the three foremost Divisions of the French army on the Alma had in it a regiment—a regiment with its two war battalions—belonging to the corps of the Zouaves. What

* I rest this upon what I have seen of the French army in Africa, in the Crimea, and on board ship.

† i.e., of the Foreign Legion, or of the native African levies.

the spear-head is to a spear, that its Zouave Regiment was to each of these three Divisions.*

CHAP.
I.

Prince Napoleon's division comprised 9000 men; and of these, some 2000 were men of the 2d Regiment of Zouaves. Whether this regiment was impatient of the supposed slowness with which Prince Napoleon had hitherto advanced—whether it was governed by its contempt of line regiments, and a fierce resolve to have no neighbourship with any other than Zouave comrades—or whether there were other causes which shaped its movements, I have not learnt; but what happened was this: the regiment after fording the river, broke away from the unfortunate Division to which it belonged, marched off towards its right front, began to climb the height, and never stopped until it had coolly ranged itself close alongside of the 1st Zouave Regiment—a regiment which formed the left of Canrobert's array. With Canrobert's Division, instead of with Prince Napoleon's, the regiment continued to act until the close of the battle. Before men are hard upon a divisional general for his seeming backwardness in an action, they ought to allow for the misfortune which left him indeed the master of some 7000 men, but robbed him of the warlike corps on which he must have relied as the element for giving life and fire to his

Prince
Napoleon is
abandoned
by his
Zouave
regiment.

* I have borrowed this expressive image from Lord Clyde, who used it once in conversation as a means of illustrating the kind of power which even a large body of our native Indian troops is accustomed to derive from the presence of one or two English battalions.

CHAP.
I.

masses. For, if one might recur to the image already used, one would say that the spear-head had flown off, and that what remained in the hands of Prince Napoleon was only the wooden shaft. Justice in this regard is the more needful, since it would plainly be unfitting and impolitic for Prince Napoleon to say in his defence, that with 7000 French troops around him he was still reduced to helplessness by the want of his Zouave Regiment.

Also St Arnaud was riding with this Division, and he therefore was answerable for its place in the field.

There is another consideration which alone would seem to free Prince Napoleon from almost all the blame founded upon the backwardness of his Division. In the midst of that very Division, Marshal St Arnaud was all this time riding; and it is obvious that by being thus present with a force which was hanging back out of its place, the officer who commanded the whole French army brought full upon his own shoulders the weight of the blame which might otherwise be thrown upon the divisional general.

D'Aurelle's brigade thrusts itself forward in advance of Prince Napoleon;

But the eloping of his Zouave Regiment was not the only mishap which befell Prince Napoleon. We saw that D'Aurelle's brigade—a brigade forming part of the 4th or Reserve Division—had been ordered to support Canrobert. Of the motives which governed the leader of this brigade I know nothing. Perhaps, whilst he was low down in the bottom of the valley, he lost his conception of the distance (the lateral distance from east to west) which separated him from the Division he was ordered to support. At all

events, what he did was this: having his whole brigade in a close, deep, narrow column, he pushed forward and jammed it into a steep road exactly in front of Prince Napoleon's foremost battalion. He thus made it impossible for Prince Napoleon to get into action by that road,* and put him in the plight of a man left behind—in the plight of a general who commands one of the Divisions intended to be foremost, and yet is left planted with his force in the rear of troops meant to act as reserves. Nor did D'Aurelle's brigade do any the least good by thus thrusting itself into the road in advance of Prince Napoleon; for, either because of the nature of the ground or from some other cause, the brigade never spread itself out so as to be capable of fighting. Always in deep column with narrow front, it hung back clinging fast to the steep part of the hill, and remaining unseen by Kiriakoff, who moved freely across its front as though there were no such force on the hill-side. Upon the whole, the result was, that, taken together, D'Aurelle's brigade and Prince Napoleon's mutilated Division were a column of near 12,000 men, which might be said to be in mere order of march during all the critical period of the battle; for, with a depth of nearly a mile, the column had a front of only a few yards. Thus disposed, the 12,000 men who formed the column were not, of course, in a state which allowed of their attempting to engage an

but in an order which incapacitates it from any immediate combat.

* There was another road by which the Prince could, and by which at a later period he did, ascend.

CHAP.
I.

Helplessness
of the deep
column
which was
formed by
D'Aurelle's
brigade and
Prince
Napoleon's
Division.

enemy inclined to make a stand against them ; and they were even, it would seem, very helpless for purposes of mere self-defence.* Indeed, it is hard to see how they could have escaped a great disaster, if a bold Russian officer who knew the ground had come down with a few score of light-infantry men upon the flank of D'Aurelle's brigade. Apparently Kiriakoff's abstinence from all enterprises of this sort, and the quiet confidence with which he afterwards manœuvred on the plateau, were both owing to the steepness of ground which hindered him from perceiving the small slender head of D'Aurelle's column.

Condition
of Kiriakoff
on the
Telegraph
Height.

Upon the whole, then, Kiriakoff, though handling no forces except his two batteries, his four Taroutine battalions, and his fast-dissolving militiamen, was not at this time out of heart. His artillery, sweeping down the smooth cap of the Telegraph Height, both on its northern and north-western sides, commanded the only ground by which Canrobert could advance ; and, firing over the heads of the Taroutine battalions, effectually kept him down. Moreover, it still tormented all those masses of French infantry which, though approaching the Telegraph Height, were not yet so close as to have come in for the shelter which the steepness of the hillside afforded.

And now we shall see the cause of the stress

* See the plan showing the way in which Prince Napoleon's Division and D'Aurelle's brigade were disposed. It is taken from the official French plan of the 'Atlas de la Guerre 'd'Orient.'

which had been put upon the French army by that incubus of the 'eight battalions' of which the aide-de-camp spoke. We left Prince Mentschikoff countermarching from west to east with the seven battalions which he had under his personal orders. The detached battalion of the 'Moscow' corps had been afterwards called in, and its junction brought up the whole body to eight battalions. With this force gathered in mass, and standing halted on the right rear of the Telegraph, Prince Mentschikoff was preparing to make an onslaught upon the head of Canrobert's Division; but just as he was going to move, he abandoned the idea of leading the column in person. The cause of this change is obvious. Evidently Prince Mentschikoff was called off to another part of the field by tidings of what the English were doing.

CHAP.
I.

The 'column
' of the eigh
' battalions

Kiriakoff had had a horse shot under him, and was standing on foot near one of his 'Taroutine' battalions, when Prince Mentschikoff rode up, and (apparently suppressing the tidings which forced him to quit this part of the field) gave Kiriakoff the charge of the great 'column of the 'eight battalions' which had been amassed for the purpose of an attack upon Canrobert's Division. The Prince then rode off, and was not seen again or heard of in this part of the field. Of course it follows that he went as straight as he could towards that part of his position which was undergoing the assault of the English.*

Kiriakoff
is invested
with the
charge of
this column

* I say 'it follows,' because Prince Mentschikoff was a brave

CHAP.
I.

He marches
it across the
front of
D'Aurelle's
brigade;

Kiriakoff instantly took a fresh horse and rode to the ground—ground on the right rear of the Telegraph—where the ‘column of the eight battalions’ awaited him. This vast column he disposed in a solid body, with a front of two, and a depth of four massed battalions. When all was ready, he began to move it flankwise from east to



west. Plainly hindered by the ground from seeing the head of the column which was formed by D'Aurelle's brigade and Prince Napoleon's Division, he dealt with the French as though they had no such force near; for with that heavy column of his, which trailed, as we have seen, to a depth of four battalions, he marched straight across the front of D'Aurelle's brigade. He marched in peace. Nay, so far were the French from looking upon his hazardous movement in the light of a gift offered them by Fortune, that it was the dread apparition of this vast Russian column which had sent the panting aide-de-camp to the side of Lord Raglan's stirrup.

man, incapable of quitting one of the two scenes of battle except for the purpose of going to the other. In the mention which they make of Prince Mentschikoff's presence in different parts of the field, the narratives of the Russian divisional generals leave a chasm of several important minutes. This chasm, as will be seen at a later page, I try to fill up by conjecture.

CHAP.
I.

and then
advances
upon the
right centre
of Canrobert's Division.

Bending afterwards more towards the north, Kiriakoff advanced upon the right centre of the ground on which Canrobert had spread his battalions. Canrobert's troops did not long stand their ground; for when Kiriakoff, advancing and still advancing, was nearly at last within musket-shot of his foe, the French no longer bore up under the weight that is laid upon the heart of a Continental soldier by the approach of a great column of infantry. Kiriakoff conceives that he inflicted a sheer defeat upon his foe. 'Canrobert's Division,' he writes, 'could not resist our charge. Hastily taking off their batteries, they began to descend the hilly bank.'* On the other hand, the French say nothing of this reverse. Perhaps the truth lies intermediately between the broad assertion of Kiriakoff and the unfaithful silence of the French; for what seems the most likely is, that Canrobert, being still without his artillery, was for the moment resolved to decline the combat, and that with that view, and of his own free will, without waiting to be put under stress of actual fight, he drew his troops down to a steeper part of the hillside. Be this as it may, it is certain that, under the pressure of Kiriakoff's great column, the head of Canrobert's Division fell back.†

The head of
Canrobert's
Division
falls back.

* Kiriakoff's narrative. It will be observed that his statement clashes with the passage in which I say that Canrobert was without his guns. I have relied upon the detailed statements supplied to me from French sources; and if I am right in doing so, it follows that Kiriakoff must have been mistaken in supposing that he saw the French carrying off their guns.

† Upon this point Kiriakoff's narrative is confirmed by

CHAP.
I.

State of the
battle at
this time.

Along almost their whole array at this time it seemed to fare ill with the Allies. Still close to the sea-shore, Bonat, with one French brigade and 5000 Turks, was without artillery, and was therefore holding back from the plateau, far away from any scene of strife. Following the same barren track, General Forey with Lourmel's brigade was marching to the sea-shore, and was annulled. Bosquet, with his one brigade on the plateau, had long been isolated, and was not so near to any Russian battalion as to be able to engage it with his infantry. Canrobert was undergoing the check which we have just seen. The unwieldly column formed by D'Aurelle's brigade and by Prince Napoleon's Division—a column with a front of only a few yards and the depth of a mile—was in an order adapted for the march, but not for fighting, and, its small slender crest being kept close down out of sight, had failed to exert that pressure which, even without firing a shot, may be inflicted by the known presence of a great body of troops. And the forces thus palsied were nothing less than the whole French army, including even their reserves. Much, of course, might always be hoped from the bravery and the swift invention of the warlike French; but apart from that vast though undefined resource, and apart from what fortune might do for him, Marshal St Arnaud was without the

Romaine. Writing from his saddle, and at the very minute of witnessing the event, he recorded it in these words: 'French 'centre falling back.'—Romaine's saddle-notes.

means which would enable him to bear up against any grave disaster, and hinder it from becoming sheer ruin. CHAP.
I.
————

The fortunes of the English had been checkered; and it might be said that at this moment their prospects were a good deal overcast. Evans, still repressed by the commanding fire of the Causeway batteries, and having but three battalions to fight with, was sustaining a hard conflict. Codrington's people had been forced to relinquish their hold of the Great Redoubt; and the shattered remains of the battalions which stormed the work were not only descending the slope of the hill, but (as will be afterwards seen more particularly) breaking down by their bodily weight the left wing of a battalion of Guards. Finally, General Buller, on our extreme left, was in an attitude of mere defence. It is true that the Great Redoubt had been dismantled—that (with the exception of the centre battalion of the Guards) our supports had not yet tried their prowess—and that the bare apparition of our Headquarter Staff on the knoll was putting a heavy stress on the enemy. It is true, also, that there was one English regiment still fighting with a Russian column. All else had of late gone ill.

XXVII.

This was the condition of things when Lord Raglan's sudden, vehement longing for 'a couple of guns' received its happy fulfilment. Captain

CHAP.
I.

The two guns which Lord Raglan had called for are brought to the top of the knoll.

Their fire enfilades the Causeway batteries, and causes the enemy to withdraw his guns.

Adye, upon hearing the commander's words, had galloped down to the river, and there had found Turner's battery making its way across the ford. Adye's manner and words carried with them, if so one may speak, the exceeding eagerness of Lord Raglan; and, the commander of the battery (Captain Turner) being a determined and most able officer, two of his guns were dragged up to the top of the knoll with extraordinary despatch. Captain Turner came up in person with the part of his battery thus hurried forward. The two pieces, when once on the top, were soon unlimbered; and one of them—for the artillerymen had not all been able to keep pace—was worked by Colonel Dickson with his own hands. The guns were pointed upon the flank of the Causeway batteries. Every one watched keenly for the result of the first shot. The first shot failed. Some one said, 'Allow a little more for the wind;' and the words were not spoken as though they were a quotation from 'Ivanhoe,' but rather in a way showing that the speaker knew something of artillery practice.* The next shot, or the next shot but one, took effect upon the Causeway batteries. It struck—so men said—a tumbril drawn up close in rear of the guns.

It presently became a joyful certainty that the Causeway batteries, exposing their flank to this

* I might well say the words sounded as though coming from one who 'knew something of artillery practice,' for, as I now know, the speaker was Captain, now Colonel, Turner himself, the officer commanding the battery

fire from the knoll, could not hold their ground; and in a few moments a keen-eyed officer, who was one of the group around Lord Raglan, cried out with great joy, 'He is carrying off his guns!' And this was true. The field-pieces which formed the Causeway batteries were rapidly limbered up and dragged to another ground far up in the rear.*

With the two great columns of infantry which constituted the enemy's reserves it fared no better. After not more than two failures, the gunner got their range, and our nine-pounders ploughed through the serried masses of the two Russian columns, cutting lanes through and through them. Yet for some minutes the masses stood firm; and even when the still increasing havoc at length overruled the punctilio of those brave men, it seemed to be in obedience to orders, and not under the stress of any confusing terror, that the two great columns gave way. They retreated in good order.

It ploughs through the enemy's reserves, and drives them from the field.

Our gunners then tried their pieces upon the Vladimir battalions, and although the range was too great to allow of their striking the column, they impressed Kvetzinski with a contrary belief. He was sure that these troops were reached by the guns on the knoll; and it will be seen by-and-

* Kiriakoff says that these guns were dragged off by the men of the Borodino corps. I do not think that there were any observers on 'Lord Raglan's knoll' who saw guns dragged from the field by infantry; but there were features in the ground which prevented their seeing into the line of retreat as effectually as they had seen into the batteries.

CHAP. I. by that the belief he thus harboured was destined to be one of the causes contributing to govern his movements.

The Ouglitz column was stopped in its advance

So also was the Vladimir.

This was the time when the great column of the Ouglitz corps, being fired, as it seemed, with a vehement spirit, was still marching down from the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill with a mind to support the Vladimir battalions, and enable them to press the retreat of our soldiery then coming down in clusters from the Great Redoubt; but the disasters which Lord Raglan had that moment inflicted upon the enemy by the aid of the two guns on the knoll, made it natural for the Russian Generals, who saw what was done, to stop short in any forward movement. The Ouglitz column, as we before saw, was stopped in the midst of its eager advance; and for want of the support which these troops had been going to lend, the triumphant Vladimir column was brought to a halt on the site of the Great Redoubt.

So here was the spell which now for several minutes had been governing the battle. The apparition of a score of plumed horsemen on this knoll may have had more or less to do with the resolve which led Kvetzinski to dismantle the Great Redoubt: but, at all events, this apparition, and the fire of Lord Raglan's two guns, had enforced the withdrawal of the Causeway batteries; had laid open the entrance of the Pass; had shattered the enemy's reserves; had stopped the onward march of the Ouglitz battalions; and had chained

up the high-mettled Vladimir in the midst of its triumphant advance.

CHAP.
I.

XXVIII.

On and near the great road leading down to the bridge, Evans had been continuing his difficult struggle. He still shared with the flames the possession of the village—still held the vineyards below it; and a part of his small force had succeeded, as already shown, in crossing the river, and establishing itself under the bank on the Russian side; but beyond the ground thus gained, Evans had not yet been able to push; for the Causeway batteries were so well placed, and so diligently served, that they closed the mouth of the Pass.

Progress
hitherto
made by
Evans.

The force around Evans was scant, but in other times he had commanded an army; and whilst he watched the efforts of the only three battalions remaining near him, he was alive to the progress of the action in other parts of the field.* He had just witnessed the onset of Codrington's brigade; and he was sitting in his saddle tormented with the grief of observing that, for want of supports, the storming of the Great Redoubt was likely to be all in vain, when suddenly he heard the report

* The three battalions near him were the 47th (Adams's brigade), and the 30th and the 55th, both belonging to General Pennefather's. The 95th, as we saw, was carried forward in the rush of Codrington's brigade, and (with the exception of the 47th Regiment) Evans's second brigade (the one commanded by General Adams) was in another part of the field.

CHAP.
I.

Guns heard
resounding
from the
knoll:

their visible
effect upon
the Cause-
way bat-
teries.

of a nine-pounder gun sounding from a very new quarter—sounding from somewhere among the knolls and broken ground on his right front, and in the heart of the Russian position. The fire was repeated. Evans keenly watched the Causeway batteries in his front. And not in vain, for again the nine-pounder was heard, and there followed that sort of change in the Russian batteries which seemed to show that they were under fire—under fire coming flankwise from the west. Again and again the fire of the nine-pounder was repeated. The sound came from a quarter to which it was to be expected that the French might have reached; but some, they say, fancied and said, ‘That is an English gun!’ Whoever so spake had an ear for the music of battle, the nine-pounder thus heard being one of the two that Lord Raglan had brought up to the knoll. A busy change began to stir in the Russian batteries. Presently, though the smoke of the burning village lay heavy in this part of the field, our people could make out what the change was. It was one of great moment to the Allies; for the enemy was limbering up, and beginning to carry off the sixteen guns which up to this minute had barred the mouth of the Pass. The great road lay open.

Evans ad-
vancing.

Evans understood the battle. He acted instantly. He saw that though he was weak, yet the moment had come for the advance of his three battalions.

The 47th Regiment under Colonel Haly had to

ford the river below the bridge,* and at a part where the water was deep. It encountered a good deal of difficulty in crossing. Some men were drowned, but the rest gained the bank on the Russian side of the stream and moved forward. Evans rode across the stream at a point between the 47th and the two battalions of Pennefather's brigade.

CHAP.
I.

Advance
of the 47th:

With these two battalions (the 30th and the 55th regiments) General Pennefather was present in person. Colonel Hoey, commanding the 30th, needed no order to advance. Understanding the business of war, he had already gained a lodgment for his battalion under the farther bank of the river, and was plying the Russian artillerymen with rifle fire when he observed that the enemy's batteries suddenly slackened their fire. He inferred the change that was coming; and at once caused his men to spring up the bank, formed them carefully on the top, and then, having his battalion in a beautiful line, marched straight up towards the site of the Causeway batteries.

of the 30th:

When the 55th was approaching the Alma, General Pennefather had desired that the battalion should advance in line; but after forming two or three groups which were immediately struck down by the enemy's shot, he allowed its commander

of the 55th.

* The enemy seems to have imagined that his sappers and miners (who had been posted near for the purpose) had effectually destroyed the bridge; but this was an error. When our people obtained the dominion of it, they found the parapet wanting, but the bridge itself sound.

CHAP.
I.

(Colonel Warren) to follow a more summary method. Colonel Warren instantly crossed the river, and formed the battalion in line under cover of a spur or rising-ground at the base of the hills. When the line had been formed, it moved forward, General Pennefather leading in front. At that time the line of the 55th was parallel with the river.

The enemy does not further resist this advance with his infantry.

From first to last the enemy, so far as I know, had done but little with the formed battalions of his Borodino regiment disposed in this part of the field; * and he now began to draw in the multitude of skirmishers which had hitherto swarmed in the valley.† He did not engage his infantry in further endeavours to bar the mouth of the Pass, nor even show one of his battalions in this part of the great road; but upon the hillocks, a good way in rear of the ground just abandoned by the Causeway batteries, he again established his guns; and from this new position, though not with great effect, he opened fire upon our advancing troops.

Evans, joined by Sir Richard England in person, now has with him thirty guns.

To this fire General Evans was presently able to reply with a strong force of artillery; for Sir Richard England rode up, proposed to accompany him in the advance, and offered to place both his batteries at Evans's disposal. So the two divi-

* General Kiriakoff says, as we have already mentioned, that the Borodino battalions dragged away the guns of the Causeway batteries, but I cannot find any other distinct statement of things done by the regiment in the course of the battle.

† Skirmishers drawn partly from the four Borodino battalions, and partly also from the No. 6 Rifle battalion.

sional generals now rode forward together, having with them in all thirty guns.*

Moreover, the infantry of Sir Richard England's Division was following him into the Pass, and would soon bring a welcome support to Evans's three battalions.†

But some minutes elapsed before these supports could come up; and, by reason of what had befallen our soldiery on the Kourganè Hill, the three battalions which Evans had with him were for some time almost alone upon the enemy's ground. Yet not utterly; for, on the western slope of the Kourganè Hill, one English battalion—Lacy Yea, with his Royal Fusiliers—was still holding its ground, still engaged with

Sir Richard England's dispositions for bringing support to Evans.

* *i.e.*, the three batteries belonging respectively to the 1st, the 2d, and the Light Divisions, and two belonging to the 3d, Sir Richard England's Division.

† Apparently Sir Richard England did not know of what had befallen the Scots Fusilier Guards in time to be able to adapt his measures to that event. Of course, if he had known it in time, he would have been anxious to put a literal interpretation upon the order 'to support the Guards,' and would have moved a part of his force towards the chasm which had been wrought in the centre of the brigade of Guards. I took pains to make out the exact movements of the 3d Division, but in vain; for those who would be the most likely to know differ broadly the one from the other. By further trouble I might have dispelled this obscurity; but the Division was not engaged to an extent greater than might be inferred from its losses (one killed and seventeen wounded), and therefore I have desisted from further endeavours. It may be safely said, however, that after receiving the order to support the Guards, Sir Richard England held his Division in hand, sending portions of it to give support where he deemed it to be needed; and that when Pennefather's brigade crossed the river it was followed by the whole or by the bulk of the 3d Division.

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I.

Evans's
situation
in the
mean time.

a mass of the enemy's infantry. That stand that Lacy Yea had been making was a hinge on which a good deal might turn. If he should hold his ground a few minutes more, he would cover from the enemy's masses the left flank and left front of Evans's three battalions, and at the end of that time the supports would be up. Evans was an old commander, who knew how to read the signs of a battle, and he was able to see and understand that the enemy, almost in the very moment of his success at the Great Redoubt, was palsied by the guns still sounding from the knoll, and was losing his freedom of action. He resolved to stand firm in the Pass; and he established his thirty guns near the site of the batteries which had just been withdrawn by the Russians. For some minutes, his position was rather critical; and he had to trust much to the hope that Lacy Yea and his Fusiliers would be able to hold their ground.

XXIX.

Protracted
fight be-
tween the
Royal
Fusiliers
and the
left Kazan
column.

It was between the Great Causeway and the slopes of the Kourganè Hill that Lacy Yea, with his Royal Fusiliers, had long been maintaining an obstinate conflict. Long ago, as we saw, he had crossed the river, had brought his men to the top of the bank, and was trying to form them, when there came down marching upon him a strong Russian column—a column of two battalions, and numbering some 1500 men. These

battalions belonged to the Kazan regiment—a corps which loyal Russians had patience to call ‘the Regiment of the Grand Duke Michael.’ After having marched down some way, the column came to a halt.

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I.

It was then that, for the first time in that war, the soldiery of the Western Powers were brought so near to a body of Russian troops as to be able to scrutinise its material. The men of the column were of high stature and strictly upright, with broad, plain, whitish faces, all seemingly cast in a common mould, and very similar the one to the other. The long grey over-coat, worn alike by all the officers and men of the Russian forces, and reaching down to the ankles, gave no clue to distinguish this mass from any other of the Czar’s battalions; but spiked helmets, glittering with burnished plates of brass, led some of the English to imagine that the column formed part of the Emperor’s guard.* The body was formed with great precision in close column, with a front of only one company; but a chain of skirmishers thrown out on either flank in prolongation of the front rank, sought to combine with the solid formation of the column some of the advantages of an array in line.† The steady men were in

* The notion was altogether ill-founded, there being none of the Imperial Guard in the Crimea.

† The advantages of this hybrid formation were strongly urged about the middle of the last century by General Lloyd, an Englishman. General Lloyd was an officer in the service of Russia, and it seems probable that the formation, of which he was a vehement advocate, may have been adopted in the Russian service in consequence of his advice.

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the front and on the flanks of the column ; and the constant firing in the air which went on in the interior of the mass showed that that was the place assigned to the young soldiers. The column stood halted at a distance of, perhaps, some fifty yards from the knotted chain of soldiery which represented the Royal Fusiliers.

Lacy Yea was so rough an enforcer of discipline that he had never been much liked in peace-time by those who had to obey him ; but when once the Fusiliers were in campaign, and still more when they came to be engaged with the enemy, they found that their chief was a man who could and would seize for his regiment all such chances of welfare and glory as might come with the fortune of war. They were destined to learn before many months should pass over that, although other regiments might be dying of want, yet, by force of their Colonel's strong will, there was food and warmth to be got for the Royal Fusiliers ; and already they well understood that the fiery nature of their chief was a quality good in battle. The martinet of the barrack-yard was in war-time a trusted ruler—a king beloved by his people.

Lacy Yea had not time to put his Fusiliers in their wonted array, for the enemy's column was so near that, forthwith and at the instant, it was necessary to ply it with fire ; but what man could do, he did. His very shoulders so laboured and strove with the might of his desire to form line, that the curt red shell-jacket he wore was as

though it were a world too scant for the strength of the man and the passion that raged within him; but when he turned, his dark eyes yielded fire, and all the while from his deep-chiselled, merciless lips, there pealed the thunder of imprecation and command. Wherever the men had got clustered together, there, fiercely coming, he wedged his cob into the thick of the crowd—the ‘rooge’ he would call it, in his old Eton idiom of speech—and by dint of will tore it asunder. Though he could not form an even array, yet he disentangled the thickest clusters of the soldiery, and forced the men to open out into a lengthened chain, approaching to line formation. Numbers of the Fusiliers were wanting, and, on the other hand, there were mingled with the battalion many of the soldiery of other regiments. With a force in this state, Yea was not in a condition to attempt a charge or any other combined movement. All he could hope to be able to do was to keep his people firm on their ground, to hinder them from contracting their front or gathering into heavy clusters, and then leave every man to make the best use he could of his rifle.

Continental generals would not easily believe that, upon fair, open ground, there could be a doubtful conflict between, on the one side, a body of fifteen hundred brave, steady, disciplined soldiers, superbly massed in close column, and on the other a loose knotted chain of six or seven hundred light-infantry men without formation. Yet the fight was not so unequal as it seemed.

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A close column of infantry has only small means of offence, and is itself a thing so easy to hurt that every volley it receives from steady troops must load it with corpses and wounded men. Tested strictly in that way—tested strictly by its small means of hurting people, and the ease with which it can be hurt—the close column is a weak thing to fight with; and yet it has power over the troops of most nations, because its grandeur well fits it for weighing upon the imaginations of men.

But Lacy Yea and his islanders were not so fashioned by nature, nor so tamed down by much learning, as to be liable to be easily coerced in any subtle, metaphysical way; and although the shots of individual soldiers and small knots of men had not, of course, the crushing power which would have been exerted by the fire of the Royal Fusiliers when formed and drawn up in line, still, the well-handled rifles of our men soon began to carry havoc into the dark-grey oblong mass of living beings which served them for their easy target. And though, seemingly, the front rank of the compact mass yearned to move forward, there was always occurring in the interior some sudden death or some trouble with a wounded man, which seemed not only to breed difficulty in the way of an advance, but also to make the column here and there begin to look spotted and faulty. The distance was such as to allow of a good deal of shooting at particular men. Once Yea himself found that he was singled out to be

killed, and was covered by a musket or rifle; but the marksman was so fastidious about his aim that, before he touched the trigger, a quick-eyed English corporal found time to intervene and save his colonel's life, by shooting the careful Russian in the midst of his studies. 'Thank you, my 'man,' said Lacy Yea; 'if I live through this you 'shall be a sergeant to-night.'

Whilst this long fight went on, it sometimes happened that the fire and impatience of one or other of the Fusiliers would carry a man into closer quarters with the column. Of those who were spurred by sudden impulses of this kind, Monck was one. He sprang forward, they say, from his place on the left of the Fusiliers, and saying, 'Come on, 8th company!' rushed up to the enemy's massed battalions, ran his sword through a man in the front rank, and struck another with his fist. He was then shot dead by a musket fired from the second rank of the column. Personal enterprises of this kind were incidents varying the tenor of the fight; but it was by musket or rifle ball at the distance of some fifty yards that the real strife between the two corps was waged.

It was not always against the enemy that Lacy Yea was labouring. He came to know or imagine that some of his Fusiliers had remained behind in the valley finding base shelter. That this should be, and that even for a few minutes this should pass, was to him not tolerable; and in the fiercest heat of his strife with the column, one of

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his best officers was sent back that he might turn the drove out of their sheds, and force them to come instantly into the presence of the enemy,—into the presence, more terrible still, of their raging colonel.

The fight lasted. When Codrington's people were scarce beginning their rush towards the face of the Great Redoubt, the Royal Fusiliers—rudely and hastily gathered, but contriving to hold together—were beginning this battle of their own. When the storming battalions came down, the regiment was fighting still. When the despondency of the French army was at its worst—when the head of Canrobert's Division was pushed back down the hill by the 'column of the eight battalions'—when, along the whole line of the Allies, there was no other regiment fighting—Lacy Yea and his people were still at their work. When Evans, having crossed the river, was leading his three battalions to the site of the Causeway batteries, it was the battalion of the Royal Fusiliers that stood fighting alone on his left; and nearly at the very time when disaster befell the centre of the brigade of Guards, Lacy Yea and his Fusiliers were gathering at last the reward of their soldierly virtue.

For by this time death and wounds, making cavities and compelling small changes in the great living mass, had injured the symmetry of the spruce Russian column. As a piece of mechanism, it was no longer what it had been when the fight began, but the spirit of the brave and obedient

men who composed it was still high. The cohesion of the mass was not yet destroyed ; but it was endangered, and had come to depend very much upon the personal exertions of officers.

Lacy Yea observed that every now and then, when a part of the column was becoming faulty, a certain man, always on foot, but of vast towering stature, would stride quickly to the defective spot, and exert so great an ascendancy, that steadiness and order seemed always to be restored by his presence. The grey over-coat common to all shrouded the rank of every Russian officer ; and since this man was not on horseback, there was nothing to disclose his station in the corps except the power he seemed to wield. What its colonel was to the Royal Fusiliers, that the big man seemed to be to the Russian column ; and it was not, I think, without a kind of sympathy with him—it was not, one would believe, without a manly reluctance—that Yea ordered his people to shoot the tall man. He did, however, so order ; and he was quickly obeyed. The tall man dropped dead, and when he had fallen there was no one who seemed to be the like of him in power.

The issue of this long fight of the Fusiliers was growing to be a thing of so great moment, or else the sight of it was become so heating, that Prince Gortschakoff now resolved to take part in it bodily. So, deputing Colonel Issakoff, then acting as his Chief of the Staff, to represent him in his absence, he rode down to the column and

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strove to lead it on to a charge with the bayonet.* But he could do nothing; for, because of the disorder already beginning, and the loss of great numbers of its officers, the heart was nearly out of the column.† So, giving orders for the battalions to keep up their fire, he rode away to his right and left the column still engaged with Yea and his Fusiliers.

The 55th
attacking
the column
in flank.

When Prince Gortschakoff had ridden off, the column was assailed by fresh adversaries. After crossing the river, Colonel Warren, we saw, pressed on with the 55th regiment extended in line, and his men in that order were advancing up the Pass when he saw on his left front the column engaged with Lacy Yea's Fusiliers. Colonel Warren instantly caused his regiment to bring forward their right shoulders, and in fact to wheel

* This statement is founded, as will be seen below, upon a narrative written by Prince Gortschakoff himself; but it interested me to hear, as I lately did from an officer in the Royal Fusiliers, a statement coinciding exactly (so far as it goes) with the Prince's narrative. Sir Thomas Troubridge, who was the Major commanding the right wing of the Fusiliers, told me he remembered that after the fight between the column and the Fusiliers had been going on a long time, he saw a horseman with some mounted followers—evidently, as he conceived, a General and his staff—ride down and join the column.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† What Prince Gortschakoff says is this: 'I first rode towards the chasseurs' (meaning the Kazan troops), 'who were standing firm under a very heavy fire, although losing a large amount of men. I first tried to lead them on (à la baïonnette), but finding that they could not re-form immediately for a charge, and had lost nearly all their officers, I left them with orders to continue their feu de bataillons.'—*Note to 1st Edition.*

upon their centre, very much as a company wheels. This manœuvre was performed under fire from the column, and the change of front was carried to the length of bringing the battalion into a line almost perpendicular to the line of its former front, and almost parallel with the flanks of the Russian column. When the manœuvre was complete, the 55th opened fire upon the flank of the Russian column.

Portions of the column—mainly those in the centre and in the rear—became discomposed and unsettled. Numbers of men moved a little one way or another, and of these some looked as though they stepped a pace backwards; but no man as yet turned round to face the rear. However, though the movement of each soldier taken singly was trifling and insignificant, yet even that little displacement of many men at the same time was shaking the structure. Plainly, the men must be ceasing to feel that the column they stood in was solid. The ranks which had been straight as arrows became bent and wavy.

The Russian officers well understood these signs. With drawn swords, moving hither and thither as actively as they could in their long, grey, melancholy coats, they seemed to become loud and vehement with their orders, their entreaties, their threats. Presently their gestures grew violent, and more than one officer was seen to go and seize a wavering soldier by the throat. But in vain; for seemingly by some law of its own nature, rather than under any new stress of

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external force, the column began to dissolve; the hard mass became fluid. It still cohered; but what had been, as it were, the outlines of a wall, were becoming like the outlines of a cloud.

Defeat of
the column

The 55th was about to deliver a fire which seemed likely to prove cruelly destructive, when it received an order which is believed to have come from General Pennefather personally—an order to ‘cease firing and charge.’ Thereupon the officers went out in front and busied themselves in the ordained task of stopping the fire; but already their adversaries were giving way. First a few, then more, then all, turned round. Moving slowly at first and as though discontent with its fate, the column began to fall back. It retreated after some moments with a much increased speed, and is believed on the whole to have escaped great part of the slaughter that might have been inflicted upon it, if the fire of the 55th had not been stayed by the order to charge.

The Royal Fusiliers bought this triumph with blood. In killed and wounded the battalion lost twelve officers and more than two hundred men. Monck, we before saw, was killed; and Hare,* Watson, Fitzgerald, Hibbert, Hobson (the Adjutant), Persse, Appleyard, Coney, Crofton, Carpenter, and Jones, were wounded. For some time one of the colours of the regiment was missing, but it did not at any time fall into the hands of

* Hare died of his wounds a few hours after the battle.

the enemy, and remained safe in charge of some soldiers belonging to the Royal Welsh * CHAP.
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A regimental officer engaged in a general action cannot often at the time compute the relative importance of the duty which he is performing; but on the morrow of the battle, or even perhaps much later, he may learn that the fortune of the day was hinging upon the conduct of his single regiment. Lacy Yea was a simple-hearted, straight-going man, with a wholesome ardour for fighting, and a great care for the honour of his regiment, but not looking far beyond it. Around him the battle had been flowing and ebbing. With the watching of those changes he did not much vex his mind—he hardly, perhaps, remarked them. He was too busy with the fight to be able to contemplate the battle. Except when he yearned to unearth the people whom he believed to be skulking, and to have them dragged before him, he thought of nothing but that the corps he commanded should stand fighting and fighting till it got the victory. He went through with his resolve, and hardly knew at the time the full worth of his constancy. He hardly knew that, whilst he fought, the whole of the English front line—first on his left hand and then on his right—had been getting the support it grievously needed from the tenacity of his 7th—the Royal—Fusiliers.†

* The colour, I believe, was found lying upon the ground, but how that came to happen I do not know, and I have not thought it necessary to find out, because the colour was never for a moment ‘lost.’

† See Plan. When Codrington’s people were storming the

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It is arranged that the defeated column is to be pressed by the Grenadier Guards.

It was plainly right that the defeated column should be pressed in its retreat by troops in a state of formation; and Yea, looking back, perceived that the Guards were now at hand. Troubridge went to the Grenadiers—saw one of its officers—told him of the defeat of the Russian column, and of the condition of the Royal Fusiliers—and asked whether it would not be well that the Grenadiers should come up and clinch the defeat of the retiring column. Colonel Hood was referred to, and he at once consented to do as was proposed.

Sir George Brown—his grey so wounded that men saw the blood from afar—now chanced to ride to the part of the hillside where Troubridge was passing. After telling him of the defeat of the Russian column, and of the state of the Royal Fusiliers, Troubridge asked him whether the Fusiliers should go on, or allow the Guards to pass them.*

Sir George said, ‘Let the Guards go on. Collect your men, and afterwards resume the advance.’

redoubt, they were covered on their right by the fight which Yea was there maintaining; when they had to fall back, it was still that stand of the Fusiliers which covered their flank. When Evans advanced with his three battalions, there was nothing but the Royal Fusiliers to cover his left. For some of the proofs by which I support my statements respecting the fight maintained by the Royal Fusiliers, see Appendix, No. III.

* At this time, and whilst he was still speaking with Sir George Brown, Troubridge observed the sight which will be referred to in a future page, as fixing the order in which events followed one another in different parts of the field.

XXX.

After only retiring so far as to be nearly abreast of the Great Redoubt, the column defeated by Laey Yea's Fusiliers was able to rally and again show a front to the English; * for it had on its right the great Vladimir column, which still stood halted near the parapet of the Great Redoubt. On the right rear of the Vladimir men there was a double-battalion column, formed out of the Kazan corps.† On the right of that last column, but still further held back, there was another double-battalion column, formed of the Soudal corps; and next to these, but much more in advance, and standing on the extreme right of the whole of the Russian infantry, there were posted the two remaining battalions of the Soudal corps. Somewhere in this part of the field, there were the two battalions of sailors. As an immediate reserve, or rather as a support for all these forces, the four Ouglitz battalions were kept in hand on the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill, and were still, as before, massed in column. At some distance on the extreme right of the Russian position, the enemy's cavalry stood posted as before, confronting from afar, but never provoking, the horsemen of our

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State of
the field in
this part of
the Russian
position.

* After their defeat, the two battalions which composed the column seem to have parted from one another. The two bodies into which it resolved itself remained, bravely lingering on the hillside, though, having lost most of their officers, they were in a helpless condition.

† The column defeated by the 19th Regiment, and by some of the men of the 23d.

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Light brigade. After allowing for casualties, and especially for the heavy losses sustained by the column which engaged our 7th Fusiliers, it may be conjectured that these Russian forces on the Kourganè Hill amounted to some 15,000 men. Except the Kazan battalions, none of these troops had been hitherto engaged in hard fighting, for the triumphant Vladimir column had not yet encountered formed troops. Nearly all the Russian artillery had been taken away from the front, and, except that there were five pieces of ordnance not yet withdrawn from the Lesser Redoubt, the enemy had no guns now remaining in battery. The impending struggle was a fight—a sheer fight—of infantry.

Advance and
discomfiture
of the Scots
Fusilier
Guards.

At the moment when the troops which had stormed the redoubt began to retreat, the 1st Division had not yet emerged from the cover afforded by the river's bank; but General Codrington's message hurried the advance of the Scots Fusilier Guards.* The battalion climbed up the bank, formed line with a good deal of haste, and began to move forward.

At this time, there were numbers of stragglers of the Light Division standing about near the

* We saw that, at the time of passing the river, the left-flank company got parted from the rest of the battalion. That separation lasted during the period of the struggle which followed; and when, therefore, in this Note I speak of the Scots Fusilier Guards in general terms, it must be understood that I mean to designate that body of seven companies which remained together, when the left-flank company had got parted from the rest of the battalion.

bank of the river ; but in front of the left centre of the Fusilier Guards there was a large disordered body (men chiefly, I believe, of the 23d and 95th Regiments), who had just let go their hold of the redoubt. These men had faced about to the front, and were firing in the direction of the great column of the Vladimir corps then halted within the redoubt. The moment the heads of the Fusilier Guards rose clear of the ground which till then had been giving them shelter, the men found themselves under a flight of the enemy's missiles, and the higher they marched, the more they incurred the fire which seemed to be directed against the light infantry men in their front. Many of the Fusilier Guards were struck down. Still, their onward movement was maintained.

Suddenly the parapet of the redoubt became thickly lined with Russian soldiery ; and, in the next instant, the fire of the enemy's musketry came heavily pouring down into the confused body of light-infantry men who had been hitherto making a stand in front of the Fusilier Guards. The crowd of light-infantry men which received this fire gave way ; and in another instant, it was coming down in a mass towards the left centre of the Fusilier Guards. Perhaps the haste with which the Fusilier Guards had been pushed forward was one of the causes which hindered them from meeting the emergency by a fitting manœuvre. It does not appear that any step was taken to make the battalion open out. So presently, the descending crowd came into bodily

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contact with the Fusilier Guards; and this so heavily, that the crowd broke through a great part of the left wing of the advancing battalion. The weight of the retreating throng at that one spot was so great and so unwieldy, that a soldier of the Scots Fusilier Guards was thrown, it is said, to the ground with such force as to break his ribs.* The part of the Scots Fusilier Guards which had thus been thrust out of line by physical pressure was of course in a state of confusion.

The remnant of the battalion thus maimed was, at the moment, without support; for, directly in its rear, there were no formed troops coming on; and of the two battalions on its right hand and its left, neither one nor the other had hitherto come up abreast of it. On the other hand, the force which our Fusilier Guards undertook to attack was that majestic Vladimir column which had just been defeating Sir George Brown. With a strength of no more than perhaps some four or five hundred men, the remnant of what had been the centre battalion of the brigade of Guards was advancing all alone, not merely against a breast-work thick lined with Russian soldiery, but also against a hitherto victorious column which was nearly 3000 strong. Still, the maimed battalion pushed on; but by this time it had so far lost its symmetry that it had come to be, as it were, two sides of a triangle—two sides of a triangle whereof the salient pointed straight to the front.

* His name, I have heard, was Hesketh.

At the foremost point or apex thus formed, Lindsay was carrying the Queen's colour; and the swiftness of his onward movement, coupled with the eagerness of those who were near him to keep up with the colour, may have been the cause which refracted the line. There was a good deal of impetuosity at this time, and it would seem that the conception of what was the needful thing to do was—not so much to labour after the restoration of complete order, but rather—to carry the redoubt, and break down the great column by a rush; for in the midst of such shouts as 'Forward Guards! Forward Guards'—Hugh Annesley was heard cheering thus—the bent and irregular line pressed on; and at length it had moved so far up the slope as to be within some thirty or forty yards of the Work. Then numbers of the Russians burst out over the parapet, and some, it is said, came straight on, with their bayonets down 'at the charge.' The Queen's colour seemed to be in danger; for it was difficult to imagine that these imperfectly formed companies of the Fusilier Guards could maintain themselves long against the overwhelming weight of the column in their front. But the immediate cause which brought about the retreat was, after all, the word of command. I believe that the order to retire which now reached the battalion was given by the authority of General Henry Bentinck, the officer commanding the brigade. It was delivered to the line by the Adjutant of the Fusilier Guards. With pistol in hand—for some of the Russian

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soldiery were coming close down—Drummond, the Adjutant of the battalion, rode up and gave the order to retire. By these words, as I gather, the battalion was stopped ; but it did not instantly obey the command to retire. There was a reluctance to fall back ; and it would seem that the feeling which caused this reluctance was not altogether a false instinct ; for, however imperative the necessity for retreating may have been, the order had come too late to avert the impending disaster ; and it is likely enough that, being, as they were, in the close presence of a powerful enemy, our men may have fancied there must needs be some mistake in an order which directed them to go about at a moment when no due arrangements had been made for covering their retreat. Be this as it may, the Adjutant (as it was his duty to do) repeated the order. It seems he repeated it thrice ; and the last time, he was no longer content to say, ‘ the battalion will retire ! ’ for he told it with force that it ‘ must.’

I know of no means that were taken for covering the retreat. If any were tried, they failed ; for, the moment the battalion obeyed the word of command, it lapsed into a state of disorder, and then fell back in confusion. Seeing this, the soldiery thrown out by the Russians in advance of their great column pushed forward with increasing boldness, and the Queen’s colour was now in greater danger than ever. But borne by a resolute officer, and surrounded by resolute men, it was guarded with care to the last, and kept safe

from the enemy's touch.* At one moment, the foremost of the assailants were so close, that a soldier of the Fusilier Guards received a wound in the hand from a bayonet. It was then that the Fusilier Guards suffered the chief part of their losses. By its retreat, the battalion seemed, as it were, to draw the enemy forward; for the great Vladimir column, which had hitherto stood halted within the redoubt, now broke out over the parapet, and undertaking pursuit, began to glide down the slope.

For some time, a great part of the Fusilier Guards remained in confusion on the lower part of the slope; but Dalrymple's, and also, I think, Jocelyn's companies, were rallied so quickly as to be enabled to partake of the fight which engaged the Grenadier Guards; and, before long, the main part of the battalion had not only been re-formed in advance of the road running parallel with the river, but was briskly resuming its place in the centre of the brigade of Guards.†

In the course of this struggle grave losses befel the Scots Fusilier Guards. Lord Chewton and 3 sergeants were killed. Colonel Dalrymple, Colonel Berkeley, Colonel Hepburn, Colonel Haygarth, Astley, Bulwer, Buckley, Gipps, Lord En-

* It was for his resolute defence of the colour at this juncture, that Lindsay received the Victoria Cross.

† In the report which the Duke of Cambridge addressed to Headquarters the day next but one after the battle, H.R.H. states that the Fusilier Guards re-formed '*with the greatest alacrity.*' Holograph MS. Report of the 22d September 1854, by H.R.H.

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I.

The
Grenadier
Guards.

nismore, and Hugh Annesley,* and 13 sergeants, were wounded; and of the rank and file 17 were killed and 137 wounded.

When Colonel Hood consented to move forward his battalion against the column just defeated by Lacy Yea, he at once caused his men to ascend the bank which had hitherto sheltered it;† and, as soon as the battalion was on the top, its left wing began to incur a good deal of fire from men acting with the Vladimir column. Burgoyne, carrying one of the colours, was wounded; and, the charge of the colours then devolving on Lieutenant Robert Hamilton, he also in the next minute was struck down by shot; but he quickly rose from the ground, recovered his hold of the standard, and was able to carry it to the end of the battle. Under this fire, the battalion dressed its ranks with precision, and marched forward in faultless order.‡ This perfect order it kept till its left wing encountered some of the clusters of

Their
march up
the slope.

* It happened to me afterwards to see and wonder at the high courage and composure with which Annesley bore his dreadful wound. A musket-shot had entered his jaw, and passed, tearing its way through the mouth. The wound was of such a kind that it seemed as though nothing but death could be of use to him. Yet he was not only uncomplaining, but able to think and act for others.

† Colonel Hood had not failed to seize the precious opportunity which was offered to his battalion by the sheltering steepness of the bank. In a private letter he writes: 'Under the steep bank of the river, we closed in to our centre; and to this manœuvre our after-success was mainly attributable.'

‡ 'We formed in perfect and compact order on the top of the bank, and then advanced steadily up the intrenched position.'
—Colonel Hood, private letter.

men coming down from the Great Redoubt. Then the battalion neatly opened its ranks for the passage of the retreating soldiery, and afterwards formed up anew.* This done, it marched on.

CHAR.
I.

Meanwhile, General Codrington had been labouring to bring together the remnant of his brigade. Sergeant O'Connor, despite his grievous wound, still bore the colour of the Royal Welsh, which he had been carrying with loving care throughout the worst stress of the fight. The missing colour of the Royal Fusiliers, now committed to the honour of the Welsh regiment, was borne by Captain Pearson. Around these two standards General Codrington rallied such men as he could gather, and made them open out and form line two deep. The body thus formed numbered about 300 men, and General Codrington wished to place it on the left of the Grenadiers, in order to fill a part of the chasm at that moment lying quite open in the centre of the Brigade of Guards.† But it occurred to him—for he was himself a Guardsman, and he knew the feelings of the corps—that to place soldiers of the line abreast of the Grenadiers, and in the room of the broken regiment, might give pain to a battalion of

Codrington rallying some men of the Light Division ;

and proposing to place them in the vacated interval between two battalions of the Guards.

* 'Our 6th and 7th companies opened out to let them pass, and closed up as coolly as if in Hyde Park.'—Colonel Hood, private letter.

† Of course it is not intended that these words 'chasm' and 'interval' (which occur in several places) should be taken as indicating that the Scots Fusilier Guards were far away, but merely that, for the moment, the main body of the battalion had lost its formation, and was re-forming upon an alignment a little in rear of that on which the Grenadiers were standing.

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I.

His
proposal
rejected
by the
Grenadier
Guards.

Continued
advance
of the
Grenadiers:

the Guards; so he sent to the Grenadiers to know if they would like troops to come up to fill the empty space. The answer was a proud one. It was also, perhaps, a rash answer; for the Vladimir column—compact and strong, with a sense of the power it had just put forth—was not only impending over the left front of the Grenadiers, but also in part confronting the vacated interval. However, the answer was ‘No!’ and the Grenadiers, with their left flank stark open, but in beautiful order, contentedly marched up the slope.*

The sentiment which had thus rejected the aid proffered by General Codrington was not one universally entertained by the officers of the Guards. A little later, and at a moment when the Grenadiers were halted on the slope, with the Vladimir column impending over their left flank, Major Hume of the 95th, and an ensign of the same corps, came bearing the colours of their regiment, and having with them eight men. Hume, accosting Colonel Hamilton, who commanded the left wing of the Grenadiers, said that the eight men

* It was in disobedience to the contingent orders he had received that Colonel Hood thus advanced with the Grenadiers. In his journal he writes: ‘Last order received by me was from ‘Captain Fielding, Brigade-Major (when battalion was lying ‘down under cannonade and shelling)—“The Brigadier desires ‘“you to conform to any movements on your left.”’ Now the movement on Colonel Hood’s left, to which, by the words of General Bentinck’s orders, he thus found himself told to conform, was the retreat of the Fusilier Guards. In other words, there had occurred an event which placed Colonel Hood under orders to retire. Therefore it was that, immediately after the sentence above quoted, he wrote in his journal these words: ‘Thank God, I disobeyed!!! Advanced steadily in line.

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I.

then following the colours of the 'Derbyshire' were all that remained together, and that he wished to take part with the Grenadiers in continuing the fight. Colonel Hamilton, assenting, told Hume to fall in on the left of the Grenadiers. Afterwards, other men of the 'Derbyshire' came up and joined their colours. A few moments later, Colonel Berkeley came up, bringing with him some men of the Scots Fusilier Guards, and Colonel Dalrymple also acceded with a company of the same regiment which he had held together from the first. With General Bentinck's sanction, all these portions of what had been the centre battalion formed line on the left of the Grenadiers. These accessions, of course, did but little towards filling the vacated interval; but on the left of the chasm still open, there stood the 'Coldstream' battalion. This battalion of the Guards confronted the centre and right of the great Vladimir column, and was drawn up in line with beautiful precision. It had been much less exposed to fire and mishaps than either of the other battalions of the brigade; and, besides, had not been pressed forward (as each of the two other battalions had been) to meet any especial emergency. So it fell to the lot of this Coldstream battalion to become an almost prim sample of what our Guards can be in the moment which precedes a close fight. What the best of battalions is, when, in some Royal Park at home, it manœuvres before a great princess, that the Coldstream was now on the banks of the Alma, when it came to show its

these joined afterwards by other soldiery aligning with them on their left

The Coldstream.

CHAP.
I.

graces to the enemy. And it was no ignoble pride that caused the battalion to maintain all this ceremonious exactness; for although it be true that the precision of a line in peace-time is only a success in mechanics, the precision of a line on a hillside with the enemy close in front is at once the result and the proof of a steady warlike composure. And it ought to be borne in mind that what our troops were now undertaking in this part of the field was—not to swell the tide of a victory, but—to try to retrieve misfortunes.

Temper of
English
soldiery
advancing
after a
check.

Happily, it is then, just then, after a discomfiture sustained in their front, that English soldiery advancing in support often give superb proof of their quality; for by nature they are so constituted, that the ill fortune of their comrades does not commonly affect them with feelings of discouragement, but, on the contrary, is apt to heat their blood by rousing an emotion like anger; and, when they have thus been wrought upon, they are sterner men for a foe to have to do with than they are when all has gone well.


The extreme left of the Coldstream was nearly in the centre of the troops which the Duke of Cambridge commanded, and with this battalion, accordingly, His Royal Highness was present in person. With it, also, there was a visitor, whose presence showed the strength of the tie between the officer and his regiment. Colonel Steele had broken loose from his duty at Headquarters, and was riding with his own beloved 'Coldstream.' *

* He was military secretary to Lord Raglan.

Further to the left, and in the same formation, the three battalions of the Highland Brigade were extended. But the 42d had found less difficulty than the 93d in getting through the thick ground and the river, and, again, the 93d had found less difficulty than the 79th; so, each regiment having been formed and moved forward with all the speed it could command, the brigade fell naturally into direct échelon of regiments, the 42d in front.

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I.

Advance
of the
Highland
Brigade.

And although this order was occasioned by the nature of the ground traversed, and not by design, it seemed, nevertheless, so well suited to the work in hand that Sir Colin Campbell did not for a moment seek to change it.

These young soldiers, distinguished to the vulgar eye by their tall stature, their tartan uniforms, and the plumes of their Highland bonnets, were yet more marked in the eyes of those who know what soldiers are by the warlike carriage of the men, and their strong, lithesome, resolute step. And Sir Colin Campbell was known to be so proud of them, that already, like the Guards, they had a kind of prominence in the army, which was sure to make their bearing in action a broad mark for blame or for praise.

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I.

The two
battalions
remaining
with General
Buller.

From the time when General Buller had judged it right to abstain from bringing his force to the support of his comrades in the Great Redoubt, the two battalions which remained under his control had stood halted near the bank of the river, and one of them, the 88th, was still formed in a hollow square, as though expecting a charge of cavalry. Sir Colin Campbell conceived that this attitude of the 88th was unsuited to the time and the place, and, not knowing that General Buller in person was directing the regiment, Sir Colin, in some anger, took upon himself to request, nay, almost to command, that the hollow square should be instantly changed into line-formation. When the ranks of the Highlanders came up to this part of the ground, and still went on continuing their advance, a man of one of the halted regiments—a man speaking perhaps in a coarse cynic spirit, perhaps in the deep, honest bitterness of his heart—cried out, ‘Let the Scotchmen go on! ‘they’ll do the work!’ Then the Highlanders marched through, and continued their forward movement.

After this, the 88th, although still formed in square, and the 77th, then extended in line, were both of them for the moment falling back; and meanwhile the now dispersed soldiery who had been forced to relinquish the redoubt were spread out along the lower part of the slope firing powerless shots towards the earthwork. It seemed to Sir Colin Campbell that this state of discomfiture on the part of Sir George Brown’s troops was fast

involving the fate of the battle, and that it was a thing of great need to show, and to show at the very instant, a steady and well-formed battalion ranged frank and fair on the slope. With this intent he was carrying forward the 42d, and placing it in advance of the alignment which the Coldstream was taking up on his right. The 42d had just been taking ground to its left, and was still in the formation which had been resorted to for effecting the change—that is, it was in open column of companies, ‘right in front,’ and facing westwards, but was preparing to wheel into line. So far as concerned all this part of the field, the fight was in its crisis. The Staff of the 1st Division were near the left, or left front of the Coldstream, and not far from the ground where the grenadier company of the 42d stood ranged. It was in this condition of things that men heard a voice exclaiming, and uttering mischievous words.

‘The brigade of Guards will be destroyed,’ said one adviser; and he asked whether it ought not to fall back a little in order to recover its formation?

Suggestion
that the
Guards
should
fall back.

These words, as I hear, were not spoken by an officer holding any high rank, and accordingly owe all their importance to the answer they quickly elicited and the change which thereupon followed.

He who answered the question * was a veteran

* He answered the question the moment he heard its purport told to him. He had not himself heard it fall from the lips of the officer with whom it originated.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

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I.

soldier, and it was with a deference no less wise than graceful that the Duke of Cambridge loved to seek and to follow his counsels.

Sir Colin
Campbell.

Whilst Ensign Campbell was passing from boyhood to man's estate, he was made partaker in the great transactions which were then beginning to work out the liberation of Europe. In the May of 1808 he received his first commission—a commission in the 6th Foot; and a few weeks afterwards—then too young to carry the colours—he was serving with his regiment upon the heights of Vimieira. There, the lad saw the turning of a tide in human affairs; saw the opening of the mighty strife between ‘Column’ and ‘Line;’* saw France, long unmatched upon the Continent, retreating before British infantry; saw the first of Napoleon’s stumbles, and the fame of Sir Arthur Wellesley beginning to dawn over Europe.

He was in Sir John Moore’s campaign, and at its closing scene—Corunna. He was with the Walcheren expedition; and afterwards, returning to the Peninsula, he was at the battle of Barossa, the defence of Tarifa, the relief of Taragona, and the combats at Malaga and Osma. He led a

* In his most interesting and most valuable ‘Life of the Duke ‘of Wellington,’ Mr Gleig repeats the description of Vimieira, which the Duke once gave in his presence at Strathfieldsaye. The Duke’s words are thus given by Mr Gleig: ‘The French ‘came on, on that occasion, with great boldness, and seemed ‘to feel their way less than I always found them to do afterwards. They came on, as usual, in very heavy columns, and ‘I received them in line, which they were not accustomed to, ‘and we repulsed them three several times.’

forlorn hope at the storming of St Sebastian, and was there wounded twice ; he was at Vittoria ; he was at the passage of the Bidassoa ; he took part in the American war of 1814 ; he served in the West Indies ; he served in the Chinese war of 1842. These occasions he had so well used that his quality as a soldier was perfectly well known. He had been praised and praised again and again ; but since he was not so connected as to be able to move the dispensers of military rank, he gained promotion slowly, and it was not until the second Sikh war that he had a command as a general : even then he had no rank in the army above that of a colonel. At Chilianwalla he commanded a division. Marching in person with one of his two brigades, he had gained the heights on the extreme right of the Sikh position, and then bringing round the left shoulder, he had rolled up the enemy's line and won the day ; but since his other brigade (being separated from him by a long distance) had wanted his personal control, and fallen into trouble, the brilliancy of the general result which he had achieved did not save him altogether from criticism. That day he was wounded for the fourth time. He commanded a division at the great battle of Gujerat ; and there,—seizing discretion—he so used the artillery arm that whilst sparing his infantry, he yet proved able to vanquish the whole right wing of the enemy. In 1851 and the following year he commanded against the hill-tribes. It was he who forced the Kohat Pass. It was he who, with only

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a few horsemen and some guns, at Punj Pao, compelled the submission of the combined tribes then acting against him with a force of 8000 men. It was he who, at Ishakote, with a force of less than 3000 men, was able to end the strife; and when he had brought to submission all those beyond the Indus who were in arms against the Government, he instantly gave proof of the breadth and scope of his mind as well as of the force of his character; for he withstood the angry impatience of men in authority over him, and insisted that he must be suffered to deal with the conquered people in the spirit of a politic and merciful ruler.

After serving with all this glory for some forty-four years he came back to England; but between the Queen and him there stood a dense crowd of families—men, women, and children—extending further than the eye could reach, and armed with strange precedents which made it out to be right that people who had seen no service should be invested with high command, and that Sir Colin Campbell should be only a colonel. Yet he was of so fine a nature that, although he did not always avoid great bursts of anger, there was no ignoble bitterness in his sense of wrong. He awaited the time when perhaps he might have high command, and be able to serve his country in a sphere proportioned to his strength. His friends, however, were angry for his sake; and along with their strong devotion towards him there was bred a fierce hatred of a

system of military dispensation which could keep in the background a man thus tried and thus known.

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Upon the breaking-out of the war with Russia, Sir Colin was appointed—not to the command of a division, but of a brigade. It was not till the June of 1854 that his rank in the army became higher than that of a colonel.

Campbell was not the slave, he was the master of his calling, and therefore it was that he had been able to save his intellect from the fate of being drowned in military details. He knew that although a general must have a complete mastery of even the smallest of such things, still they were only a part—a minute though essential part—of the great science of war. He understood the precious material whereof our army is formed. He heartily loved our soldiery; for he was a soldier, and had fellow-feeling with soldiers, and they had fellow-feeling with him. Instinctively they knew that, together, they might do great things—he by their help, they by his. Knowing the worth of their devotion and their bodily strength, he cherished them with watchful care; and they, on their part, loved, honoured, and obeyed him with a faith that all he ordered was right. He set great store upon discipline, but it was never for discipline's sake that he did so (as if that were itself an end), but because he knew it to be one of the main sources of military ascendancy. So, although the officers and soldiers serving under him got no more rest than was

CHAP. good for them, they were never vexed wantonly ;
 I and in proportion as they grew in knowledge of
their calling, they came to understand why it
was that their chief compelled them to toil.

A bodily ardour for fighting may be more or less masked and hidden ; but he to whom this great passion has not been vouchsafed by nature, is wanting in one of the qualities which go to make a general. For warfare is so anxious and complex a business, that against every vigorous movement heaps of reasons can for ever be found ; and if a man is so cold a lover of battle as to have no stronger guide than the poor balance of the arguments and counter-arguments which he addresses to his troubled spirit, his mind, driven first one way and then another, will oscillate, or even revolve, turning miserably on its own axis, and making no movement straight forward. Now, it is a characteristic still marking the Scottish blood, that often—and not the less so when it flows in the veins of a gentle-hearted being—it is seen to fire strangely and suddenly at the prospect of a fight. Campbell loved warfare with a deep passion ; and at the thought of battle his grand, rugged face used to kindle with uncontrollable joy.

‘The brigade of Guards will be destroyed ; ought it not to fall back ?’* When Sir Colin Campbell heard this saying, his blood rose so high that the answer he gave—impassioned and

* As to the comparatively subordinate rank of the officer with whom this suggestion originated, see *ante*.

far-resounding — was of a quality to govern events. CHAP.
I.

‘It is better, sir, that every man of Her Majesty’s Guards should lie dead upon the field than that they should now turn their backs upon the enemy!’

Campbell’s answer to the suggestion that the Guards should fall back.

Then speaking apart to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Colin counselled him to go straight on with the Guards, and at the same time he himself undertook to turn the Redoubt by at once moving up with his 42d Regiment. Doubts and questionings ceased. The advance was continued. Sir Colin Campbell rode off to his left.

It was upon Sir Colin Campbell now, as on General Buller a short time before, that there devolved the anxious duty of securing the Allied armies from any flank attack which might be undertaken against them at a moment when our troops were engaging the enemy in front; and Sir Colin, at one moment, judged that with the battalion which formed his extreme left he ought to stand ready to show a front in any direction. He, therefore, sent Sterling to direct that the 79th should go into column.*

His disposition of the Highland Brigade.

But, seen in the dim field of battle, an enemy’s force bears marked on its front faint, delicate, momentous signs, analogous to those which, in

* It is from a body of troops massed in column that the greatest variety of manœuvres can be quickly and safely evolved. When a battalion extended in line is called upon to change its front, the radius of the segment in which it must wheel is of course very long.

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speaking of a man or a woman, are called 'expression of countenance;' and it is given to men who know and love the business of war to be able to read those signs. Sir Colin Campbell well understood that the enemy ought to assail his left flank with a storm of horse, foot, and artillery; and, to deal with any such onslaught, he at first took care to stand ready; but when he came to ride forward and gain higher ground, the old soldier was able to divine that with all their horsemen, and all their columns of infantry, the Russians would venture nothing against his flank. He therefore recalled his order to the 79th, and allowed it to go forward in line.

Including the chasm which divided the Grenadier Guards from the Coldstream, the whole line in which the Duke of Cambridge now moved forward to the attack of the Kourganè Hill was more than a mile and a half in length.* It was only two deep; but his right regiment was supported by a part of Sir Richard England's Division; and Sir George Cathcart was on its left

* The 1st Division alone was upon a greater front than had been covered by the 47th Regiment, Pennefather's brigade, and the Light Division all put together, yet it did not cover a foot more of ground than was right. We before saw the effect produced by trying to put ten battalions upon ground which was now found to be not more than enough for six. It is hardly necessary to say that a knowledge of the quantity of ground covered by a single battalion in a barrack-yard would not give a sufficient clue for getting at the extent of ground which was covered by six battalions drawn up in line upon a field of battle. Sir Colin Campbell was free to take ground to his left, and he took it amply, contriving to outflank, or almost to outflank, the enemy's infantry array.

rear with the part of his Division then on the field. On the extreme left and left rear of the whole force there was the cavalry under Lord Lucan.

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These troops were going to take part in the first approach to close strife which men had yet seen on that day between bodies of troops in a state of formation deliberately marshalled against each other.* The slender red line which began near the bridge, and vanished from the straining sight on the eastern slopes of the Kourganè Hill, was a thread which in any one part of it had the strength of only two men. But along the whole line, from east to west, these files of two men each were strong in the exercise of their country's great prerogative. They were in English array. They were fighting in line against column.

The nature
of the fight
now about
to take
place on the
Kourganè
Hill.

After the rupture of the peace of Amiens, Sir Arthur Wellesley, being then in India, became singularly changed, growing every day more and more emaciated, and seemingly more and more sad. He pined; and was like a man dying without any known bodily illness, the prey of some

* The French had not been engaged in any conflicts of this sort, for, though the head of Canrobert's Division confronted formed troops for a moment at a distance of a few hundred yards, it dropped back, as we saw, without fighting. Evans's struggle had been in thick ground, not allowing regular array. Codrington's people (including Lacy Yea's Fusiliers as well as the stormers of the redoubt) had had hard fighting, and against troops in perfect order, but they had gone through their struggles without the advantage of being themselves in a state of formation.

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consuming thought. At length he suddenly announced to Lord Wellesley his resolve to go back to England; and when he was asked why, he said, 'I observe that in Europe the French are fighting in column and carrying everything before them; and I am sure that I ought to go home directly, because I know that our men can fight in line.' From that simple yet mighty faith he never swerved; for always encountering the massive columns of infantry, he always was ready to meet them with his slender line of two deep. With what result the world knows.*

Long years had passed since the close of those great wars, and now once more in Europe there was going to be waged yet again the old strife of line against column.

Looking down a smooth, gentle, green slope, checkered red with the slaughtered soldiery who had stormed the redoubt, the front-rank men of the great Vladimir column were free to gaze upon two battalions of the English Guards, far apart the one from the other, but each carefully drawn up in line; and now that they saw more closely, and without the distractions of artillery, they had more than ever grounds for their wonder at the

* An account of Sir Arthur Wellesley's pining sickness—his 'wasting away,' as he himself described it—is given in published accounts of men who remarked it (in Malcolm's book, I think, or Monro's), and his disclosure of the motive which caused him to return to Europe was preserved and handed down by Lord Wellesley. What I have ventured to do is to seem to connect the pining sickness with the mighty resolve which was destined to change the fate of the world.

kind of array in which the English soldiery were undertaking to assail them. ‘We were all astonished,’ says Chodasiewicz—yet he wrote of what he saw when the English line was much less close to the foe than the Guards now were—‘we were all astonished at the extraordinary firmness with which the red-jackets, having crossed the river, opened a heavy fire in line upon the redoubt. This was the most extraordinary thing to us, as we had never before seen troops fight in lines of two deep, nor did we think it possible for men to be found with sufficient firmness of morale to be able to attack in this apparently weak formation our massive columns.

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I.

XXXI.

Beginning on our right hand with the Grenadier Guards, and the few men brought up alongside them under Dalrymple, Berkeley, and Hume, and going thence leftwards across the still open ‘chasm’ to the Coldstream battalion, and, lastly, going yet further leftwards to the array of the Highland Brigade, we shall now see what manner of strife it was when at length, after many a hindrance, five British battalions, each grandly formed in line, but imperilled by the yawning gap at which tacticians might shudder, marched up to the enemy’s columns.

Advancing upon the immediate left of the ground already won by Pennefather’s brigade, the Grenadiers were covered on their right, but their

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left, or to speak more exactly, the left of the few men aligning with them, remained altogether uncovered; and it was over the very ground thus lying wide open before them that the Vladimir battalions stood impending.

The Grenadiers were marching against the defeated but now rallied Kazan column which had fought with the Royal Fusiliers, when Prince Gortschakoff rode down to the two left battalions of the Vladimir, and undertook to lead them forward in person. First sending his only unwounded aide-de-camp to press the advance of any troops he could find, the Prince put himself at the head of the two left Vladimir battalions, and ordered them to charge with the bayonet. The Prince then rode forward a good deal in advance of his troops, and his order for a bayonet-charge was so far obeyed, that the column, without firing a shot, moved boldly down towards the chasm which had been left in the centre of our brigade of Guards. The north-west angle of this strong and hitherto victorious column was coming down nearer and nearer to the file—the file composed of only two men—which formed the extreme left of the Grenadiers.

Then, and by as fair a test as war could apply, there was going to be tried the strength of the line-formation, the quality of the English officer, and the quality of the English soldier. Colonel Hood brought the line to a halt, and was about to execute the manœuvre which will be presently mentioned, when his troops had to meet a new peril in the apparition of that unknown ‘mounted

Prince
Gortscha-
koff's ad-
vance with
a column
of the
Vladimir
corps.

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‘officer’ who so often comes riding up in moments of crisis, directs the troops to fall back, and then all at once gallops away without having been surely identified. The horseman approached the left flank company of the Grenadiers, and cried out ‘Retire!’ But Colonel Henry Percy looking at the Vladimir column, and seeing at the instant what ought and what ought not to be done, met the danger by promptly insisting that the movement really meant to be enjoined by the mounted officer must needs be that very one which the conjuncture seemed to require. ‘Retire!’ said Colonel Percy. ‘What the devil can they mean? They must mean “dress back”’ and in the next moment, Percy (acting under the authority of Colonel Hamilton who commanded the left wing), aided by Neville his senior subaltern, began causing the left subdivision of the left flank company to ‘dress back’ at such an angle as to make it face the Vladimir column; and this, it quickly appeared, was exactly what Colonel Hood wished, for he rode up and directed Colonel Percy to go on with the operation.

Apparition
and voice
of ‘the
mounted
officer.’


Manceuvre
executed
by the
Grenadier
Guards.

The wound Percy received at this time did not hinder him from completing his task, and in a few moments the subdivision stood ranged on a line so refracted as to be forming an obtuse angle with the rest of the battalion. So whilst, with the main part of his force, he still faced the Kazan battalions that had confronted him from the first, Colonel Hood showed also a front—a small, but smooth, comely front—to the Vladimir column

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I.

its effect.

now coming on with a mind to turn his left flank, and march straight down through the chasm. In an instant, his ready manœuvre brought the Vladimir troops to a halt; and men seeing the stately battalion thus adapting its front to the exigency, and stopping the enemy's column, might well enough say that the colonel was handling his fine slender English blade with a singular grace—with the gentleness and grace of the skilled swordsman, when, smiling all the while, he parries an angry thrust. In the midst of its



pride and strength, the Vladimir found itself checked, nay, found itself gravely engaged with troops so few as to comprise but half a company of our Guardsmen. They were aided, however, by Dalrymple with the company of the Scots Fusilier Guards which we saw him bring up; for he put his line into conformity with the change of front effected by Percy; and the like was done also by those few other soldiers under Berkeley and Hume who had ranged themselves on Colonel Hood's left. Thus the fire of perhaps altogether some six or seven score of men was brought to

bear upon the Vladimir column, and with effect, for it poured into a close mass of living men. Colonel Dalrymple fired in volleys, and complacently counted them, reckoning up no less than fifteen; but the Grenadiers chose another method, and stood file-firing along their whole line.

On the left of the chasm still open in the centre of the brigade of Guards, and on ground less advanced than that reached by Colonel Hood's Grenadiers, there stood the Coldstream battalion commanded by Colonel Upton, and drawn up in magnificent order; but to this spot, apparently, the 'unknown mounted officer' must have sped, when he vanished from the sight of the Grenadiers, for down the ranks of the Coldstream the word was passed to 'Retire;' and 'the retire,' moreover, was sounded by buglers along the line;* but the false command was met by an outburst of regimental opinion expressed in loud cries of 'No! No!' This resistance alone, it would seem, proved strong enough to counteract the false order, for the Coldstream battalion kept its ground, then advanced, and was soon directing its fire upon the two more battalions which formed the right wing of the Vladimir.

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I.

The Coldstream.

Assailed
by orders
to retire:

its resistance.

We shall see the share that other Russian and other British troops were destined to have in governing the result of the struggle; but if for a moment we limit our reckoning to the

* With respect to the 'unknown mounted officer,' and the perturbing commands often given to our troops in action without apparent authority, see Appendix, No. VI.

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I.

The Grenadiers and the 'Coldstream' engaged with six battalions in column

troops which stood fighting at this time, it appears that the whole of the four Vladimir battalions and the lessened mass of the left Kazan column were engaged with the Grenadiers and the Coldstream. In other words, two English battalions, each ranged in line, but divided the one from the other by a very broad chasm, were contending with six battalions in column. And although of these six battalions standing in column there were two which had cruelly suffered, the remaining four had hitherto had no hard fighting, and were flushed with the thought that they stood on ground which they themselves had reconquered.

XXXII.

The stress which a line puts upon the soldiery of a column;

But, after all, if only the firmness of the slender English line should chance to endure, there was nothing except the almost chimerical event of a thorough charge home with the bayonet which could give to the columns the ascendancy due to their vast weight and numbers; for the fire from a straitened, narrow front could comparatively do little harm, whilst the fire of the battalion in line was carrying havoc into the living masses. Still, neither column nor line gave way. On the other hand, neither column nor line moved forward. Fast rooted as yet to the ground, the groaning masses of the Russians and the two scarlet strings of Guardsmen stood receiving and delivering fire.

But meanwhile, on the part of the English,

another mind, as we shall see by - and - by, was bringing its strength to bear upon this part of the battle.

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I.

If the English array puts a grievous stress upon the soldiery of Continental masses, its pressure is not less hard upon the mind of a general who has the suffering columns in his charge. It not only condemns him to know of the havoc that is rending his people upon a small space of ground within the reach of his own sight, and his own hearing, but afflicts him besides with a sense of being largely outflanked ; and, although he may be really contending with foes who are but few against many, he sometimes becomes oppressed by a belief that he is overwhelmed by mighty numbers. General Kvetzinski was with the right Vladimir column. He was a brave, able man, and we have already seen something of what the relative numbers were with which the Russians and the English were fighting ; but it seems that the spectacle of the extended front presented by the English array broke down the General's sense of his own comparative strength, and put upon him the belief that he was cruelly outnumbered. Even the sight of the wide chasm there was between the two battalions of the Guards did not lift the weight from his heart. 'The enormous forces,' said he,—'the enormous forces of the enemy made our position a very dangerous one.'

and upon
a general
who has
charge of
columns.

Impressions
wrought
upon the
mind of
Kvetzinski
by the Eng-
lish array.

It was near the eastern shoulder of the redoubt that he sat in his saddle. Every moment he

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I.

had been growing more anxious, for, besides the troubles that were besetting his front, he could not but know that Pennefather's brigade was established in the Pass; and the apparition of our Headquarter staff on the knoll, followed quick by Turner's guns, had cheated him into the notion that the whole French army was marching straight eastward into the English field of battle. Nay, he imagined that the guns on the knoll were throwing a flanking fire into the left of his Vladimir battalions;* and indeed it would seem that these battalions were really struck—not by shot

* He was wrong in this. Turner's guns tried their range against the columns on the Kourganè Hill, but found the distance too great. The passage in which Kvetzinski speaks of the state of things in the direction of 'the knoll' is this:—
'From the left, the French, having forced our left-wing fore-posts, were hurrying to the rescue of their allies, whose efforts were beginning to flag before the unheard-of and unparalleled heroism of the brave Vladimirtzi. The French battery, having taken up its position on the left wing of our side' (this so-called 'French battery' was Turner's battery on the knoll), 'began to fire sideways on the fast-thinning ranks of our gallant regiment. Their reserve were hastening to cut off our retreat.' I have already shown how all but inevitable it was that Kvetzinski and all other Russians on the Kourganè Hill should make this mistake—should suppose that the group of plumed officers in blue frocks who crowned the knoll betokened the presence of the French army in that part of the field, and that Turner's guns were a French battery. If amongst the French or their friends there are any men so constituted as to wish to keep the benefit derived from this mistake, their best course will be to quote this passage from Kvetzinski, and to suppress the explanation which shows how his error arose. For the sake of fairness, and not without a foresight of the wrongful use which may be made of the passage, I give what I believe to be a close and accurate translation from the Russian words in which it was written.—*Note to 1st Edition.*

discharged from the knoll, but from some of Franklin's guns then newly established in battery upon a spur overlooking the Pass.* But now, when he looked to his right — when he looked slantwise down to the east of where the Coldstream stood ranged — he saw an array of tall plumes, having eight times the front of one of his own battalion columns; looking a little farther eastward, he saw another array which, though it was not yet so near, was like to the first, and was moving. Again, when he looked still farther eastward, he saw yet another array coming up, and though it was less near than the first, and even less near than the second, it was like to either of them in the greatness of its front and the towering plumes of the men. Kvetzinski could see that, taken together, these three lines of plumed soldiers had a front some twenty times broader than one of his battalion columns, and (still, it seems, suffering himself to infer vast numbers from mere extent of front) he began to have that torturing sense of being outnumbered and outflanked which weighed upon the memory and for ever replenished the diction of the warlike Psalmist. It seemed to him that the enemy 'increased upon him to trouble him;' that 'the

* I rest this belief entirely upon the authority of Colonel Hamley's soldierly narrative, 'The Campaign of Sebastopol,' p. 31. Colonel Hamley was himself in the Artillery, and all that he says respecting the operations of the arm to which he belonged has, of course, a peculiar value. The guns were some of those thirty pieces of ordnance which Evans and Sir Richard England had just brought into the Pass.—*Note to 1st Edition.*

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‘ nations compassed him round about ;’ that they ‘ came round about him like water ;’ that they ‘ kept him in on every side ; yea, that they kept ‘ him in on every side.’ This anxiety was all wrongly based. Far from having his whole array outflanked towards the east to any woeful extent, Kvetzinski had a column on his extreme right which fairly enough confronted the extreme left of the English infantry ; and, far indeed from being himself outnumbered, he was largely outnumbering his adversaries ; but it followed from the difference between his and his enemy’s manner of fighting that each of his columns, taken separately, was widely outflanked, and he was becoming an example of what must happen to the commander of columns when (without exerting his weight by trying to charge home with the bayonet) he strives to set his dense masses against troops standing firmly in line.

The sight of a battalion advancing upon his right front convinces him that he must move.

Presently, he saw that the array of plumed soldiers which had stood ranged next to the Coldstream was moving—was moving up—was moving swiftly ; and he knew that the nearest of the columns which he had on his right was so far from the ground where he stood, and so hindered, too, by the intervening dip of the ground, as to be unable to engage the new-comers before the moment when (unless he retreated) they would reach the flank of his right Vladimir battalions. On the other hand, he could not, in common prudence, stand still and wait to be turned by the battalion now gliding up the slope on his right ;

for brave as were his Vladimir men, a huge massive Russian column was not the delicate weapon with which he could try to imitate Colonel Hood, showing a front at once on two sides. Therefore it became but too clear to him that the columns along the redoubt must move to some ground other than where they were, and this almost instantly, for the bending plumes did not cease from coming.

But, also, all this while, the columns along the redoubt had been more and more feeling the stress that was put upon them by the fire and the array of the Guards. After the moment when the Vladimir men were brought to a halt by Colonel Hood's manœuvre, Prince Gortschakoff, still riding at the head of the column, was violently thrown to the ground. He had received no wound from the shot which caused his fall, but his charger was killed by it; and, there being no other horseman near, he was obliged to remain on foot. It would seem that the concussion of the fall may have clouded his judgment. At all events, after this accident he walked away towards a column which he saw coming down in support.* On his road he passed through the site of the Great Redoubt, and there found General Kvetzinski. The Prince, walking up to the Divisional General, told him that he had had his horse shot under him, and that all the field-officers of the regiment† he commanded had been killed. It is not stated that the two generals, thus meet-

Meantime the columns along the redoubt are becoming distressed by the fire of the Guards.

* The four Ouglitz battalions.

† Meaning, I imagine, the Kazan Chasseurs.

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ing at a critical moment, took occasion to consult about the way in which they should fight out the battle. When their conversation had ended, Prince Gortschakoff walked up the hillside towards a column he wanted to meet.*

The shot which dismounted Prince Gortschakoff, his departure from the ground where the Vladimir stood, the spruce beauty of the slender red line which had brought it to bay, and the steadiness of the fire with which the brave column had been plied for now several minutes—all these were causes which helped to distress the left Vladimir battalions; and although it was the turning movement on the right of the Russian columns which made it a thing of sheer need to move, and to move at once,† still, it would seem that General Kvetzinski's measures for dealing with the new emergency were forestalled by what he presently saw on his left front; and the event which was destined to put its actual and direct governance upon this part of the battle was the still pending fight between the left Vladimir battalions and the Grenadier Guards.‡

* All this is told by Prince Gortschakoff himself with simplicity and apparent truthfulness. It is plain that his fall had shaken and confused him.

† Kvetzinski says, 'The decisive moment I had been fearing and expecting had arrived: the English moved higher up in three lines, and threatened to turn our right wing.'

‡ 'The left wing,' he says, 'began to falter, leaving my left side exposed.' I understand him to be speaking of troops on the immediate left of the column with which he was riding, and not of any troops on the left of the whole Division which he commanded, because the retreat of the troops in the Pass had taken place before the time of which he is speaking.

The Grenadiers, when we left them just now, were busy with their rifles along their whole line, and were making good use of that delicate bend in the formation of their leftmost company which enabled them to pour their fire into the heart of the Vladimir column then hanging on their flank. The reckoning of him who puts his trust in column is mainly based on the notion that its mere grandeur of aspect will give it a clear ascendant as soon as it is seen at all near; and when the English line had once delivered its fire, the front-rank men of the column were not without grounds for making sure that their next glimpse of the red-coats would be a glimpse of men in retreat; for to have come forward to within a distance convenient for musket-shots and to have once delivered their fire, this was surely the utmost in the way of close fighting that files of only two men each would attempt against masses. But when, though only a little, the smoke began to lift, the gleams that pierced it were the light that is shed from bayonet-points and busy ram-rods—gleams twinkling along the line of the two ranks of soldiery who still, as it seemed, must be lingering in their strange array; and wherever the smoke lifted clear, there—steadfast as oaks disclosed by rising mist—the long avenue of the Bearskins loomed out, and so righteously in place as to begin to enforce a surmise that, after all, the files of the two men each might be minded to stand where they were, ceremoniously shooting into the column and filling it minute by minute

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I.

Continuance
of the fight
between the
Grenadier
Guards and
the left
Vladimir
column.


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I.

with the tumult of men killed or wounded. And though it was but a few of the men planted close in the massive columns who could thus from time to time look upon the dim forms of the soldiery who dealt the slaughter, yet the anxiousness of those who could gain no glimpse of the Bearskins was not for that reason the less. Nay, it was the greater; for he who knows of a present danger through his reading of other men's countenances, or by seeing his neighbours fall wounded or killed around him, is commonly more disturbed than he who, standing in the front, looks straight into the eye of the storm.

Still, up to this time it was only from the extreme left of the Grenadiers' line that fire was poured into the column. A harder trial was awaiting the Vladimir men. Colonel Hood had hitherto wielded his line as though he judged it right to deal carefully with the left Kazan battalions still lingering on his front; and, up to the last, he did not think himself warranted in disdaining their presence, for he could not know that their loss in officers had made them so helpless as they were; but he now saw enough to assure him that his real foe was the left Vladimir column on his flank. Thither, therefore (though he would not altogether avert his line from the defeated troops in his front), he now determined to bend the eyes and the rifles of a great portion of his battalion. So he wheeled forward his battalion upon its left—or in other, and perhaps the more expressive, form of mili-

tary speech, he 'brought forward his right shoulder.'* Still respecting the presence of the defeated Kazan troops, he did not carry this manœuvre so far as to place his battalion bodily on the flank of the Vladimir column; but he carried it far enough to make the column a mark for the troops which formed his left wing. The

Vladimir Column.



Vladimir was wrapped in fire; was wrapped in that fire which is hardly tolerable to soldiery massed in column—fire poured upon its flank.†

* 'I brought up my right shoulder.'—Private letter from Colonel Hood, dated the day after the battle. One of the characteristics which can hardly fail to interest any one who has had the advantage of reading Colonel Hood's letters, is the exceeding modesty which makes him continually seek to ascribe all merit to others rather than to himself. Thus, although, in hurriedly writing the six words above quoted, he chanced to use the first person, he hastened, in a subsequent letter from the banks of the Alma, to give the whole merit of the manœuvre to the battalion. He writes, '*Instinctively* our men brought right shoulders forward.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† 'Instinctively our men brought right shoulders forward, 'and commenced file-firing with such coolness and accuracy 'that the effect was instantaneous. They [the Russians] were 'checked perceptibly with astonishment at the telling nature of our flank-fire.' *N.B.*—The word which I have written 'perceptibly' seems in the original to have the syllable 'im' at its commencement, but I imagine that the word as I have written it was the one intended.--*Note to 4th Edition.*

CHAP. Even this, for some minutes, the brave Vladimir
I. bore.*

If the voice of the English soldier is heard loud in fight, his shout may be the shout of triumph achieved, or else—and then it is of a thousandfold higher worth—it may be the like of what used to foretoken the crisis of the old Peninsular battles, when late in the day the voice of ‘the Light Division’ was heard;—the almost inspired utterance by which the soldier, growing suddenly conscious of an overmastering power, declares and makes known his ascendant. Of two things happening in a field of battle, at nearly the same time, it is often hard to say which was the first; and yet upon that narrow priority of a few moments there may depend the question of which event was the cause, and which the effect. What people know is, that there was an instant when the Vladimir column was seen to look hurt and unstable, and that, either at the same instant, or the instant before, or the instant after, the Grenadiers were hurrahing on their left, hurrahing at their centre, hurrahing along their whole line. As though its term of life were measured—as though its structure were touched and sundered by the very cadence of the cheering—the column bulged, heaving, heaving. ‘The line will advance on the centre!† The men

* Speaking of course roughly, Colonel Hood puts this period of Russian endurance at ‘five minutes.’ Private letter, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† In this, and in the sentence presently following where it

'may advance firing.'* This, or this nearly, was what Hood had to say to his Grenadiers. Instantly sounded the echo of his will: 'The line will advance on the centre! Quick march!' Then between the column and the seeing of its fate the cloud which hangs over a modern battle-field was no longer a sufficing veil; for although, whilst the English battalion stood halted, there lay in front of its line that dim, mystic region which divides contending soldiery, yet the Bear-skins, since now they were marching, grew darker from east to west, grew taller, grew real, broke through. A moment, and the column hung loose; another, and it was lapsing into sheer retreat; yet another, and it had come to be like a throng in confusion.† Of the left Kazan troops there was no more question. In an array which was all but found fault with for being too grand and too stately, the English battalion swept on.‡

Defeat of
the left
Vladimir
column,
and of the
left Kazan
battalions.

recurs, the word 'on' should be replaced by the word 'by.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

* 'Unsupported I would not charge, but made my men advance, firing steadily.' Private letter from Colonel Hood, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

† 'In five minutes the Russian column faltered, then turned, then ran.' Private letter from Colonel Hood, 21st Sept. 1854.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

‡ The criticism alluded to in this sentence was that of a French officer who witnessed the advance of the Guards. After speaking of it with enthusiastic admiration, he ended by saying that it was 'too majestic'—'trop majestueux.'—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

Speaking of this advance of his Grenadiers, Colonel Hood writes: 'I am told the effect was great, and *this common-sense manoeuvre of a line against a dense column is my only merit.* 'It was done at Waterloo effectively, and on the Alma yester-

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I.

Kvetzinski's
oblique
movement
of retreat
with the
right Vlad-
imir column.

Seeing that, before many moments were over, the Grenadiers would be up in the redoubt, Kvetzinski conceived that his retreat by the great road was already cut off, and he ordered that the right Vladimir column—the column with which he was present—should move from the field obliquely, avoiding the English right. This was a path which would take the column along the eastern skirts of the Kourganè Hill, and bring it towards the spot where the right Kazan column stood posted. Kvetzinski, still firm and soldierly, charged a few of his men with the duty of covering his retreat; and, entrusting the command of this little rear-guard to Ensign Berestoffsky, gave orders that the march should be leisurely. He was not ill obeyed; but the movement was hardly one which could be executed with all the accustomed dignity of Russian troops in retreat, for the column had to move slantwise across the front of the battalion which was swiftly ascending the hill, and, if it were to

‘day. I hope due credit will be done to my fine fellows, for it was a proud sight to see them behave so well; and what an honour to command such a body of men! . . . The battalion has been the admiration of French, English, and Russians.’—Private letter, 21st September 1854.

My numerous quotations from the private journal and private letters of Colonel Hood correspond so closely with the tenor of this part of the narrative that the reader will be likely to say, ‘That journal and those letters were evidently the authority on which the Author based his account of the operations of the Grenadier Guards.’ It is, however, a fact, that I never saw the journal nor the letters, and never knew anything of their tenor, until after the publication of the first and second editions of this book.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

lose many moments, the plumed soldiery would be on its flank. CHAP.
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The left wing of the Grenadiers was quickly in the part of the battery where lay the dismounted howitzer; and on the opposite or eastern shoulder of the work, the Duke of Cambridge, riding up with the Coldstream, stood master of the Great Redoubt.

The Duke of Cambridge is master of the Great Redoubt.

In its retreat the right Vladimir column was still plied with the fire of the Coldstream. General Kvetzinski had his horse shot under him; and presently afterwards he was so wounded in the leg as to be unable to move on foot. The soldiers around him formed a litter for him with their muskets, and the brave man, causing his bearers to march with the rear-guard, continued to give his orders to Ensign Berestoffsky. Presently, however, he was again struck by shot; and indeed he was now almost shattered, being wounded in two of his limbs, and in the side. To the last he had comported himself as a good soldier.

Kvetzinski is wounded and disabled.

XXXIII.

But whose was the mind which had freshly come to bear upon this part of the fight, and what was the plumed array which, threatening Kvetzinski on his right front, forbade him from further tarrying on the line of the Great Redoubt? Before the moment when the Guards and the columns began their fight, Sir Colin Campbell was sitting in his saddle by the left of the Cold

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I.

Sir Colin Campbell's conception of the part he would take with his brigade.

stream, and talking from time to time with the Duke of Cambridge. The veteran was watching for his time. And, although the ground before him favoured the concealment of troops, yet his skill in the reading of a field of battle had enabled him to see, or in some way know or divine, that what forces the Russians had on their right of the Great Redoubt were all more or less held back. So, if he could swiftly move up a battalion to the crest which rose straight before him, he would be on the flank of the position from which the Vladimir confronted the Guards before any other battalions could come down to engage him.* Upon descrying his advance, the Russians, he thought, would see the instant need of abandoning their struggle with the Guards; but if by chance, or because of their obstinacy, they should fail to do so, then, as soon as he could reach the ground he longed for, he would bring round the left shoulder, turn full towards the west, and roll up the Muscovite columns before their supports could come down to save them. This was what he thought might be done; and the keen, perfect weapon with which to do it had come fresh into his hand. The other battalions of the Highland Brigade were approaching; but the 42d—the far-famed ‘Black Watch’—had already come up. It was

The 42d was at his side.

* ‘The immediate object being to turn the redoubt, while ‘the attack in front was made by the Guards.’ Original MS. Report, dated ‘Bivouac on the river Alma, 22d September ‘1854,’ and signed ‘C. Campbell, Major-General.’—*Note to 4th Edition.*

ranged in line. The ancient glory of the corps was a treasure now committed to the charge of young soldiers new to battle; but Campbell knew them—was sure of their excellence—and was sure, too of Colonel Cameron, their commanding officer. Very eager—for the Guards were now engaged with the enemy's columns—very eager, yet silent and majestic, the battalion stood ready.

Before the action had begun, and whilst his men were still in column, Campbell had spoken to his brigade a few words—words simple, and, for the most part, workmanlike, yet touched with the fire of warlike sentiment. 'Now men, you are going into action. Remember this: whoever is wounded—I don't care what his rank is—whoever is wounded must lie where he falls till the bandsmen come to attend to him. No soldiers must go carrying off wounded men. If any soldier does such a thing, his name shall be stuck up in his parish church. Don't be in a hurry about firing. Your officers will tell you when it is time to open fire. Be steady. Keep silence. Fire low. Now, men'—those who know the old soldier can tell how his voice would falter the while his features were kindling—'Now, men, the army will watch us; make me proud of the Highland Brigade! '*

Sir Colin Campbell and the Highland Brigade.

* Of course, the memory of those who unexpectedly found themselves hearing Sir Colin's address to his brigade, can supply but an imperfect record of the words which were uttered; and perhaps, if the impressions of any great number of the hearers were compared, few or none would be found to be closely similar. I think, however, that the address given in the text is not

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I.

Their en-
gagement
with several
Russian
columns.

It was before the battle that this, or the like of this, was addressed to the brigade; and now, when Sir Colin rode up to the corps which awaited his signal, he only gave it two words. But because of his accustomed manner of utterance, and because he was a true, faithful lover of war, the two words he spoke were as the roll of the drum: 'Forward, 42d!' This was all he then said; and, 'as a steed that knows his rider,' the great heart of the battalion bounded proudly to his touch.

Having directed his staff not to follow him,* Sir Colin Campbell went forward alone in front of the 42d; but before he had ridden far, he saw that his reckoning was already made good by the event, and that the column which had engaged the Coldstream was moving off obliquely towards its right rear. When the 42d had come up, he was rejoined by his Staff, and he then rode up a good way in advance, for he was swift to hope that the withdrawal of the column from the line of the redoubt might give him the means of learning the ground before him, and seeing how the enemy's strength was disposed in this part of the field. In a few moments he was abreast of the redoubt, and upon the ridge or crest which divided the slope he had been ascending from the broad and rather deep hollow which lay before grossly wide of the truth: at all events, I can answer for the substantial accuracy of the injunction against quitting the ranks in order to carry off wounded men.

* Because he knew that a group of officers would be likely to draw more fire than a single horseman.

him. On his right he had the now empty redoubt, on his right front the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Straight before him there was the hollow, or basin, just spoken of, bounded on its farther side by a swelling wave or ridge of ground which he called the 'inner crest.' Beyond that, whilst he looked straight before him, he could see that the ground fell off into a valley; but when he glanced towards his left front he observed that the hollow before him was, so to speak, bridged over by a bending rib which connected the inner with the outer crest—bridged over in such a way that a column on his left front might march to the spot where he stood without having first to descend into the lower ground. More towards his left, the ground was high, but so undulating and varied that it would not necessarily disclose any troops which might be posted in that part of the field.

Confronting Sir Colin Campbell from the other side of the hollow, the enemy had a strong column—the two right battalions of the Kazan corps—and it was towards this body that the Vladimir column, moving off from the line of the redoubt, was all this time making its way. The Russians saw that they were the subject of a general officer's studies; and Campbell's horse at this time was twice struck by shot, but not disabled. When the retiring column came abreast of the right Kazan troops it faced about to the front, and took part with them in opposing a strength of four battalions—four battalions hard worked

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and much thinned—to the one which, eager and fresh, was following the steps of the Highland General. Looking towards his left front, and along the natural bridge or viaduct which has just been spoken of, Sir Colin Campbell saw another column much heavier than either of the two which confronted him. This heavy column was composed of two battalions of the Soudal corps, and it was of greater size and strength than the Vladimir and the Kazan columns, because it was as yet untouched. A column formed of the two remaining Soudal battalions—battalions also untouched—was on the extreme right of the enemy's infantry position, but so placed that at this moment it could not be seen by Campbell. On the higher slopes of the Kourganè Hill, the four Ouglitz battalions stood impending over the scene of the coming fight, and these battalions were also untouched. With three battalions Sir Colin Campbell was about to engage no less than twelve; but the three were in line, and the twelve were massed in five columns.

The time that it took Sir Colin Campbell to learn the ground before him, and to read the enemy's mind, proved almost enough for enabling his superb 42d to reach him. In the last part of their advance, the men of the battalion had had to come up over ground both broken and steep, but they traversed it with a speed which observers admired from afar. In the land where those Scots were bred, there are shadows of sail-

ing clouds skimming straight up the mountain's side, and their paths are rugged, are steep, yet their course is smooth, easy, and swift. Smoothly, easily, swiftly, the 'Black Watch' seemed to glide up the hill. A few instants before, and their tartans ranged dark in the valley—now, their plumes were on the crest. The small knot of horsemen who had ridden on before them were still there. Any stranger looking into the group might almost be able to know—might know by the mere carriage of the head—that he in the plain, dark-coloured frock, he whose sword-belt hung crosswise from his shoulder, was the man there charged with command; for in battle, men who have to obey sit erect in their saddles; he who has on him the care of the fight seems always to fall into the pensive yet eager bend which the Greeks—keen perceivers of truth—used to join with their conception of Mind brought to bear upon War. It is on board ship, perhaps, more commonly than ashore, that people in peace-time have been used to see their fate hanging upon the skill of one man. Often, landsmen at sea have watched the skilled, weatherworn sailor when he seems to look through the gale and search deep into the home of the storm. He sees what they cannot see; he knows what, except from his lips, they never will be able to learn. They stand silent, but they question him with their eyes. So men new to war gaze upon the veteran commander, when, with knitted brow and steady eyes, he measures the enemy's power, and

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draws near to his final resolve. Campbell, fastening his eyes on the two columns standing before him, and on the heavier and more distant column on his left front, seemed not to think lightly of the enemy's strength ; but in another instant (for his mind was made up, and his Highland blood took fire at the coming array of the tartans) his features put on that glow which, seen in men of his race—race known by the kindling grey eye, and the light, stubborn crisping hair—discloses the rapture of instant fight. Although at that moment the 42d was alone, and was confronted by the two columns on the farther side of the hollow, yet Campbell, having a steadfast faith in Colonel Cameron and in the regiment he commanded, resolved to go straight on, and at once, with his forward movement. He allowed the battalion to descend alone into the hollow, marching straight against the two columns. Moreover, he suffered it to undertake a manœuvre which (except with troops of great steadiness and highly instructed) can hardly be tried with safety against regiments still unshaken. The 'Black Watch' 'advanced firing.'*

But whilst this fight was going on between the 42d and the two Russian columns, grave danger from another quarter seemed to threaten the Highland battalion ; for, before it had gone many paces, Campbell saw that the column which had

* We saw that Colonel Hood with the Grenadier Guards 'advanced firing,' but at that moment he had already brought the column which he attacked to the verge of its ruin.

appeared on his left front was boldly marching forward; and such was the direction it took, and such the nature of the ground, that the column, if it were suffered to go on with this movement, would be able to strike at the flank of the 42d without having first to descend into lower ground.

Halting the 42d in the hollow, Campbell swiftly measured the strength of the approaching column, and he reckoned it so strong that he resolved to prepare for it a front of no less than five companies. He was upon the point of giving the order for effecting this bend in the line of the 42d, when, looking to his left rear, he saw his centre battalion springing up to the outer crest. But almost in the same moment he saw, or in some way divined, that this battalion, in its exceeding ardour for the fight, was coming up wild and raging. He instantly rode to his left.

The 93d in the Crimea was never quite like other regiments, for it chanced that it had received into its ranks a large proportion of those men of eager spirit who had petitioned to be exchanged from regiments left at home to regiments engaged in the war. The exceeding fire and vehemence, and the ever ready energies of the battalion, made it an instrument of great might, if only it could be duly held in, but gave it a tendency to be headlong in its desire to hurl itself upon the enemy.

In a minute, this fiery 93d—it was commanded by Colonel Ainslie—came storming over the crest,

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and, having now at last an enemy's column before it, it seemed to be almost mad with warlike joy. Its formation, of course, was disturbed by the haste and vehemence of the onset; and Campbell saw that, unless the regiment could be halted and a little calmed down, it would go on rushing forward in disordered fury, at the risk of shattering itself against the strength of the hard, square-built column which was solemnly coming to meet it.

But he who could halt his men on the bank of a cool stream when they were rushing down to quench the rage of their thirst, was able to quiet them in the midst of their warlike fury. Sir Colin got the regiment to halt and dress its ranks. By this time it was under the fire of the approaching column.

Campbell's charger, twice wounded already, but hitherto not much hurt, was now struck by a shot in the heart. Without a stumble or a plunge the horse sank down gently to the earth, and was dead. Campbell took his aide-de-camp's charger; but he had not been long in Shadwell's saddle when up came Sir Colin's groom with his second horse. The man, perhaps, under some former master, had been used to be charged with the 'second horse' in the hunting-field. At all events, here he was; and if Sir Colin was angered by the apparition, he could not deny that it was opportune. The man touched his cap, and excused himself for being where he was. In the dry, terse way of those Englishmen who are much

accustomed to horses he explained that towards the rear the balls had been dropping about very thick, and that, fearing some harm might come to his master's second horse, he had thought it best to bring him up to the front.

When the 93d had recovered the perfectness of its array, it again moved forward, but at the steady pace imposed upon it by the chief. The 42d had already resumed its forward movement; it still advanced firing.

There are things in the world which, eluding the resources of the dry narrator, can still be faintly imagined by that subtle power which sometimes enables mankind to picture dim truth by fancy. According to the thought which floated in the mind of the churchman who taught to All the Russias their grand form of prayer for victory, there are 'angels of light' and 'angels of darkness and horror,' who soar over the heads of soldiery destined to be engaged in close fight, and attend them into battle.* When the fight grows hot, the angels hover down near to earth with their bright limbs twined deep in the wreaths of the smoke which divides the combatants. But it is no coarse, bodily help that these Christian angels bring. More purely spiritual than the old

* This is part of the Russian prayer for victory :— ' O Lord !
' . . . hear us this day praying for these troops that are
' gathered together. Bless and strengthen them, and give them
' a manly heart against their enemies. Send them an Angel
' of Light, and to the enemies an Angel of Darkness and Horror
' to scatter them, and place a stumbling-block before them to
' weaken their hearts and turn their courage into flight.'

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I.

Immortals, they strike no blow, they snatch no man's weapon, they lift away no warrior in a cloud. What the angel of light can bestow is valour, priceless valour, and light to lighten the path to victory, giving men grace to see the bare truth, and, seeing it, to have the mastery. To regiments which are to be blessed with victory the Angel of Light seems to beckon, and gently draw his men forward. What the Angel of Darkness can inflict is fear, horror, despair; and it is given him also to be able to plant error and vain fancies in the minds of the doomed soldiery. By false dread he scares them. Whether he who conceived this prayer was soldier or priest, or soldier and priest in one, it seems to me that he knew more of the true nature of the strife of good infantry than he could utter in common prose. For indeed it is no physical power which rules the conflict between two well-formed bodies of foot.

The mere killing and wounding which occurs whilst a fight is still hanging in doubt, does not so alter the relative numbers of the combatants as in that way to govern the result. The use of the slaughter which takes place at that time lies mainly in the stress which it puts upon the minds of those who, themselves remaining unhurt, are nevertheless disturbed by the sight of what is befalling their comrades. In that way, a command of the means necessary for inflicting death and wounds is one element of victory. But it is far from being the chief one. Nor is it by perfect-

ness of discipline, nor yet by a contempt of life, that men can assure to themselves the mastery over their foes. More or less all these things are needed; but the truly governing power is that ascendancy of the stronger over the weaker heart which (because of the mystery of its origin) the churchman was willing to ascribe to angels coming down from on high.

The turning moment of a fight is a moment of trial for the soul and not for the body; and it is, therefore, that such courage as men are able to gather from being gross in numbers, can be easily outweighed by the warlike virtue of a few. To the stately 'Black Watch' and the hot 93d, with Campbell leading them on, there was vouchsafed that stronger heart for which the brave pious Muscovites had prayed. Over the souls of the men in the columns there was spread, first the gloom, then the swarm of vain delusions, and at last the sheer horror which might be the work of the Angel of Darkness.* The two lines marched straight on. The three columns shook. They were not yet subdued. They were stubborn; but every moment the two advancing battalions grew nearer and nearer, and although—dimly masking the scant numbers of the Highlanders—there was still the white curtain of smoke which always rolled on before them, yet, fitfully, and from moment to moment, the signs of them could be traced on the right hand and on the left in a long, shadowy line, and their coming was ceaseless.

* See the next note.

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But, moreover, the Highlanders being men of great stature, and in strange garb, their plumes being tall, and the view of them being broken and distorted by the wreaths of the smoke, and there being, too, an ominous silence in their ranks, there were men among the Russians who began to conceive a vague terror—the terror of things unearthly; and some, they say, imagined that they were charged by horsemen strange, silent, monstrous, bestriding giant chargers.* The columns were falling into that plight—we have twice before seen it this day—were falling into that plight, that its officers were moving hither and thither, with their drawn swords, were commanding, were imploring, were threatening, nay, were even laying hands on their soldiery, and striving to hold them fast in their places. This struggle is the last stage but one in the agony of a body of good infantry massed in close column. Unless help should come from elsewhere, the three columns would have to give way.

But help came. From the high ground on our left another heavy column—the column composed of the two right Soudal battalions—was seen coming down. It moved straight at the flank of the 93d.

So now, for the third time that day, a mass of infantry some fifteen hundred strong was descending upon the uncovered flank of a battalion in

* It was from the poor wounded prisoners that our people gathered the accounts of the impression produced upon their minds by the advance of the Highlanders.

English array; and, coming as it did from the extreme right of the enemy's position, this last attack was aimed almost straight at the file—the file of only two men—which closed the line of the 93d. CHAP.
I.

But some witchcraft, the doomed men might fancy, was causing the earth to bear giants. Above the crest or swell of ground on the left rear of the 93d, yet another array of the tall bending plumes began to rise up in a long, ceaseless line, stretching far into the east; and presently, in all the grace and beauty that marks a Highland regiment when it springs up the side of a hill, the 79th came bounding forward. Without a halt, or with only the halt that was needed for dressing the ranks, it advanced upon the flank of the right Sousdal column, and caught the mass in its sin—caught it daring to march across the front of a Highland battalion—a battalion already near, and swiftly advancing in line. Wrapped in the fire thus poured upon its flank, the hapless column could not march, could not live. It broke, and began to fall back in great confusion; and the left Sousdal column being almost at the same time overthrown by the 93d, and the two columns which had engaged the 'Black Watch' being now in full retreat, the spurs of the hill and the winding dale beyond became thronged with the enemy's disordered masses.

Defeat of
the four
Russian
columns.

Then, again, they say, there was heard the sorrowful wail that bursts from the heart of the brave Russian infantry when they have to suffer

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defeat; but this time the wail was the wail of eight battalions; and the warlike grief of the soldiery could no longer kindle the fierce intent which, only a little before, had spurred forward the Vladimir column. Hope had fled.

After having been parted from one another by the nature of the ground, and thus thrown for some time into *échelon*, the battalions of Sir Colin's brigade were now once more close abreast; and since the men looked upon ground where the grey remains of the enemy's broken strength were mournfully rolling away, they could not but see that this, the revoir of the Highlanders, had chanced in a moment of glory. Knowing their hearts, and deeming that the time was one when the voice of his people might fitly enough be heard, the Chief touched or half lifted his hat in the way of a man assenting. Then along the Kourganè slopes, and thence west almost home to the Causeway, the hillsides were made to resound with that joyous, assuring cry, which is the natural utterance of a northern people so long as it is warlike and free.*

Descending into the hollow where the vanquished troops flooded down, the waves of sound lit upon the throng and touched it, some imagined, as a breath of air touches a forest, lightly stirring its numberless leaves. And, in truth, it

* Many of our people who had heard the cheers of the Highlanders were hindered from seeing them by the bend of the ground, and they supposed that the cheers were uttered in charging. It was not so. The Highlanders advanced in silence.

might be that even in this the hour of turmoil and defeat the long-suffering Muscovites were stirred with a new thought, for they never before that day had heard what our people call 'cheers;' and the sound is of such a kind that it startles men not born to freedom.

The three Highland regiments were now reformed, and Sir Colin Campbell, careful in the midst of victory, looked to see whether the supports were near enough to warrant him in pressing the enemy's retreat with his Highland Brigade. He judged that, since Cathcart was still a good way off, the Highlanders ought to be established on the ground which they had already won; and, never forgetting that, all this while, he was on the extreme left of the whole infantry array of the Allies, he made a bend in his line, which caused it to show a front towards the south-east as well as towards the south.

The great column of the four Ouglitz battalions was still on the rise of the hill beyond the hollow. It was a force some 3000 strong, was as yet untouched, and was glowing with the same fire and zeal as when it had come down in anger to support the attack upon Codrington's brigade. From the high and commanding ground where the column stood posted, its officers had been able to see and understand the numerical proportions of the combatants more clearly than any man could who was toiling in the smoke of the fight. Looking down from the slope, they had had to endure to see

Stand made
by the
Ouglitz
battalions.

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I.

the gathered masses of their fellow-countrymen giving way to the slender lines of the red-coats; and not bearing to think that their Czar and his famed infantry were to be coerced by means so small and delicate, they became inflamed with indignation against their own people for being defeated; and presently the whole column came down the hill, undertaking nothing less than to stay the ebb of the tide. It thrust itself full against the retreating masses, and angrily strove to drive them back into the fight.*

The enemy's neglect of other measures for covering the retreat.

But the Highland Brigade now again opened fire; and, the enemy being left very helpless, and having no guns in battery wherewith to attempt a stand, the Ouglitz column was forced to turn.† It went part way up to its old ground in order to be able to cover the retreat of the vanquished masses.

The enemy's brave and devoted infantry, already abandoned by their ordnance, were now also left uncovered by the Russian cavalry. That force, nearly 3000 strong, had been so palsied by orders or want of orders, or by some other unexplained

* After speaking (as shown in the former notes) of the defeat of the Russian columns with which his brigade had been fighting, Sir Colin Campbell says that they 'were driven down into the valley upon a mass of troops which were placed in reserve on the heights in their rear, and an attempt was made by this reserve to move in advance, forcing forward the retiring troops.' The MS. by Sir Colin Campbell, quoted *ante* at page 256.

† 'But fire being again opened, this reserve returned to its position, evidently with a view to cover the men who had been driven by the three Highland regiments.'—*Ibid.*

cause, that, although long confronted by a comparatively small body of horse, it had not only abstained from all challenge, but had twice borne to look upon the open flank of a slender infantry line ascending to carry the heights without interposing in the fight; and now, when the faithful battalions might well look for charges of horsemen to cover the retreat, the Russian cavalry still remained idle, though it lingered for a while on the field.*

Our cavalry, long impatient of the restraint imposed upon it by the commander of the forces, had crossed the river without Lord Raglan's authority; and although the nature of the ford and the upset of a gun-carriage had caused a good deal of delay, they reached the top of the hill soon after the Highlanders had crowned it. With Lord Lucan's sanction, three guns of the horse-artillery, under Captain Maude, were placed in battery, and three guns of Captain Brandling's troop, which came up at the time, were established on the right of the 42d. The fire of these six guns told cruelly upon the enemy's retreating masses; and, the like being done by other English batteries on the west of the Kourganè Hill, the slaughter was so great that, of

Slaughter
of the
retreating
masses by
artillery.

* At an early period of the action, symptoms of the unenterprising intentions of the Russian cavalry had been detected by Sir George Cathcart. Being on our extreme left, he had narrowly watched the enemy's horsemen, and even before the deployment of the 1st Division he had found himself able to assure Lord Raglan that nothing serious was likely to be attempted by the enemy's cavalry on the right bank of the river. This message was carried, I think, by Captain Elliot.

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I.

those who fell, very many fell upon their comrades, making in some places small banks of slain or wounded men; but where the round-shot ploughed into columns still keeping something of their old coherence, there the men so fell that there were—but I care not to speak any more of the slaughter that is wrought by cannon when the infantry strife is all over.

Losses sustained by the enemy on the Kourganè Hill:

Of the four Russian Generals who took part in this fight of the Kourganè Hill, three were wounded; and nearly all the field-officers, together with very many officers of humbler grade who were on duty with the enemy's infantry in this part of the field, were either killed or wounded. The brave Vladimir and the Kazan corps suffered dreadful losses. The loss of the four Kazan battalions alone was put at no less than seventeen hundred.*

by the
Guards and
Highlanders.

This achievement of the Guards and the Highland Brigade was so rapid, and was executed with so steadfast a faith in the prowess of our soldiery and the ascendancy of Line over Column, that in vanquishing eighteen battalions of infantry,† and in going straight through with an onset which tore open the Russian position, the six battalions together did not lose 500 men.‡

Is it then with slight loss—is it thus in a swift

* Chodasiewicz, p. 76. The estimate was not official, and was made under the influence of the despondency created by the retreat. It seems probable, therefore, that it exaggerated the loss.

† Including the two battalions of sailors.

‡ The exact number seems to be 438, and of this loss a large proportion was occasioned by the disaster which befell the

march of a few hundred paces on a hillside, and with all this seeming ease and grace, that the last of the work is done whereby nation gains the mastery over nation?

Well, the truth is that, before it comes to a struggle like this, a State waging war may have to bear cruel losses—losses at sea, losses by pestilence and famine; losses also inflicted by the enemy before he consents to give battle with his infantry upon open ground; and it might happen to a nation to have to go through a campaign without coming once to the strife for which her people are fitted; but when at last, after many an obstacle vanquished, after many a tormenting delay, the English array of two deep is suffered to reach open ground, and there measures its strength with gross columns, then the annals of our country have taught us that, unless there be an almost overwhelming disparity of numbers, there ought to be no misgiving about what will be the end of the fight.

XXXIV.

On the western slopes of the Kourganè Hill, no step, that I know of, was taken for covering

Scots Fusilier Guards. Besides the casualties occurring to officers, which have been mentioned elsewhere, Cust of the Coldstream and Abercrombie of the 93d were killed, and Baring of the Coldstream was wounded. Cust was a man so much beloved by his friends, that when I was going to the Crimea in 1869 several of them asked me to try to find his grave. I found it; and a lovelier grave there could not be. It was on the right bank of the Alma, and richly overgrown with 'the flowers of the field.'

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I.

The scarlet
arch on the
knoll.

the withdrawal of the defeated troops ; and if in the minds of Russian officers in that part of the field there yet remained any notion of trying to govern the retreat, their last hope was blasted by the new and ominous sign which then started full into view. On the fatal knoll, whence evil seemed always to come to the army of the Czar, there took place a sudden change. The horsemen with the white plumes were quite suddenly withdrawn from sight, and in a minute the knoll was surmounted with a scarlet arch. The arch was an arch built of English troops ranged in line across the summit, and thence on either side stretching down the steep shoulders of the knoll. And this arch of formed troops rose up in the heart of what had been the Russian position. Moreover, it faced towards the south-east, plainly showing that it was in the mind of the red-coats to cross the higher part of the Pass, and spring upon the flank of the troops which were retiring along the Great Causeway.

Then, perhaps, if not long before, the most hopeful of the Russian officers who looked from the Pass or from the western slopes of the Kourganè Hill, would be constrained to acknowledge that their army had fallen under the mastery of that gracious-looking horseman long seen on the knoll, who managed his charger and his field-glass with one hand and a half-empty sleeve. And, indeed, the mastery was now so complete that to any poor Muscovite soldier who was simply moving from the field with all the speed he had,

his officers could hardly say with truth that they had any better tactics to show him.

It will be remembered that when Lord Raglan, after crossing the river, gained his first joyful glimpse of the knoll, he ordered up Adams's brigade in all haste. The force obeying this order comprised two battalions, the 41st under Colonel Carpenter, and the 49th under Major Dalton.* These troops encountered some trouble in passing the river, but were keenly urged forward; and the moment they gained the summit of the knoll, Lord Raglan, with his own eye and voice, caused them to be drawn up in line. In order to make way for them on the top, the Headquarter Staff moved aside, and Lord Raglan so placed the line that it fronted towards the south-east.

If the battle at this time had been hanging in doubt, Lord Raglan, placed as he was with these two battalions in his hand, could hardly have failed to make them the means of governing the result, for their advance would have threatened to roll up the enemy's line from its centre to its extreme right. As it was, the force became that scarlet bow on the knoll which seemed to present to the enemy the alternative of sheer flight or captivity.

Lord Raglan, however, perceived that the cogency with which these battalions would act in hurrying the retreat, depended rather upon

* The 47th, as we saw, remained under the personal direction of Evans, and crossed the river when he did.

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I.

their mere appearance on this part of the field than upon any real power that they had of intercepting the enemy; for though the enemy might judge them to be very near, they were parted from him by deep hollows, and it was plain that if they were moved forward before the knowledge of their presence had sufficiently spread, they would in a great measure lose their weight; because in crossing the hollow which divided them from the line of the retreat, they would necessarily drop out of sight. So, in order that the aspect of the force might sink into the enemy's heart, Lord Raglan kept it formed upon the summit of the knoll for two or three minutes. He then moved it towards the south-east. General Eyre at nearly this time advanced by the line of the Causeway with one of Sir Richard England's brigades.

Retreat of
the last
Russian
battalions,
which had
hitherto
stood their
ground.

The column of the Ouglitz battalions began to fall back; and thenceforth there remained no part of the Russian army in this part of the field which was not in full retreat.

The guns of Turner's battery were limbered up and pushed forward to a commanding spot further up in the Pass, and thence, at long range, they continued to pour their fire upon the enemy's retreating troops. In the performance of this duty they were aided by a French battery. Afterwards Lord Raglan sent an aide-de-camp with orders to cause the guns to advance to a more commanding ground which he had observed on their left front. The English battery

Final opera-
tions of the
artillery.

advanced accordingly; but the officers in command of the French battery declined to move forward. It was at this time that Walsham was killed. He was the last officer who fell that day. Besides Walsham, our artillery corps lost two officers killed—namely, Dew and Cockrell; and of the rank and file, nine were killed, and twenty (besides one sergeant) were wounded.

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I.

Their losses

XXXV.

Lord Raglan now descended from the knoll whither Fortune, in her wild and puissant governance of human events, had happily chosen to lead him. Bending his steps towards the ground just won by the Duke of Cambridge's Division, he rode across the main Causeway.

Lord Raglan
crossing the
Causeway:

At that very time, as I make it, there was riding towards Lord Raglan, and riding, too, along the same road, though at a distance of some few hundred yards, a man, confounded and troubled, who had helped to bring great woe on his country.*

Clearly wanting in many, nay, perhaps, in most, of the qualities which make an able commander, Prince Mentschikoff was still a brave

Prince
Mentschi-
koff on
ground not
far off:

* The General who describes his interview with Prince Mentschikoff tells us what was the state of the battle at the time when the meeting took place: and it seems to me that that stage was the very one that the battle had reached when Lord Raglan crossed the great road. If so, it follows of course that the two facts occurred simultaneously.

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I.

man. It could not but be that his heart was in the cause. A momentous battle had been raging. Of one of the contending armies he was the Commander-in-Chief. He was in full health. He yearned to be acting: yet from the moment when he entrusted to Kiriakoff the great column of the eight battalions, his mind had given no impress to events.

The part he
had been
taking in
the battle:

In order to see how this came to be possible, it must be remembered, first, that the tract of ground over which Prince Mentschikoff watched was somewhat broad; and, secondly, that all the decisive fighting of that day was condensed into a narrow period of time. The Allies had been advancing upon a front of five miles; and all the fights in which the combatants had engaged with their ranged battalions took place, as I reckon it, within a period of some thirty-five minutes. Now, if any man used to the saddle, and acquainted also with a country of open downs much divided by hollows and ravines, will fasten his mind upon any two hill-tops or other landmarks which he knows to be five miles asunder, and will then imagine a number of brief events to be happening, first in one part of this extended tract and then in another, but all within little more than half an hour, he will be able to understand how it might be possible for the Russian General to be eagerly riding from east to west and from west to east, yet always being so luckless as never once to strike in upon the ground where the event that

he yearned to witness and to control was swiftly passing. It was not, I am sure, from any neglect or delinquency that Prince Mentschikoff came to be annulled during all the heavy stress of the battle.

CHAP.

I.

We left the Prince handing over to Kiriakoff the charge of the great column of the eight battalions, and it is only by conjecture that I can form an idea of what became of him during the critical period of several minutes which then immediately followed. He would not have abandoned the personal command of the column which he had eagerly gathered together for a great enterprise, unless he had been dragged away by tidings of what was happening in the English part of the field. Thither, therefore, he would ride, and he would ride, no doubt, with the knowledge (for that was what his last tidings must have taught him) that the English had stormed and carried the Great Redoubt. But he would have to cross the great road, and before he got thither he would see—and would see, one may imagine, with unspeakable astonishment—that the Volhynia columns then constituting what remained of his ‘great reserves’ were no longer in their place. Finding that they were retiring, or had already retired, and knowing nothing of the way in which Lord Raglan had driven them from the field by the use of his two guns on the knoll, the Prince would be likely to ride in the direction which the reserve columns took, very eager to find some man upon whom to vent his anger.

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I.

The minutes it took him to ride after the reserves to seek out the cause of their retreat, and to come back to the front, would be those very minutes in which the position held by the centre and the right of the Russian army was falling into the hands of the English.

his re-
appearance
in the Eng-
lish part of
the field.

This, I repeat, is only a conjectural mode of filling the chasm which is left open by the Russian narrators; but the spot where the Prince is found when he reappears in the eye of History, is exactly the one in which those who adopt my surmise would expect to see him riding. For it was by the great road, where his reserves had been posted, that Prince Mentschikoff came back into that part of the field with which the English had dealt. When last he saw it, the position, immensely strong by nature, was held in the grip of powerful batteries, and battalions standing rigid as granite. Since that time, it is true, some hours had passed, but it was only a few minutes before that he had been the assailant in the other part of the field, placing a mighty column in the hands of Kiriakoff with orders to make an onslaught upon Canrobert's Division. Now—he gazed, and gazed again, being slow to understand—being slow to let in the belief—that the grey, rolling masses which approached him were the ruins of two-thirds of his army. But presently he came upon a sight hardly less strange, hardly less shocking to him, than his retreating soldiery. He met on the road a lone man—a lone man on foot, walking away

His meeting
with Gorts-
chakoff:—

from the field. He looked, and came to make out that this lone pedestrian was Prince Gortschakoff—Prince Gortschakoff, the chief to whom he had entrusted the command of the whole centre and the whole right wing of his army. ‘What is this?’ ‘What is the matter?’ ‘Why are you on foot?’ ‘Why are you alone?’ These, as was natural, were the questions hurled at Prince Gortschakoff by his troubled, amazed commander. ‘My horse,’ said Gortschakoff, ‘was killed near the river. I am alone, because all the aides-de-camp and officers of my Staff have been killed or wounded. I have received six shots;’ and then, in a spirit scarce worthy of historic moments, scarce matching with the greatness of the disaster which his overthrow had brought upon a proud and mighty empire, Prince Gortschakoff showed the rents which shot had made in his clothes.*

At this time, so far as I know, Prince Mentschikoff used none of the means by which, though forced to retreat, skilled commanders can make themselves feared. On the very road where he stood, the Czar’s faithful infantry—infantry famous for its heroism in the trying hour of a retreat—was left to extricate itself from the field by brute flight. It would seem that Prince Mentschikoff’s authority—already for some time neutralised by the mischances which, all the day long, had been throwing him

his omission to take measures for covering the retreat:

* It is Prince Gortschakoff himself who gives this account of his meeting with Prince Mentschikoff.

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I.

he is carried
along with
the retreat-
ing masses

into the wrong part of the field—now slipped from out of his hands. He had no longer a grasp of his army. A little later, he was seen borne along with the ebb, a dismal unit in the throng. Endued with a high spirit, and having a good deal of the pride which a man may justly take in his country so long as it is warlike and honest, he broke out into a loud, angry cry. ‘It is a disgrace,’ he said, ‘for a Russian soldier to retreat!’ An officer, hearing his words, and being maddened, partly by the defeat, and partly, as they say, by strong drink, fiercely answered his General, and told him to his face, in the hearing of the soldiery, that if he had ordered the men to stand, they would have held their ground.* To this depth of wretchedness Prince Mentschikoff fell in the nineteenth month from the time when, in the name of a mighty empire, and under the gaze of all Europe, he came down into the Bosphorus with commission to trample upon the Ottoman State.

XXXVI.

The array of
the English
army on the
ground they
had won.

Meantime Evans had been rejoined by the two regiments detached under Adams. The Scots Fusiliers had resumed their place in the centre of the brigade of Guards. The Light Division, re-formed, had followed the advance of the Duke of Cambridge. Sir Richard England, pushing forward towards his right front, had taken up

* Chodasiewicz.

ground on one of the eastern spurs of the Telegraph Height. At the opposite extremity of our line, Sir George Cathcart had established his troops on the left rear of the Highland Brigade. Facing almost due south, and pushed forward to the reverse of the slopes which made the strength of the Russian position, and ranged upon a front of two miles, the British infantry looked down upon the enemy's retreating masses.

At this time Lord Raglan sent the Adjutant-General with his orders to the cavalry. Those orders, however, did not authorise the operations by which it is usual for horsemen to gather in the fruits of a victory. A commander, even in battle, must not forget the campaign. The Western Powers were invading a province of Russia with forces which had to march through an open country. Their pretension to wage such war as that depended upon their having at their command all the three arms of the service; therefore the strength of the arm in which they were the most weak was the measure of their power as invaders. The French, as we saw, had no cavalry, and the English had rather more than a thousand sabres and lances. With such a force, thrown forward to intercept the enemy's retreating masses, many prisoners, if not also some guns, might have been assuredly taken; and it was to be expected that blows of this kind would aggravate the despondency of the beaten army. But Lord Raglan judged that no practicable capture of trophies or prisoners was worth the risk of los-

Operations
of the Eng-
lish cavalry.

CHAP.
I.

ing a material part of his small brilliant cavalry force. He therefore declined to let his horsemen push forward without the support of a powerful artillery; and the orders he sent by the Adjutant-General directed that the cavalry should escort the foot-batteries to the front. In delivering this instruction, Estcourt cautioned Lord Lucan, and told him 'that the cavalry were 'not to attack.'

Lord Cardigan, with one-half of the cavalry force, was directed to escort the guns which were to go to the right, whilst Lord Lucan in person went forward with the rest of the cavalry, and escorted the guns advancing on our left. Lord Lucan, riding in advance of the guns with a squadron of the 17th Lancers, came upon many of the enemy's stragglers in retreat, and he ordered the horsemen who were with him, supported by another squadron, to pursue and take prisoners. A troop of the 11th Hussars had been ordered (it was said by Lord Raglan himself) to do the same thing, and the 17th had already taken a great many prisoners, when the operation was stopped by special orders from Lord Raglan. What Lord Raglan had meant was, that the troopers employed in taking prisoners should be spread out as skirmishers; and when he saw that they were acting in serried ranks, and were going on far in advance, he became anxious lest some of the enemy's guns should be brought to bear upon them, and occasion him a loss in that one description of force with which the Allies were

scantily provided. He therefore sent first one and then another Staff officer to the commander of the cavalry, with orders to give up the pursuit of prisoners, and return to the duty of escorting the guns. Thereupon, Lord Lucan recalled the troopers in advance, and the prisoners they had taken were set free.

CHAP.
I.

XXXVII.

It will be remembered that at the time when the head of the first French Division was pushed back by the 'great column of the eight battalions,' General Canrobert was still without his artillery. But these batteries having been sent down to Almatamack, and having there crossed the river, had at last been brought up to the plateau, and (along with some guns belonging to Bosquet's Division) they were now travelling eastward. In the part of the field where Bosquet stood, and from which this long train of artillery had commenced its eastward journey, there was no enemy at hand; and even when the guns had come to within a short distance of the ground in front of Canrobert's right wing, there was no Russian battalion which could be seen by the French artillerymen; for the train was moving along a hollow which, so long as a man rode low down, was deep enough to hinder him from seeing far either on his right hand or on his left. But some of the officers who were with the guns now thought it was time to obtain a wider view

*Progress of
a French
artillery-
train along
the plateau
from west
to east.*

CHAP.

I.

Officers
describing
the 'column
' of the eight
' battalions.'

of the ground, and they therefore rode part way up the slope which overhung the ravine towards their right. Before they had yet got quite up to the flat ground above the ravine, they suddenly stopped; for, monstrous, immense, and obtruded before them on the plateau, at a distance of only a few hundred yards, they saw a grey, oblong-cut block—saw what in one moment they knew to be a mass of Russian infantry—a mass of unwonted size—standing rigidly built in close column. This was the great 'column of the eight battalions'—the dumb, gliding phantasm of the Telegraph Height, whose bare aspect had given strange speed to the breathless French aide-de-camp on the knoll, and had just been constraining the head of Canrobert's Division to fall back, and drop under the crest. With that warlike swiftness of thought which is natural to the French in the hour of battle, the officers who caught sight of this apparition darted straight upon the perception of what ought to be done. Some of the guns were brought up to a part of the slope from which, without being easily seen, they could throw their fire into the column.*

The column
torn by ar-
tillery-fire:

Suddenly Kiriakoff found that his close mass of eight battalions was cruelly rent by shot and shell coming from the west. Without stopping to find out by calm scrutiny the quarter whence the fire really came, Kiriakoff hastily accepted

* See the Plan. It is taken from a sketch which was made for me by a French officer who was present with the artillery thus brought to bear on the column.

the belief that it came from the sea ; and in order to place his troops out of the reach of the ships, he began to move off his column in an inland or easterly direction, taking nearly the same route as that by which he had advanced.* Whilst he thus marched, shot and shells continued to cut their way into the midst of his hapless column, inflicting a dreadful slaughter. This trial—the trial of men who have to march under a shattering fire without being able to strike one blow at their slayers—was borne by the Russian soldiery with a great fortitude. Order was maintained ; and, torn as it was from moment to moment, the column marched grandly. Along with the column there were two batteries ; but, far from helping to cover its retreat, these guns were suffered to become a burthen ; for, several of the horses having been wounded or killed, the task of dragging off the cannon was thrown upon soldiers. It would seem, however, that the natural awe with which Canrobert's troops had looked upon the advance of the huge column was not lifted off from their minds when first they saw it withdrawing, for no French infantry moved forward to press the retreat of the eight battalions. 'The French,'

CHAP.
I.

and moved
eastward by
Kiriakoff.

Its de-
meanour

* My knowledge of the exact way in which these guns were brought to bear upon the hapless column is derived from a French officer who was present with the guns, and who took part in seizing the occasion which was presented by the sudden discovery of the column. With respect to a statement at one time put forward—a statement that 'the column of the eight battalions' had been defeated by *infantry*, see No. VIII. of the Appendix.

CHAP.
I.

is halted
on the right
rear of the
Telegraph:

the part
it had taken
in the battle.

says Kiriakoff, 'did not follow us. I am ignorant
' of the reason why. Maybe they did not want
' to stand between the fire of their ships and our
' regiments; maybe the sight of the two bodies of
' Hussars, headed by Colonel Wailinovich, may
' have checked them.* In fact, I cannot explain
' their conduct.' By pursuing his easterly march
for some time, Kiriakoff brought his column out
of the artillery-fire which had been tearing it, and
he came at last to a halt upon a spot on the right
rear of the Telegraph. Although it was the des-
tiny of this 'column of the eight battalions' to
be able to put a great stress upon the French
army, and afterwards to be cruelly shattered by
cannon, yet, from first to last, the body which
thus did and thus suffered was without an oc-
casion for firing a shot.

XXXVIII.

A flanking
fire from
the French
artillery
poured upon
the troops
on the
Telegraph
Height.

Moved from west to east along the top of the
plateau, the French guns, which had dealt with
the column, were now once more in battery, and
upon ground from which they threw a flanking
fire in the direction of the troops which still
remained on the slopes in front of the Telegraph
Height. The only infantry forces which had
been placed in that part of the field were the four

* The translation I have used says 'annoyed them,' but I
gather from the context that the word I have ventured to sub-
stitute more accurately represents the General's meaning.

Taroutine and the four 'Militia' battalions; but, supposing that the breaking-up of the 'Militia' battalions was by this time virtually complete, Kiriakoff had no infantry on the whole Telegraph Height except the four Taroutine battalions, and the stricken, the bleeding column which he had just withdrawn from the front. Yet at this time, though Kiriakoff evidently did not know of the proximity of many of the French battalions which were hanging back close under the plateau, there were in reality some thirty thousand Frenchmen and Turks standing on ground from which, in a period of only a few minutes, they might close in both upon his front and his left flank. Without apprehending the extent to which he was encompassed, Kiriakoff came to see that the troops he had in front of the Telegraph must not be left standing under a cross-fire of artillery. He had not in his own hands the means of repelling or silencing the guns which were pouring their fire from the west along the summit of the plateau; and being without orders, and even, it seems, without tidings, he tried to find a clue for the guidance of his conduct by learning the course which the battle was taking in the English part of the field. Hitherto his glances in that direction had brought him no comfort. Even so early as the time when he pushed back the head of Canrobert's Division, he had found that the English were gaining the ascendancy over the centre and right wing of the Russians. 'When,' he writes—
'when the first success of the enemy had been

Condition
of things
in that part
of the field.

The result
of what
Kiriakoff
had hitherto
observed in
the English
part of the
field:

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I.

‘stopped on the left wing, in the centre* and
 ‘the right wing* the turn of affairs was begin-
 ‘ning to be against us. I cannot judge the
 ‘particulars of that part of the battle, being fully
 ‘occupied by doing my own duty, and I could
 ‘not observe as well the events on my right;
 ‘but thus far I could see, that the enemy had
 ‘taken up a strong position on the left bank of
 ‘the Alma.’ This, at the moment of his success
 against Canrobert, had been Kiriakoff’s percep-
 tion of the course which events were taking in
 the English part of the field; and now, when he
 looked once more to where the red-coats were
 moving, he saw that in that part of the field the
 battle was lost to the Czar. He saw not only
 that the Causeway batteries had been withdrawn,
 and that upon their site English regiments were
 established (apparently he had seen that before†),
 but that Mentschikoff’s infantry reserves were in
 retreat; and that, looking eastward along the
 Russian side of the river as far as his eye could
 reach, he was unable to see the end of the slender
 red line which marked the advance of the Eng-
 lish. Even if he did not observe or understand
 the ominous silence of the Great Redoubt, he
 could not fail to see that the withdrawal of the
 Causeway batteries, and of the infantry reserves,
 was not only an abandonment of the great ‘position

his convic-
 tion that in
 that part
 of the field
 the English
 had won
 the battle:

* *i.e.*, those portions of the Russian army which were opposed to the English.

† When he said that the English ‘had taken up a strong
 ‘position on the left’ [*i. e.*, the Russian] ‘bank of the river.’

'on the Alma,' but was also a retreat with which it was his obvious duty to conform. For that reason he first ordered his troops to retire to a part of the Great Post-road which lay on the right rear of his position; and when he got to that spot, he found that the victory won by Lord Raglan was by that time so well assured as to oblige him to continue his retrograde march, and conform at once to the movements of the seven-and-twenty battalions then yielding to their English assailants.

he conforms
to the move-
ment of
the troops
retreating
before the
English.

'Impossible,' writes Kiriakoff, after speaking of the direction in which French artillery had been brought to bear upon his troops in front of the Telegraph—'impossible to leave the left wing 'thus exposed to a cross-fire, and I could not send 'or wait for orders from the Commander-in-Chief. 'The right wing* having already begun a very decisive movement of retreat, I commanded the march 'towards the main road, on either side of which 'I ranged the troops. This road was beyond the 'height where our principal reserves had stood. 'Then I became aware that our right wing* was 'indeed retreating; and, wishing to conform as 'much as possible with their movements, I 'ordered a second march towards a height beyond the road.† . . . The enemy did not 'follow us.'

* *i.e.*, troops opposed to the English.

† If full faith be given to this testimony of Kiriakoff, it is of course conclusive of the question as to where the Russian retreat began; for he speaks as an eyewitness of the retreat which

CHAP.
I.

His retreat
not molested
by French
infantry:

Kiriakoff's
artillery.

In their retreat the Taroutine battalions—the troops which marched in what was then the rear of Kiriakoff's force—were plied with the fire of cannon, but were not at all vexed by French infantry.*

General Kiriakoff's retreating artillerymen were not called upon to fend off a pursuit, but they seized what they judged an apt moment for facing about to plant some guns in battery, and we shall presently witness their fire reaching back to the Telegraph Height.

had taken place in front of the English, and he was the actual ordainer of the retrograde movement which he deemed to be the necessary consequence of the defeat which his countrymen had sustained at the hands of our people. It may be said that it was for his interest to make this statement, and that therefore he is not an impartial witness. This is true: but, besides that his character for honour and high spirit places him above the suspicion of gross and intentional misstatement, it happens that his account is corroborated in the most distinct terms by Anitchkoff, an apparently impartial narrator. Anitchkoff, when he wrote, was an officer on the General Staff of the Russian army, writing under circumstances which gave him considerable means of knowing the truth, and which made it his duty to hold the balance evenly between Gortschakoff, Kiriakoff, and Kvetzinski; yet in clear words he corroborates Kiriakoff. After speaking of the centre and right wing of the Russians—the troops with which the English had been dealing—and of their retreat 'to the former position two versts to the 'south,' he adds immediately these words: 'Whither they 'were' [remark the word presently coming] 'whither they were 'followed by the left wing, who had withstood and repelled the 'attack of the whole of the four French Divisions until the 'moment of the general retreat.'

* Chodasiewicz. This writer was a field-officer in the Taroutine corps, and his statements (almost all of them valuable) are an excellent authority in all that relates to the operations of his own regiment

XXXIX.

When Kiriakoff's battalions had withdrawn, Canrobert's Division and D'Aurelle's brigade—that brigade followed close by Prince Napoleon—moved straight upon the Telegraph. It was whilst our Grenadier Guards in a distant part of the field were stepping up from the river's bank to engage the enemy in their front, that this advance of the French took place.* The two Zouave Regiments (which stood, as we know, side by side on the left front of Canrobert's force), and, almost at the same moment, the 39th regiment of the line—the regiment which formed the head of D'Aurelle's column—pushed swiftly forward towards the Telegraph. These troops for a while continued to be sheltered by the steepness of the hill they were ascending, but upon gaining its crest, the heads of their columns incurred the artillery fire hurled back, as we saw, from the ground to which Kiriakoff's force had retreated; and on closely approaching the Telegraph, they all at once came on some riflemen whom the enemy, when about to move off, had neglected to withdraw from the spot;† but, undaunted by the

CHAP.
I.

Great con-
flux of
French
troops to
wards the
Telegraph

Capture of
the Tele-
graph.

* Sir Thomas Troubridge of the Royal Fusiliers saw both the movements, and marked that they took place simultaneously.

† It is not with the gallant French *army* that the construction of warlike fables originate. The record of this encounter, by one of the gallant Zouave officers who took part in it, states these Russian Riflemen found at the Telegraph to be a force consisting of '*two companies*.' See footnote *post* in which the passage is given. In each Russian battalion there were twenty-four men armed with rifles; and founding myself partly upon

CHAP.
I.

cannonade which thus greeted them, and overwhelming the helpless riflemen—not without a free use of the bayonet—the French masses continued their onset; and three agile soldiers running forward in advance of their comrades, reared the colours of their three several regiments on the stump of the unfinished pillar, or the scaffolding which surrounded its sides. Whilst in the very act of thus planting the standard of his regiment, Lieutenant Poitevin of the 39th Regiment was struck dead by a cannon-ball, and a grape-shot killed Serjeant Fleury of the 1st Regiment of Zouaves, the flag-staff supporting its colours being also at the same time broken by a fragment of shell.*

Nature of
the combat
at the Tele-
graph.

So, the substance of what here occurred was the converging onset of thousands of high-mettled soldiery springing forward to reach the goal without suffering themselves to be daunted by a pelting fire of artillery; and their merit, one need hardly say, was neither augmented nor lessened by

the recollection of a conversation on this subject with General de Todleben, I am led to conjecture that the Riflemen found at the Telegraph belonged all to the 'Minsk' regiment, which, out of its four battalions, might have furnished as many as ninety-six Riflemen.

* The military reader will not fail to observe that all the above-mentioned missiles, 'round-shot,' 'grape,' and 'fragment of shell,' were of the kind discharged only by *artillery*, and will see how far that circumstance goes towards negating the supposition that the Russians were intentionally making a stand with infantry on the summit of the Telegraph Height. The hapless riflemen, plainly left by mistake at the Telegraph, must have suffered under the artillery fire directed upon that part of the ground by their own fellow-countrymen.

the presence of the few hapless riflemen whom they found left behind—left behind, we may infer, by mistake—on ground near the foot of the Telegraph.

CHAP.
I.

Still, there yet remained the fact that some Russian foot-soldiers, however few, and whether owing or not to mistake, had been left behind and exposed to the fate of being overwhelmed and bayoneted when the French came up thronging upon them; and accordingly their presence at the Telegraph, when conjoined with the other occurrences which we saw attending its capture, became the evident basis, or rather the sound part of the basis, on which the story of an arduous fight between French and Russian infantry was some time afterwards built.

The other part of the basis on which the fable long rested was unsound, it is true, but still specious.

When soldiers in battle break loose from the guidance of their commanders, they so feel the need of a purpose, that a tree, a house, or a wind-mill—any object, in short, which stands out plain in the landscape—may have power to draw them towards it; and if a conflux like this has once set in, the eddy soon begins to run strong. First three or four eager and venturous men, then clusters, then scores, then hundreds, rushed panting for the goal that they saw in the conspicuous pillar on the Telegraph, now surmounted with flags; and soon, thousands and thousands of vehement soldiery were thronging from many quarters upon this single point. There could not but be a great

Turmoil
on the
Telegraph
Height.

CHAP.
I.

turmoil, and there is reason to fear that, with the shouts of the victors, there mingled the voices of the hapless riflemen crying vainly for quarter; and although the Russian guns were withdrawn, French batteries, pursuing with fire, still maintained the roar of artillery. With such sights and sounds to guide them, observers might easily imagine that the Telegraph Height was the theatre of a struggle which must include in its area the clash of hostile battalions; but, as from the battle-field itself, so also from the imaginations of men brooding over it, the smoke after some time was lifted; and for that assemblage of facts which was needed to constitute a real infantry fight, one essential ingredient proved wanting. No Russian battalion was present; and accordingly the impetuous Zouaves, no less than their more gentle comrades of the line, were precluded by sheer want of opponents* from the means of engaging

* So far as concerned the notion of a serious fight at the Telegraph itself, I find that I might have averted the controversy to which the above statement gave rise. In the 'Souvenirs d'un officier du 2^{me} Zouaves,' published in 1859, the 'opponents' are thus estimated:—'The 1st Regiment of 'Zouaves operates the same movement; the two regiments' [*i.e.*, the 1st and 2d Zouaves, which had together a strength of about 3000—they kept a strength of no less than 2768 even so late as the following November] 'arrive at the foot of the 'tower, of which they take possession, notwithstanding the 'resistance of *two companies* of sharpshooters armed with large 'rifles,' pp. 144, 145. Considering that the Zouaves were 3000, followed close by many thousands more of French troops, and that the Russians attempting to obstruct them were estimated by *their assailants* at 'two companies,' it will hardly be denied any more that there was that 'sheer want of opponents' which is suggested in the text.—*Note to 5th Edition.*

in that desperate strife of infantry against infantry which, under the description of 'the combat at the 'Telegraph,' has found a place in French annals.*

At length the state of the smoke allowed men to see that no Russian battalion was near. Then the close of what resembled a fight was joyfully hailed as a victory.

From the time when the bulk of the French advanced to the banks of the river, Marshal St Arnaud had placed himself in the midst of Prince Napoleon's battalions; and, the Prince's Division having been kept low down in the bottom during the critical period of the battle, it must have been hard for a man who remained jammed down with those troops to obtain a fair view of what was going on;† but the Marshal, it seems, now galloped up to the Telegraph, and sharing, no doubt, in the belief that there had been a hot fight there, and inferring also that the fight had been won by the thousands of eager Zouaves whom he saw thronging round the pillar, he turned, it is said, to these his most trusted soldiery, and said to them, 'I thank you, my Zouaves!'

Marshal
St Arnaud

Canrobert's and Prince Napoleon's Divisions, with D'Aurelle's brigade betwixt them, were then massed about the Telegraph upon a very small space of ground.

* The narratives which French historians have given of this supposed fight, together with my reasons for excluding their stories from my text, will be found in the Appendix.—*Note to 1st Edition.*

† See the Plan (taken from the 'Atlas Historique'), which shows the Marshal's position.

XL.

CHAP.

I.

Opportunity
of cutting
off some of
the enemy's
retreating
masses.

Vain endea-
vours of
Lord Raglan
and of Airey
to cause the
requisite
advance of
French
troops.

At this time, two messengers came in haste from different parts of the English field of battle : they both came with the same object. The first of these was an aide-de-camp sent straight from Lord Raglan to the nearest French troops he could find ; the other was Colonel Steele, who came charged with the request which General Airey from another part of the field had taken upon himself to address to Marshal St Arnaud. Whilst the Russian battalions were retreating before the English infantry, Lord Raglan in one part of the field, and General Airey in another, had, almost at the same moment, observed the same opportunity, and fastened upon the same mode of seizing it. Each of them had seen that masses of the retreating infantry were moving in such a direction, and through a gorge which so straitened their movements, that their retreat could be cut off or turned into a ruinous disaster by the immediate advance of a few battalions pushing forward from the left of the French line, and bearing towards the great road.

When Lord Raglan's aide-de-camp reached the Telegraph, he found that the troops he came upon had just halted two hundred yards in front of the building, and that the column with which he sought to find the Prince was under a good deal of excitement. Used to the silence of English troops, the aide-de-camp was a good deal struck with the effect produced by thousands of soldiers

in heavy masses talking all at the same time. The aide-de-camp was accompanied by Vico, the French Commissioner accredited to the English Headquarters. Vico conveyed Lord Raglan's wishes to the General commanding the brigade, and was told in answer that the troops would advance. This, however, they did not do.

The similar request which Colonel Steele addressed to St Arnaud was met by a refusal. The Marshal excused himself for declining to advance by saying that his troops had left their knapsacks in the valley below.

Marshal St Arnaud was able to remain all day on horseback; and it does not appear that the state of his health at this time was such as to hinder him from using his intellectual powers; but he did not place himself in a part of the field from which a general could hope to be able to govern events; and from the time when he dispatched his ill-devised orders to the 4th Division, I have not been able to perceive that his mind at all touched the battle.

St Arnaud.
The extent
to which
his mind
was brought
to bear on
the battle.

XLI.

General Forey, perhaps, had hoped that in the presence of the enemy he might be able to cover over the mark which his reputation contracted on the 2d of December—on the day when, along with Maupas's commissaries of police, he suffered himself to be publicly used as the assailant and the jailer of the unarmed legislature of France; but if

The ground
reached by
Forey with
Lourmel's
brigade.

CHAP.
I.

Position
taken up by
the rest of
the French
army.

by chance this man shall be brought some day to his account, it will not be by an appeal to the memory of the Alma that he will be able to avert his punishment. With Lourmel's brigade, as we saw, he had followed the steps of Bouat, marching off to the peaceful sea-shore, and becoming null in the battle. When D'Aurelle was already at the Telegraph, Forey, with Lourmel's brigade, had but just crossed the river at its very mouth, and was more than two miles distant from the nearest of the enemy's forces. But with the exception of this annulled brigade under Forey, and the two Turkish battalions which had been left to guard the baggage, the whole of the French and Ottoman troops were now ranged upon the plateau of the Telegraph Height. Their array was upon ground less advanced than that taken up by the English. It fronted towards the east.

XLII.

The position
taken up by
Kiriakoff.

When Kiriakoff's movement of retreat had brought him to the ridge which lay at a distance of nearly two miles in rear of the Telegraph, he forthwith took up a position, and once more showed a front to the Allies. Having with him not only his own artillery, but that also which Prince Mentschikoff had brought from the centre at the commencement of the action, and being in company at this time with some of the cavalry, he was able to complete the semblance of something like a defensive stand by placing thirty guns in

battery, and covering his left-front with several squadrons of hussars. By this wise and soldierly attitude, Kiriakoff masked the confusion into which the rest of the Czar's army had been thrown, and caused the Allied commanders to believe that they had still a formidable enemy in their front.

CHAP.
I.

The effect produced upon the Allies by his soldierly attitude.

Not only did Kiriakoff thus face round, but he even caused the body of cavalry which he had on his left to move forward; and it happened that this advance of the Russian hussars brought them down to a spot which was near the ground where Lord Cardigan rode with his squadrons. It seems, however, that there was an intervening bend or rise in the formation of the ground which prevented these two hostile bodies of cavalry from being visible the one to the other.

He moves forward some cavalry.

Lord Raglan, with some of his Staff, had ridden forward to this part of the field. He met the advance of the enemy's squadrons with an almost cold gaze. The joyous animation with which, from the summit of the knoll, he had watched and governed the battle—this now had passed. He wore the look—men came to know it too well before he died—the look which used to show that he was feeling the stress of the French Alliance, and dissembling the pain of his anger.

Lord Raglan's vexation

XLIII.

The world was old enough to know that in order to be made to yield its natural fruits, a victory ought to be followed up; and that, in

CHAP.
I.

Question as
to the way
in which
the retreat
should be
pressed.

general, a victorious army is made to press on in pursuit, until nightfall or other good cause makes it needful or prudent to halt. But the maps of this Crim Tartary gave no indication of the existence of any fresh water between the Alma and the Katcha—a stream some seven or eight miles distant. It seemed that unless the troops which might be pushed forward could reach the Katcha—and reach it, too, in strength enabling them to establish themselves on its banks—they would have to bivouac on the hills without the means of allaying the rage of thirst. Except at the mouth of the Alma, or at the mouth of the Katcha, the nature of the coast did not allow free communication between the Allied armies and the ships. It was half-past four o'clock. Soon after six the sun would set. Since morning the soldiery of both armies had toiled under a burning sun. They were very weary; and many of them—indeed almost all the English—were in a weakly state of health. These were reasons which made it needful for the Allies to effect their further pursuit of the enemy by preconcerted arrangements, yet did not apparently warrant a protracted halt of the whole of the Allied armies on the heights of the Alma. Lord Raglan had been swift to see what ought to be done by the Allies, and not less swift to determine what he himself could offer to do. He deemed that the Allies ought to push forward instantly with such portions of their force as were the least wearied. We have seen the share which the English soldiery had had in the work of the

Lord
Raglan's
opinion.

day ; but, compared with the troops of the 1st, the 2d, and the Light Division, Sir Richard England's Division was fresh. With that force of infantry, together with the whole of his cavalry and horse-artillery, Lord Raglan desired to press forward ; * but he required that a portion of the French army should take part in this movement, for he did not understand that the rout of the enemy's forces was so complete and irremediable as to put them in the power of one English division of infantry and a thousand horsemen. Besides he well knew that (even though the aid should be given for mere form's sake and not for actual use) there was a political reason which forbade him from pressing forward without making sure that his advance would be accompanied by a portion of the French army ; for it was nearly certain that an English general advancing on the afternoon of a battle, and leaving his sensitive allies in the rear, would so mortify the French people as to put the alliance, and even the ruler who contrived it, in grievous peril.

Accordingly, General Airey proposed to General Martimprey, the Chief of the French Staff, that the whole of our cavalry, together with one English division of infantry, and such portion of the French army as the Marshal might think fit, should move forward and press the enemy's retreat.

It is proposed to the French.

The answer was that any further advance of the French on that day was 'impossible ;' and the

They decline to move.

* He would then have still had with him (besides his fatigued troops) the chief part of the 4th Division under Cathcart.

CHAP.
I.

Question whether another method with the French might have answered better.

necessity of returning to where the knapsacks had been laid was once more used as the reason which forbade all forward movement. Men may fairly surmise that a sterner method than that which Lord Raglan took would have served his purpose better, and that if he had simply ordered his cavalry and Sir Richard England's Division to advance, M. St Arnaud would have been compelled to follow. But to act upon such a speculation as that would have been hardly consistent with the duties imposed upon the English General. Lord Raglan, it is true, was a soldier acting against an enemy in the field; but he was something more: he was a diplomatist specially charged with the care of that fragile structure on which the war was resting; he was charged with the care of the French alliance. Except on grounds of paramount cogency, he had no right to break loose from the fetters by which his Queen's Government had thought fit to bind their country.

XLIV.

The close of the battle.

Lord Raglan watched the advance of the Russian cavalry until he saw it come to a halt. Then it seemed—he was used of old to read such signs—it seemed that he regarded this movement and this halt of the enemy's horse as a kind of farewell gesture which marked the end of the battle; for, turning his horse's head, he slowly rode back to the ground where his infantry stood.

When our soldiers observed the approach of the

CHAP.
I.

The cheers
that greet
Lord
Raglan.

Headquarter Staff, they looked eagerly into the group that they might see if amongst the plumed horsemen the Chief himself were coming; and the moment they got a sure sight of the frock with the half-empty sleeve, it came into their hearts to offer to their General that which is of other worth than vulgar treasures—nay, that which in common times the world cannot give. They brought him the greeting which a proud soldiery can bestow upon their chief in the hour of victory and upon the field of battle. Begun at first by one corps, taken up by the next, and then by the next again, the cheers flew on from regiment to regiment, and tracked the chief in his path, till, all along from the spurs of the Telegraph Height to the easternmost bounds of the crest which had been won by the Highland Brigade, those desolate hills in Crim Tartary were made to sound like England. And the sound travelled back to the plateau on which the French were halted, and descended also the slopes where our dead and wounded lay thick. There, many a red-coat, so wounded that the roar of artillery and the tramp of battalions had become to him mere idle sounds, would yet find his heart stirred anew by the English cheers on the heights, and would raise himself on his arm, and strive so to use his last strength that, in the swelling tumult of the voices above, his own faltering ‘hurrah!’ might be one.

But, pensive and intent on sad thoughts, Lord Raglan now rode down into the valley, recrossed the river and entered the village of Bourliouk.

His visit
to the
wounded

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I.

The flames had been extinguished; and in some of the farm-buildings not wholly destroyed by fire, there lay many wounded officers. Amongst the painful scenes in those barns and sheds Lord Raglan passed a long time, giving tender care to the sufferers. Yet of the sunlight of that day there were nearly two hours remaining. There was a routed enemy in front; and, beyond, there lay the huge prize for which the invaders had come.

Ambition lends strength and momentum to the purposes of a general. Lord Raglan gave his heart to wounded men. A commander wrapped in self, and burning for fame, would have risked a breach of the French alliance, would have hardened his heart, and, killing perhaps some few of his people with cruel fatigue, would have drunk of the Katcha that night. If he had done thus, the reconnoissance of the next morning would have brought him some knowledge of hardly less worth than a victory.

The Allied
armies
bivouack-
ing on the
ground they
had won.

The Allied forces bivouacked on the ground they had won. The French were on the Telegraph Height; the English headquarters were established on the left bank of the river near the road leading up from the bridge, and almost on the site of that Causeway battery which, until it was touched by the mastering key, had barred the mouth of the Pass.

Arrival of
the troops
under
Colonel
Torrens.

In the evening our army was joined by Colonel Torrens with the troops which had been left at Kamishlu to clear the beach; and at about nine o'clock, whilst Lord Raglan was dining in his little

marquee with only one man for his guest, Torrens came to report his arrival. A third cover was laid for him. He had made a forced march, and was in bitter pain because his great haste had not availed to bring him up in time for the battle. With kind, frank, thoughtful words Lord Raglan strove to soothe him.

CHAP.

I.

XLV.

The position which Kiriakoff had taken up was not held for many minutes. To any calm man who looked from that ridge towards the north it must have been plain that the Allies were making no movement in pursuit. But—for thus powerful and thus wayward is the imagination of man in his fears—the Russians were no sooner in safety than vague terrors came assailing their minds, and Panic began to drive them. The brave soldiery who had stood superbly firm when shot were tearing their ranks were scared by phantom thoughts; and the square-built, hard, rigid battalions which had checkered the hillsides on the Alma, now dissolved into shapeless masses. Even when, after accomplishing several miles of retreat, the troops at length reached the hillsides which looked down on the banks of the Katcha, they had no belief that the Allies would suffer them to drink of its waters in peace; and the army of the Czar, degenerating into a helpless throng—officers, men, horses, guns, tumbrils, carts laden with stores, carts laden with the wounded—

Continuation of the Russian retreat.

CHAP.
I.

all pressed into a gorge leading down to the ford ; and then the disorder was so complete, and the masses which choked the gorge were so dense and helpless, that it seemed as though a small force of cavalry and horse-artillery would have sufficed to make the whole army prisoners, or bring it to utter ruin.

When they had crossed the Katcha, the bulk of the troops still hurried on, though with no idea of the direction they were to take, except that their course ought to be a prolongation of the line of the retreat already accomplished.

But presently even that poor clue failed them ; for some got to imagine that, instead of falling back upon Sebastopol, they were to make for Baktchi Seräi. Then darkness came ; and there being no landmarks, the army was as a child that has lost its way at night in a trackless moor. Sometimes the masses were bent in their course by a voice shouting out, 'To the right !' and then again they would swerve the other way under the impulse of a cry, 'To the left !' All idea of bearings was so utterly lost, that even in their flight the fugitives could no longer be sure that they were retreating ; for they did not know but that they might be marching all the while towards an enemy. Afterwards the uselessness of this wild movement in the dark got to be understood ; and, shouts for a halt becoming general, the masses at length stood still.*

* One day at Balaclava I had some conversation with Lord Raglan respecting the panic which seized the Russian army on

All this while, the Allied armies were quietly bivouacking upon the banks of the Alma, at a distance of several miles from the enemy; and, the Staff of the Russian army having ascertained that no pursuit was going on, mounted officers and Cossacks were sent to announce to the wandering battalions that the Katcha was the rendezvous. But some of the messengers having received these directions before they crossed the river, carried on the very words entrusted to them with the servile exactness of a Chinese copyist, and told the troops which had long ago forded the stream, and were thence marching southward, that they were to 'go on to the 'Katcha.' Orders thus conveyed led to a belief that the stream already passed was not the Katcha; and although, in reality, the troops had overstepped the place of rendezvous, they imagined that they had not yet reached it.

Thus confusion was prolonged; but the halt began after a time to produce good effects. The officers called for men who could undertake to find the way back to the Katcha. Some were found. These acted as guides; and at midnight the wearied troops regained the river. For about two hours they rested; but then—by panic, it is believed, in the first instance,

the banks of the Katcha, and he told me that he thought the panic may have been occasioned by the appearance of his patrols; but I have never heard from any other source that our cavalry patrolled to the neighbourhood of the Katcha on the evening of the battle; and I imagine that Lord Raglan must have spoken rather from what he inferred than from what he knew.

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I.

and afterwards by orders which the panic engendered—the army was hastily roused, and thrown once more into full retreat. It moved upon Sebastopol.*

XLVI.

Losses of
the French.

In this action the French lost three officers killed; † and on grounds which he deemed, and (privately) stated to be, to his mind ‘conclusive,’ Lord Raglan came to the belief that their whole loss in killed was 60, and their number of wounded 500. ‡ The English army lost 25

Of the
English.

* My knowledge respecting the enemy’s retreat to the Katcha is mainly derived from Chodasiewicz; but on the 23d of September the peasantry of the village of Eskel, on the banks of the Katcha, described to me the scene of panic which they had witnessed in the night of the 20th.

† St Arnaud’s Despatch.

‡ The French official accounts state the total loss of their army in killed and wounded at 1339 (or, according to M. St Arnaud’s despatch, 1343), but those statements have not obtained such credence as to induce me to place the figures in the text. Lord Raglan, I know, believed not only that the French returns were grossly erroneous, but that they were intentionally falsified; for in the same letter in which he states it to be ‘impossible’ their accounts could be true, he also speaks of the ‘pains’ which the French authorities took to make him believe them. On the other hand, I think it right to say that I am acquainted with the grounds on which Lord Raglan based his low estimate of the French losses, and that, not thinking them quite so conclusive as he did, I have abstained from hazarding a positive statement on the subject. The field of battle did not give indication of considerable losses by the French; and I recollect that the morning after the battle a French soldier told me he estimated the whole loss of his people at fifty (*une cinquantaine*). As an actual estimate of the losses, of course, his statement was of no worth, but it went towards showing what was the first impression of the French army as to the extent of the carnage.

officers and 19 sergeants killed, and 81 officers and 102 sergeants wounded; and of rank and file 318 killed and 1438 wounded; making, with the 19 who were missing, and who are supposed to have been buried in the ruins of the houses in the village, a total loss of 2002. Including 5 generals, 23 field officers, and 170 officers of lower rank, the loss of the Russians in killed and wounded was officially stated at 5709; and of that number no less than 3121 were casualties sustained by one division alone—sustained by those 16 battalions of the Vladimir, the Kazan, the Soudal, and the Ouglitz regiments which we saw engaged with our troops on the slopes of the Kourganè Hill. Except the Russians left wounded on the field, there were scarcely any prisoners taken by the Allies; and by the Russians none. Amongst the wounded Russians left on the field and taken by the English there were two general officers. Great quantities of small-arms were left upon the ground; but of prouder trophies there were few. The French captured a small four-wheeled open carriage, in which a clerk had been travelling with some official papers. The English had the gun taken by Captain Bell, and the howitzer abandoned by the enemy in the Great Redoubt.*

Of the
Russians.

The trophies
of victory
were scanty

* On the following day the French quietly came with an artillery-team, and were going to carry off one of the guns taken by the English. An English officer caught them in the act, and prevented them from executing their purpose. This enterprising attempt was the more curious, since it happened that the gun was more than a mile distant from the


XLVII.

CHAP.
I.

Question
as to the
expediency
of attacking
the Russian
position in
front.

The plan
actually
followed by
St Arnaud.

Whether it was wise to assail the enemy on his chosen ground, and to do so by a front attack instead of moving first so far eastward as to be able to come down on his left flank and compel him to fight with his back to the sea—this is a question highly interesting to soldiers ; * but no such design was put forward at the time ; and, if what Marshal St Arnaud definitively sought to do can be inferred from what he did, his intention as ultimately moulded was simply this : he resolved to



possess himself of the unoccupied ground which lay between the Russian position and the sea-shore, to pit the rest of his forces against Prince

ground on which the nearest of the French troops had been moving. Apparently it was calculated that any Englishman who chanced to observe the French drivers would assume that they were acting under authority from Lord Raglan, and that when once the gun was in the French lines, the transcendant importance of the alliance, and of a cordial feeling between the two armies, would be relied on as grounds which might prevent the English General from reclaiming it.

* Marshal Pelissier (the Duke of Malakoff) once spoke to me with immense vehemence on this subject, showing how, if he had been in command, he would have rolled up the Russian army from its right to its left and driven it to its utter destruction.

Mentschikoff's left, and to leave to Lord Raglan the duty of dealing with the enemy's centre, as well as with his right wing.

CHAP.
I.

XLVIII.

Told summarily, the battle of the Alma was this:—The French seized the empty ground which divided the enemy from the sea, and then undertook to assail the enemy's left wing; but were baffled by the want of a road for Canrobert's artillery, and by the exceeding cogency of the rule which forbids them from engaging their infantry on open ground without the support of cannon. Their failure placed them in jeopardy; for they had committed so large proportion of their force to the distant part of the West Cliff and the sea-shore, that for nearly an hour they lay much at the mercy of any Russian general who might have chosen to take advantage of their severed condition. But, instead of turning to his own glory the mistake the French had been making, Prince Mentschikoff hastened to copy it, wasting time and strength in a march towards the sea-shore, and a counter-march back to the Telegraph. Still, the sense the French had of their failure, and the galling fire which Kiria-koff's two batteries were by this time bringing to bear on them, began to create in their army a grave discontent, and sensations scarce short of despondency. Seeing the danger to which this condition of things was leading, and becoming

Summary of
the enemy.

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I.

for other reasons impatient, Lord Raglan determined to order the final advance of the English infantry without waiting any longer for the time when Canrobert and Prince Napoleon should be established on the plateau. So the English infantry went forward, and in a few minutes the battalions which followed Codrington had not only defeated the two heavy columns which marched down to assail them, but had stormed and carried the Great Redoubt. From that moment the hillsides on the Alma were no longer a fortified position; but they were still a battle-field, and a battle-field on which, for a time, the combatants were destined to meet with checkered fortune; for, not having been supported at the right minute, and being encompassed by great organised numbers, General Codrington's disordered force was made to fall back under the weight of the Vladimir column; and its retreat involved the centre battalion of the brigade of Guards. Nearly at the same time Kiriakoff, with his great 'column of the eight battalions,' pushed Canrobert down from the crest he had reached, obliging or causing him for the moment to hang back under the cover of the steep. At that time, the prospects of the Allies were overcast. But then the whole face of the battle was suddenly changed by the two guns which Lord Raglan had brought up to the knoll; for not only did their fire extirpate the Causeway batteries, and so lay open the Pass, but it tore through the columns of Prince Ment-

schikoff's infantry reserves, and drove them at once from the field. This discomfiture of the Russian centre could not but govern the policy of Kiriakoff, obliging him to conform to its movement of retreat; and he must have been the more ready to acknowledge to himself the necessity of the step he was taking, since by this time he had suffered the disaster which was inflicted upon his great 'column of the eight battalions' by the French artillery. He retreated without being molested by the French infantry, to take up a new position at a distance of two miles from the Alma; and soon afterwards, though the heads of their columns were struck by artillery fire, the French thronging up in great strength took possession of the Telegraph Height. At the moment when the French heads of columns appeared on the crest they had reached, Colonel Hood's Grenadiers in a distant part of the field were moving up to attack the battalions confronting them on the Kourganè Hill, and there, within a few minutes after a sheer fight of infantry, the enemy's whole strength was broken and turned to ruin by the Guards and the Highlanders. Thenceforth the slaughter that is wrought by artillery upon retreating masses was all that remained to be fulfilled.

XLIX.

The trophies, we saw, were scanty. But was there a gain of that priceless spoil which one nation takes from another when it proves itself the

The meed of
glory fairly
earned on
the Alma.

CHAP.
I.

How far
the Allies
were en-
titled to
take glory
to them-
selves.

better in arms? The Western Alliance had the ear of Europe, and it awarded to itself an unstinted measure of glory. Was this glory honestly taken?

The Allies were more than 60,000, and of that strength the Russians fell short by a difference exceeding one-third. This was a disparity which made it unbecoming for the Great Alliance of the West to indulge in the language of a boisterous triumph. But, besides that the strength of the ground went some way towards making the conflict equal, the very faults and shortcomings of the Allies had the effect of putting a heavy stress upon some portions of their united army; for, by sending two-fifths of his army to the seashore, and by crowding the remainder of it upon a narrow front, the French Marshal placed Prince Gortschakoff and General Kvetzinski upon a numerical equality with their English foes;* and, the ground that our people assailed being entrenched and singularly strong by nature, the Russians in that respect had of course a great advantage over their English adversaries. Besides, though our forces were about equal in numbers to the part of the Russian army with which they had to deal, yet it happened that in each distinct infantry fight the English battalions were almost always confronted by masses far, far greater in numerical strength. Justly, therefore, there may be rendered to some of the components of the Allied army a part of the glory which History must refuse to the aggregate host.

* See Appendix, No. II.

At three o'clock, as we saw, the battle had been suffered to lapse into such a condition that there was then bitter need of a general, and of troops so placed in the field, and so inclined towards the practice of close fighting, as to be able to restore—to restore, as it were, by sheer force—the waning fortune of the day. How the occasion was met this History has shown. I narrate, and soldiers will comment. They must judge, and say whether, for simplicity's sake, it be better to pile up a heap of praise, and distribute it, like a cargo of medals, amongst all the French, English, and Turks who heard the sound of the guns; or, in a harsher and more careful spirit, to part off the troops which fought hard from the troops which scarce fought at all, and to show by whose ordering it was that the course of the battle was governed.

I have been eager to acknowledge the valour and the steadiness of the Russian infantry. If I had caused it to appear that, upon the whole, Marshal St Arnaud and the troops he commanded had done marvels on the day of the Alma, I should have been helping to prolong a belief in that which I know to be false, and should be even running counter to what, with good reason, I hold to be the opinion of the French army;* but I

* I speak in great measure from knowledge acquired long subsequently to the battle, but the conviction of which I speak was not slow to show itself in the French army. Writing three days after the battle, Lord Raglan said, 'The French army accomplished what they undertook perfectly well;' but then, and speaking of the conviction which was produced upon the

CHAP.
I.

have tried to do careful justice to those who were then our allies by marking and commending the warlike quality which was displayed by their artillerymen, as well as by their keen, bold, active skirmishers. Of my own countrymen I have hardly once suffered myself to speak in words of praise. I have only told what they did.

L.

It was thus that, during three sunny hours, a French and an English army fought side by side on the Alma; but in comparing the conduct in battle of the two allied forces, it ought to be always remembered that the French were under a ban.

Cause tend-
ing to im-
pair the
efficiency
of the
French
army.

It would be unjust to look upon the action between Marshal St Arnaud and the Russian left wing as a fair sample of what a French army can do. That glance at the things done in Paris which helped us to understand the origin of the Anglo-French alliance, will now serve to teach us the cause of any shortcomings which may be attributed to the army commanded by Marshal St

English army by the fact that Marshal St Arnaud had not 'kept moving on after he had turned the enemy's left,' he adds, 'I have reason to believe that the same feeling is prevalent amongst the officers of the French army.' See extract in the Appendix, No. X. For any one who was not in the Crimea during the month which followed the battle of the Alma, it would be difficult to form a conception of the state into which the repute of the French army had fallen. Later events (and the first of these was the brilliant charge of two squadrons of the Chasseurs d'Afrique at Balaclava) showed that the warlike spirit of France was not extinct in her army.

Arnaud.* We saw something of a strange decree which enacted that services rendered by military men in their operations against Frenchmen should hold good as titles to advancement in the same way as though they were deeds done in war against the foreigner.† Incredible as it may seem, that decree was long observed to the full;‡ and the shameful principle which it involved was made to weigh heavily upon France during several of the months which followed the landing at Old Fort. Indeed, the principle, though partly waived for a time in 1855, was found to be still in dire operation long after the close of the Russian war. Just as in a later year the French Emperor entrusted to a scared and bewildered literary man the command of a whole French army in Italy, so now he committed the honour of the flag—committed it almost exclusively—to men who had shared with him in the adventure which put France under his feet. His reckoning was, that whether it were led by honourable and skilled commanders, or were tossed and flung into action by him and his December friends, a French army engaged in a short, brisk war against a Continental State would always be likely to push its way to more or less of success; and that if it should chance to do this under the leadership, or apparent leadership, of him and his friends, he

* 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. chap. xiv.

† Ibid. Decree of 5th December 1851.

‡ It was carried to the length of making Magnan and St Arnaud Marshals of France.

CHAP.

I.

and they would become similar to heroes. If they could attain to be thus thought of for a time, they might hope that for a still longer period they would enjoy the immunity and the thousand rewards which nations are accustomed to lavish upon victorious commanders.

This was the principle which governed the choice of the man to whose charge, on the day of the Alma, the honour of the French arms was left. He who commanded the army was St Arnaud, formerly Le Roy, the person suborned by Fleury. Under him in the Crimea there were four Divisions of French infantry. He who commanded the first of these Divisions was Canrobert. This officer, as I have said, was not without honest titles to military distinction; but whilst he had a professional repute which would have earned him the approval of even the most loyal of monarchs, he had also the qualification which entitled him to the favour of the French Emperor. He had commanded one of the brigades which operated against the gay boulevards on the 4th of December. The 2d Division was commanded by Bosquet. Bosquet was a man without a stain; but he was the only French General of Division at the Alma who could say that he did not owe his command to the December plot; and since it happened that he was left isolated with only one brigade during the whole time when the issue of the battle was pending, his presence at the Alma was only an imperfect exception to what was, as it were, the general rule. He who commanded the large

detached force of some 9000 men* which first crossed the river at its mouth was General Bouat; and Bouat, it seems, was an officer who earned his command by exploits against Parisians in the boulevard, the Rue St Denis, or the neighbourhood of the Nouvelle France.† He who commanded the 3d Division was Prince Napoleon. He who commanded the 4th Division was Forey; and no man could come within the principle of selection more clearly than he did, for it was he of whom I spoke when I said that he had suffered himself to be used as the assailant and the jailer of an unarmed Legislature. There were, besides, the Lourmels, the Espinasses, and numbers of others, no doubt, whose names could be easily found in their Emperor's list of worthies. Therefore it is that the part which was taken by Marshal St Arnaud and his troops in the battle of the Alma was no fair sample of what could be done by a French army. It was only a sample of what a French army could manage to do when it laboured under the weight of a destiny which ordained that all its chiefs should be men chosen for their complicity in a midnight plot, or else for acts of street slaughter.‡ Because they had perpetrated an extensive massacre of their own fellow-countrymen, there was no certainty, perhaps, that they

* One of Bosquet's brigades and the whole of the Turkish Contingent, except the two battalions left to guard the baggage.

† With the 33d Regiment.

‡ Prince Napoleon's complicity was only, as I am inclined to believe, a complicity after the fact; but it is, of course, clear enough that he owed his command entirely to the Coup d'Etat.

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I.

might not be men firm and able in honest war against the foreigner ; but also there was no such close similarity between what these men had done in Paris and what they were meant to do in the Crimea, as to warrant the notion of entrusting to them almost exclusively the honour of the French flag. There was a salient point of difference between the boulevards and the hillsides of the Alma,—the Russians were armed.

No ! The Power which fought that day by the side of England was not, after all, mighty France,—brave, warlike, impetuous France ;—it was only that intermittent thing which to-day is, and to-morrow is not ;—it was what people call ‘The French Empire.’*

LI.

Effect of
the battle
upon the
prospects
of the
campaign.

The battle of the Alma seemed to clear the prospects of the campaign and even of the war. It confirmed to the Allies that military ascendancy over Russia which had been more than half gained already by the valour of the Ottoman soldiery. It lent the current sanction of a victory to the hazardous enterprise of the invasion. It ended the perils of the march from Kamishlu, and made smooth the whole way to the Belbec. It established the Allies as invaders in a province of Russia. It did more. It offered them even Sebastopol, but always, nevertheless, upon condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize.

* This was first published in January 1863, and in exactly the same words as now.

CHAPTER II.

WHEN the fighting on the banks of the Alma had ceased along the whole line, more than one of the English generals prayed hard that their troops might be suffered to come down and bivouac near the bank of the stream ; for the labour already undergone by the men had been so great, that it was painful to have them distressed by the toil of going a long way for water, and fetching it up to the heights. But not choosing to loose his hold of ground carried at no small cost of life, Lord Raglan was steadfast in his resistance to all these entreaties, and ordered that his troops should bivouac upon the heights they had won.

CHAP.
II.

The Allied
armies after
the battle of
the Alma.

With the sanction of his chief, General Airey placed our infantry for the night in a line of columns on the heights, with the artillery in rear of each column ; and the disposition of these two arms had been so contrived that, although the artillery was covered, yet at any moment, and without there being any need of moving the infantry, the guns could be rapidly brought to

CHAP.
II.

the front, and placed in battery between the columns. In this order, and having a portion of the cavalry covering the rear, with the rest of our horsemen on its left flank, the English army bivouacked for the night.

When General Martimprey learnt that this plan had been adopted by the English, he was so well pleased with it that he resolved to advise a like disposition of the French army.

During the battle, the waggons which followed the English army had, of course, been kept far enough in the rear to be, for the most part, out of fire; but when the fighting had ceased, they were brought down towards the bridge, and soon became so crowded as to breed much confusion. For hours, and even, I think, all night, men were eagerly seeking after others whom none could help them to find.

On the night which followed the battle, men were sickening and dying of cholera in numbers as great as before.

State of the
field after
the battle.

That which lay in the sight of the troops when the fight on the Alma had ceased, was new to the bulk of the soldiery, and, in one feature, new to all. In general, the warring armies of Europe have been followed by a hateful swarm, who make it their livelihood to hover upon the march of the regiments, alighting at last upon a field of battle, that they may rifle the dead and the wounded. And there comes, too, that other and yet fouler swarm which strips the dead of their clothing and accoutrements with so strange

a swiftness, that a field which was speckled and glittering, at the close of the battle, with the uniforms of prostrate soldiers, is changed of a sudden to a ghastly shamble, with little except maimed or dead horses, and the buff, naked corpses of men, to show where the battle has raged.

But the breadth of the lands and the seas which divide this simple Crim Tartary from the great seats of European vice, had hitherto defeated the baneful energy of those who come out to prey upon armies by selling strong drinks, and robbing the dead and the wounded. Armed and clothed as he stood when, receiving his death-wound, he heard the last of the din of battle, so now the soldier lay. Many had been struck in such a manner that their limbs were suddenly stiffened, and this so fixedly, that, although their bodies fell to the ground, their hands and arms remained held in the very posture they chanced to be in at the moment of death.* This was observed, for the most part, in instances of soldiers who had been on the point of firing at the moment when they were struck dead; for, where this had happened, the man's hands being thrown forward and fixed in the attitude required for levelling a fire-lock, they of course stretched upwards towards the heavens when the body fell back upon the ground. These upstretched arms of dead men

* Medical men knew, as might be expected, that this catalepsy-like stiffness might now and then result from a gunshot wound; but I believe they were somewhat surprised at the large proportion of instances in which it occurred.

CHAP.
II.

were ghastly in the eyes of some : others thought they could envy the soldier released at last from his toil, and encountering no moment of interval between hard fighting and death.

In general, the undisturbed clothing of the stricken soldiers hid their wounds from a common observer ; and it was only here and there—as where a man's head had been partly shot away, or where the skull had been entered by a cannon-ball—that the ugliness of the havoc was obtruded upon the sight. For the most part, the wounded men lay silent. Now and then a man would gently ask for water, or would seek to know when it was likely that he would be moved and cared for ; but, in general, the wounded were so little inclined to be craving after help or sympathy, that for dignity and composure they were almost the equals of the dead.

Still, although there was nothing in the field of the battle which could mar the dignity of war, the sight was of a kind to press hurtfully upon the imagination of young soldiers. For such troops it was an ill thing to be kept a long time together in the contemplation of a field strewn with dead and wounded ; and this the more because the sight went to make a man question the cause of the slaughter in his own corps. None can wonder if the survivors of the Light Division men who had stormed the redoubt were inclined to let their thoughts dwell upon the nature of the trial to which they had been exposed, and even, in some regiments, to comment, and say, ‘Wa

'were sacrificed.'* In such questionings there is danger.

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That priceless confidence which sustains the accomplished soldier, and gives him the mastery in battle, is, after all, a sentiment of a tender and delicate kind, which may be easily weakened or destroyed, if he comes to believe that his regiment has been mishandled in a bloody encounter; and it could not but happen that regiments which had suffered great losses would be encouraged in the indulgence of a sinister criticism by keeping them long on the ground where their comrades lay maimed and slaughtered.†

On the day after the battle, the hundreds of Russians who lay wounded on the English part of the field had been brought to a sheltered spot of ground near the river.‡ There, they were laid down in even parallel ranks, and in such manner that the surface they covered with their prostrate bodies was a large symmetrical oblong. The ground where they lay was at some short distance from the Headquarters camp, and but little ex-

Fate of the
wounded
Russians.

* I myself, in passing, heard this the day after the battle. The sentence was uttered in a group of private soldiers belonging to one of the regiments of the Light Division.

† Many will recognise the high authority which is my warrant for venturing this remark, and for insisting on the danger to which the *morale* of the Light Division was exposed by its experience on the day of the Alma. Over, and over, and over again, Lord Clyde used to say that no troops in the world could be subjected to such a trial without undergoing a ruinous loss of soldierly confidence.

‡ The number, I believe, was about 500; but it was estimated, and on some authority, at 750.

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posed to view. From this, and from other circumstances, it happened that not only the wounded Russians, but also the English soldiers mounting guard at the spot, were forgotten, and left without food for many hours. But happily there was a man at Headquarters whose sense of honour and duty was supported by a strong will, by resistless energy, and a soundness of judgment and command of temper rarely united with great activity. Romaine came to know that these poor wounded Russians were lying untended, and he judged that, unless they were cared for, there would be a lasting blot upon the honour of the English name. An officer of the common stamp who had got to be possessed with such a feeling would have cheaply discharged his conscience by making a communication to Lord Raglan, or some other 'proper authority.' It was not so that the task was passed on, and got rid of. Knowing the weight of the cares pressing upon the chief, Romaine did not appeal to Lord Raglan, but began to act himself, giving no repose to any whose aid he needed, but disturbing nobody else. Under the power of his generous indignation and strong will all lethargy slowly gave way; and, having obtained four hundred pounds of biscuit, and the number of hands that were needed to aid him in the undertaking, he toiled at his good work until there was no one in all those prostrate ranks of wounded men who had not been tended with the offer of food and water. It was from seven in the evening until half-past eleven at night that he

thus laboured. At the time, his exceeding zeal made him seem to be acting for the honour of some great cause much more than from tender pity; but what he felt he has owned and recorded: 'It was the most painful act,' he says, 'I ever had to perform. Some of the faces were terrible and ghastly from wounds, and hardly had mouths to eat or drink with. They were faces to haunt one in sleep.' One young man in the centre of a rank of prostrate soldiers sat up, and succeeded in causing himself to be distinguished as an officer; and although there were few or none amongst the other sufferers who could speak any tongue but their own, there was a plaintive melody in the sound of the words they uttered which served to convey to a stranger an idea of their gentleness and gratitude. There were some who, in cheerful tones, declined to prolong life by eating, and asked instead for a light. Sankey, of the Quartermaster-General's department, entered into Romaine's feeling with great warmth, and not only shared with him in the bodily labour of tending the sufferers, but helped to overcome the difficulty that there is in wringing new kinds of exertion from people who are over-much regulated. Of course, the English sentries, who had been left for a time without food, were at once supplied with biscuit; but it did not at all delight them to have the mere staff of life without any of what they regarded as the more cheering part of their rations.

There was no enemy's force at hand to whom the care of these wounded Russians could be given

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up; and, within the period of the halt on the Alma, it was not practicable for the English to do more than get their own wounded men on board ship. So when, on the morning of the 23d, the Allies resumed their advance, the wounded Russians were left where they lay on the banks of the Alma, in charge of a medical officer. As soon as might be, they were to be got on board ship and sent to some Russian port under a flag of truce.

It fell to the lot of Dr Thompson, assistant-surgeon of the 44th Regiment, to be left with the charge of these sufferers in a country abandoned to the enemy.* He kept with him his servant, a soldier named John M'Grath, but no other was left to take part with him in the performance of the forlorn duty that he had to fulfil.† In the event of a Russian force coming upon this sur-

* I have always understood that Dr Thompson was *ordered* upon this painful duty, but the language of Captain Lushington rather leads to the inference that Dr Thompson had *volunteered* the service. See the next note.

† Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, 27th September 1854. Captain Lushington speaks of Dr Thompson, with his servant M'Grath, as having 'remained alone in an enemy's country, without tent or accommodation of any sort, for the sole purpose of alleviating the sufferings of 500 of his fellow-creatures.' And Dundas, in reporting the matter to Lord Raglan, speaks of Dr Thompson and his servant as having 'remained by themselves in an open country, without food or shelter.'—Dundas to Lord Raglan, official despatch, 30th September 1854. What they needed, however, was the help of their fellow-men, not shelter; and with regard to Dundas's idea of their having been without food, Lord Raglan, I see, with his own hand, has written on the margin opposite to that passage the following words: '*They had food.* R.'

geon and his attendant whilst left alone with their charge, the best fate they could hope for was that of being prisoners of war ; but unless their idea of the modern 'Cossacks' was other than that which commonly obtained in the Allied armies, they must have believed themselves to be in more or less danger of barbarous treatment.*

The arrangement imposing such a service must have been made in the full assurance that there would be no cruel delay in the arrival of succour from the fleet ; but (from causes to me unknown) it did actually happen that, between the time when the army marched off, and the time when succour came, there was an interval of three days and three nights.† Of the five hundred ghastly and prostrate forms which were left to this one surgeon and his one attendant for their only companions, all were so stricken as to be unable to help to lift a body ; very many were shattered in limb ; very many, still tortured by strong remains of life, were lying on their faces, with their vitals ploughed open by round-shot ; but some were dying more quickly, and others already lay dead.‡ From time to time during those

* It was observed, I think, in a former volume, that the modern Cossacks were obedient regiments of regular cavalry, with nothing of the wild, lawless character which belonged to the Cossacks of 1812 ; but the fact that this change had occurred was not generally known in the Allied armies.

† From the morning of the 23d to the morning of the 26th. Lushington reached the anchorage late at night on the 25th, and the next morning early went up to the ground where the wounded Russians were lying.—Lushington to Dundas, 27th September 1854.

‡ Ibid.

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three days, and to the utmost of their bodily strength, Dr Thompson and his servant laboured to part the dead from the living, to heave the corpses away, and get them more or less underground; but when, at last, succour came, our seamen had to lift out as many as thirty-nine bodies—some, in part, decomposed—before they could get at the living.*

When at length, on the morning of the 26th, Captain Lushington of the *Albion* came up from the shore, and discovered his two fellow-countrymen at their dismal post of duty, he was filled with admiration of their fortitude, and with sympathy for what they had endured.†

All that day, and for five or six hours more on the following morning, the seamen of the *Albion* and the *Vesuvius*, being well provided with stretchers, laboured hard, and with cheerful alacrity, at the business of carrying the sufferers on board ship; and there only remained about fifty of the wounded still lying on the ground, when the appearance of a Russian infantry force, which was judged to be three thousand strong, obliged Captain Lushington to give up the rest of his task.‡

* Lushington to Dundas, 27th September 1854.

† Ibid. Captain Lushington was despatched on this duty in his ship, the *Albion*, towed by the *Vesuvius*, and having the *Avon* transport in company.

‡ Ibid. The arrangements made by Captain Lushington for covering the working parties who carried the wounded, and for effecting the orderly retreat of his marines and small-arms men, seem to have been very able and neatly timed.

The wounded men carried on board ship were sent to Odessa under a flag of truce;* and the number of those who lived to be thus delivered up to their fellow-countrymen was 342;† but so utter a weakness had prostrated this suffering mass of human beings, that the Governor of Odessa declared it impossible, for the time, to make out by question and answer how many of them were non-commissioned officers and how many private soldiers.‡

In his letter to the Governor of Odessa, Dundas had spoken of the surrender of these wounded men as an act dictated by feelings of humanity.§ The answer of the Governor was so stern and cold as to make Dundas remark that it ‘might have ‘been more gracious;’|| but remembering what was the aspect of those wounded men on the morrow of the battle, and inferring the state

* Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 30th September 1854.

† Acknowledgment dated $\frac{17}{23}$ September 1854, signed by General Annenkoff, the Governor of Odessa.

‡ The Governor says, he does not distinguish the non-commissioned officers from the privates, ‘par l’impossibilité ‘d’en questionner la plupart dans l’état d’affaiblissement où ‘ils se trouvent.’

§ Dundas to the Governor of Odessa: ‘I trust your Excellency will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and ‘consider them as non-combatants until regularly exchanged.’

|| Dundas to Lord Raglan, 30th September 1854. The answer of the Governor to Dundas, $\frac{17}{23}$ September, refers coldly to the acknowledgment—the one above quoted—which he, the Governor, had given; and adds, that he will communicate to the Emperor the arrival of the wounded, and the condition which Dundas annexed to the surrender of them.

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they were in at the time of their reaching the port, I can excuse the Governor of Odessa if he angered a little at the sight of the word 'humanity,' and almost thought himself mocked when he was asked to agree that these poor remains of what once had been soldiers might be considered as 'non-combatants' until they should be exchanged. If Dundas had boarded the Avon, and looked on those ruins of human forms with which she was laden, his kindly heart would rather have inclined him to utter his sorrow for the havoc inflicted by war, than to speak as though he were indulging in any act of humanity*. With only, perhaps, too much truth, he might have palliated any seeming neglect of those poor Russian prisoners by alleging the hardships and privations which he could not find means to avert from our own sick and wounded men.

* To make the act an act of 'humanity,' I suppose something like sacrifice was needed, but there was none. The poor wounded men were simply an encumbrance, which it was convenient to shift off upon the Russians.

CHAPTER III.

WE saw that, at the close of the fight on the Alma, an unwillingness to lengthen the distance between the French and their knapsacks, then lying in the valley below, was the reason avowed by St Arnaud for withstanding Lord Raglan's desire to advance at once in pursuit; but, unless there were some other and heavier shackle which still held back the Allies, there could hardly be room for question that, on the morrow of the battle at latest, it would be well for them to push forward and follow up their victory. Yet they lingered on the ground they had won for the whole of two clear days. The reason why they thus remained halted must not be kept in concealment.*

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Expediency
of prompt-
ly following
up the
victory.

It had hitherto been taken for granted that the

* Both in his official and private correspondence with the Home Government, Lord Raglan is silent as to the causes of the halt on the Alma, and neither records his endeavours to bring Marshal St Arnaud to march upon the position of the Star Fort, nor the Marshal's refusal to do so. As to the cause of this reserve, I hazard my surmise in another volume—'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iv. chap. vii. of Cabinet Edition. It is fortunate that the silence of the English Commander has been in some measure compensated by other testimony.

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III.

Causes of
the pro-
tracted
halt on
the Alma ;

and of an
inchoate
intention
to abstain
from attack-
ing the
North Forts.

Allies were to march upon the Severnaya, or north side of Sebastopol ; and—not at first harbouring the thought that Marshal St Arnaud would swerve from the purpose with which the Allies had come out—Lord Raglan deemed it to be of great moment to press on, and at once attack the northern forts, without giving the enemy time to recover from the blow which had felled him. As expressed—not in language originating with Lord Raglan himself, but by his declared concurrence in the statement of opinion submitted to him by Sir Edmund Lyons,—Lord Raglan conceived ‘ that ‘ the character of the whole expedition was that of ‘ a surprise, that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy or ‘ their resources, and that in great measure they ‘ [the Allies] still remained ignorant on these ‘ points ; that all they knew positively was, that ‘ the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to ‘ them, and that the best chance of continued ‘ success was to follow it up rapidly, and try and ‘ take the Northern Forts by a *coup-de-main*.’*

* MS. Memorandum of a conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons on the 10th of February 1856, by Mr George Loch. The memorandum was placed in Sir Edmund’s hands on the same day, and after he had read it over, he returned it with a statement that it was correct ; and, a note stating that approval having been forthwith made, the paper became, upon the death of Sir Edmund Lyons, a valuable and authentic record. Its value was increased by the corroboration which was given to it in writing by the late Duke of Newcastle.—See Appendix, No. XI., where will be found all that portion of the memorandum which relates to affairs touched in this and the next volume. See also the accompanying map.

In order to give effect to his desire for an advance on the morrow, and to concert the movement with the naval chiefs, the English Commander had, on the day which followed the battle, sent a note to Sir Edmund Lyons, requesting him to come up to the English Headquarters at eight o'clock the next morning;* but the peremptory orders of Admiral Dundas prevented Sir Edmund's compliance with the request until after mid-day;† and before Lord Raglan and Lyons were destined to have their interview, counsels opposite to those they judged right had not only prevented that immediate resumption of the forward march which they both deemed to be of great moment, but had brought into question and seeming jeopardy the whole plan and fate of the expedition.

Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Raglan had met; and the purport of what passed between them, as conveyed by Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, was this: Convinced of the policy of an immediate advance, and an attack of the Northern Forts, Lord Raglan pressed his opinion upon the French Marshal, and 'proposed to him at once to advance on 'the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the 'forts.'‡

* Sir Edmund's recollection seems to have placed these circumstances at a time one day earlier than that which I assign to them; but his notes to Lord Raglan, now lying before me, show that he must have been mistaken.

† These were orders founded on the report—a false report—that seven Russian men-of-war had slipped out of Sebastopol and sailed (apparently) for Odessa. Lyons with the steam squadron was ordered to pursue.

‡ The MS. memorandum mentioned in note, *ante*, p. 338.

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In answer to this proposal for an immediate advance and attack upon the Northern Forts, Marshal St Arnaud said that 'his troops were 'tired, and that it could not be done.'*

Lord Raglan, as may be supposed, 'was disappointed by this answer,' and 'could not,' he said, 'understand it; for he knew that the troops could 'not be tired, and that there must be some other 'reason for the Marshal's answer.'†

After this, Lord Raglan had another interview with Marshal St Arnaud, at which he exerted his power of persuasion in 'again urging the French 'General to advance across the Belbec;' but in reply the Marshal now said: 'He had ascertained 'that the Russians had thrown up strong earth- 'works on the banks of the river; and, though 'he did not doubt that the Allies could force them, 'as they had the works on the Alma, they could 'not afford the loss that would be entailed.'‡

In his power of warding off or concealing every access of despondency which might be hurtful to the public service, Lord Raglan stood above other men; but even he could not hide—not, at least, from his friend Sir Edmund Lyons—the dejection of spirits which was brought upon him by Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to go on with the campaign as hitherto planned.§ And, indeed, the conjunc-

* The MS. memorandum mentioned in note, *ante*, p. 338.

† Ibid. My surmise as to what the other reason was will be given, *post*, chap. v.

‡ Ibid.

§ Sir Edmund says he 'found him (Lord Raglan) in low

ture was a painful one. I have never learnt that the Marshal proposed any alternative plan; and for a while the pause of the Allies was not a mere halt. The enterprise stopped.

It might seem that now once more—and this, too, on the morrow of a victory—the expedition was in danger of coming to an end; but if Lord Raglan had undertaken a venturesome campaign in loyal obedience to the desire of the Queen's Government rather than to his own judgment, for that very reason perhaps he was the more steadfast in his resolve to overcome or elude all obstacles: and the moment he found himself encountered by this sudden recusancy at the French Headquarters, he sought and perceived a way by which his continued persistence in the enterprise against Sebastopol could be made to consist with St Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts. Lord Raglan, indeed, had not yet abandoned the hope that this refusal might be withdrawn; but, for the time, he had to deal with it as a decision which was only too likely to be adhered to: and accordingly, but only on the supposition that St Arnaud might really persist in refusing to attack the North Forts, Lord Raglan proposed for consideration a plan of campaign which would relieve the Allies from the duty of having to march against the northern defences, by transferring the theatre of war from the

spirits. On asking him the cause, he (Lord Raglan) said ' [then follows the account of Lord Raglan's second interview with St Arnaud as above given].

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western to the southern coast. Of the counsels which ended in a resolve to adopt this new plan of campaign I shall have to speak by-and-by, and it is only in the process of accounting for the halt on the Alma that I stay to glance at them here.*

Upon the question thus raised there was no need for the Allies to come to their final and absolute decision until they should be in the neighbourhood of the Belbec; but even whilst still on the Alma, they apparently determined that nothing but a return to the old plan of attacking the North Forts should prevent them from adopting Lord Raglan's conditional proposal: and this determination carried them so far towards an actual adoption of the measure, that already their merely inchoate approval began to govern their movements.

The way in which these changes of plan detained the Allies on the Alma will now be perceived. So far as concerns the earlier period of the halt, it resulted of necessity from Marshal St Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts; for between the time of the refusal and the conditional acceptance of Lord Raglan's alternative proposal, the Allies were without any purpose sufficing to guide their steps; and when at length, by persisting in his refusal, the Marshal constrained the Allies to entertain a measure involving the abandonment of the western coast, he drove them to an alternative which still further lengthened the halt.

* See *post*, chap. v. See also the Map.

It is easy to see how the idea of abandoning the western coast carried with it a prolongation of the halt on the Alma. The number of the wounded was so great, that the labour of getting them on board could not but fill a good deal of time, and it was of necessity that this operation should be covered by the presence of a sufficient force. Now, if the Allies had been firmly persisting in their determination to march against the Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol, the western coast would have necessarily continued to be the theatre of operations, and in that case it would have been easy for them to go on with their advance the very day after the battle, leaving only a detachment on the Alma to cover the embarkation of the wounded. If, on the other hand, the Allies should determine to abandon the western coast, they could not well venture to leave there an isolated detachment; and the business of embarking the wounded must either go on without the presence of any land forces to cover the operation, or else the whole Allied army would have to be detained for the purpose; and, since the abandonment of the wounded by the land forces was an alternative too painful in its possible consequences to be held worthy of adoption,* it followed that to harbour the idea of giving up the

* With our present knowledge we may entertain no doubt that the seamen and marines of the Allied navies might have been well able to secure the safe embarkation of the wounded without requiring the support of the land forces; but, at the time, there was not information enough in the Allied camp to warrant such an assumption.

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intended attack on the North Side, and quitting the western coast of the peninsula, was to bring upon the whole Allied army the necessity of a halt on the Alma, and a halt, too, for such a time as would suffice for getting the wounded on board ship.

So, although it is true that the cause of the delay on the Alma was the unwillingness of the French Marshal to go on with the advance against the north side of Sebastopol, still, the halt having once been resolved upon, its duration was made to depend on the time it would take to have the sick and the wounded put on board ship. The French would have been able to get their sick and wounded on board in one full day. On the other hand, the number of the wounded English being, as Lord Raglan computed, just three times greater than that of the French, and the ground whence they had to be moved being very much farther from the shore, it soon became certain that at least two days of ceaseless labour would have to be gone through before the English would be able to bury their dead, and to get all their sick and wounded on board.

Even within the two full days, the work could not have been done without bringing to bear upon it surpassing exertions. Nothing short of the energy and the tenderness of the sailors would have sufficed. Admiral Dundas devoted all his medical officers to the care of the sick and wounded who lay on the field; and in the duty of removing these sufferers, and bringing them on board ship, as well as in that of landing stores,

he employed all his boats, and no less than a thousand of his seamen* Every soldier prostrate with wounds or sickness was a difficult load, which had to be carried by the strength of men for the distance of three or four miles ; but the sailors toiled, and toiled with a generous, exuberant zeal which left them no rest till the work was achieved. Deep, indeed, as Lord Raglan declared, was his 'feeling of gratitude' to the sailors for these kindly services ; and he owned that he had been singularly touched by observing the devotion with which naval officers took part in the bodily labour of lifting and carrying the wounded soldiers.†

Of the whole number of wounded English, amounting, as we saw, in number to more than sixteen hundred, a large proportion were so stricken as to be helpless ; but besides, there were the sufferers who lay upon the ground cast down and disabled by mortal sickness, and of these there were very many ; for — baffling the hopes which medical science had tried, one may say, to harbour—the cholera had proved to be a pestilence which was not to be warded off by the stir and glory of battle.‡

* Admiral Dundas to Admiralty, 27th October 1854.

† Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.

‡ Captain Dacres, the commander of the *Sanspareil*, and his captain of the fore-castle, were but two out of the number of those seamen who generously busied themselves in the kindly duties which they felt to be imposed upon them by the painful scenes of the battle-field ; but they alone took out from the tents (and buried as well as they could) the corpses of twenty-eight men who had died of cholera during the night.—Letter from Admiral Dacres, 19th October 1863.

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Thus, then, the battle having ended before five o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th of September, the Allied armies remained halted on the Alma until the morning of the 23d; and when it is asked why, instead of thus tarrying, they did not resume their advance on the morrow of the battle, the answer, we see, must be like to that which showed why they did not press the enemy's retreat on the afternoon of the fight. The hinderer was Marshal St Arnaud. But the halt having once been resolved upon, it lasted two whole days instead of one, because, though the French could embark all their wounded men in one day, the number of those who lay stricken on the English part of the field was too great to allow of their being dealt with in the lesser time.* So, notwithstanding that the measure of halting on the Alma was chargeable upon Marshal St Arnaud, still, on the 22d of September (having by that time got his own wounded on board), he could say, and could say with literal truth, that the French army was able to advance when the English army was not. Accordingly, on the 22d, whilst the English were still toiling hard at the painful task of getting their wounded on board, the Marshal suffered himself to write: 'The English are not yet ready, and I am kept back, just as at Baltechiek, just as at Old Fort. It is

* By some it has been thought that commissariat difficulties prevented the earlier advance of the Allies: but after considering the grounds on which that belief rested, I have not accepted it.

' true they have more wounded than I have, and
' that they are farther from the sea.* What
' slowness in our movements! War can hardly
' be carried on in this way. The weather is ad-
' mirable, and I am not profiting by it. I rage.'†

It being now seen that St Arnaud's refusal to advance on the position of the Northern Forts was the cause of the halt on the Alma, there remains the task of determining how far this refusal was warranted. Of the strength of the works which were thus arresting the Allies on the morrow of their victory we shall have to speak more fully by-and-by. For the present, it is enough to say that the main obstacle was the Star Fort, an octagon earthwork, surrounded by a ditch and glacis, looking down upon the open sea towards the west and the Sebastopol bay on the south; that the Fort was not a work designed against invaders coming from the Belbec, being commanded and looked into from the ground by which the Allies might approach it;‡ that the fire of the French and English ships could be easily brought to bear upon it;§ that, whatever accession of strength might be given to the adjacent ground by the hasty labours of the enemy, there were only twelve out of all the guns then

The Star
Fort:

expediency
of attacking
it:

* Letter to his brother, 22d September.

† Private journal under same date.

‡ Sir John Burgoyne questions this, but he had not an opportunity of effecting any sufficing reconnaissance of the ground; and upon such a matter I can hardly refuse to treat General de Todleben's statements as a safe guide.—'Defense de Sebastopol,' pp. 131, 230.

§ Ibid. p. 222.

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perceived
by Lord
Raglan
and Sir
Edmund
Lyons.

arming the Fort itself which could be brought to bear upon the approaches by which the Allies might advance; that the new, and as yet unarmed, work which threatened the mouth of the Belbec was assailable from the ships as well as by the land forces; * and that, finally, in the judgment both of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Fort, with all its new adjuncts, was not an obstacle which ought to baffle a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men advancing along the coast, with the active and available support of the attendant fleets.†

Soundness
of their
inferences.

Time, at last, has apparently proved that the inferences of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were sound. More than that, it has shown that, at a period when the Allies might have been marching upon the Star Fort,‡ Prince Mentschikoff had not only withdrawn to the south of Sebastopol, but had deliberately renounced the idea of venturing his army in any encounter on the north of the roadstead.§ Therefore, if Marshal St Arnaud had followed the counsels of Lord

* 'Defense de Sebastopol,' p. 222.

† Mr Loch's MS. memorandum, quoted *ante*, p. 338.

‡ Viz., the 22d or 23d of September. After the departure of Prince Mentschikoff in the night of the 24th, the Allies, though not liable to be encountered at the Star Fort by any 'army,' would still have had to deal, as we shall afterwards see, with Korniloff and his sailors; but on the 22d or the 23d, or even, as I consider, on the 24th, the invaders might have marched upon the position of the Star Fort without being met by either the army or the seamen.

§ After giving his reasons for regarding the position of the Star Fort as untenable by the Prince's army against the Allies, General Todleben says: 'Having thus convinced himself that

Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Allies would have occupied the north side of Sebastopol without encountering resistance, and having done this they could have proceeded at once to execute the main purpose of the invasion by destroying the Black Sea fleet and the naval establishments of Sebastopol.* Nor was even this all; for there is reason to believe that, by adding to their operations the mere occupation of a point on the road to Baktchi Seräi, the Allies would have secured the surrender of the south of Sebastopol, and have brought the campaign to an end.†

With the victory of the 20th of September Fortune offered Sebastopol to the Allies, but only, as I have said, on condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize.‡ That condition Marshal St Arnaud rejected, by refusing to go on against the northern defences of the place. We shall have to make a reckoning of the 'lost occasions' which followed the battle of the Alma. This one stands first.

The first of
the 'lost
'occasions'

'there was not, on this ground, any position where our troops could await the enemy with some hope of success, and without being exposed to find themselves in a most critical situation in case of failure, Prince Mentschikoff saw himself obliged to renounce encountering the Allies on the north of the roadstead. Recognising, at the same time, the necessity of reorganising his troops, of completing his supplies of ammunition and food, of reinforcing the garrison of Sebastopol, and determining the measures necessary for its defence, Prince Mentschikoff took the resolve of transporting himself to the south of Sebastopol.'—'Defense de Sebastopol,' p. 215.

* The authority for this conclusion will be given *post*, chap. v.

† And for this conclusion also.

‡ *Ante*, last page of chap. i.

CHAPTER IV.

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IV.

Advance on
the Katcha.

The village
on its
banks.

ON the morning of the 23d of September the Allies once more marched forward; and moving all the way along ground thickly strewn with arms and accoutrements—the signs of the enemy's haste to retreat—they descended at length into the valley of the Katcha. The English were quartered amid the gardens and vineyards of a village all smiling with signs of plenty; for although in broken furniture and emptied chests, there were traces of Cossack spoilers, and although, in their terror, the villagers had fled, still the happy-looking cottages, with their trellised and welcoming porches, the cherished fruit-trees and especially the abounding clusters of the vine, all seemed to speak of content and rewarded industry.

The people
of the
village.

Though the villagers had fled they had not gone far. A knot of Englishmen inclined to ramble into the country had chosen the road leading eastward as the one most likely to withdraw them from the familiar scenes of the camp. When they had gone some way in this direction, they saw

that, at a distance of some hundred of yards in front of them, there was a crowd. At sight of the strangers the crowd began to fly, but after a while, some of the people turned round, and, little by little, were brought to attend to the beckoning and the encouraging signs with which they were met. After a while, the fugitive villagers—for these were the people who formed the crowd—began to grow somewhat less fearful; and at length, though often halting in doubt, they came nearer, and then again nearer; but even when they had evidently made up their minds to accept the proffered intercourse, they yet stopped from time to time that they might make prostrations and gestures in token of submission.

These poor people were lurking about the neighbourhood of the village in order to see or make out what was going to befall their homes. Even apart from kind motives, the Englishmen saw the advantage of reassuring the villagers, and an interpreter was fetched. When the people came to understand that no harm would be done to them or their property they became very grateful, and some of them ventured back into their village. From these villagers the English first came to hear of the panic which had seized the Russian army in the midnight after the battle; and it was here, too (as told in a former page), that the simple natives excused their content by saying that for three generations they had lived in peace under the Czars.

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The English at this time received a small accession to the strength of their cavalry from the landing of the Scots Greys.

Lord Raglan's cavalry
already on
the Belbec.

But whilst the whole of the French, and the main body of the English army, were establishing their quarters in the valley of the Katcha, Lord Raglan—in the person of the General commanding his cavalry—was already in sight of Sebastopol, and descending unmolested to the Belbec. He had ordered Lord Lucan with the bulk of the cavalry and his troop of horse-artillery to push forward, and take possession of the village of Duvanköi, a village lying close to the Belbec, but so far up the stream as to be upon the high road which connected Sebastopol with Baktchi Seräi. Lord Lucan had to approach the village by passing through a long defile which might have been easily defended against cavalry; but, although watched by Cossacks, he was not opposed. The village, when reached, was found to be in a nook shut in between the bank of the river on one side and precipitous heights on the other. Finding the place unoccupied, Lord Lucan not only took possession of it—that might have been done by means of a picket—but kept his troops down in the nook for some hours. As far as was possible in such a situation, he strove to prepare against the event of an attack by placing three guns at each entrance to the village, and some scouts on the commanding hills; but he did not conceal from himself that his cavalry thus cooped down must be powerless, and exposed to destruction

if attacked by infantry or artillery.* The enemy did not seize the occasion, and at dusk Lord Lucan withdrew his troops to the high open ground above;† but certainly during some hours, our cavalry had been in peril.

Lord Lucan had been apprised that the Russians had had 2000 horse in the village of Duvanköi just before its occupation by our cavalry; and when he rose from his bivouac on the morning of the 24th, he saw bodies of Russian troops both in the direction of Sebastopol and near Mackenzie's Farm; but he was recalled into the general line of march before the enemy's movements were yet so developed as to enable him to make out their scope and bearing. If his orders had suffered him to remain in the neighbourhood of Duvanköi, he might have found that the Russians in force were converging upon the very ground where he stood, and that in a village close by Prince Mentschikoff was to establish his Headquarters.‡

Excepting the cavalry, which Lord Raglan had thus pushed on a day's march in advance, the whole of the Allied army bivouacked, as we saw, on the Katcha.

* Lord Lucan seems to have thought that the order to 'take possession of' Duvanköi made it his duty to place his main body in the village, and to keep it there during some 'few hours;' for he speaks of the occupation of the village which he had effected and continued till dusk as an act which had 'sufficiently carried out his instructions.'

† This last measure, as might well be expected, was fully approved by Lord Raglan.

‡ The village of Otarköi. It was early on the following morning that Prince Mentschikoff in person reached the village.

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Sunday
the 24th.

On the morning of Sunday the 24th of September, the Allies made ready to begin the march which was to bring them to the Belbec, and place them in presence of the Severnaya, or northern side of Sebastopol.

New
obstruction
perceived
by the
French:

They were checked. The reported existence of a fresh covered battery commanding the mouth of the Belbec had been already put forward by the French Commander as an obstacle which might force the Allies to swerve from their purpose;* and now that the advancing armies were at last on the banks of the Katcha, the Marshal's avowed anxiety on the subject of this new field-work still hung in the way of the enterprise. The French, as we know, were on the right; or, in other words, next to the sea. Theirs was the part of the Allied army which (if the advance should be continued in the direction hitherto followed) would be brought opposite to the newly-formed battery; and, not unnaturally, they deemed it to be within their peculiar and separate province to judge of the importance of an obstacle which lay, as they thought, in their path. Moreover, it had now become known at the French Headquarters that the enemy had sunk men-of-war across the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead.

their re-
quest for
a little
delay.

At seven in the morning, Lord Raglan received a message from the French Marshal requesting that the march might be postponed till ten o'clock, not only for the purpose of considering the aspect of affairs as altered by the sinking of the enemy's

* See *ante*, chap. iii., and *post*, chap. v.

ships, but also in order to give time for a further reconnoissance of the field-work at the mouth of the Belbec.

The request was conveyed by Colonel Trochu, who brought a note signed by himself, which he left in the hands of Lord Raglan. In English, the note runs thus: ‘Last night news reached the French camp that the Russians had yesterday destroyed the entrance of the port of Sebastopol by sinking five ships and two frigates. Thence there results a new situation, on the subject of which the Marshal sends me to confer with his lordship Lord Raglan. Besides, the Russians have constructed in advance of Fort Constantine* a battery which directly commands the mouth of the Belbec, where the siege materials and the supplies have to be disembarked, and where the line of march is which the French army would have to take. Pending the expression of opinion on this subject by his lordship Lord Raglan, the Marshal has adjourned the departure for some hours.

Lord Raglan, of course, could do no otherwise than yield to the request, more especially on the last ground assigned; for the field-work to which it referred stood opposite—not to the English, but—to the Marshal’s line of advance, and (unless it were shunned altogether) would have to be dealt with by the French.

* Colonel Trochu meant the ‘Star Fort.’ It was common at the time in the Allied camps to call the ‘Star Fort’ ‘Fort Constantine.’ The real Fort Constantine, however, was a sea-fort at the mouth of the Sebastopol bay.

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The advance
at length
resumed,
but without
any fixed
determi-
nation to
attack the
' North
' Side.'

Sebastopol
in sight.

Marshal
St Arnaud :

his state.

Bend in the
direction of
the march.

It seems to have been ultimately agreed that the Allies should continue their march upon the Belbec, though without committing themselves to an attack of the Severnaya, or encountering the new field-work; and accordingly, at about ten o'clock the advance was resumed. Soon, crowning the ridge of the hills which divide the Katcha from the Belbec, and then, gazing eagerly southwards, the two armies looked down on Sebastopol.

On this summit, the Allies for a while remained halted. Marshal St Arnaud quitted his saddle and lay upon the ground. According to the accounts of the French historians, he was within a few hours of the period when the physicians pronounced him to be suffering from cholera; and although, at this time, his appearance and manner spoke more of downcast spirits than of mortal disease, it may well be imagined that nothing other than bodily illness had made him joyless at this the moment of his first looking down on Sebastopol. He was unspeakably sad. Contrasting the hard enterprise before him with the work of happier days in the country of the Arabs and the Kabyles, he sighed as men sigh when they have to endure without hope.

Again the Allies marched forward; but by the time that their line of march was developed, an observer who knew the ground might have inferred, from the direction they took, that already they were swerving from their purpose. Shunning the imagined strength of the new field-work

at the mouth of the Belbec, they began to bend away from the shore. CHAP.
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The ground at this time traversed by the invading armies was so thickly strewn with the marks of the enemy's hasty flight and confusion, as to show that defeat had been lapsing into ruin, and that that which had entered Sebastopol was a hurried and fugitive crowd. Amongst the things abandoned there was even that cargo of kitchen implements which had supplied the table of the Russian Headquarters. The Allies failed to read these signs, or rather they failed to read them with that kind of understanding which leads to clear inference and to accordant action. Indeed, it would seem that they had hardly at all treasured up and applied the narrative of that Russian panic on the Katcha which the villagers had been giving them on the foregoing night. Strange to say, that stand, or that mere semblance of a stand, which Kiriakoff had made at the close of the battle on the Alma, had raised up a veil so effectual, that it still served to screen the Russians from the eyes of their invaders. No fragments of the wreck, no accounts of eye-witnesses, were enough to countervail the effect which Kiriakoff had wrought upon the counsels of the Allies, by showing them a front for some minutes, and causing them to believe that the retreat which he was covering must be a retreat in good order.*

The track of
the Russian
army.

The proofs
of its
shattered
state not
well mas-
tered by
the Allies

* The reason why the few minutes' stand made by Kiriakoff imposed so effectually upon the Allies was this: it happened

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The invaders
descending
into the
valley of
the Belbec.

Reconnais-
sance by
Lord
Cardigan.

Grave im-
port of a
resolve to
shun an
attack of
the 'North
' side.'

The invading armies now descended into the beauteous valley of the Belbec. There was little that could yet be seen of the Russian troops. Lord Cardigan, with a couple of squadrons, reconnoitred a pass towards Sebastopol in the direct front of the English lines, and reported it impracticable, there being, he said, a marsh in front, then a causeway, and then a battery of heavy guns supported by a strong force of infantry and some cavalry.

To go hardily on with the old plan of the invasion, undertaking to carry at once whatever the enemy might have prepared by way of defence for his Star Fort,—this, however difficult, or however easy, was, at all events, an enterprise deliberately contemplated beforehand, and of such a kind as to be strictly consisting with the character of the expedition; for the attack was one in which (by aiding in the capture of the works at the mouth of the Belbec, and the entrenchments connecting them with the Star Fort) the naval forces of the Allies could take a great part. Besides, the condition of things was such that, if the Allies should determine to shun this encounter, their caution would be far from restoring them

that his line of retreat was so far diagonal, that when he took up his second position, some two miles in rear of the Alma heights, he was no longer opposite to the French line of battle (as he had been during the action), but to the English; and the consequence was, that his presence in order of battle, much aided by the nature of the ground, masked the confusion of that part of the Russian army which was retreating from its conflict with the English.

to the approved and recognised paths of scientific warfare. On the contrary, a tardy wariness in that direction could hardly now fail to be imprudent. The expedition had gone too far to leave open a choice between risk and safety. The choice was between two or more kinds of grave danger. This night, though the soldiery were gladdened by the beauty of the vale, and the wealth of the gardens and the villas, it could not but happen that the chiefs would be busied with anxious counsels.

CHAPTER V.

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V.

The design
of operating
against
Sebastopol
from the
north.

AT the time when the deliberations of the Allies in Bulgaria resulted in their determining that the western, and not the southern, coast of the Crimea should be looked to for the place of their landing, it was not so much settled in words, but rather taken for granted, that this resolve carried with it the ulterior design of moving on southward along the same western coast, and operating against the northern defences of Sebastopol. The assumption was a natural one; for, because of the Sebastopol bay, it was only from the north that an invader remaining established on the western coast could attempt an attack.

Long before, and prior indeed to the actual commencement of the war, Captain Drummond of the Retribution had ventured to give firm counsel upon this subject; and the knowledge he had acquired by lying at anchor in the roadstead of Sebastopol enabled him to speak with great weight.* Both Captain Drummond and Captain

* See the Plan. Since the now published statements and comments of General de Todleben tend very strongly to show

Willes (who was acting with him at the time of the survey) conceived themselves able to report decisively in favour of an attack upon the Star Fort as a means of achieving the great object of the Allies; * but if, even before the invasion, they were warranted in fixing upon the Severnaya or 'North Side' as the true point of attack, much more was it now to be concluded in favour of such a choice, since the Allies, by their successful landing, followed up by the result of the battle on the Alma, had fastened already upon that very part of the coast from which they could conveniently assail the Star Fort; and moreover, it was fairly to be reckoned, that if the Allies should go straight to their end, without at all turning aside, or interposing fresh marches between themselves and their prey, the momentum they had gathered from their victory might carry them through the defences without being put to a siege.

Bivouacking now on the Belbec, the Allies were at last within gunshot of the fortress they had come over sea to confront; and, the period in which it had been possible to keep the ques-

The time
had now
come for
a final
decision

that the 'North Side' was the true point to attack, it cannot but be interesting to the friends of Captain (now Admiral Sir James) Drummond to see the words in which he reported to the above effect: 'I think that, on carrying the position of the "E" Fort' [the Star Fort is marked "E" in Captain Drummond's plan] 'the place would fall immediately.'—Captain Drummond's Report, 9th January 1854.

* Captain Willes says, in his Report: 'I think it is quite possible to destroy the arsenal with time and 20,000 soldiers, artillery, &c. The attack on the South Side should be a feint.'

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tion open being close to its end, they were called upon to determine whether they would at once prepare to deliver the attack, or give up their old plan of campaign.

It is now therefore time to see what there was in front of the Allies which might be calculated to turn them from the execution of their original design.

The Sever-
naya or
north side
of Sebas-
topol.

On the northern side of the Sebastopol bay, and facing the sea-forts which cover the town and harbour, there were not only other sea-forts of great size and power, but also some barracks, some magazines, and a factory worked by the Government. This aggregate of buildings, or the quarter in which they stood, was known amongst Russians by the name of the Severnaya; and the English have been accustomed to call it the 'North side of Sebastopol,' or, in language more short, the 'North Side.' If once the Allies could make themselves masters there, they would be able to deal so heavily with the town and arsenal of Sebastopol, and would have it so completely in their power to burn every ship in the harbour, that thenceforth the main object of the invasion might be regarded as an object attained.*

Its value to
the Allies.

But even these were not all the advantages which might be expected to flow from a resolve to attack the Star Fort. By reason of the prox-

* I rest this assertion upon the authority of General de Todleben.—'Défense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 239. The General (in accord with Drummond, *ante*, p. 361) states his conclusion upon this point in decisive, unhesitating terms.

imity of that field of action to the roads which converge near Mackenzie's Farm, the plan of operating against the north side of Sebastopol was compatible with measures for seizing the enemy's lines of communication.* And this was a priceless advantage; for although, in regard to material supplies, Sebastopol for the time might be sufficing to the needs of the Russian army, Prince Mentschikoff was wholly dependent upon his lines of communication for the reinforcements which he believed to be of absolute necessity to him. General de Todleben has good means of knowing the degree of stress which must have been put upon the Russians by the loss of their lines of communication; and it is his judgment that, at this time, the establishment of an Allied force on the road to Baktchi Seräi must have brought the campaign to an end.†

The forts, barracks, storehouses, and factory, which thus came to be of great worth in the eyes of the striving nations, were at the foot of a high plateau surrounded on three sides by water. Along the northern boundary of the plateau there flowed the stream of the Belbec; on the west, its base met the Black Sea; and on the south, where the buildings were placed, it fronted the great bay of Sebastopol. The sea-forts were not so constructed as to be the means of defence against an

The plateau
overhanging
the North
Side.

* Not only with the north, but with the south-east of the Crimea, where there were 10,000 men under Khomatoff.

† Expressed in his book, and—very positively indeed—in conversation with me.

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The Star
Fort

invader coming down upon them by land from the north; but on the high ground above, though still at a distance of only a few hundred yards from the bay, there was the Work already referred to—a Work ill-contrived and dilapidated—which the English have called the Star Fort. The work had been constructed in the year 1818, with a view to secure Fort Constantine, and the other great sea-forts which lined the north of the roadstead, from being taken in reverse by marines or other forces landing on the west coast; but it stood in the path of any invader approaching Sebastopol from the Belbec, and could therefore be brought into use as a means of defence against him. It was an octagon, having sides of which each was from 190 to 230 yards long; and, of its eight angles, every other one was supplied with a little bastion or caponiere, having an earthen parapet, whilst three out of the four remaining angles of the octagon were furnished with small bonnettes and barbettes, each taking three pieces. At the flanks of the bastions, the lines of what would otherwise have been the curtain were so interrupted as to provide means of obtaining a flanking fire from some small guns placed in casemates. The profiles of the bastions gave 14 feet of height with 10 of thickness, and the other parts of the fort had a height of from 4 to 7 feet, with a thickness of from 3 to 7 feet. The bastion which looked towards the roadstead was retrenched at its gorge by a work called a cavalier. The fort was surrounded by a ditch 12 feet deep

and 18 feet broad, with revetment in masonry and a glacis. It was covered on its south and south-eastern sides by two lunettes, but both of these faced the water, and were of no important use against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. Of the 47 guns which armed the work, only 12 could be of service in the expected attack from the north. The fort was commanded, and even looked into, from the heights towards the north.*

In and near this work, from the day of the landing, on the 14th of September, down to the evening of the 24th, the time of which we are speaking, the Russians had toiled night and day, and with a force of, at one time, some 1500 workmen. Their object was, not only to repair and strengthen the Star Fort itself, but also to provide generally for the defence of the plateau against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. By those who know that these hurried works went on under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben, it will be easily inferred that they

Endeavours
of the Rus-
sians after
the 14th
Sept. to
strengthen
the fort
and the
plateau.

* It may be right to say that in the above account of the Star Fort I have not implicitly followed the description contained in the text of General de Todleben's work; but my words, I believe, will be found to agree with the plans which accompany his book. Those plans agree very well with the description contained in the admirable work which I have followed, the work of Gendre ('Matériaux pour servir,' &c.), but not with the words of General de Todleben's book. General de Todleben's book purports not to have been written, but edited by him; and I imagine he would be much more likely to allow mistakes to occur in the words of the narrative compiled under his auspices than to suffer any grave faults to appear in the elaborate maps and plans of fortifications which form so valuable a portion of the work.

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were planned with a consummate skill; but what even he found means to achieve in ten days could not but fall very short of what was needed.

However, he threw up works on each flank of the fort in order to strengthen and extend the line of defence, taking care that all the approaches (some of which had before been quite out of harm's way from the fort) should now be liable to be swept by fire. Besides this, he erected two batteries on the crests towards the north-west, with the design of keeping off the enemy's ships; and two, if not three, out of the nine guns which ultimately armed these batteries were so placed as to command that part of the coast which lay towards the mouth of the Belbec. The earthwork prepared for the reception of those two guns was the apparition described to Lord Raglan in the morning by Colonel Trochu, and threatening, as we have already seen, to scare the Allies from their purpose. It does not appear that Todleben foresaw the effect which these two guns would have upon the counsels of the Allies. His general object was to take care that no ships should come within range without incurring fire; and he did not, it would seem, entertain any notion that, by refusing to the Allies the absolutely peaceful possession of the mouth of the Belbec, he might drive them to abandon their plan of campaign. He connected both of these north-western batteries with the Star Fort by means of trenches, which were to be lined by men using their musketry

In order to prevent the Star Fort from being looked into by the enemy, a great effort was made to increase the height of the parapet; but under the weight of the earth laid for this purpose upon one of the old parapets the revetment of the scarp gave way, and a breach was thus made by the defenders themselves. One of Todleben's objects was to throw up works which might prevent the enemy from turning the Star Fort on the eastern flank, but for the execution of this part of his plan there was no time.

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By the morning of the 25th there were altogether twenty-nine guns in battery and available for the defence against the expected attack from the north. Amongst these were the nine pieces which now armed the two new north-western batteries, including the two 24-pounder carronades which commanded the coast towards the mouth of the Belbec. These two batteries, however, were liable to be destroyed by the guns of the Anglo-French fleet;* and the trench connecting one of them with the fort could be enfiladed and taken in rear by fire from the same quarter.† Indeed, the position of the ground and of the Russian works was such that in every stage of an attack undertaken against the Star Fort, the seamen and the ships of the Allies would have been able to take a great part.‡

Guns available for the defence.

Part that might have been taken by the fleets in attack on Star Fort.

In order to cover the retreat of the Russians, some of their ships were placed in such positions

* Todleben, 'Défense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 233.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

CHAP. as to be able to sweep with their broadsides the
 V. slopes on the north of the roadstead.

The form of the ravines descending from the Star Fort was such that upon two, if not three, of the approaches from the side of the Belbec, the assailants might come up to the ditch without first incurring a cannonade of any great might or duration.*

Forces
available
for the
defence.

With regard to the forces available for the defence, it may be said that if the Allies had advanced against the Star Fort on the morning of the 25th they would have encountered there and on the ground adjoining a battalion of militiamen,† a company of sappers, and so large a body of sailors—withdrawn, for that purpose, from the ships and from the defence of the South Side—as would bring up the whole number of combatants to 11,000.‡ The sailors were, for the most part, ill armed, some of them having old flint-and-steel muskets, and others, it seems, only pikes or cutlasses. This was the force which, extended along a front of a mile, was to defend the fort and the plateau against a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, supported and actively aided by their fleets. The defenders, however, were commanded by one whose name will be long illustrious in the annals of Russia. For the present, it

The force
defending
the position
on the 24th
and 25th
Sept.

Admiral
Korniloff.

* In the 'Défense de Sebastopol,' General de Todleben undertakes to show elaborately, and in full detail, the power and duration of the fire to which the assailants would be exposed.

† I continue to use the term 'militia' as a word for distinguishing what the Russians call their 'reserve' battalions.

‡ 11,350.—Todleben, vol. i. p. 227.

suffices to say of Admiral Korniloff, that he was a chivalrous, resolute, and devoted seaman, who, with hardly a hope of any better success than that of an honourable death, had determined to defend the plateau and the fort to the last extremity.

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Of the reception so prepared for the Allies, I am content to say only this much, because, after all, it so happened that the Star Fort was never assailed; and although there is use in inquiring what would have been the probable result of an attack upon 'the North Side' from the direction of the Belbec, it chances that this very question has already received an answer which comes with so much authority, and is, at the same time, so well supported by detailed statement and laborious demonstration, that it is well to give the conclusion without reproducing, in this place, the voluminous materials of proof on which it is rested.*

Policy of
attacking
the north
fort;

We saw that the officer who planned and directed the works of defence was Colonel de Todleben. He it is who has now pronounced that the plateau and the fort could not have been successfully defended against the attack which the Allies had the means of making.† The situation of

* The passages in which General de Todleben maintains his conclusion will be found in pp. 230-233, 238 and 239 of his work; but I do not reproduce them, because they fail to deal with the really disputed question—*i.e.*, the question whether the position could have been advantageously defended by *an army*. The argument in favour of that last view (*i.e.*, Sir John Burgoyne's) will be found in the Appendix, No. XII.

† Todleben, 'Défense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. pp. 230-233.

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in the
opinion of
Totleben ;

the defenders, he says, notwithstanding all they had done, and notwithstanding their heroic resolves, was nothing less than desperate ;* and he declares that the complete success of the expected attack by the Allies would have been inevitable.† He adds—and there were reasons which gave great importance to that part of the question—that their success must have been speedy.‡ These conclusions he of course founds on his own complete knowledge of the defences as seen from within ; and it would not of necessity follow that the weakness of which he was cognisant would be visible to the Allies. But, then, General de Todleben goes further. Supposing the Allies to have made full use of even those restricted means of observation they had, he says they must needs have learnt that the attack was feasible.§

in that of
Lord Raglan and Sir
E. Lyons.

And, lest it be said that this, after all, was only the conclusion of an Engineer officer standing on the sea-cliff, and thence undertaking to say how far the defences could be judged of from the ships, it must be repeated that the conclusion to which General de Todleben says the Allies ought to have come was the very same as that to which Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons did come in fact. Sir Edmund, as commanding the in-shore squadron, would have been called upon to take a great part in any attack carried on along the coast, and therefore his judgment was that of a man preparing to act upon it. He, no less than Lord Raglan

* Todleben, 'Défense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 30.

† Ibid. p. 233.

‡ Ibid. p. 232.

§ Ibid. p. 239.

was convinced, as we saw, that after the Alma the true policy of the Allies required an immediate attack upon the Star Fort.

The Allies were not ignorant that the possession of the North Side would at once enable them to cannonade the enemy's shipping.* Nor again did they fall into the error of supposing the Star Fort to be of itself a formidable work.† Indeed it may be said that the hindrances which stood in the way of the enterprise were all of such a kind that they must have been as clearly apparent to the minds of general officers whilst planning at Varna as now they were to the eyes of men scanning the work with their field-glasses. It is true, as we saw, that towards the north-west of the Star Fort a field-work had lately appeared, which bent round the shoulder of the hill, and in such a direction that two if not three of its guns, at a range of two miles, might bring their fire to bear upon the waters at the mouth of the Belbec; but the use of the spade and the pickaxe has been so long known in the world, and the crust of the earth has been so frequently used by man as a means

The objections that were urged against attacking the North Side.

* See the 3d clause of Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 395. It is difficult for an Englishman to help thinking wistfully of the course things might have been likely to take if, the French claim to precedence being out of the way, the English had been on the right. In that case, Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons would have been operating, as it were, side by side, and the enterprise against the Star Fort would have given a good occasion for showing what can be done by the closely combined action of land and sea forces.

† See Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 395, in which he admits it was 'by no means formidable if insulated.'

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of sheltering himself whilst engaged in efforts to harm his assailants, that if the Allies were to turn aside from a well-weighed plan of campaign at the sight of a newly-made battery, they would not only disclose a flexibility scarce consistent with the pretensions of aggressive States, but would be conceding to the power of the Defence, as compared with the power of the Attack, an ascendant which does not belong to it. Certainly, it was possible that by a gun in the new battery, discharged at a range of two miles, a vessel might be struck whilst engaged in bringing stores into the mouth of the Belbec ; but it was not with a notion of being baffled by a contingency of this kind that the venturesome enterprise of the invasion had been planned or begun ; and the Work which thus threatened the entrance of the Belbec was not only open to attack by the land forces of the Allies, but was also so placed that the naval forces of the French and English ships could have taken their part in its capture.

Again, it was said that the position which the Russians would have to defend on the North Side was only a mile in extent, and that therefore their main strength might be concentrated with powerful effect upon a comparatively small space of ground.* It was also argued that, from the moment of the landing, the Russians must have inferred that the invaders intended to attack the Severnaya or North Side, and that, therefore, there was no hope of surprising the enemy by an

* Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 395.

attack at that point.* So far as they went, these two arguments were sound, but, taken alone, they had not sufficient cogency to warrant the abandonment of a well-matured plan of campaign.

Yet again, it was argued that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone, though involving the means of cannonading the Russian ships and their dockyards, would not of necessity carry with it the entire possession of Sebastopol.† To this objection the answer is twofold: for, first, it is clear that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone would have enabled the Allies to attain at once the main object of the invasion; but, secondly, as we have already seen, the operations against the Severnaya might have been easily accompanied or followed by a measure which (unless General de Todleben errs) must have instantly given the Allies the whole of the prize they were seeking.‡

By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the North Side was the want of a safe harbour on that part of the neighbouring coast which was north of the Sebastopol bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be so driven from the coast by stress of weather as to put the Allies in peril for their supplies. Of course this fear was one which applied to the idea of attempting any landing at all on the western shores of the Crimea; and, since it had

* Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 395.

† Ibid.

‡ See *ante*, p. 369 *et seq.*

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 -- V. -- Allies had both landed and established themselves
 in the country, it was hardly perhaps opportune
 to revive the objection at a time when the in-
 vaders had made good their footing in the penin-
 sula by a decisive victory. The Allies did well
 to regard the want of a harbour as a grave evil ;
 but apparently their most prudent mode of allow-
 ing this care to weigh upon their counsels would
 have been by treating it as a motive for shorten-
 ing to the utmost the anxious interval, and deter-
 mining—ay, even, if need be, at a painful cost of
 life—to carry the works of the Severnaya with a
 peremptory despatch, whilst yet by title of victory
 they seemed to have might on their side. So
 inextricably were the Allies engaged in the ex-
 pedition, and so deeply were they committed in
 the face of Europe to the duty of achieving their
 end, that, whatever may have been their wisdom
 originally in resolving to touch the Crimea, the
 driest prudence now seemed to command that they
 should follow up the victory with swiftness, and
 always in that venturesome temper which was
 the only one fitted to their enterprise. For refuge
 as well as for glory they needed the port of
 Sebastopol.

Sir John
 Burgoyne
 the great
 opponent.

The plan of going straight on to attack the
 Star Fort found its greatest and most gifted
 opponent in Sir John Burgoyne ; and if it be
 asked how he brought himself to think the
 obstruction so formidable, the explanation is
 this:—Instead of regarding the Fort as a work

which (along with its adjuncts) would be only defended by its mere garrison, he looked upon it as a part only of an extended line of defence. He looked upon it as marking the dominant feature of an entrenched position which, in his judgment, might be advantageously defended by an army; and then, having formed that opinion, he went on to infer that a like opinion would govern the decisions of the enemy, and that by a whole army accordingly the position would be defended.* There, he erred. There was no intention on the part of the Russians to attempt to defend the position by means of an army; and it must be added that the mistake of believing the contrary was one that might have been cleared away by a careful reconnaissance.

But if the relinquishment of the North Side was not to be justified upon military grounds, there was still this to say for the measure:—it was a way out of trouble. We have seen that when, the day after the battle, Lord Raglan proposed to St Arnaud ‘at once to advance to the ‘Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the ‘forts,’ the Marshal answered that ‘his troops ‘were tired, and that it could not be done.’† We also learnt that on the following day, the 22d, Lord Raglan was ‘again urging on the French ‘General to advance across the Belbec,’ and, for

Recapitulated statement of the French objection to attack the ‘North Side.’

* In Sir John Burgoyne’s ‘Military Opinions,’ p. 238, the expressed ground of objection to an attack of the Star Fort was, that the position would be defended by an ‘*army*.’ It was Burgoyne himself who put the word in italics.

† Statement of Sir E. Lyons, *ante*, chap. iii.

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once in his life, was cast into a state of 'low spirits,' by hearing the Marshal reply, 'that he ' had ascertained that the Russians had thrown ' up strong earthworks on the banks of the river ; ' and though he (the Marshal) did not doubt that ' the Allies could force them, as they had the ' works on the Alma, they could not afford the ' loss that would be entailed ; '* and, finally, we were enabled to perceive the way in which this refusal of the French to go on with the campaign as originally planned, was the cause which induced the Allies to halt—to halt with the whole of their forces—for two clear days on the Alma.†

Reconnais-
sance by Sir
Edmund
Lyons.

Failure of
his endea-
vour to
persuade
St Arnaud.

It must now be added, that the further efforts of Sir Edmund Lyons to induce the Marshal to agree to an attack on the position of the Star Fort were attended with no success. Upon hearing from Lord Raglan that the Marshal had alleged the new earthworks overlooking the Belbec as an obstacle not to be faced, Sir Edmund put himself on board a small steamer, and ran in so close as to be able to reconnoitre effectually. He then ascertained that the newly-appearing works were of the kind represented by the Marshal, but that they had not yet been armed. Sir Edmund hastened to report the result of his survey to the French Commander, but

* Statement of Sir E. Lyons, *ante*, chap. iii.

† Instead of leaving merely a division to cover the embarkation of the wounded, an expedient which would have consisted perfectly with the plan of advancing at once to the attack of the Star Fort. See *ante*, chap. iii.

could not persuade him to resume the idea of marching against the Star Fort. CHAP.
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At first—and this was the cause of Lord Raglan's dejection—the whole enterprise seemed to be threatened with ruin by the refusal of Marshal St Arnaud to go on in the execution of the plan of campaign with which the Allies had set sail. But the English General was by nature so constituted that no man could be better qualified than he was to lessen to the very utmost the acknowledged evil of a divided command; for, besides that his devotion to the public service was so entire as to exclude all thought of self, he was free from the vanity (if vanity it be) which makes a man desire that a great event should be traceable to his own conception: and he was not accustomed to ponder over warlike devices in such a way as to be likely to conceive a violent predilection for one plan, or a violent dislike of another. He plainly believed that, for an army endued with the strength which a victory always gives, an inferior or even rash plan, carried through with good will by each of the commanders, would serve the cause better than any other plan (however good in itself) which failed to win the cordial approval of both the chiefs. He was, therefore, well qualified to deal with the emergency in which the Allies would find themselves placed if the French should persist in their unwillingness to assail the Star Fort.

Lord Raglan's peculiar aptitude for lessening the evils of a divided command

The evil was occasioned by the fact that, at a moment when (from causes which will be

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Dilemma
in which
the Allies
were placed.

afterwards spoken of*) the French army was temporarily disqualified for enterprise, that same army chanced to be the one which (by reason of its position on the right of the Allied forces, and therefore opposite to the Star Fort and its out-works) was called upon to perform an arduous duty. This accident, if so one may call it, being the true root of the evil which threatened the fate of the invasion, it followed that a way of escape from it might be found, if the hitherto adopted plan of campaign could be replaced by one which, for the moment, would present the labouring oar to the English instead of the French. Blending a technical phrase with words of common parlance, a man might say that the condition of the Allied army was this:—If, as first intended, it were called upon to operate ‘by its right,’ it would still be under the palsy which affected the French Headquarters. If, on the other hand, the Allied army were to operate against the enemy ‘by its left,’ it would instantly shake off all numbness deriving from Marshal St Arnaud, and would practically come under the leadership of the English General.

The information that had been furnished respecting the land defences of Sebastopol:

It was possible to imagine a plan of campaign which would work this change. Though custom and foreseeing prudence have made it the practice of the great European Powers to obtain in peacetime full accounts and plans of the fortresses belonging to rival States, this (in common with many other of the warlike duties attaching upon

* At the close of this chapter.

her in peace-time) England had neglected; and it happened that in the case of Sebastopol, there had been a like neglect on the part of the French War Office. Neither France nor England were authoritatively informed of the state of the land defences of Sebastopol.

In the year 1835, Colonel Macintosh had given to the world an account of the then state of the land defences of the place; and he had brought to bear upon this task not only a sufficing care and labour, but also so much sagacity, and so sound a knowledge of the military art, that to this hour it is curious to see how the destined strife for the Malakoff had been foreshadowed in a book which at the opening of the war was almost twenty years old.* When the war began to impend, General Macintosh imparted further expositions of the subject to the authorities at the Horse Guards; and it is now certain that the body of information and suggestive comment which he supplied would have been a wholesome study for the Allies; for, although it would have

by Colonel
Macintosh:

* On the 16th of December 1834, General (then Colonel) Macintosh, in a memorandum addressed to our ambassador at Constantinople, wrote: 'It appears that the works intended to enclose the town on this side (it is now quite open) are meant to consist in a strong enceinte of revetted bastions. They are now laid out, and quarries opened to carry them on. . . . The new works are to extend as nearly as possible in the direction *e, e, e*, and will completely cover the town and harbour. At present the inner harbour is commanded from the height *d*.' By looking at the accompanying copy of the sketch which Colonel Macintosh sent with his memorandum of 1834, it will be seen that the ground there designated as 'the height *d*' is the site of the Malakoff.

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————

been necessary for them to make wide allowance for the changes which the hand of man might have wrought in a period of twenty years, the great features of the ground must needs be the same, and the plan of the defences which (according to the showing of General Macintosh) the Russian engineers had traced out on paper was one so cogently dictated by the nature of the ground, that it might well be regarded as a useful indication of what the defences would be even after a lapse of years. It was natural, however, that, being impatient of their strange want of knowledge concerning the actual state of the land defences, and yearning after fresher information, the Allies should have given too little care to the result of old surveys and inquiries.

Our army is not constituted upon a plan which entices its officers to the pursuit of warlike studies or warlike inquiries having only a contingent usefulness; and the power which England may be able to exert in appealing to arms depends a good deal upon the readiness with which she may be able to break down mere professional barriers, and bring to bear upon the great business of war the abounding zeal, energy, and skill of her whole people.

by Mr
Oliphant

It was from the book of a young Scottish traveller that the Allies derived what knowledge they had of the state of the land defences at Sebastopol.

Mr Oliphant had been gifted with an almost

instinctive power, which showed him from afar where fields of action were opening; and he was so prone to decide and dart forward whilst others were only pondering that, however many there might have been with wishes and plans like his, yet commonly of late years he has been the first to alight upon the scene of coming events. So it happened that, before the home statesmen of the day had begun to take the alarm, this restless, sagacious traveller had half divined the war, and already was pacing those ridges and knolls and ravines upon which, a little while later, his country was to rivet her thoughts. For some time, it had been the policy of the Czar to withdraw Sebastopol from the eyes of Europe; and, in general, no traveller was suffered to enter the place. But an obstacle of this kind was sure to be overcome by the spirit of enterprise; and Mr Oliphant not only found means to enter Sebastopol, but succeeded in informing himself of the then state of the land defences on the south side of the harbour. Returning to England, he quickly made known the result of his observations, and caused to be published these words:—

‘ But of one fact there is no doubt, that how-
‘ ever well fortified may be the approaches to
‘ Sebastopol by sea, there is nothing whatever to
‘ prevent any number of troops landing a few
‘ miles south of the town in one of the six con-
‘ venient bays with which the coast as far as Cape
‘ Kherson is indented, and, marching down the
‘ main street (provided they were strong enough

CHAP. 'to defeat any military force that might be op-
V. posed to them in the open field), sack the town,
— 'and burn the fleet.' *

This report not only did much to evoke the desire for an enterprise against Sebastopol, but also caused men to see that, at all events up to the period when the question of the Holy Shrines began to assume a grave aspect, little had been done to the land defences; and that, whatever obstacles might have to be encountered by an army attacking the place from the south, those obstacles, at the time of Mr Oliphant's visit, were not of a kind to make a formal siege needful. Moreover, as there was no proof that works on a great scale had been going on during the last eighteen months, there seemed to be fair ground for hoping that, so far as concerned the existence of regular fortifications in masonry, the land approaches to Sebastopol might be nearly in the state they were in when Mr Oliphant saw them.

Before he left England, Lord Raglan did not fail to give himself the advantage of a personal interview with Mr Oliphant, and afterwards with Oliphant's fellow-traveller, Mr Oswald Smith. The result was, that the impression created by

* Oliphant's 'Russian Shores of the Black Sea,' p. 260. Mr Oliphant's report was accurate. With the exception of throwing up a work near the water's edge, which was more properly an adjunct to one of the sea-forts than a part of the land defences, nothing had been done at the time of his visit towards fortifying the main town of Sebastopol on its south side. Mr Oliphant's book was published on the 15th of November 1853

the passage in Mr Oliphant's book was strengthened. Thenceforth the probability of finding Sebastopol weakly fortified on the land side never ceased to be kept in remembrance; and it was only the supposed want of a convenient landing-ground on the southern coast of the Crimea which afterwards caused the Allies to discard for a time the plan of attacking the place from that side.

At the time of the earliest deliberations on the subject, Lord Raglan had been disposed to think that Sebastopol ought to be attacked on the south side; and although he had ceased to dwell on the idea from the time when the west coast was chosen for the place of landing, it recurred to him, as we saw, on the morrow of the battle, when he found himself encountered at the French Headquarters by a refusal to attack the Star Fort. He then conceived that if the French should persist to the last in their refusal, he at least might avert that utter cessation and collapse of the whole enterprise which their determination threatened to produce by persuading them (as a substitute for the old plan which they were thus abandoning) to join with him in marching across the country to the south coast, and there establishing a new base of operations, from which to attack Sebastopol on its south side.

Lord
Raglan's
original
inclination

its revival.

Conception
of the flank
march.

The hazardous character of such an undertaking as this has been masked, as we shall hereafter see, by a strange coincidence, and by the singularly happy immunity which that coinci-

Objections
to which
the plan
was open

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dence brought with it ; but the plan now proposed was nothing less than that, in the presence of a Russian army understood to be concentrated in Sebastopol, the Allies should break into a slender column, with a depth of many miles, and in that state defile for two whole days or more (through a forest unknown save by maps) round the eastern side of Sebastopol. It would seem at first sight that an army undertaking such a task would lay itself open to the danger of being cut into two or more pieces at the pleasure of the Russian Commander.

Some reckoned, indeed, that the defeat which the enemy had suffered might be expected to render him so tolerant that he would suffer the flank march to go on under his eyes without daring to undertake the seemingly easy task of bringing it to ruin ; but to hope this was to found a great deal upon the moral effect of a victory ; for the condition of troops and waggon-trains defiling through forest and mountain roads is exactly such as to give to a defeated army on their flank an occasion to recover its boldness and self-respect by effecting successful though petty attacks upon the more helpless portions of the long, trailing column. Besides, it is obvious that if the enemy's prostration was so complete as to make him capable of suffering the Allies to defile by their left and march round him, it was still more likely that, in the event of a prompt attack upon the Star Fort, that same prostration of spirit would bring about the fall of the Work. Indeed,

one strong reason for discarding the plan was, that if the Allied army should once turn aside to make a circuitous march, instead of going on straight with its purpose against the Star Fort, it would lose a great deal of that priceless momentum which the victory of the Alma had given it.

Again, the configuration of the ground in the neighbourhood of the Mackenzie Heights was of such a kind that if, as was proposed, the Allies should march round to Balaclava and the Chersonese with the whole of their forces, they would so forfeit their freedom of action that (except by undertaking a second invasion) it would become impracticable for them, however strong they might be, to press upon the enemy by offensive operations in the field.* Shut back in a narrow district, they would be liable to undergo the attacks of the Russian Commander whenever he might find it convenient to assume the offensive, and yet would be debarred from exercising a corresponding power themselves. The invaders had no acquaintance with the country into which they were going, except what they got from their map; † and although, so far as it went, this guide was not an unfaithful one, the language of the engraver, who represented with lines and shading

* This, as we shall hereafter see, was effectually proved in the spring of 1855, when, in the hope of finding an escape from the almost intolerable predicament in which the Allies had placed themselves, the French Government was about to undertake a fresh invasion of the Crimea.

† A reprint, under the auspices of Major Jervis, of the map prepared by the Russian Government.

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the southward declivities of the Mackenzie range, did not have the effect of warning the Allies that there was there an impregnable position, and that, if they should leave it to the enemy, they would concede to him irrevocably an advantage of the greatest worth, by giving up their power to attack him in the open field, and compelling themselves to assail him, if ever they should assail him at all, in his lines of defence at Sebastopol.

And last, it must be observed that for the Allies to avoid the attack of the Star Fort, which stood within gunshot before them, and to move away to the south coast, was to fly from a task measured out, understood, well defined, and go off to confront things unknown. The weakness of the Fort itself as an aid to defence had been perceived by the Allies;* and although they did not know that it had been abandoned by the Russian army to the care of the seamen, they were aware that it would be defended, if defended at all, by a force suffering under the depression of a lost battle, and having to attempt a stand with an arm of the sea in its immediate rear. Yet to the task of seizing this fort, and so at once gaining the north side of Sebastopol, and the means of destroying the enemy's fleet and dockyards, they were going to prefer the unexplored forest and the mountain roads, with the necessity of having to debouch into a plain where the presence of a Russian army might be expected, and of afterwards being forced to

* See Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 395.

conquer for themselves new means of communication with the sea. On that, of course, their very existence was to depend; and then, again, in the distance there would still lie before them the prospect of having to force the immensely strong position of the Sapounè ridge; for until that ridge should be carried, they could not even begin to attack the southern defences of Sebastopol—defences of which, at this time, they knew very little. They had learnt, indeed, that on its land side, some two years before, the place was open; but in knowledge of what might since have been done for its defence their minds were almost blank.

The dangers and evils thus attaching to the plan of the 'flank march' were of the gravest kind; but the truth is, that the unwillingness of the French Commander to persist in the plan of attacking the north side of the place had brought the affairs of the Allies to such a state that, supposing his reluctance to continue, very little freedom of choice could or would remain to Lord Raglan. He could not, of course, insult the French army by marching across its front to attack a work which was straight opposite to their lines, and away from those of the English. And, although Lord Raglan judged it to be his duty to uphold, to the last, the expediency of going on with the old plan of campaign, and attacking the North Fort, he also felt that there was a limit to the urgency which could be appropriately exerted in that direction; for it was evident that

The little
freedom of
choice left
to Lord
Raglan.

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to be beyond measure persistent in pressing and pressing the French Marshal to undertake an attack against his declared will and judgment was not only a course which held out small promise of good, but one which, if too far pursued, could hardly be otherwise than unbecoming, offensive, and impolitic. The thought of abandoning the expedition was not to be borne; and, although it may be judged that next to an attack on the Star Fort, the most politic mode of conquering the enemy's stronghold was by means of field operations carried on upon his lines of communication, yet the impatience of the English at home was so great, was so closely pointed to one object, and was, moreover, so hotly shared by their Government, that a resort to any plan of campaign, however wisely conceived, which avoided a direct attack upon Sebastopol, would have been almost looked upon as a flinching from duty.

Well, but if, for this reason, field operations could not well be proposed as a substitute for a direct attack upon Sebastopol, then what choice was left? The truth is, that the unwillingness of the French to attack the north side of Sebastopol had brought the Allies into straits so hard that, with all its rashness, the plan of defiling round the east of Sebastopol might be regarded as the least of the evils from which a choice could be made. Rightly looked at, 'the flank march'—for so the movement is called—was a perilous, a desperate expedient, by which

Reasons
tending to
justify the
resort to
the flank
march.

—that he might avert a collapse of the whole undertaking—Lord Raglan sought to find an alternative for the enterprise declined by the French. From causes which will be spoken of presently, the French army, without any fault of its own, was, for the moment, paralysed; and, the English army, on the other hand, being ready for action, and under a General resolved to force on the enterprise, there was great temptation to clutch at a plan which would relieve the French army from all immediate demand on its energies, and cast the load on the English. The plan of the flank march fulfilled these conditions; for it spared the French from the task which had seemed to await them on their right front, and invested the English General with the leadership and the virtual control of the proposed operation.

But, although it was as an escape from a dilemma that the flank march is best to be justified, I do not represent that Lord Raglan himself thought ill of the measure. Without ever wavering in his opinion that the victory on the Alma should be followed up by pursuing the old plan and attacking the Severnaya or North Fort, he yet thought that he saw such good features in the alternative plan as to be able to fall back upon it with a cheerful contentment. Apparently he was not much impressed with the hazardous character of the flank march; and, on the other hand, he certainly thought that, if once the Allies should be established on the south coast, they

Light in which Lord Raglan regarded the alternative of the flank march.

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would there be on the best ground for attacking Sebastopol.*

Sir John
Burgoyne.

For the purpose of informing himself upon any question of military engineering, Lord Raglan had at his side an accomplished and gifted adviser. Sir John Burgoyne was a general of engineers now serving on the Staff of the army which Lord Raglan commanded. His experience of war went back to the great days. It began with the first year of this century at Malta. In 1806 he was serving in Sicily. He was commanding engineer with General Fraser's expedition to Egypt, and was at the assault on the lines of Alexandria, and the siege of Rosetta. He was with Sir John Moore at Messina and in Sweden in 1808, and was with him the same year in the Peninsula. He was at Corunna. He blew up the bridge of Benevente in the presence of the enemy. He was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1809, and attached to the 3d (Picton's) Division. He was at the passage of the Douro. He served in the lines of Torres Vedras. He blew up Fort Conception in presence of the enemy. He was at Busaco, at the first siege of Badajoz, at Elboden, at Aldea del Ponte, and at the siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, where he

* 'I have always been disposed to consider that Sebastopol 'should be attacked on the south side, and Sir John Burgoyne 'leant strongly to the same opinion.'—Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 28th September 1854. This must not be understood as implying—for that would be contrary to the fact—that Lord Raglan, *when once landed on the western coast of the Crimea*, did not anxiously desire and prefer that there should be an attack on the north side.

was present at the assault. He was at the second siege and capture of Badajoz, and was present at the assault and escalade of the castle. He was commanding engineer at the siege and capture of the forts of Salamanca, and at the battle. He was commanding engineer at the capture of Madrid, and the Retiro, and also at the siege of Burgos, where he was wounded. At Vittoria he had a horse shot under him. He was wounded at the assault of St Sebastian. He conducted the siege of the castle of St Sebastian as commanding engineer. He was at the passage of the Bidassoa, the Nivelle, at the Nive, at the passage of the Adour, the blockade of Bayonne, and the repulse of the sortie. He was at New Orleans, and was with the force despatched to Portugal in 1827.* He had, therefore, a vast experience, connecting his name with a glorious period of England's history; and the value of this advantage was not, as so often happens, in the least counteracted by failure of energy. On the contrary, Sir John Burgoyne was gifted with a vigour of mind which made him in that respect the equal of those who were young. Furrowed by years, and the sheer labour of great wars, he still showed what mettle there was in the generation of men with which England began the century; for neither Egypt, nor the retreat to Corunna, nor the cares of Torres Vedras, nor the business of all the great sieges—Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, St Sebastian—nor yet the discomfiture of New Orleans, had been

* Hart's Army List.

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able to imprint upon his features the marks of painful anxiety. To high intellectual power he added the firmness of a reasoner who holds that there can be no sect in mathematics, and that opinions carefully formed must not be dominated by mere results. As might be expected, he was master of the science of the military engineer; but his mind, ranging freely beyond his own branch of the service, had become stored with the many kinds of knowledge which concern the whole business of war. He wrote with clearness, with grace, and so persuasively that, having a pen in his hand, he was liable perhaps to be drawn into error by the cogency of his own arguments. He was daring and resolute; and, since his mind had been formed at a time when England was not only in a robust and warlike condition, but also in some degree careless of the lives of common soldiers and workmen, it is probable that he could have easily brought himself to make a great sacrifice of life for a great purpose; and the power to do this, where a strong place has to be taken, is one of no little worth. Moreover, it is believed that Sir John Burgoyne was not without that wholesome ambition which, if the command of an army had chanced to fall to his lot, might have impelled him to great achievements.* It is possible that because he was the commanding engineer with Fraser's expedition to Egypt, and

* He was at one time so nearly the senior general officer serving under Lord Raglan, that, under possible circumstances, he might have succeeded to the command. The Duke of Newcastle imagined that because Burgoyne was an engineer officer,

at the siege of Burgos, and because he was at New Orleans, and because he was advising in the business of trying to take Sebastopol at a time when the place did not fall, therefore some, in estimating his quality as a general, might condemn him, after the manner of the Athenians, for not being fortunate; and supposing it to be insisted upon (as it would be by the more accurate Moderns) that a mere charge of lucklessness is no honest answer to a question concerning the capacity of a general, the objector, when thus driven home, might venture perhaps a surmise that Sir John Burgoyne's sureness of judgment was liable to be endangered by his too indiscriminate reliance upon the processes of close reasoning; for a method like that is most apt to lead man into fallacies, whenever he applies it to questions of such a kind that they need to be solved by the instinctive, the divining power, or even by coarse sagacity.

Still, the tenor of counsels, appearing at first sight to result from a too studious method of solving warlike problems, might be traceable, after all, to the nature of Sir John Burgoyne's position at the English Headquarters, rather than to the original bent of his mind; for he who, without holding a command, was called upon to give advice likely to be accepted at the French Headquarters, as well as by his own chief, was obliged to make proposals of such a kind that he could

it would have been matter of course for him to decline the command of the army, but upon that point Lord Raglan undeceived the Secretary of State in very decisive terms.

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support them in argument; and that very necessity would be enough to prevent him from striking upon one of those daring yet happy conceptions which can be originated and pushed to great issues by a sole commander, although they are wanting in those smooth, placid features which would best recommend them to a council of war.

Of course, it was in the nature of things that the judgment of a man deeply versed in the business of sieges should be more or less warped by his science; and that, advising on the conduct of an enterprise much dependent on swiftness of action and on prompt use of the blessing of victory, the skilled engineer might be too ready to enter upon a war of entrenchments; but Sir John Burgoyne had so much breadth of view, and so general a knowledge of the warlike art, that he was as little likely, perhaps, to err in this direction as any other officer of the same calling in the French or the English camp.

His opinion.

Now, Sir John Burgoyne not only held that the project of an attack upon the south side of Sebastopol had many and great advantages over that of assailing the Star Fort, but even brought himself to believe that, for the sake of being able to exchange the one plan for the other, it would be wise to front all the hazard of marching the Allied armies to the east of the Sebastopol roadstead, and thence round to the south of the place. His opinion was known to his chief; and when Lord Raglan perceived that the reluctance of the French to attack the Star Fort was strong, and

firmly rooted, he hastened to obtain for the alternative plan which had occurred to him the sanction and persuasive support of Sir John Burgoyne. Accordingly, on the morrow of the battle on the Alma, he requested Sir John to put his opinion in writing; and, in the course of the same day, the English Commander was furnished with this memorandum:—

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He is requested to put it in writing.

Memorandum.

‘CAMP ON THE ALMA, 21st Sept. 1854.

‘I would submit that, unless some impeding circumstances occur which cannot now be foreseen, the combined armies should at once move round to the south side of Sebastopol, instead of attacking Fort Constantine,* by which the following advantages may be anticipated:—

Sir John
Burgoyne's
Memorandum

‘1. That instead of attacking a position naturally strong and of limited extent, to which a powerful support will be given by Fort Constantine,* which is a permanent fortification, though by no means formidable, if insulated, the enemy would have to defend a very extensive line, divided by valleys, and from every information, very imperfectly, if at all, entrenched, and which would probably be forced rapidly.

‘2. As the advance is from the north, our attack will rather be expected on that side, and not on the south.

‘3. Even supposing the Fort Constantine* to be taken, although it will open the shipping, dockyard, &c., to cannonading, it does not insure entire possession of the important establishments until after a second operation, which may still require to move round to the south, while

* By Fort Constantine Sir John Burgoyne means the Star Fort. Fort Constantine was one of the sea-forts, but at this period of the invasion the name was often applied by mistake to the Star Fort.

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‘ the enemy will retain to the last free and open communi-
‘ cation to the place.*

‘ 4. There is every reason to believe, from the appearance
‘ of the maps, and what may be expected to be the forma-
‘ tion of the ground, that there is a very strong position
‘ between the sea at Balaclava and along the valley of the
‘ Tchernaya, that would most efficiently cover the Allied
‘ armies during the operation, but is too extensive to be
‘ taken up by the garrison.

‘ 5. That the communication with the fleet, which is, in
‘ fact, our base of operations, would be far more secure and
‘ commodious by the small harbour of Balaclava and the
‘ bays near Chersonese, than on the open coast to the
‘ north, and with the advantage of a good road from Bala-
‘ clava to the attacks, and a very flat country to pass to
‘ them from the bays near Chersonese.

‘ 6. Under ordinary circumstances such a movement
‘ would have the effect of exposing the communication of
‘ the army to be cut off; but in this case the idea is, to
‘ abandon the communication from the north altogether,
‘ and establish a new one to the shipping in the south,
‘ which would be moved round for that purpose.

‘ J. F. BURGOYNE, *Lieut.-General.*’

Plan of the
flank march
propounded
to Marshal
St Arnaud:

Having completed this memorandum, Sir John Burgoyne was requested by Lord Raglan to go to the French Headquarters, and there propound the plan of the flank march. He obeyed. His interview with Marshal St Arnaud took place in the presence of the Marshal's chief of the Staff and of General Bizot, the officers in command of the

* Possibly some words may have been here left out or miswritten, for, as actually worded, this last suggestion seems to be not only an error, but an inversion of the real state of the case. The attack of the *North Side* was the one which would have been compatible with plans for seizing the enemy's lines of communication, whilst the flank march was on the contrary a final abdication of all power to operate in that way.

Engineers. Some other Staff officers were in the tent. When Sir John Burgoyne had explained the proposal recorded by his memorandum, and had answered the few questionings which were addressed to him, the Marshal at once, and without at all seeking counsel from the officers about him, declared, as Sir John understood, that he approved the plan, and was willing to join with Lord Raglan in the determination to carry it into effect ; * but it must not be understood that these words carried with them an unconditional decision. The Marshal apparently understood the proposal exactly in the same sense as that in which Lord Raglan had meant it to be submitted to him ; and what his answer really imported was, that if he should persist in his objection to attack the North Fort, then, and in that event, he would consent to resort to the flank march. At all events, it is certain that the question of adopting the plan of the flank march remained open until a later period. †

and by him
entertained

Yet, even as early as the time when the Allies still lay on the Alma, the plan had won so much favour, that already, as we saw, it acted upon the arrangements of the commanders, preventing them from leaving a detachment to cover the embarka-

* Letter from Sir John Burgoyne.

† See Marshal St Arnaud's journal, under date of the 23d and 24th September. Lord Raglan fixes the evening of the 24th, on the Belbec, as the time when the measure was adopted. —Despatch to Secretary of War, Sept. 28. See also, *post*, an extract from a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written on the night of the 24th.

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tion of the wounded, and, in that way, prolonging the halt.

And now, in the evening of the 24th of September, whilst the troops were establishing their quarters among the gardens and the villas on the Belbec, the Allies took their final resolve.

Lord Raglan's conference with Marshal St Arnaud on the evening of the 24th.

Lord Raglan, with some of his Staff, went to the camp of the French Headquarters. The interview was not a long one. Lord Raglan, in few words, and for the last time, submitted that the Allies should go on with their original plan of campaign, and assault the works on the north of Sebastopol. Marshal St Arnaud once more declined to agree to this. He said that the defences of the Star Fort had revetments in masonry, and that he would not undertake to attack such a work without laying formal siege to it.* This answer was treated as negating all further idea of attacking Sebastopol from the north.† As regards the course which, in these circumstances, was to be resorted to, Lord Raglan, as we saw, had himself proposed the alternative plan; and Marshal St Arnaud, it seems, though not with-

* Information from an officer present. In a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written just after this conference, and dated, 'On the Belbec, 24th Sept., night,' Lord Raglan says: 'We crossed to the Belbec this afternoon, and moved to the heights above it. I was anxious to have gone farther, but the French thought otherwise.'

† The mouth of the Belbec being commanded by the new battery thrown up near the Star Fort, it was conceived that no base of operations could be constituted in that region without first carrying the Star Fort, and that, consequently, any attacks on the Fort must be of a summary kind.

out some hesitation, had already made up his mind to accept it.* On this subject, therefore, neither one nor the other of the two commanders had need to use words of persuasion. They agreed to attempt the flank march.†

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Determina-
tion to
attempt
the flank
march.

* On the 24th the Marshal wrote in his private journal : ' We start at eleven o'clock. We shall turn the positions and ' the batteries by the left.' Lord Raglan's view seems to have been that the Marshal's assent to the flank march did not so much result from positive approval of the measure as from reluctance to go on with the original plan of attacking the Star Fort after hearing of the new works which commanded the mouth of the Belbec. In his private letter of the 28th of September to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan, after speaking of Sir John Burgoyne's memorandum respecting the flank march, says : ' The Marshal did not very readily adopt the idea ' in the first instance ; but when he found that the mouth of the ' Belbec was commanded, and that strong works were erecting ' in front of Fort Constantine ' [meaning the Star Fort] ' which ' would impede the use of the river, he assented to the proposition ' without hesitation.' I imagine that the hesitation which Lord Raglan here ascribes to St Arnaud must have shown itself *after* Burgoyne's interview with the Marshal, and *before* the discovery of the new field-work overlooking the mouth of the Belbec.

† Statement by an officer present. Writing that same night of the deliberations between the French and the English Headquarters, Lord Raglan says : ' We shall move again to-morrow ' morning, and we have nearly determined to attempt the ' attack of Sebastopol from the south side, abandoning our com- ' munication with the Katcha.' — Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, dated, ' On the Belbec, 24th Sept. 1854, night.' In qualifying his language by the word ' nearly,' Lord Raglan, as I understand him, was adapting his statement to the fact that the execution of the plan was to be subject to the result of the reconnoissance he was going to undertake on the morrow. He did not, in any other sense, mean that the resolve was otherwise than final ; and as the intended reconnoissance was to be in the course of the flank march, and, so to speak, a part of it, I can make, without qualification, the statement in the text to which this note is appended.

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State of
Marshal
St Arnaud.

During the conversation, Marshal St Arnaud sat rigidly up in an armed chair, and to some who observed it his bearing conveyed an impression that he wished to give to the interview an appearance of formality ; but Lord Raglan perceived the truth. He had no sooner left the French camp than he said to one of his Staff, ‘ Did you observe St Arnaud ?—he is dying.’

This was the last time that the two chiefs conferred upon the business of the campaign. When Lord Raglan visited the French Headquarters on the following morning, he found that the Marshal was no longer in a condition to be able to take part in affairs.

The decision
to which
the chiefs
came.

The decision the chiefs had come to was this :—that unless the reconnaissance which Lord Raglan was to make on the morrow should disclose good reasons for changing the plan, the English army first (to be followed in due time by the French) should endeavour to push round the head of the Sebastopol roadstead by gaining the Mackenzie Heights, with intention to descend thence into the valley of the Tchernaya, and recover communication with the sea by seizing the harbour of Balaclava.

Probable
cause of the
Marshal's
unwilling-
ness to
attack the
Star Fort :

At the time, it was hard to account for the Marshal's unwillingness to go on with the task of assailing the Star Fort, as well as for his ready acceptance of an alternative plan which, for the moment, would throw the leadership of the Allied army into the hands of his English colleague ; and Lord Raglan acknowledged to Sir Edmund

Lyons that he could not understand the Marshal's recusancy. But time has since thrown some light on what was then obscure; and to me it seems that the theory which best explains the counsels of the French Headquarters at this time is the obvious, the simple, the shallow one—the one which traces them to the bodily condition of Marshal St Arnaud.* Without any accurate knowledge of the successive maladies from which the Marshal was suffering, or of their singular intermissions, it is easy to see that, in the interval between the battle of the Alma and his final determination to consent to the flank march, he was grievously ill in health, and was, from time to time, prostrated by his sufferings. But just as, in his African campaigns, he had more than once bravely resolved to drag his suffering body out of hospital that he might be acting with his regiment in some approaching engagement, so now, exerting himself to hold on in spite of his bodily state, he persisted in keeping his command. In the condition in which he was it was physically impossible for him to perform the laborious duties of a general who has to provide for the attack of such a place as the Star Fort. If it be said that he might have resigned his command, the answer is, that that was exactly the end he was striving

his bodily
state.

* This was the solution which Sir Edmund Lyons afterwards adopted; but he also intimated that, at the time of the Marshal's refusal to go on against the North Forts, the state of his bodily health was not so far known to him (Sir Edmund) or to Lord Raglan as to enable them to see that that was the cause of the evil.

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to avoid. With his old spirit of resistance to bodily weakness, he clung to his command, and apparently with the more tenacity from the time when he suspected that measures had been secretly taken to provide for the event of his becoming unable to remain at the head of the army. So when, as a substitute for the attack of the Star Fort, there came the proposal to resort to the flank march, he could see that the measure was one which averted the immediate necessity of his resigning the command by shifting the stress of duty in the Allied army from its right to its left, and thereby enabling him to do now again what he had so happily done once before when he lay struck down by illness*—that is, to leave the virtual leadership of the whole expedition for the time in the hands of the English Commander.

This way of explaining what passed is the more to be welcomed since it tends to disperse the seeming cloud that was thrown upon the French army by the counsels of its chief, and recognises that singular power of fighting against bodily sickness which was one of the most interesting features in the character of Marshal St Arnaud.†

If this final determination to turn aside from

* During the voyage. See 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. ii. chap. xx. of Cabinet Edition.

† Since I wrote the above, I have had an opportunity of seeing that General de Todleben ascribes the avoidance of the Star Fort to the same cause—the maladies of the French Marshal.

the Star Fort was in one sense a mere continuance of St Arnaud's former refusal to march on and attack the work, still it took place under different conditions, and in circumstances which gave it the character of a distinct resolve. Thus regarded, it has to be ranged as the second of the 'lost occasions' which followed the battle of the Alma.

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The avoidance of the Star Fort was the second of the 'lost occasions.'

APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

THE STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY ENGAGED ON THE ALMA.

WHEN I published my narrative of the battle of the Alma, the first volume of the 'Defense de Sebastopol' had not yet made its appearance ; but now that I am revising my statements, I might certainly accept, if I chose, the tempting guidance afforded me by a work which is not only sanctioned officially by the Russian Government, but carries with it besides the immense recommendation of having been compiled under the auspices of General de Todleben. How readily I could follow such an authority upon questions of numerical strength I showed when I wrote my account of the battle of Inkerman ; and it might seem at first sight that, if only for the sake of consistency, I ought to be content with the like guidance in revising my account of the Alma ; but there are several considerations which interpose to prevent me from doing so.

General de Todleben was present at the battle of Inkerman, taking in it a part of great moment ; and it was natural that under such circumstances a narrative of the action

written under his auspices should be upon an extended scale ; that it should be enriched by the statements of numberless officers who had fought side by side with the hero commanded to frame the record ; and, finally, that it should be prepared with much expenditure of labour. Accordingly, that account was supported by figures purporting to give the exact strength of each Russian regiment engaged ; and upon the whole, I felt that reposing, as I did, the most implicit confidence in the personal honour of General de Todleben, I might venture to accept the figures he appeared to have sanctioned, or, at all events, might do so as a rule, making only those little corrections which the occurrence of some trivial errors appeared to render necessary. I acted accordingly, and have seen no reason to regret my decision.

But the narrative of the battle of the Alma contained in the ' *Defense de Sebastopol* ' is far from fulfilling the conditions which were observed in the account of ' *Inkerman* . ' General de Todleben was not present at the battle of the Alma, and appears to have been unsuccessful in obtaining the information necessary for giving a good account of the action ; but (for the purpose at present on hand) the main defect of the record is that it does not (as was done in the case of *Inkerman*) give the strength of each regiment separately, but simply mentions a total in what one may call a loose cursory way, saying that the troops concentrated by Prince Mentschikoff on the Alma were ' *nearly 33,600,* ' ' *près de 33,600 ;* ' and by any one turning to the Appendix, no further account of the numerical strength is found, but only a repetition of the figures ' *33,600,* ' without the qualification of the word ' *nearly* ' (' *près de* '), and the inquirer is left to guess whether the number of artillerymen who served the 96 guns is meant or not meant to be included in the ' *total* ' 33,600.

The difficulty of accepting the loosely given ' *total* ' thus furnished is increased by another circumstance. In an

early part of the work—a part prepared evidently with much more elaboration than the account of the battle—the Official Narrative gives the numerical strength appertaining to the 42 battalions, the 16 squadrons, the 9 sotnias, and the 84 guns which were under the direct command of Prince Mentschikoff on the 13th of September 1854, and there shows that, although 12 of the guns and 2 of the sotnias of Cossacks, and the body of Sappers, acceding to Mentschikoff before the battle were not in hand on the 13th, the strength even then was 38,597.* Except that the Sappers were afterwards *added*, and that one battalion of ‘Lithuania’ and another of ‘Wilna’ were replaced by an equal number of other battalions, *i.e.*, by two battalions of sailors, the 42 battalions of infantry shown to have had a strength of 38,597 on Wednesday the 13th of September appear to have been identical with those 42½ battalions which, according to the same official authority, were gathered just seven days afterwards on the banks of the Alma;† and I think it must be acknowledged that, in the absence of any epidemic, or any engagement with an enemy, the falling off of the strength from 38,597, or rather from 39,000,‡ to 33,600 within the short period of seven days, is a circumstance requiring a detailed explanation.§ The

* ‘Defense de Sebastopol,’ p. 140. The reader will see how closely that number of 38,597 approaches to the number I give—viz., 39,251, and will observe that (with the requisite additions mentioned in the next footnote but one) the 38,597 would be brought up to a number substantially equalling the result of my computation.

† Compare the Table No. 8 in the Appendix to the ‘Defense de Sebastopol’ with the Table 13.

‡ I say 39,000, because, if the number of the Sappers, and of the 2 sotnias of Cossacks of the artillerymen serving the 12 additional guns were added to the 38,597, it would bring the numbers to more than 39,000.

§ I had once a conversation on this subject with the illustrious General de Todleben; but we had not the figures before us. What I gathered was that he had relied upon some statements satisfying him that by leaving behind weakly men, the strength actually present on the Alma had been reduced to the number shown in the ‘Defense.’

absence of any specific statement as to the strength of each battalion makes it impossible to know how, or with what amount of care, the loosely given total of 'nearly 33,600' has been reached; and I may own I am inclined to surmise that there has been a clerical error or 'slip' of some kind, and that the total of horse and foot really meant to be indicated was one reached by adding 3600 cavalry to 33,000 infantry, and thus attaining 36,600—a number which (with the addition of the artillerymen for 96 guns) would be in fair harmony with the official statement of the strength under the direct command of Prince Mentschikoff seven days before the battle.

Under these circumstances I have felt that it would not be safe for me to discard the result of computations which for a period of some ten years after the battle were regarded in Europe as trustworthy for the sake of adopting a 'sum total' founded on no stated basis, and being possibly the result of a penman's error; but on the other hand, I so deeply revere the authority of General de Todleben, that I do not venture to negative absolutely that account of the Russian strength on the Alma which he has allowed to appear under the sanction of his great name; and have accordingly taken care to submit the computations on which I rely in terms distinctly qualified.

I may say with great confidence that (in the absence of some special reason for discarding it) the computation which deducted one-fourth from the nominal strength of a thousand, and gave accordingly an average strength of 750 to each Russian battalion, has proved itself one which seems rather to understate than exaggerate the numerical strength; for we fortunately know the strength of each regiment which fought at Inkerman, and that knowledge enables us to say that almost all the regiments there engaged (saving those that had suffered on the Alma) had at even that late season a strength of considerably *more than*

3000 each,—in other words, a strength of considerably *more than* 750 for each battalion.

After all, a difference of conclusion in regard to the numerical strength of the Russians on the Alma is not a matter of so much import as might at first sight be imagined ; for on the one hand, it must be acknowledged by all that the allies, French, English, and Turks, were together in numbers exceeding those of the Russians by more than a third ; and on the other hand, it is equally plain that in each of the several combats which took place between the Russians and the English, on the day of the Alma, our people were largely outnumbered.

NOTE II.

N.B.—The letters “a.b.” mean “Artillery Brigade.”

Russian troops at the Alma, as posted at the commencement of the battle.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Sotnias.	Guns.	Men. ^a
Opposed to the French.	Brest regt. militia, . . .	2	1500
	Bialostock do., . . .	2	1500
	Taroutine regt., . . .	4	3000
	Moscow do., . . .	4	3000
	Part (say half) of 6th Rifle battalion, . . .	1	375
	Minsk, . . .	1	750
	No. 4 (light) 17th of a.b.,	10	262 ^b
	Marines, ^c . . .	2	1500
	Vladimir regt., . . .	4	3000
	Sousdal, . . .	4	3000
Opposed to the English.	Oughlitz, . . .	4	3000
	Kazan, . . .	4	3000
	Borodino, . . .	4	3000
	Sappers, ^d . . .	1	750
	Part (say half) of 6th Rifle battalion, . . .	1	375
	Leuchtenberg regt.,	8	3600
	Grand-Duke Saxe-Weimar,	8	
	37th of Don Cossacks,	5	
	60th do.,	6	210
	No. 3 (light) of 14th a.b.,	8	
In reserve.	No. 4, do. do.,	8	
	No. 1 de position of 16th a.b.,	12	394
	No. 1 (light) of do.,	12	315
	No. 2 (light) of do.,	12	315
	No. 3 position battery of the Don Cossacks,	8	263
	No. 4 (light) of do.,	8	210 ^e
	Volhynia regt., . . .	4	3000
	Minsk do., . . .	3	2250
	No. 5 (light) of 17th a.b.,	10	262
	No. 12 of 6th Horse Artillery brigade,	8	210 ^f
Total, . . .					44 16 11 96 39,251

^a The infantry strength is calculated at the rate of 750 men for each battalion, and that of the artillery at the rate of 263 men for eight heavy guns, and 210 men for the like number of light guns. The strength of the cavalry is stated at 3600, on the authority of General de Todleben's ‘Defense de Sebastopol.’

^b Total opposed to the French, 13½ battalions, 10 guns, and 10,387 men.

^c General de Todleben believed that only one battalion of marines was present, but on grounds stated in one of the footnotes, I adhere to the opinion that there were two.

^d General de Todleben believed that only half a battalion of sappers was present; but the difference being unimportant, and having stated that there was an entire battalion, on what seemed to me good authority, I allow the statement to remain unchanged.

^e Total opposed to the English, 23½ battalions, 68 guns, and 23,142 men. Shortly after the commencement of the action, four of the squadrons of regular cavalry, and the two Don Cossack batteries—viz., the No. 3 and No. 4 of the 14th Artillery brigade, were moved away to ground opposite the French.

^f Total held in reserve, 7 battalions, 18 guns, and 5722 men. Shortly after the commencement of the action, the three “Minsk” battalions, and also both the batteries previously held in reserve, were moved to ground opposite the French; and on the other hand, the four “Volhynia” battalions, which then constituted the whole of Prince Mentschikoff's reserves, were dealt with by the English alone.

From these facts, and from those stated in the last preceding footnote, it results that the French, first and last, had against them 16 battalions and a half of infantry, 4 squadrons of cavalry, and 44 guns; whilst the English, first and last, had to deal with 27 battalions and a half of infantry, 16 squadrons and 11 sotnias of cavalry, and 68 guns; but, on the other hand, they were relieved in an early period of the action from portions of the cavalry and artillery previously acting against them, being thenceforth confronted by only 12 squadrons of regular cavalry (instead of 16), and (instead of 68) by only 52 guns.

Summary.

Russian forces at the commencement of the action.

	Guns.	Men.
Opposed to the French, .	10	10,387
„ „ English, .	68	23,142
In reserve,	18	5,722
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total, .	96	39,251

* * * The changes which took place in the course of the action are duly indicated by the last foregoing footnote.

NOTE III.

NOTE RESPECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE 7TH, THE ROYAL FUSILIERS.

WRITTEN, it would seem, with the help of information deriving from Sir George Brown, the 'Quarterly Review' has this statement:—

'While this was going on upon the left of Codrington's brigade, the right, consisting of the 33d and 7th, gallantly attacked the Russian infantry which protected the battery and the Redan. The battle was not fought, however, as Mr Kinglake would have us believe. Lacy Yea and his gallant Fusiliers did just as well, but not one whit better, than Colonel Blake and his equally gallant 33d. The personal exploits of Lacy Yea, Mr Kinglake's particular *protégé*, are about as authentic as those of Homer's heroes, and so is the long fight maintained by him and his men against five or six times their number of Russian troops. The two regiments went forward together, Codrington leading them on.* They drove back

* This was a mistake of Sir George's. Codrington was not with the 7th Fusiliers. He, as we saw, led the 23d and the other troops with them straight into the redoubt.

‘the Russians and planted themselves on the brow of the height, from which the enemy retired ; and they remained there, partially engaged, till the Russians rallied and advanced to recover the Redan. Symptoms of unsteadiness then began to show themselves, and no wonder. A mass of Russian troops came towards them in front. They saw their comrades driven out of the Redan upon their left ; they distrusted their own ability to keep the advanced position which they had won, and *they wavered*. Sir George Brown observed this from the point where he was, trying to rally the 19th and 23d in their retreat : *he rode over to the height and did his best to stop the 33d and 7th ; but they would not attend to him*. It has been said that a bugle sounding the retreat misled them. For this the evidence is, to say the least of it, very incomplete ; but whether by sound of bugle or not, *they turned round and moved back*, slowly and doggedly, just as the Grenadier Guards came upon the ground and were formed and ready for action.

‘Having opened *to let the 7th and 33d pass*, the Grenadiers re-formed line and advanced against the Russian columns in their immediate front. Sir George Brown went with the Grenadier Guards.’—‘Quarterly Review,’ No. 226, p. 566.

Thus, according to Sir George Brown and the ‘Quarterly,’ the 7th Fusiliers and the 33d Regiment advanced side by side up the slope, attacked ‘the Russian infantry which protected the battery and the Redan,’ and obtained a temporary success, but then, under pressure of an advancing column, ‘wavered,’ and fell back,—fell back in such a state that when the divisional General tried to stop them, ‘they would not attend to him,’ and continuing to fall back, retreated through the Grenadier Guards.

On the other hand, my statement is that Lacy Yea and his 7th Fusiliers did not move up at all with the rest

of the brigade to the line of the Great Redoubt, because, at the very moment of ascending the river's bank, they encountered a heavy Russian column, with which they remained long engaged; that, at last, they defeated the column; and that, when they had done so, Sir Thomas Troubridge was sent to suggest that the enemy's retreat should be pressed by an advance of the Grenadier Guards.

Now, of these perfectly dissimilar accounts, which is the true one?

Without recurring to the means by which (as a sagacious reader will infer) I gathered my first impressions of what the battalion did, I must say, in the outset, that at the battle of the Alma Sir Thomas Troubridge was a field-officer, on duty with the right wing of the regiment; that, from the beginning to the end of the engagement between the 7th Fusiliers and the column, he, Sir Thomas Troubridge, was personally present; that he witnessed the defeat of the column with his own eyes; that he himself carried the message which suggested that the Grenadier Guards should advance in pursuit; that he, Sir Thomas Troubridge, is living—is living in London and holding office at the Horse-Guards; and, finally, that he has over and over again assured me of the substantial truth of my narrative so far as it concerns what he saw of the operations of the 7th Fusiliers.

Colonel Yea did not live to hear it imputed to his 7th Fusiliers,—to hear it imputed to them by their divisional General,—that they had given way at the sight of an enemy's column, and had retreated in such a state that they 'would not attend to him;' but some of Lacy Yea's simple, truthful letters have been laid before me.

In a letter addressed to Lord Vivian, and dated the 27th of September, 1854, Lacy Yea describes the passage of the river at the Alma, and then writes:—'I had to deal with

‘ the 32d Regiment *—I should suppose of some distinction, as they wore Wellington boots, pulled high up over their trousers, and grand-looking helmets, and had kits which were beautiful, and which my men eagerly put on; there was not one of them who would not have made a front rank for me. One of the men said they had been marched from Moscow, through Odessa, here. . . . There was an unlucky check in the 23d, which caused a similar retrograde in their supporters, the Fusilier Guards, which cost an enormity of lives in both regiments. *I never stopped until we drove our birds clean off the ground,* having commenced with them after emerging from the deep banks of the river, within fifteen yards of their skirmishers.’

Shortly afterwards, Colonel Yea wrote to his sister, Mrs Cholmley Dering :—

‘ Jeffries being ordered home suddenly, I take the opportunity of sending you, to take care of, a helmet ornament belonging to one of the regiments (Russian) to which my regiment was opposed at Alma. It was the sharpshooters belonging to that regiment, which I found within fifteen yards when I rode up the bank out of the river. *We—that is, the 7th—were solely engaged against this regiment without help, and a pretty thrashing we gave them.*’

Colonel Aldworth writes the following letter to Sir Thomas Troubridge :—

‘ May 3, 1863.

‘ MY DEAR SIR THOMAS,—I write in reply to your inquiry as to what occurred on the right of the 7th Royal Fusiliers at the battle of the Alma, after crossing the river.

‘ I was, as you know, in command of the right company of the regiment, and can confidently state that the right

* Two battalions of the Kazan corps. Their accoutrements were marked ‘ 32d.’

‘ wing of the regiment *did not at any time fall back*. We
 ‘ were opposed to a heavy Russian column, *which had come*
 ‘ *down the hill and halted in our immediate front*, throwing
 ‘ out numerous skirmishers. The Guards did not pass us
 ‘ *until this column had turned, and was in full retreat*. I
 ‘ cannot say much about the left wing, having seen but
 ‘ little of it during the engagement, owing to the smoke,
 ‘ and my position on the extreme right.—Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ‘ R. W. ALDWORTH, Col.,
 ‘ Lt.-Col. Commanding 1st Battalion
 ‘ 7th Royal Fusiliers.’

Of Colonel Aldworth Sir Thomas Troubridge thus writes:—‘ The steadiness with which the men held their
 ‘ ground on the right, under a very heavy fire, was in
 ‘ great measure due to the example and coolness of this
 ‘ officer.’

Nor is it only from the officers of the 7th Fusiliers that the proof of what the battalion did at the Alma is to be found. The regiment next on the right of Colonel Lacy Yea’s Fusiliers was the 55th. The 55th was commanded at the Alma by Colonel, now General, Warren. In a memorandum by him now lying before me, there is this passage :—

‘ Sir John [Pennefather] allowed the 55th Regiment to
 ‘ follow Colonel Warren, who crossed the river and formed
 ‘ the regiment in line under the cover of a spur of the
 ‘ heights of the Alma, up which they advanced in line
 ‘ (Major-General Pennefather leading in front the battalion
 ‘ which was parallel to the Alma); then, having ascended
 ‘ this spur, they formed themselves in presence of a column
 ‘ of Russians who fired into them. This column of Rus-
 ‘ sians *was at that time engaged with a part of the light*
 ‘ *Division under Colonel Yea*, and the 55th were directed
 ‘ by their Colonel to bring forward their right shoulders

‘ and make a wheel to the left. . . . With this accession to Colonel Yea’s force, *the Russians in a short time disappeared*, leaving many on the ground.’

A writer, who seems to have enquired a good deal about what was passing at the time when Sir George Brown imagined that the 7th Fusiliers ‘ would not attend to him,’ has undertaken the somewhat intricate task of showing how Sir George Brown fell into his error. He thus writes :—

‘ But we are not only able to free the 7th Fusiliers from ‘ the effects of Sir George Brown’s wondrous narrative. ‘ We can do more : we can explain to Sir George Brown ‘ how it was that—honestly, quite honestly—he fell into ‘ his error. Mr Kinglake states that, when the 7th Fusiliers had defeated the left Kazan column, it was not ‘ thought wise for the victors to advance in pursuit themselves, but to leave that duty to the Grenadier Guards. ‘ The 7th Fusiliers, therefore, at the moment of its victory, ‘ remained halted. Mr Kinglake also represents that the ‘ defeat of this left Kazan column took place “nearly at ‘ “the very time when disaster befel the centre of the brigade of Guards.”—(Page 410, third edition.) Attention ‘ to this, reinforced by information from officers present, ‘ soon discloses the cause of Sir George Brown’s mistake. ‘ In their retreat, some of the Fusilier Guards passed ‘ through the left companies of the 7th, and these companies becoming entangled with the defeated soldiery, ‘ and having on their left front a fresh, a heavy, and a ‘ victorious column of the enemy’s infantry (the Vladimirs), ‘ were far from being in a state for any aggressive movement, and were in great need of the support which they ‘ got when the Grenadiers passed through them. It was ‘ from what he saw there—from what he saw at the extreme left of the regiment—that Sir George Brown formed ‘ the notion which he has imparted to the ‘Quarterly.’ If

‘ he had ridden along the line to Lacy Yea’s right wing, ‘ he would have seen that, notwithstanding the critical ‘ state of its left companies, the regiment (taken as a ‘ whole) was almost in the very moment of achieving its ‘ final victory over the left Kazan column. If he had ‘ stooped to the use of a glass, and had condescended to ‘ recognise for a moment the existence of one of Evans’s ‘ battalions, he would have seen the Kazan column slowly ‘ retiring, and would have been surprised to observe that, ‘ on ground where he imagined there were none but his ‘ own Light Division regiments, Colonel Warren with his ‘ 55th was not only well in advance, but had wheeled on ‘ his left, and was pouring his fire into the flank of the ‘ enemy’s column. Far from doing this, and far from in- ‘ forming himself of the truth by subsequent inquiry, Sir ‘ George Brown has remained for nearly nine years under ‘ the impression produced on his mind by a glance at the ‘ extreme left of the 7th ; and, because at this time he saw ‘ the 33d and the 7th close together, and in nearly the ‘ same line, he seems to have inferred that from first to ‘ last they had been acting together.’—Pamphlet by an ‘ Old Reviewer,’ published by Harrison, Pall Mall.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

NOTE IV.

RESPECTING THE STATEMENT THAT MEN COMING DOWN FROM THE REDOUBT BROKE THROUGH THE SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS.

A REVIEWER impressed with the ideas of Sir George Brown said I was ‘ wrong in having asserted that the Fusiliers in their tumultuous advance encountered a heap of ‘ our men running away from the redoubt. The fugitives

‘from the redoubt were clean out of the way when the Fusilier Guards pushed forward.’

Is there any truth—any semblance of truth—in this denial? We will see.

General Bentinck, who was personally present with the Fusilier Guards when they began their advance, wrote in his Report the day next after the battle: ‘The entrenchment partially won by the Light Division was lost, and at the moment *some confusion was occasioned by the regiment obliged to abandon it retiring through the Scots Fusilier Guards, and thereby putting their left wing out of line.* The battalion retired for a short time, re-formed, and returned to its post. In this partial movement to the rear, a severe loss was sustained by the Scots Fusilier Guards.’—*Holograph Report by General Bentinck.* Colonel (now General) Ridley commanded one of the wings of the Fusilier Guards, and he has orally confirmed to me the truth of the statement.

Colonel Percy commanded the left-flank company of the Grenadiers, and was therefore so placed as to be able to see what happened to the Fusilier Guards. He writes: ‘*The repulsed regiments came down violently upon them and broke their line.* If the Russians alone had come down upon them, they would have been received with the bayonets.’

Captain the Honourable Hugh Annesley, an officer of the Fusilier Guards, two days after the battle, made this entry in his journal: ‘Then the 23d *came down in one mass right on top of our line.* Their disorder was caused by the Colonel and both Majors being killed, and no one knowing who to look to for orders. However it was, *they swept half my company clean away, and a great many of the next one to it.*’—*Extracted from the original MS.*

Of the officers of the Fusilier Guards with whom I have

conversed on the subject, the one who was the least impressed with the extent of the confusion thus wrought was Lord Listowell; but it is only in regard to the *extent* of the mischief that he differs from the other eyewitnesses. I hear that Colonel Sir Charles Hamilton (who commanded the battalion, Colonel Jocelyn, Colonel Francis Seymour, and others, all agree in stating that the line of the Fusilier Guards was broken by the bodily pressure of the retreating troops of the Light Division. With the exception of Sir George Brown, I do not remember to have heard of any one present at the battle who held a contrary belief.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

NOTE V.

RESPECTING THE SEPARATION OF THE VLADIMIR CORPS INTO TWO BODIES.

I MUST acknowledge that I do not gather from the Russian accounts any distinct mention of this separation of the great Vladimir column into two columns of two battalions each. Prince Gortschakoff's narrative speaks of the column with which he moved as 'the battalions of the 'Vladimir regiment standing on the left of the epaulement' (the breast-work), and this is an expression which might either apply to two battalions which had been separated from the other two, or it might apply to all the four battalions of the corps. I have, however, found it so impracticable to reconcile this last interpretation with known facts that I have adopted the former one. Upon this point I am not in terms helped by Kvetzinski's narrative; but as he himself was clearly with *some* of the Vladimir battalions all this time, and as he had no knowledge of the fact that Gortschakoff had made a charge with battalions of the

same corps, it seems to follow as a necessary consequence that at this time the four battalions had been divided into two columns. A concurrence of circumstances leads me to infer that this was the case, and that one of the columns, as I have stated, was towards the right and the other towards the left of the redoubt. At first sight it may seem odd that Kvetzinski, the divisional general, should not know what was being done with two of his battalions posted at only a small distance from the column with which he rode; but the truth is that Gortschakoff, having for the time the supreme command in this part of the field, and being (as is evident from his own account) in a high state of excitement, rode up to the Vladimir battalions, which he found near the (Russian) left of the earthwork, and, so to speak, snatched them without saying a word to the general commanding the Division. After all, the movement which he made in advance was only a slight one; and for that reason, perhaps, it was hardly looked upon as severing the troops taking part in it from those which remained with Kvetzinski.

NOTE VI.

THE APPARITION OF THE 'UNKNOWN MOUNTED OFFICER.'

THIS occurred so frequently in the battles of the Crimea, that an explanation of the cause would be desirable, but I must own myself to be without a fixed opinion on the subject. The apparition might be that of an aide-de-camp bringing a real order from some general who proves afterwards willing to be silent on the subject; or, again, it might be some officer of so anxious a temperament, and at the same time so immensely presumptuous, that he

does not scruple to utter a direction to troops in a moment of crisis without having any authority to do so. Whether the dangerous visitor really escapes identification, or whether men who have recognised him choose to hold their tongues on the subject from motives of prudence or good nature, I cannot say ; but the subject is one which in the event of a war would deserve very careful attention ; for a wrong and unauthorised direction to troops in the critical moments of a fight must, of course, be beyond measure mischievous, and may prove to be a cause of disaster. It would apparently be easy to provide for the identification of all mounted officers not acting with their regiments ; and other obvious means might be suggested which would have the effect of averting the evil.

NOTE VII.

RESPECTING SOME OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH MAY INTERFERE WITH THE DESIRE TO FIGHT IN LINE.

THE power which a nation may have of fighting in line depends, perhaps, mainly upon the constitutional temperament of its people, but in some degree also upon the question whether the high quality of its soldiery is fairly spread through the bulk of its army. No nation can expect to be able to fight in line if the prowess of its people is so abundantly gathered into the choice regiments as to leave the rest of the army in a condition of recognised inferiority. In Sir George Cathcart's book there is an interesting statement both of the causes which deprived the French of the power of fighting in line, and of the manner in which the predicament was met by the genius of Dumouriez. The system which Dumouriez contrived

as a makeshift was attended with success so brilliant that it was not only acted upon by France herself throughout the revolutionary war, but was adopted by all the Continental Powers which came into conflict with her; and until the English displayed to them once more the line formation, Bonaparte and the other imitators of Dumouriez were encountered by nothing but their own system—their own system, worked out with inferior ability, and with means to which the system was ill adapted. Dumouriez's system is the one still used by France, and still rendered necessary by the manner in which the French army is constituted. A French general goes into action probably with a strong proportion of cavalry, but certainly with a very powerful artillery. He also has several Zouave, Chasseur, or other choice regiments, well fitted for skirmishing and for close, bold fighting in villages, enclosures, and broken ground; but a great part of the rest of his army consists of masses, the fruit of the conscription—masses which may be so displayed as to give an appearance of impending strength, but which, he well knows, must not be placed in any very trying situation. Thus provided and thus clogged, he tries to make such a use of his artillery and of his choice regiments as shall *avert any extended conflict between formed battalions*. If he can do that (he did so in the Italian campaign of 1859, but at the horrible cost of sacrificing his choice regiments), he will have a very good chance of winning the battle. His difficulties, however, are likely to be increased by the progress of modern invention; for the new artillery is making it hard for him to know where to place the less impetuous part of his army.

NOTE VIII.

RESPECTING THE ABANDONED THEORY THAT THE DEFEAT
OF THE COLUMN OF THE EIGHT BATTALIONS HAD BEEN
EFFECTED BY INFANTRY.

AT one time the French stated (see Du Casse, 'Précis
' Historique ') that the retreat of this great column was the
result of a fight with their infantry ; but no such representa-
tion is now persisted in, for the French official statement
(agreeing in that respect with Kiriakoff) says fairly that what
forced the column to retreat was—not any sort of combat
with the French infantry, but the fire of the batteries
mentioned in the text. After describing the advance of
the great Russian column, the official French statement
says :—' Déjà cette colonne était parvenue à 150 mètres de
' la droite du 7^e de ligne, et la situation devenait très
' critique lorsque les deux batteries de la division Canrobert
' (qui avaient été forcées d'aller passer au gué d'Almatamak),
' et les deux batteries de la division Bosquet, arrivent au
' galop sur le champ de bataille, ouvrent un feu terrible
' contre la colonne Russe, lui font éprouver des pertes
' considérables, *et la forcent à la retraite.*'—' Atlas His-
' torique et Topographique de la Guerre d'Orient.' The
only words in this official statement which might produce
a wrong impression are those which describe the guns as
coming up at a gallop. When the train was travelling
along the hollow, it no doubt moved as fast as it properly
could ; but when the guns were brought part way up the
slope, and unlimbered and placed in battery, the operation
was performed so skilfully, and, so to speak, so stealthily,
that Kiriakoff never made out the quarter whence destruc-
tion came, and imagined that his column was rent by the
gunnery of the ships. My knowledge of the exact way in

which these guns were brought to bear upon the hapless column is derived from a French officer who was present with the guns, and who took part in seizing the occasion which was presented by the sudden discovery of the column. When an account of an infantry fight with 'the 'column of the eight battalions' had once gone out to the world, it may seem strange that the story should be afterwards repudiated by any French personages writing or drawing officially; but, besides that there is really a strong, honest leaning towards truth in the 'Atlas Historique,' it is obvious that the French artillery officers, whose skill and quickness had shattered the great column and driven it from the field, might justly and most cogently call upon the authorities to withdraw the falsehood which gave to French infantry the credit justly due to French gunners.

NOTE IX.

NOTE RESPECTING THE TRUTH OF THE ACCOUNTS WHICH REPRESENT THAT A GREAT AND TERRIBLE FIGHT TOOK PLACE NEAR THE TELEGRAPH ON THE DAY OF THE ALMA.

IN the beginning of the year 1855 the Baron de Bazancourt was sent to the theatre of war by the French 'Minister of 'Public Instruction,' and the 'Mission' with which the Baron went charged was that of writing a history of the Crimean expedition. He was accredited to the then French Commander-in-Chief by the Minister of War, and he seems to have been freely supplied with all such materials for getting at the truth as could be found in the military journals of the French army, and in the statements voluntarily

made to the historian-elect by officers who had themselves directed the operations which they undertook to describe.* Closely translated, the Baron's account of the supposed fight at the Telegraph runs thus. After speaking of the point where the building of the Telegraph stands, he says : — ' It is there that the battle is ; it is there that there are ' the efforts of attack and defence. On all sides we crown ' the plateau ; but the considerable Russian forces massed ' behind the Telegraph, the sharpshooters sheltered in this ' partly-built tower, and the batteries placed right and left, ' decimate our troops. Already the 1st Zouave Regiment ' and the first battalion of the Chasseurs of the 1st Division, ' and on their left the 2d Zouaves of the 3d Division, shel- ' ter themselves behind the undulations of the plateau, ' and were keeping up a sustained fire against the Russians, ' when two batteries of the reserve, led by Commandant ' La Boussinière, came to oppose artillery to artillery. The ' battery of Captain Toussaint quitted the road in order to ' arrive more rapidly, by a movement towards its left, just ' in front of the Telegraph ; the Zouaves themselves help ' to drag the guns up the last acclivities. They are soon ' placed, and open their fire, to which the Zouaves of the ' two divisions and the foot Chasseurs add a redoubling of ' fire. Four Russian guns quickly limber-up and with- ' draw. But the fire of the enemy's masses, and that of ' the artillery placed in rear of the Telegraph, cause us ' serious losses. This position of expectancy could not long ' be maintained ; an impetuous charge of the Russian ' cavalry on this point was imminent.

' Colonel Cler, who knows the war-tried and resolute ' troops which he commands, comprehends that he cannot ' save them from utter destruction but by one of those ' sacrifices which snatch victory. For an instant he hesi- ' tates between a charge with the bayonet against the great

* See his Preface, p. 6.

‘ front of the Russian square and an attack on the tower of
 ‘ the Telegraph, the centre and culminating point of the
 ‘ enemy’s line. It is upon this last plan that he decides ;
 ‘ and, going forward in advance of the angle formed by
 ‘ the regiments, and putting his horse into a gallop, he
 ‘ cries out, “To me, my Zouaves ! To the tower ! to the
 ‘ “tower !”

‘ All precipitate themselves at the same time — that
 ‘ is, the 2d Zouaves, the 1st Zouaves, with Colonel Bour-
 ‘ baki at their head, the foot Chasseurs, the 39th Regi-
 ‘ ment, which comes up with Colonel Beuret and General
 ‘ d’Aurelle.

‘ It is a human torrent which nothing stops. Colonel
 Cler comes the first to the tower ; all have followed him ;
 ‘ all arrive ardent, impetuous, irresistible. The struggle
 ‘ was short, but it was one of those bloody, terrible strug-
 ‘ gles in which man fights body to body with his enemy
 ‘ —in which the looks devour each other [où les regards se
 ‘ dévorent, whatever that may mean]—in which the hands
 ‘ grapple each other—in which arms dashed against arms
 ‘ are made to yield sparks of fire.* Dead and dying are
 ‘ heaped together, and the combatants trample upon them
 ‘ and smother them.

‘ The Russians received this formidable shock on the
 ‘ points of their bayonets ; they ask each other if these are
 ‘ indeed but men [si ce sont des hommes] who thus dare
 ‘ to rush upon death. They fight, but soon they stagger ;
 ‘ and these formidable masses, menaced on all sides by the
 ‘ two divisions which advance in close columns, become
 ‘ broken, and operate their retreat.

‘ Colonel Cler seized the eagle of his regiment, which he
 ‘ plants on the tower to the cry of, “May the Emperor
 ‘ “live !” Sergeant-major Fleury of the 1st Zouaves rushes
 ‘ upon the upper scaffolding of this partly-built building

* I have observed this phenomenon in fights upon the stage.

‘ and balances the flag, which sinks with the intrepid non-commissioned officer struck in the forehead by a canister shot [une balle de mitraille]. The flag of the 1st Zouaves also floats on this glorious trophy, which a fragment of a shell breaks at the staff [flotte aussi sur ce glorieux trophée qu’un éclat d’obus brise à la hampe]. Lieutenant Poitevin, ensign-bearer of the 39th, precipitates himself in his turn outside his battalion, and comes, in the midst of a rain of projectiles, to plant on the tower of the Telegraph the eagle of his regiment ; a cannon ball [un boulet] strikes him full in the breast, and stretches him lifeless. Every one amongst all these intrepids seemed to have in himself the enthusiasm of death.’

That is the account which M. de Bazancourt gives, and he does not seem to have found himself cramped by the officially-admitted fact that in the whole battle the French only lost three officers killed. One of these, Lieutenant Poitevin, was struck, as we saw, after the Telegraph was carried, and when the Russians were operating their retreat ; but in the actual fight, terrific and murderous as M. de Bazancourt represents it to have been, it does not appear that any French officer was either killed, wounded, or hurt.

It would seem that in 1856 the feeling of the French army respecting the story of the supposed fight at the Telegraph was not in such a state as to favour anything like a repetition of M. de Bazancourt’s description, for in that year M. du Casse published his ‘Précis Historique ;’ and although he describes some portions of the battle at considerable length, he disposes of the capture of the Telegraph in terms which do not necessarily denote any kind of infantry fight, and in only eight words.* ‘The Telegraph,

* He adds an account of the planting of the flags on the Telegraph ; but his narrative of the *taking* of the Telegraph is, as I have said, in eight words.

‘ the key of the position, is carried.’ ‘ Le Télégraphe clef de la position est enlevé.’

If the accounts given by the French had ended there, it might have been inferred that they wished quietly to repudiate the bloody narrative of M. de Bazancourt, and to drop the notion of saying that there was really a great fight at the Telegraph : but the official atlas of the French Government renews the story ; for in the plan which illustrates this period of the battle, it places the Taroutine and the ‘ Militia ’ battalions close in front of the Telegraph and around it ; and the letterpress narrative accompanying the plans has these words :—‘ Le Général Canrobert lance sa division sur les défenseurs du Télégraphe ; après un combat opiniâtre auquel prend part le 39^e de ligne de la brigade d’Aurelle de la 4^e division, les Russes sont chassés de leur position, et les drapeaux des 1^{er} et 2^e de Zouaves et du 39^e de ligne flottent successivement sur le Télégraphe.’

That the three flags were hoisted on the Telegraph no one doubts ; but the question is, whether those triumphant demonstrations were preceded by anything like a serious fight. The difficulty of believing this is occasioned by the tenor of the Russian accounts. General Kiriakoff was naturally anxious to show that he had made an obstinate stand ; and it may be imagined that if the heroic struggle described by M. de Bazancourt had really occurred, General Kiriakoff’s narrative would have put it in full relief. He, however, says not a word of any such struggle. In one part of his narrative he speaks of the Taroutine and the ‘ Militia ’ battalions as being so far in advance, and so low down, that the batteries near the Telegraph fired over their heads : and at a later period of his narrative, without having said a word about any intermediate operation, he says that these battalions were under a cross-fire of artillery ; and that, for that reason, and because the troops opposed

to the English were already in full retreat, he 'commanded 'the march towards the main road.' He does not say a word of the bloody struggle with infantry in which the French represent his troops to have been engaged.

At first sight, it does not seem highly probable that, upon the very summit of a smooth hill-top, where there was nothing to offer cover for the body of even one man, a few battalions (already dispirited by the passive endurance of artillery-fire to which they had been condemned) should be ordered to make a stand against the 30,000 Frenchmen and Turks who were converging upon that very point from the west as well as from the north; and if Kiriakoff had resorted to such a measure, it is all but incredible that his careful and almost minute narrative of his operations should have omitted all mention of an exploit strange in itself, and, if only it were true, redounding very much to the glory of his troops. Not only, however, does Kiriakoff appear to have been ignorant of any such fight, but the whole tenor of the narrative in which he describes what he did is inconsistent with the notion that anything of the kind could have passed. According to his statement, he was a divisional general left without orders; he saw his troops suffering under a cross-fire of artillery; he knew (though apparently in an imperfect way) that overwhelming masses of French troops were more or less near to the verge of the plateau, and being thus circumstanced, and seeing, moreover, that the English had already carried the position, he thought it time to withdraw his battalions from the line of the artillery-fire; but from first to last he never was challenged or vexed by the near approach of any French infantry. Such is his account. But this is not all. Both Kiriakoff and the official French statement of the '*Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient*' agree in representing that, after the check which it had given to Canrobert's Division, the great 'column of the eight battalions' had

been kept together, and moved a good way in the right rear of the Telegraph, without ever engaging in any kind of struggle with infantry. Now, except the troops composing that column, the only battalions of Russian infantry which were at any time in this part of the field were the Taroutine and the 'Militia' battalions; and accordingly, these are the troops which the French official 'Atlas' places in array at the Telegraph. Now the 'Militia' battalions, we saw, were inferior troops, and had dissolved. There remained the Taroutine battalions: and if any stand had been really made at the Telegraph, these must have been the troops which made it. It happens, however, that an intelligent and highly-instructed field-officer of that corps has written an apparently complete account of every part of the battle of which he was competent to speak; and if any of Kiria-koff's forces, but still more if any of the Taroutine battalions, had made the stand alleged, it is quite incredible either that Major Chodasiewicz, who was present with the Taroutine corps, should have remained ignorant of the fact, or that, knowing it, he should have omitted to state the truth. If any of the Taroutine battalions had been engaged in a fight of this sort, it would have been for them the grand, the all-absorbing event of the day; for it certainly was not their fate to be brought into conflict with French infantry in any other part of the field, and they would not have failed to remember an obstinate and bloody fight of the kind described by the French. But Chodasiewicz, though he minutely describes the way in which the Taroutine battalions were galled in their retreat by the fire of artillery, does not say a word of any kind of fight at the Telegraph between French and Russian infantry. Yet his was the very regiment which, if the French story were true, must have borne the brunt of the alleged fight.

Upon the whole, I have conceived that these authentic and trustworthy narratives of General Kiriakoff and Major

Chodasiewicz * forbid me to admit into my text any statement similar to the account given by M. de Bazancourt, or even to that contained in the 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient ;' but those who are so constituted as to wish to incline the ear to a teacher duly prepared for them by the French Emperor's 'Minister of Public Instruction,' will find in the above quotation from M. de Bazancourt, the sort of guidance they like.—*End of Note to 1st Edition.*

In dealing with this question of the supposed fight at the 'Telegraph,' I did not affect to conceal the leaning of my own opinion ; but still, I avoided the language of actual assertion, and was content to speak in terms which were fitted—not so much to demand assent, but rather—to provoke inquiry. Accordingly the subject underwent discussion ; and by-and-by (though not at this moment, nor in this Appendix) I shall try to show the state of the dispute which my narrative served to invite.

Meantime I will only say that concerning the whole notion of a great fight with organised masses of Russian troops at the Telegraph, inquiry has hitherto strengthened the opinion disclosed in the text ; and if I have done a wrong to the French, it is in imputing it to them too generally that they warranted M. Bazancourt's story. Marshal St Arnaud's despatch not only says nothing of any such a fight at the Telegraph, but virtually confirms that narrative of the Russian retreat on which I relied ; and the story, as we before saw, is substantially rejected by the 'Précis Historique.'—*Note to 4th Edition.*

See now—and this seems absolutely conclusive—the quotation from the 'Souvenirs d'un officier du 2^{me} Zouaves,' which will be found in the footnote, *ante* p. 298.—*Note to 5th Edition.*

* Anitchkoff was an officer of the Staff, whose narrative is based on accounts taken from various Russian sources, and he says not a word of any fight at the Telegraph, nor of any other combat which could have been confounded with it.

NOTE X.

NOTE CONTAINING AN EXTRACT FROM A LETTER ADDRESSED BY COLONEL NAPIER, THE HISTORIAN OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, TO LORD FITZROY SOMERSET.

IF the foregoing volume has begun to disclose to its readers the entireness of Lord Raglan's devotion to the public service, his more than common swiftness of action, his subtle understanding of the feelings of other men, and his tenderness for their honest pride, it may be interesting to hear, that some thirty years before the time I write of, these very qualities had been ascribed to Lord Fitzroy Somerset by the Historian of the Peninsular War. In a letter of October 1824, which is now before me (but which I never saw until long after the publication of this book), Napier wrote :—

‘ MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,—The rapidity with which
‘ you have fulfilled ——’s desires would be extraordinary
‘ coming from any other quarter, but your accurate know-
‘ ledge of everything that does or has belonged to the army
‘ enables you to *do* before others can *think*. You are well
‘ aware from the long acquaintance you have had with my
‘ opinions that I am no flatterer, and that I am not dis-
‘ posed to express sentiments which I do not feel. I would
‘ certainly rather have my feelings judged of by my actions
‘ than by my words, but I should be wanting both to you
‘ and myself if I failed to express my admiration of the
‘ unabated warmth with which you assist real merit unin-
‘ fluenced by any consideration but the services of the in-
‘ dividual. Neither has the delicacy with which you have
‘ upon several occasions kept back all appearance of per-
‘ sonal protection been unobserved by myself or those
‘ numerous claimants who have at different times found a
‘ sure friend in you when they could find none elsewhere.’

When I see Napier writing that Lord Fitzroy Somerset could *do* before others could *think*, I am reminded of a singular instance of the uncommon swiftness with which his mind worked. One day in the Peninsula, and at a time when the Headquarters Staff were moving along the road, there was brought an intercepted despatch, but it was in cipher—in a cipher unknown. Lord Fitzroy Somerset took up the paper, and, still riding on with the rest of the Staff, began to bend his mind to the letters and signs. Before he quitted his saddle, he had pierced the secret, had found out the key, and had read the despatch.—*Note to 4th Edition.*

NOTE XI.

EXTRACT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION HELD WITH SIR EDMUND LYONS, WHICH WAS MADE BY MR GEORGE LOCH, LATE MEMBER FOR SUTHERLANDSHIRE, FEBRUARY 10, 1856, AND APPROVED AS ACCURATE ON THE SAME DAY BY SIR EDMUND.

‘SEBASTOPOL undoubtedly might have been taken within
 ‘five days after we landed in the Crimea. He had earnestly pressed that an immediate attempt should be made
 ‘on it: Lord Raglan had the same feeling. After the
 ‘battle of the Alma, the same day, he received a note from
 ‘Lord Raglan requesting that he would call on him by
 ‘eight o’clock the following morning. He prepared to go;
 ‘but meanwhile he received a letter from Admiral Dundas, saying that information had been sent him by the
 ‘Turkish Admiral, that seven Russian line-of-battle ships
 ‘had left the harbour, making apparently for Odessa, and
 ‘ordering him (Sir Edmund) to get ready to follow them
 ‘with the steam squadron. Sir Edmund answered that he

‘ could not understand this ; that he, Admiral Dundas, ought to have better information on the subject than the Turkish Admiral ; that he, Admiral Dundas, was himself lying within twelve miles of the harbour ; that doubtless he had been watching it narrowly by means of the numerous steamers at his command, and therefore that it was not likely that such a squadron could have put to sea without his knowledge ; that even if they had, it was extremely unlikely they would go to Odessa, which was a *cul de sac*.’ (He found afterwards that the Admiral had kept no watch whatever on the harbour.)

‘ Before, however, this matter was cleared up, the time for going to Lord Raglan had passed, and it was between twelve and one before he got to Headquarters. On going in, after explaining the cause of his being late, Lord Raglan showed him a memorandum made by Sir John Burgoyne, in which he suggested the movement round the head of the harbour to the Sebastopol side. He, Sir Edmund, at once urged strong reasons against this. He said that the character of the whole expedition was that of a surprise ; that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy, or their resources, and that in great measure they still remained ignorant on these points ; that all they knew positively was that the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to them, and that the best chance of continued success was to follow it up rapidly, and to try and take the northern forts by a *coup de main*. Lord Raglan said that he concurred in these views ; that he had already made representations to St Arnaud on the subject ; that he proposed to him at once to advance on the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the forts, but that St Arnaud had told him his troops were tired, and that it could not be done ; that he, Lord Raglan, was disappointed by this answer, and could not understand it, for he knew the

'troops could not be tired, and that there must be some 'other reason.' (The truth was, as afterwards known, that St Arnaud was here stricken down by his mortal malady.)

'Sir Edmund again saw Lord Raglan the following day, and found him in low spirits. On asking him the cause he said he had been again urging on the French General to advance across the Belbec, but that he had replied that he had ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong earthworks on the banks of the river; and though he did not doubt that the Allies could force them as they had the works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed. On this, Sir Edmund went on board a small steamer, ran close in, reconnoitred the works, found them to be as represented, but that they were without guns. He reported this, but the French General replied that he had already given his officers *orders* to commence the march round the harbour, in order to reach the south side; that during this march, as is well known, they fell in with the rear-guard of Ment schikoff's army abandoning Sebastopol; and it is now known that the Russians had not left 2000 men in the place, believing it to be untenable.'

HATCHFORD, *February 11.*

I last night showed this memorandum to Sir Edmund Lyons, saying that I had no business to make notes of what he had said without his knowledge. He returned it after reading it, confirming its correctness.

(Signed) GEORGE LOCH.

(*Private.*)

CLUMBER, *January 10, 1863.*

MY DEAR MR LOCH,—I am much obliged to you for allowing me to read your interesting memorandum of a conversation with Lord Lyons.

I was so often on board his flag-ship off Sebastopol, that you will easily suppose that there is little in it which is new to me ; indeed I can corroborate from other sources of information a great deal of it.

What is related in page 20 struck me with *personal* interest. It was done under secret instructions from me, sent (most irregularly of course, but, as I thought, justifiably on account of the imminent danger) without the knowledge of my colleagues.

This must be known to Kinglake, as he no doubt has my letter.—I am, yours sincerely,

(Signed) NEWCASTLE.

NOTE XII.

ARGUMENT FOR AVOIDING THE ATTACK OF THE NORTH SIDE.*

‘ The north front was exceedingly strong by nature, and
‘ extended across a ridge of bold and rocky heights, inter-
‘ sected by steep ravines. A permanent fort, conspicuously
‘ situated in a commanding position, occupied its centre,
‘ and was supported on either side by earthen entrench-
‘ ments and batteries. The entire front was exposed to
‘ enfilade from the right of the position, where heavy guns
‘ could readily and securely be placed ; and all the ap-
‘ proaches were commanded by the men-of-war and steam-
‘ ers in the harbour. This position was, moreover, defended
‘ by an army, which, although recently defeated, had re-

* It might be assumed that this argument (extracted from the Official Journal of our Siege Operations) is substantially Sir John Burgoyne’s ; but those who prefer looking to his publicly avowed words will find the same argument in p. 238 *et seq.* of his ‘ Military Opinions.’

‘treated to its supports, and was still very powerful, as
‘subsequent events clearly proved.

‘To assail such a position by a *coup de main* with an
‘army little superior to the defenders, with nothing but
‘field-pieces at its command, and with its flanks and retreat
‘quite insecure, would have been a most desperate under-
‘taking, with every probability of a failure or repulse, the
‘consequences of which would have been most disastrous.

‘A regular siege, on the contrary, required heavy guns
‘and stores of all kinds, and therefore a harbour. Now
‘the only place to the north of Sebastopol where the dis-
‘embarkation of stores could be effected was the narrow,
‘shallow beach at the mouth of the Katcha, open to every
‘gust of wind, difficult to defend, and which, from its dis-
‘tance in the rear, would have been much exposed, while
‘its communications could have been intercepted at any
‘moment by an enemy capable of such enterprises as he
‘afterwards attempted at Balaclava and Inkerman.’

THE accompanying Plans of the ground on which the battle of the Alma was fought have been taken from the Official French 'Atlas Historique,' but with slight changes made here and there for the purpose of giving greater distinctness to some of the natural features.

I may take this opportunity of saying that the object of all the Plans of battles and other military operations contained in this and in the subsequent volumes is—not to assert any facts thereby appearing to be indicated, but—merely to aid the reader in his endeavours to follow the statements he finds in the text; and accordingly they are not to be regarded as either reaffirming or varying the printed words of the narrative.

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